1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
291 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
292 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
293 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
297 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
303 payment_id.hash(hasher);
304 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
310 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
312 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
315 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
316 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
317 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
322 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
323 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
324 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
325 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
326 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
328 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
334 struct ReceiveError {
340 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
341 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
343 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
344 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
345 pub enum FailureCode {
346 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
347 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
348 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
349 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
350 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
351 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
352 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
353 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
354 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
355 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
356 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
359 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
361 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
362 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
363 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
364 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
365 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
367 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
368 err: msgs::LightningError,
369 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
370 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
372 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
374 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
376 err: LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
386 shutdown_finish: None,
390 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
391 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
394 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
396 err: LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
406 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
410 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
413 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
416 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
420 log_level: Level::Warn,
423 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
425 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
427 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
438 shutdown_finish: None,
443 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
444 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
445 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
446 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
447 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
449 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
450 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
451 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
452 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
453 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
454 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
455 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
457 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
461 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
462 struct ClaimingPayment {
464 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
465 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
468 (0, amount_msat, required),
469 (2, payment_purpose, required),
470 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
473 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
474 struct ClaimablePayments {
475 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
476 /// failed/claimed by the user.
478 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
479 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
481 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
482 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
483 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
485 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
486 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
487 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
488 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
491 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
492 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
493 /// quite some time lag.
494 enum BackgroundEvent {
495 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
496 /// commitment transaction.
497 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
501 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
502 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
503 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
504 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
505 /// event can be generated.
506 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
507 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
508 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
511 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
512 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
513 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
516 /// State we hold per-peer.
517 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
518 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
520 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
521 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
523 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
524 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
525 latest_features: InitFeatures,
526 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
527 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
528 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
529 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
530 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
532 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
533 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
534 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
535 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
537 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
538 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
539 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
540 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
541 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
542 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
543 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
544 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
545 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
546 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
550 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
551 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
552 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
553 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
554 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
555 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
558 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
562 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
563 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
565 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
568 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
569 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
570 struct PendingInboundPayment {
571 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
572 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
573 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
574 /// this payment being removed.
576 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
577 user_payment_id: u64,
578 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
579 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
580 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
583 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
584 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
585 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
586 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
587 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
588 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
589 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
590 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
592 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
593 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
601 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
603 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
608 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
609 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
610 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
611 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
612 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
613 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
614 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
615 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
616 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
618 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
619 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
621 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
622 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
623 pub trait AChannelManager {
624 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
625 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
626 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
627 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
628 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
629 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
630 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
631 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
632 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
633 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
634 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
635 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
636 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
638 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
640 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
641 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
643 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
644 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
645 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
647 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
648 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
649 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
650 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
651 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
652 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
653 R::Target: Router + Sized,
654 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
656 type Watch = M::Target;
658 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
660 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
662 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
664 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
665 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
667 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
669 type Router = R::Target;
671 type Logger = L::Target;
673 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
676 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
677 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
679 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
680 /// to individual Channels.
682 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
683 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
684 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
685 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
687 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
688 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
689 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
690 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
691 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
692 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
693 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
695 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
696 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
697 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
699 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
700 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
701 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
702 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
703 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
705 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
706 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
707 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
708 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
710 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
711 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
712 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
714 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
715 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
716 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
717 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
718 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
720 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
721 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
722 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
723 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
724 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
725 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
726 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
727 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
730 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
731 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
732 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
733 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
734 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
738 // `total_consistency_lock`
740 // |__`forward_htlcs`
742 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
744 // |__`per_peer_state`
746 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
748 // | |__`claimable_payments`
750 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
756 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
758 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
762 // | |__`pending_events`
764 // | |__`pending_background_events`
766 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
768 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
769 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
770 ES::Target: EntropySource,
771 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
772 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
773 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
777 default_configuration: UserConfig,
778 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
779 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
785 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
787 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
789 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
790 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
792 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
793 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
794 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
795 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
797 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
798 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
800 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
801 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
802 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
803 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
804 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
805 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
806 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
807 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
809 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
811 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
812 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
814 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
816 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
817 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
818 /// and via the classic SCID.
820 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
821 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
823 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
825 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
827 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
828 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
829 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
831 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
832 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
834 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
835 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
837 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
838 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
840 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
841 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
842 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
843 /// active channel list on load.
845 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
846 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
848 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
850 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
851 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
852 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
854 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
855 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
856 /// the handling of the events.
858 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
859 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
862 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
863 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
864 /// would break backwards compatability.
865 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
866 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
867 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
869 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
870 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
872 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
874 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
875 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
876 /// confirmation depth.
878 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
879 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
880 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
882 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
884 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
886 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
888 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
890 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
892 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
893 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
894 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
896 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
897 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
899 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
900 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
901 /// keeping additional state.
902 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
904 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
905 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
906 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
907 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
909 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
910 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
912 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
913 /// are currently open with that peer.
915 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
916 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
919 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
921 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
922 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
923 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
924 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
925 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
927 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
928 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
929 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
930 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
931 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
932 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
933 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
934 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
935 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
936 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
937 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
939 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
948 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
950 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
951 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
952 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
953 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
954 pub struct ChainParameters {
955 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
956 pub network: Network,
958 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
960 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
961 pub best_block: BestBlock,
964 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
970 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
971 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
972 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
973 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
974 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
975 /// updates are ready for persistence).
977 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
978 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
979 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
980 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
981 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
983 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
984 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
987 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
988 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
989 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
992 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
993 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
995 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
996 persistence_notifier: notifier,
997 should_persist: persist_check,
998 _read_guard: read_guard,
1003 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1004 fn drop(&mut self) {
1005 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1006 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1011 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1012 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1014 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1016 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1017 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1018 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1019 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1020 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1022 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1023 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1025 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1027 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1028 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1029 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1030 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1031 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1032 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1033 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1034 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1035 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1036 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1037 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1038 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1039 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1041 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1042 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1044 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1045 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1046 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1047 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1049 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1050 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1051 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1052 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1053 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1054 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1057 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1059 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1060 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1063 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1065 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1066 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1068 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1069 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1070 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1071 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1073 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1074 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1075 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1076 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1078 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1079 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1080 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1082 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1083 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1084 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1086 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1087 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1088 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1089 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1090 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1091 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1092 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1093 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1094 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1095 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1096 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1099 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1100 /// to better separate parameters.
1101 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1102 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1103 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1104 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1105 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1106 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1107 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1108 pub features: InitFeatures,
1109 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1110 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1111 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1113 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1115 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1116 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1117 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1118 /// payments to us through this channel.
1119 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1120 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1121 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1122 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1123 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1124 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1125 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1128 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1129 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1130 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1131 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1132 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1133 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1134 /// lifetime of the channel.
1135 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1136 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1137 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1138 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1139 /// our counterparty already.
1141 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1142 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1143 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1144 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1146 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1147 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1148 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1149 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1151 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1152 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1154 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1155 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1157 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1158 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1159 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1160 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1161 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1162 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1163 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1164 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1165 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1168 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1170 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1171 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1172 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1173 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1174 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1175 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1176 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1178 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1179 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1181 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1182 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1183 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1184 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1185 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1186 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1187 /// this value on chain.
1189 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1191 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1193 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1194 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1195 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1196 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1198 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1199 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1200 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1202 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1203 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1204 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1205 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1206 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1208 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1209 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1210 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1211 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1213 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1214 pub balance_msat: u64,
1215 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1216 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1217 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1218 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1220 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1222 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1223 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1224 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1225 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1226 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1227 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1228 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1229 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1231 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1232 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1233 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1234 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1235 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1236 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1237 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1239 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1240 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1241 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1242 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1243 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1244 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1245 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1246 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1247 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1249 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1251 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1252 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1253 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1254 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1255 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1257 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1258 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1259 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1260 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1261 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1262 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1263 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1265 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1266 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1267 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1268 pub is_outbound: bool,
1269 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1270 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1271 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1272 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1273 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1275 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1276 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1277 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1278 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1280 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1281 pub is_usable: bool,
1282 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1283 pub is_public: bool,
1284 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1285 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1286 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1287 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1288 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1289 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1291 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1292 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1295 impl ChannelDetails {
1296 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1297 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1298 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1300 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1301 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1302 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1303 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1306 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1307 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1308 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1310 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1311 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1312 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1313 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1316 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1317 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1319 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1320 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1321 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1323 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1324 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1325 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1326 features: latest_features,
1327 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1328 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1329 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1330 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1331 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1332 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1333 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1334 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1335 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1336 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1338 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1339 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1340 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1341 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1342 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1343 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1344 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1345 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1346 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1347 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1348 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1349 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1350 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1351 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1352 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1353 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1354 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1355 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1356 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1357 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1358 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1359 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1360 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1361 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1362 config: Some(channel.config()),
1367 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1368 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1369 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1370 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1371 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1373 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1375 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1376 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1377 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1380 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1381 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1382 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1384 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1385 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1386 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1388 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1389 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1390 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1392 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1393 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1397 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1399 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1401 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1402 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1403 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1404 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1406 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1407 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1408 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1411 macro_rules! handle_error {
1412 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1413 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1414 // entering the macro.
1415 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1416 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1420 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1421 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1423 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1424 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1425 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1426 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1430 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1431 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1432 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1433 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1438 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1439 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1441 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1442 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1443 action: err.action.clone()
1447 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1448 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1449 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1450 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1451 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1455 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1462 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1463 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1464 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1465 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1466 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1467 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1469 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1470 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1471 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1472 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1473 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1475 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1476 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1478 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1482 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1483 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1484 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1486 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1487 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1489 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1490 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1492 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1493 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1494 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1495 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1496 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1497 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1503 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1504 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1508 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1510 $entry.remove_entry();
1518 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1519 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1523 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1525 $entry.remove_entry();
1533 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1534 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1536 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1537 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1543 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1544 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1545 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1546 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1547 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1549 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1550 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1551 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1552 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1553 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1554 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1555 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1556 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1557 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1558 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1563 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1564 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1565 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1566 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1567 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1568 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1569 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1570 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1571 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1573 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1578 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1579 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1580 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1581 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1582 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1583 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1584 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1585 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1586 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1588 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1593 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1594 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1595 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1596 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1597 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1598 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1599 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1600 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1601 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1602 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1603 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1605 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1606 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1607 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1613 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1614 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1616 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1617 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1618 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1619 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1620 updates.announcement_sigs);
1621 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1622 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1625 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1626 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1627 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1629 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1631 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1632 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1634 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1635 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1636 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1637 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1642 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1643 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1644 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1645 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1646 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1648 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1649 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1650 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1653 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1654 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1655 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1656 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1657 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1658 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1659 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1660 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1664 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1665 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1666 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1667 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1668 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1670 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1676 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1677 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1681 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1682 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1683 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
1684 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
1685 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1687 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1689 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1690 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1691 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1692 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1695 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *$self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
1696 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1697 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1700 for event in pending_events {
1701 $event_to_handle = event;
1705 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1706 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1711 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1713 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1715 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1716 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1717 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1722 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1724 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1725 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1727 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1729 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1730 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1731 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1734 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1735 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1736 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1737 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1738 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1739 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1740 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1741 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1743 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1744 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1745 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1750 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1752 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1753 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1754 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1755 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1756 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1757 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1758 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1759 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1761 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1764 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1765 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1767 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1769 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1771 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1773 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1774 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1775 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1776 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1786 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1787 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1788 &self.default_configuration
1791 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1792 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1793 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1796 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1797 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1799 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1801 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1805 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1810 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1812 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1813 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1814 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1815 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1816 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1818 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1819 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1821 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1822 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1823 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1825 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1826 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1827 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1828 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1829 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1830 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1832 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1833 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1834 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1835 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1836 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1837 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1841 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1842 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1844 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1846 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1847 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1849 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1851 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1852 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1853 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1854 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1855 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1856 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1860 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1865 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1867 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1868 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1871 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1873 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1879 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1880 node_id: their_network_key,
1883 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1886 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1887 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1888 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1889 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1890 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1891 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1892 // the same channel.
1893 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1895 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1896 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1897 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1898 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1899 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1900 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1901 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1902 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1910 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1911 /// more information.
1912 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1913 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1916 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1917 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1919 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1920 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1922 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1923 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1924 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1925 // really wanted anyway.
1926 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1929 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1930 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1931 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1934 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1937 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1938 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1941 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1947 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1948 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1950 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1951 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1952 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1954 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1955 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1956 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1957 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1958 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1959 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1960 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1961 total_msat: *total_msat,
1964 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1965 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1967 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1968 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1970 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1975 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1976 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1977 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1978 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1979 Some(transaction) => {
1980 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1984 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1985 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1986 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1987 reason: closure_reason
1991 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1994 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1995 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1996 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1998 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1999 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2003 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2005 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2006 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2007 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2008 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
2009 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2011 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2012 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2013 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2014 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2015 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2019 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2020 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2021 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2022 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2023 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2026 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2027 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2028 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2029 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2033 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2041 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2042 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2043 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2044 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2047 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2051 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2052 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2053 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2055 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2056 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2058 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2059 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2060 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2061 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2063 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2065 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2066 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2067 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2068 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2069 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2070 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
2073 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2074 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2075 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2077 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2078 /// the channel being closed or not:
2079 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2080 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2081 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2082 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2083 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2084 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2085 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2087 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2089 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2090 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2091 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2092 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2093 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2094 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2098 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2099 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2100 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2101 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2102 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2103 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2104 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2105 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2107 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2108 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2109 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2110 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2111 // ignore the result here.
2112 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2116 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2117 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2118 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2119 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2121 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2122 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2124 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2125 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2126 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2127 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2128 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2130 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2132 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2134 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2137 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2138 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2139 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2140 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2141 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2146 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2149 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2151 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2152 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2154 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2155 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2156 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2157 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2158 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2159 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2160 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2171 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2172 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2173 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2175 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2176 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2177 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2180 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2181 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2182 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2184 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2185 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2186 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2187 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2188 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2191 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2192 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2193 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2194 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2195 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2199 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2200 /// local transaction(s).
2201 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2202 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2203 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2207 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2208 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2210 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2211 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2212 return Err(ReceiveError {
2213 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2215 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2218 // final_expiry_too_soon
2219 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2220 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2222 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2223 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2224 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2225 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2226 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2227 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2228 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2229 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2230 return Err(ReceiveError {
2231 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2232 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2235 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2236 return Err(ReceiveError {
2238 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2239 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2243 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2244 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2245 return Err(ReceiveError {
2246 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2247 err_data: Vec::new(),
2248 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2251 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2252 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2253 return Err(ReceiveError {
2254 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2255 err_data: Vec::new(),
2256 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2258 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2259 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2261 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2262 phantom_shared_secret,
2264 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2265 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2266 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2267 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2268 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2269 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2270 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2271 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2272 return Err(ReceiveError {
2273 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2274 err_data: Vec::new(),
2275 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2279 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2281 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2284 return Err(ReceiveError {
2285 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2286 err_data: Vec::new(),
2287 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2292 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2295 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2296 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2297 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2298 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2302 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2303 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2304 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2306 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2307 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2308 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2309 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2310 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2311 failure_code: $err_code,
2317 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2318 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2321 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2322 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2323 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2325 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2326 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2327 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2328 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2329 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2330 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2331 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2332 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2334 macro_rules! return_err {
2335 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2337 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2338 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2339 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2340 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2341 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2342 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2348 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2350 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2351 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2353 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2354 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2358 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2359 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2361 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2363 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2364 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2365 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2366 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2367 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2369 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2372 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2373 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2374 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2376 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2377 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2378 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2381 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2382 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2383 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2384 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2388 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2389 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2390 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2393 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2394 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2395 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2396 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2397 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2402 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2403 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2404 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2405 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2406 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2407 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2408 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2409 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2410 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2411 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2412 // phantom or an intercept.
2413 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2414 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2415 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2419 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2422 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2424 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2426 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2427 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2428 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2432 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2434 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2435 // have no consistency guarantees.
2436 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2440 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2441 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2442 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2443 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2444 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2446 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2447 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2448 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2449 // we don't have the channel here.
2450 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2452 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2454 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2455 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2456 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2457 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2458 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2459 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2460 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2461 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2462 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2463 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2464 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2466 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2469 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2470 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2472 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2473 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2477 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2478 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2479 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2480 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2482 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2489 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2490 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2491 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2492 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2493 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2494 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2496 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2497 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2499 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2500 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2501 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2502 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2503 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2504 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2505 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2506 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2507 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2508 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2514 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2515 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2516 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2517 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2519 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2520 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2522 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2523 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2524 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2526 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2527 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2528 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2529 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2530 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2531 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2532 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2536 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2541 pending_forward_info
2544 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2545 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2546 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2548 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2549 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2550 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2552 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2553 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2554 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2555 if !chan.should_announce() {
2556 return Err(LightningError {
2557 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2558 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2561 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2562 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2565 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2568 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2569 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2570 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2571 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2573 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2574 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2575 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2577 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2578 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2579 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2580 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2581 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2582 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2586 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2588 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2590 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2592 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2593 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2594 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => true,
2595 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2596 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => false,
2599 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2600 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2602 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2603 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2604 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2605 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2606 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2607 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2608 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2609 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2611 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2612 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2613 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2615 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2617 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2624 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2625 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2626 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2629 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2630 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2631 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2633 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2634 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2635 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2637 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2638 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2639 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2640 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2641 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2643 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2645 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2646 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2647 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2648 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2651 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2652 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2653 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2654 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2655 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2656 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2657 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2658 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2660 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2661 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2662 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2664 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2665 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2667 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2668 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2669 Some(monitor_update) => {
2670 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2671 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2672 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2675 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2676 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2677 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2678 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2679 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2680 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2681 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2682 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2688 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2689 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2690 // `channel_by_id` map.
2691 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2692 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2697 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2698 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2700 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2705 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2707 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2708 /// fields for more info.
2710 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2711 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2713 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2715 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2716 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2717 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2718 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2719 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2721 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2722 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2723 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2724 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2725 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2727 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2728 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2729 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2730 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2732 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2734 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2735 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2736 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2738 /// In general, a path may raise:
2739 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2740 /// node public key) is specified.
2741 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2742 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2744 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2745 /// relevant updates.
2747 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2748 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2749 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2751 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2752 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2753 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2754 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2755 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2756 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2757 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2759 self.pending_outbound_payments
2760 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2761 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2762 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2765 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2766 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2767 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2768 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2770 self.pending_outbound_payments
2771 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2772 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2773 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2774 &self.pending_events,
2775 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2776 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2780 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2781 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2782 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2783 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2784 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2785 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2789 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2790 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2791 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2795 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2796 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2797 /// retries are exhausted.
2799 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2800 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2802 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2803 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2804 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2806 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2807 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2809 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2810 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2811 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2812 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2813 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2816 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2817 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2818 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2819 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2820 /// never reach the recipient.
2822 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2823 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2825 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2826 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2828 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2830 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2831 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2832 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2833 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2834 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2835 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2836 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2837 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2838 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2841 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2842 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2844 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2847 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2848 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2849 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2851 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2852 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2853 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2854 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2855 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2856 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2859 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2860 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2861 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2862 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2863 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2865 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2866 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2867 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2870 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2873 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2874 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2877 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2878 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2879 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2880 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2881 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2884 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2888 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2890 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2892 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2893 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2894 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2895 } else { unreachable!(); });
2897 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2899 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2900 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2902 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2903 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2904 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2910 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2912 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2913 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2918 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2919 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2922 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2924 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2927 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2928 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2929 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2938 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2939 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2940 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2944 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2946 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2947 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2949 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2950 /// across the p2p network.
2952 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2953 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2955 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2956 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2957 /// keys per-channel).
2959 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2960 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2961 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2963 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2964 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2965 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2967 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2968 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2969 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2970 /// for more details.
2972 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2973 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2974 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2977 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2978 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2980 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2985 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2986 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2987 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2988 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2989 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2990 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2991 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2995 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2996 let mut output_index = None;
2997 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2998 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2999 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3000 if output_index.is_some() {
3001 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3002 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3005 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3007 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3010 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3013 if output_index.is_none() {
3014 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3015 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3018 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3022 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3024 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3025 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3026 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3027 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3029 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3030 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3032 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3033 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3035 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3037 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3038 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3039 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3040 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3041 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3042 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3043 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3044 pub fn update_channel_config(
3045 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3046 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3047 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3048 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3049 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3054 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3056 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3057 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3058 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3059 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3060 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3061 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3062 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3063 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3064 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3068 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3069 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3070 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3073 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3074 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3075 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3076 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3077 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3085 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3086 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3088 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3089 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3091 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3092 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3093 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3094 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3095 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3097 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3098 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3100 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3103 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3104 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3105 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3106 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3107 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3110 let next_hop_scid = {
3111 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3112 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3113 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3114 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3115 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3116 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3118 if !chan.is_usable() {
3119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3120 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3123 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3125 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3126 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3131 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3132 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3133 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3136 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3137 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3138 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3140 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3142 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3143 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3146 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3147 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3148 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3149 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3150 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3152 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3156 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3157 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3159 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3162 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3163 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3166 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3167 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3168 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3171 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3172 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3173 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3174 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3175 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3177 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3180 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3181 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3182 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3183 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3188 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3190 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3191 /// Will likely generate further events.
3192 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3195 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3196 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3197 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3199 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3200 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3202 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3203 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3204 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3206 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3207 match forward_info {
3208 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3209 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3210 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3211 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3212 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3215 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3216 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3217 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3219 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3220 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3221 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3222 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3223 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3224 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3227 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3228 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3230 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3233 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3234 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3240 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3241 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3243 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3247 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3248 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3250 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3254 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3255 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3256 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3257 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3258 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3260 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3261 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3262 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3263 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3264 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3266 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3268 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3269 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3273 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3274 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3275 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3276 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3282 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3285 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3288 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3289 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3290 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3291 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3292 // problem, not ours.
3298 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3299 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3301 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3306 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3307 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3308 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3313 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3315 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3319 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3320 match forward_info {
3321 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3322 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3323 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3324 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3325 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3329 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3330 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3331 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3332 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3333 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3334 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3335 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3337 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3338 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3339 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3341 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3344 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3346 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3347 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3348 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3349 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3354 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3355 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3357 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3359 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3360 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3362 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3365 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3367 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3368 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3369 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3378 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3379 match forward_info {
3380 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3381 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3382 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3383 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3386 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3387 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3388 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3389 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3391 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3392 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3394 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3397 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3398 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3399 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3400 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3401 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3402 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3403 phantom_shared_secret,
3405 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3406 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3407 // if routing nodes overpay
3408 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3409 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3411 total_value_received: None,
3412 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3417 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3418 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3419 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3420 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3421 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3423 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3424 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3425 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3426 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3427 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3428 phantom_shared_secret,
3430 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3431 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3435 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3436 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3437 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3438 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3439 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3442 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3443 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3444 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3446 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3447 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3448 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3451 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3452 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3453 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3456 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3457 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3458 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3459 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3461 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3465 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3466 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3467 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3468 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3469 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3470 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3471 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3472 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3473 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3474 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3475 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3477 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3479 _ => unreachable!(),
3482 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3483 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3484 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3485 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3486 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3488 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3489 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3490 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3491 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3492 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3493 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3494 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3495 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3496 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3500 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3501 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3502 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3504 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3506 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3507 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3509 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3511 payment_claimable_generated
3515 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3516 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3517 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3518 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3519 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3520 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3521 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3522 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3524 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3525 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3526 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3527 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3528 Ok(result) => result,
3530 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3531 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3535 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3536 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3537 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3538 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3539 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3544 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3546 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3547 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3548 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3549 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3552 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3554 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3555 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3556 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3557 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3558 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3559 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3560 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3561 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3565 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3566 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3571 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3572 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3579 if payment_data.is_none() {
3580 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3581 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3584 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3585 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3586 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3587 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3588 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3590 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3591 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3593 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3594 if payment_claimable_generated {
3595 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3601 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3602 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3610 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3611 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3612 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3613 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3614 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3615 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3617 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3620 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3622 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3623 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3624 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3626 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3628 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3629 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3630 events.append(&mut new_events);
3633 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3635 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3636 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3638 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3639 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3640 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3641 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3642 if background_events.is_empty() {
3646 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3648 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3649 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3650 // monitor updating completing.
3651 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3658 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3659 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3660 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3661 self.process_background_events();
3664 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3665 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3666 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3667 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3668 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3669 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3670 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3672 if !chan.is_live() {
3673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3674 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3675 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3677 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3678 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3680 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3681 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3685 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3686 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3687 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3688 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3689 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3690 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3691 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3693 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3695 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3696 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3697 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3698 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3699 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3700 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3701 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3709 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3711 /// This currently includes:
3712 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3713 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3714 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3716 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3717 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3718 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3720 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3721 /// estimate fetches.
3723 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3724 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3725 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3726 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3727 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3728 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3730 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3732 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3733 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3734 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3737 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3740 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3741 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3742 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3743 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3744 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3746 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3747 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3748 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3749 if needs_close { return false; }
3752 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3753 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3754 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3755 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3756 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3757 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3758 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3759 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3760 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3764 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3766 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3767 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3768 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3769 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3773 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3778 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3782 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3783 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3788 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3789 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3790 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3791 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3792 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3793 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3794 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3795 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3796 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3797 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3798 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3800 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3801 // have no channels to the peer.
3802 let remove_entry = {
3803 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3804 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3807 entry.remove_entry();
3810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3815 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3816 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3817 // This should be unreachable
3818 debug_assert!(false);
3821 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3822 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3823 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3824 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3825 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3826 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3828 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3829 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3830 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3832 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3839 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3840 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3841 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3842 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3846 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3847 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3850 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3852 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3853 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3854 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3855 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3856 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3863 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3864 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3865 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3867 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3868 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3869 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3870 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3872 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3873 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3874 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3875 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3876 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3877 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3880 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3881 /// reason for the failure.
3883 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3884 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3887 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3888 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3889 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3890 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3891 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3892 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3898 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3899 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3900 match failure_code {
3901 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3902 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3903 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3904 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3905 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3906 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3911 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3912 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3914 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3916 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3917 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3918 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3919 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3920 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3921 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3922 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3924 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3926 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3927 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3929 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3934 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3935 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3936 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3937 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3938 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3939 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3940 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3941 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3942 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3943 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3945 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3946 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3947 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3948 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3950 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3951 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3952 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3953 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3954 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3958 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3959 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3960 // be surfaced to the user.
3961 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3962 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3963 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3965 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3967 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3970 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3972 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3976 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3979 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3980 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3981 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3982 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3986 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3987 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3988 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3989 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3990 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3991 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3992 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3993 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3994 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3997 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3998 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3999 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4002 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4003 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4004 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4006 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4007 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4008 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4009 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4010 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4012 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4014 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4016 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4017 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4018 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4019 push_forward_ev = true;
4021 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4023 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4026 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4029 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4030 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4031 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4032 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4033 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4034 failed_next_destination: destination,
4040 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4041 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4043 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4044 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4045 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4046 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4048 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4049 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4050 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4051 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4053 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4054 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4055 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4056 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4057 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4058 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4059 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4060 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4065 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4066 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
4067 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4068 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4069 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4070 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4071 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4072 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4077 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4078 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4079 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
4081 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4082 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4083 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4084 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4089 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4091 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4092 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4093 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4094 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4095 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4096 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4097 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4098 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4099 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4101 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4102 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4103 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4104 debug_assert!(false);
4108 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4110 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4111 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4112 debug_assert!(false);
4116 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4118 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4119 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4120 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4121 if sources.len() != 1 {
4122 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4123 debug_assert!(false);
4129 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4131 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4132 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4133 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4134 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4137 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4138 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4139 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4140 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4144 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4145 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4146 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4147 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4149 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4150 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4151 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4152 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4153 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4158 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4159 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4160 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4161 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4162 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4163 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4164 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4166 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4169 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4170 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4171 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4172 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4176 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4177 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4178 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4179 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4183 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4184 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4185 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4189 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4190 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4191 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4194 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4197 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4198 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4199 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4201 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4202 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4204 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4205 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4207 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4208 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4209 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4210 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4211 if let Err(e) = res {
4212 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4213 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4214 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4215 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4216 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4223 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4224 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4225 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4229 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4230 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4231 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4232 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4233 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4234 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4235 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4236 // again on restart.
4237 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4238 payment_preimage, update_res);
4240 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4241 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4242 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4243 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4244 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4245 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4249 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4250 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4253 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4255 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4256 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4258 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4259 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4260 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4261 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4262 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4263 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4264 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4267 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4268 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4270 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4272 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4275 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4279 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4280 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4281 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4287 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4288 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4289 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4292 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4293 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4295 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4296 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4297 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4298 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4299 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4303 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4304 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4310 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4311 /// update completion.
4312 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4313 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4314 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4315 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4316 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4317 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4319 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4320 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4321 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4322 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4323 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4324 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4326 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4328 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4329 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4330 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4331 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4334 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4335 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4337 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4338 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4339 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4344 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4345 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4346 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4347 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4352 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4353 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4354 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4355 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4356 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4361 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4365 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4371 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4372 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4373 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4377 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4378 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4379 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4385 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4386 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4388 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4389 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4391 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4392 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4393 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4394 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4395 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4401 let mut peer_state_lock;
4402 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4403 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4404 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4405 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4407 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4412 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4413 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4414 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4417 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4420 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4422 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4423 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4426 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4427 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4428 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4430 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4431 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4432 /// used to accept such channels.
4434 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4435 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4436 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4437 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4440 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4441 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4443 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4444 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4445 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4447 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4448 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4450 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4451 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4453 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4454 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4456 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4457 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4458 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4459 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4462 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4463 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4465 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4466 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4467 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4468 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4469 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4470 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4471 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4472 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4474 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4475 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4478 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4479 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4480 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4481 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4482 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4483 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4486 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4487 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4488 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4490 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4491 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4492 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4493 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4494 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4495 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4496 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4497 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4500 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4501 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4502 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4506 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4507 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4508 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4511 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4512 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4518 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4519 /// or 0-conf channels.
4521 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4522 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4523 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4524 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4525 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4526 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4528 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4529 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4530 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4531 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4532 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4533 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4534 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4538 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4541 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4542 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4544 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4545 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4546 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4547 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4549 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4552 num_unfunded_channels
4555 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4556 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4557 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4560 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4564 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4565 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4566 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4567 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4569 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4570 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4571 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4572 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4575 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4577 debug_assert!(false);
4578 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4580 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4581 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4583 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4584 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4585 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4586 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4587 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4588 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4590 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4591 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4592 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4595 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4596 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4597 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4598 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4599 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4602 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4603 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4604 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4607 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4608 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4612 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4614 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4618 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4619 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4620 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4622 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4623 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4624 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4627 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4628 pending_events.push(
4629 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4630 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4631 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4632 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4633 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4634 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4639 entry.insert(channel);
4645 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4646 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4648 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4650 debug_assert!(false);
4651 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4655 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4657 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4658 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4663 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4664 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4665 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4666 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4667 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4669 user_channel_id: user_id,
4674 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4675 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4678 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4680 debug_assert!(false);
4681 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4684 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4685 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4686 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4687 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4688 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4689 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4694 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4695 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4696 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4699 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4702 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4703 funding_msg.channel_id))
4705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4706 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4710 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4711 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4712 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4713 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4714 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4715 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4716 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4720 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4722 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4723 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4724 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4726 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4727 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4728 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4729 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4730 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4731 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4732 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4733 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4741 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4742 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4744 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4746 debug_assert!(false);
4747 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4754 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4755 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4756 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4757 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4758 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4759 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4760 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4761 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4762 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4763 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4772 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4773 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4774 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4776 debug_assert!(false);
4777 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4779 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4781 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4782 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4783 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4784 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4785 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4786 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4787 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4788 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4789 msg: announcement_sigs,
4791 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4792 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4793 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4794 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4795 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4796 // announcement_signatures.
4797 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4798 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4799 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4800 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4807 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4808 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4817 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4818 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4819 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4821 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4823 debug_assert!(false);
4824 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4826 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4827 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4828 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4831 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4832 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4833 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4834 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4837 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4838 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4839 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4840 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4842 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4843 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4844 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4845 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4846 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4847 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4852 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4853 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4854 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4855 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4856 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4860 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4863 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4864 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4865 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4866 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4872 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4874 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4876 debug_assert!(false);
4877 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4879 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4882 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4884 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4885 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4886 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4887 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4892 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4893 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4894 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4895 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4896 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4897 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4898 } else { (tx, None) }
4900 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4903 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4904 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4905 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4907 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4908 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4911 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4915 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4920 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4921 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4922 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4923 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4925 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4926 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4927 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4928 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4930 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4931 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4932 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4934 debug_assert!(false);
4935 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4939 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4942 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4943 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4944 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4945 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4946 match pending_forward_info {
4947 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4948 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4949 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4950 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4952 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4953 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4954 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4955 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4956 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4959 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4961 _ => pending_forward_info
4964 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4971 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4972 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4974 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4976 debug_assert!(false);
4977 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4981 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4983 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4988 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4992 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4994 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4996 debug_assert!(false);
4997 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5001 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5003 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5010 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5012 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5014 debug_assert!(false);
5015 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5017 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5018 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5019 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5021 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5022 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5023 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5025 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5032 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5034 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5036 debug_assert!(false);
5037 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5041 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5042 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5043 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5044 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5045 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5046 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5047 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5048 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5050 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5055 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5056 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5057 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5058 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5059 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5060 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5061 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5062 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5063 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5064 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5065 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5067 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5068 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5070 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5071 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5072 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5073 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5074 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5075 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5078 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5079 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5081 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5082 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5083 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5085 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5086 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5087 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5088 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5089 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5092 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5093 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5096 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5097 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5098 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5099 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5100 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5101 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5102 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5105 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5106 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5107 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5112 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5113 // payments are being processed.
5114 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5115 push_forward_event = true;
5117 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5118 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5125 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5126 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5129 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5130 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5131 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5133 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5137 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5138 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5139 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5140 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5141 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5143 if !forward_ev_exists {
5144 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5146 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5151 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5152 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5154 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5156 debug_assert!(false);
5157 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5158 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5159 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5160 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5162 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5163 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5164 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5165 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5166 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5167 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5168 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5173 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5177 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5178 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5179 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5181 debug_assert!(false);
5182 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5184 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5185 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5186 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5188 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5190 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5195 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5196 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5197 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5199 debug_assert!(false);
5200 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5202 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5203 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5204 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5206 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5210 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5211 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5212 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5213 msg, &self.default_configuration
5215 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5216 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5217 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5225 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5226 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5227 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5228 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5230 // It's not a local channel
5231 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5234 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5235 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5236 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5237 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5239 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5240 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5241 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5243 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5244 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5245 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5246 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5247 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5248 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5252 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5253 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5254 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5255 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5257 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5258 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5263 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5266 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5268 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5271 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5273 debug_assert!(false);
5274 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5276 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5277 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5278 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5279 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5280 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5281 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5282 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5283 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5284 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5285 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5286 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5287 let mut channel_update = None;
5288 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5289 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5290 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5293 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5294 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5295 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5296 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5297 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5298 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5299 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5304 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5305 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5306 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5307 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5308 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5309 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5313 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5317 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5318 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5321 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5322 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5327 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5328 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5329 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5331 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5332 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5333 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5334 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5335 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5336 match monitor_event {
5337 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5338 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5340 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5343 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5344 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5345 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5348 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5349 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5350 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5351 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5353 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5354 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5355 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5356 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5359 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5360 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5361 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5362 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5363 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5364 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5365 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5366 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5367 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5368 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5369 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5373 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5374 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5376 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5378 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5380 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5389 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5390 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5396 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5397 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5400 has_pending_monitor_events
5403 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5404 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5405 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5407 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5408 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5409 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5410 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5412 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5417 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5418 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5419 /// update was applied.
5420 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5421 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5422 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5423 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5425 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5426 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5427 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5428 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5430 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5431 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5434 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5435 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5436 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5437 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5438 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5439 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5440 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5441 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5443 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5444 has_monitor_update = true;
5446 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5447 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5448 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5449 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5450 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5451 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5452 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5454 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5456 continue 'peer_loop;
5465 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5466 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5467 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5470 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5471 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5477 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5478 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5479 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5480 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5481 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5482 let mut has_update = false;
5484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5486 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5489 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5490 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5491 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5492 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5493 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5495 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5496 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5499 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5500 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5501 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5502 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5503 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5508 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5510 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5511 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5512 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5518 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5519 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5527 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5528 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5534 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5535 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5537 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5538 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5539 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5540 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5541 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5542 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5543 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5544 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5545 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5546 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5547 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5548 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5549 assert!(should_broadcast);
5550 } else { unreachable!(); }
5551 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5553 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5557 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5558 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5560 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5561 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5564 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5566 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5567 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5568 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5570 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5571 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5572 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5573 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5574 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5575 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5576 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5577 // never fail a payment too early.
5578 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5580 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5588 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5591 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5592 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5594 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5595 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5596 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5597 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5599 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5601 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5602 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5606 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5607 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5609 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5611 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5612 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5614 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5615 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5616 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5617 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5618 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5619 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5620 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5621 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5622 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5623 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5624 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5627 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5628 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5630 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5633 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5635 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5637 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5638 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5639 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5640 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5641 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5644 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5645 /// stored external to LDK.
5647 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5648 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5649 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5651 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5652 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5655 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5656 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5657 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5658 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5660 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5661 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5662 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5663 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5664 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5666 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5667 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5668 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5669 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5670 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5672 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5673 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5675 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5676 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5680 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5681 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5683 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5685 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5686 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5688 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5689 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5690 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5691 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5692 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5693 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5694 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5697 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5698 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5700 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5703 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5705 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5707 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5708 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5711 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5712 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5714 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5715 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5716 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5719 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5720 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5722 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5723 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5724 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5725 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5727 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5728 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5729 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5730 Some(_) => continue,
5731 None => return scid_candidate
5736 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5738 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5739 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5741 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5742 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5743 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5747 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5748 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5749 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5751 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5752 /// times to get a unique scid.
5753 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5754 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5755 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5757 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5758 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5759 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5760 return scid_candidate
5764 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5765 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5766 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5767 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5769 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5770 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5773 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5774 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5775 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5776 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5785 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5786 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5787 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5788 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5789 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5793 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5794 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5795 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5800 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5801 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5802 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5806 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5807 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5811 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5812 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5815 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5816 /// using the given event handler.
5818 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5819 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5823 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
5827 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5829 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5830 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5831 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5832 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5833 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5834 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5838 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5839 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5840 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5841 /// is always placed next to each other.
5843 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5844 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5845 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5846 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5848 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5849 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5850 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5851 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5852 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5853 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5854 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5856 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5857 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5858 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5859 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5862 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5863 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5865 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5866 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5869 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5870 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5871 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5874 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5875 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5879 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5880 events.replace(pending_events);
5889 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5891 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5892 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5893 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5894 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5895 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5896 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5900 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5902 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5903 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5904 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5906 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
5910 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5912 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5913 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5914 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5915 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5916 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5917 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5921 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5923 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5924 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5925 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5926 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5927 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5930 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5931 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5934 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5935 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5936 let new_height = height - 1;
5938 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5939 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5940 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5941 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5942 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5943 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5946 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5950 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5952 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5953 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5954 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5955 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5956 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5957 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5961 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5962 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5963 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5964 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5966 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5967 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5970 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5971 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5973 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5974 if height < last_best_block_height {
5975 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5976 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5980 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5981 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5982 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5983 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5985 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5986 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5990 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5992 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5994 macro_rules! max_time {
5995 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5997 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5998 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5999 // having an explicit local time source.
6000 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6001 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6002 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6003 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6004 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6010 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6011 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6012 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6013 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6017 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6018 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6019 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6022 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6023 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6024 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6031 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6033 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6034 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6035 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6036 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6037 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6038 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6043 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6045 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6046 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6047 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6048 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6049 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6050 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6054 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6055 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6057 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6058 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6059 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6060 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6061 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6063 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6064 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6067 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6068 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6069 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6070 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6071 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6072 let res = f(channel);
6073 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6074 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6075 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6076 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6077 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6079 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6080 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6081 if channel.is_usable() {
6082 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6083 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6084 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6085 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6095 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6096 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6099 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6100 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6101 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6102 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6103 msg: announcement_sigs,
6105 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6106 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6109 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6110 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6111 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6116 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6117 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6118 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6119 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6120 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6121 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6122 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6123 // is always consistent.
6124 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6125 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6126 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6127 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6128 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6131 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6132 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6133 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6134 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6135 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6136 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6141 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6142 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6144 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6145 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6146 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6147 data: reason_message,
6157 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6158 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6159 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6160 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6161 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6162 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6163 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6164 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6165 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6166 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6168 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6169 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6170 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6174 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6177 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6178 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6179 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6180 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6181 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6182 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6183 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6184 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6185 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6188 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6189 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6190 _ => unreachable!(),
6192 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6193 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6194 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6201 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6203 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6204 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6208 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6210 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6211 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6213 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6214 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6217 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6218 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6219 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6222 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6223 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6224 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6225 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6228 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6229 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6230 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6231 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6234 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6235 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6237 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6238 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6239 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6240 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6241 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6244 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6245 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6246 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6247 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6250 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6251 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6252 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6253 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6256 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6257 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6258 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6259 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6263 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6264 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6266 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6267 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6268 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6269 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6270 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6271 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6275 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6277 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6280 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6282 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6285 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6287 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6290 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6295 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6296 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6297 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6300 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6302 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6305 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6307 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6310 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6312 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6315 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6317 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6320 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6322 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6325 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6327 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6330 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6332 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6335 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6337 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6340 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6342 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6345 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6347 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6350 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6351 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6352 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6355 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6360 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6362 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6365 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6367 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6368 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6370 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6371 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6372 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6375 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6376 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6377 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6378 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6379 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6380 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6385 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6387 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6388 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6389 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6390 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6391 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6392 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6393 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6394 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6395 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6396 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6397 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6398 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6399 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6400 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6401 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6402 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6403 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6404 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6405 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6406 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6407 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6410 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6411 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6412 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6413 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6416 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6418 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6420 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6421 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6425 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6426 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6427 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6431 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6433 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6434 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6435 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6436 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6437 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6438 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6441 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6442 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6444 if inbound_peer_limited {
6447 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6448 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6449 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6450 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6451 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6456 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6457 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6459 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6460 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6461 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6462 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6467 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6468 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6473 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6476 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6477 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6478 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6479 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6480 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6481 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6482 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6483 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6484 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6485 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6489 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6490 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6491 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6496 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6497 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6498 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6499 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6500 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6509 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6513 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6516 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6517 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6518 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6519 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6520 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6521 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6522 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6523 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6525 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6526 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6527 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6531 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6532 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6533 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6534 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6537 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6538 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6539 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6540 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6548 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6549 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6553 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6554 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6557 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6558 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6562 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6563 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6564 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6565 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6568 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6569 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6571 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6572 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6573 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6574 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6575 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6578 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6579 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6580 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6581 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6584 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6585 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6586 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6587 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6590 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6591 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6592 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6593 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6594 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6595 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6596 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6597 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6598 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6599 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6600 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6601 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6602 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6603 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6604 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6605 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6606 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6607 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6609 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6610 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6611 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6617 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6618 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6620 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6621 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6622 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6623 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6626 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6627 (2, node_id, required),
6628 (4, features, required),
6629 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6630 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6631 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6632 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6635 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6636 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6637 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6638 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6639 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6640 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6641 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6642 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6643 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6644 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6645 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6646 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6647 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6648 (7, self.config, option),
6649 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6650 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6651 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6652 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6653 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6654 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6655 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6656 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6657 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6658 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6659 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6660 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6661 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6662 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6663 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6664 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6665 (32, self.is_public, required),
6666 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6667 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6668 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6669 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6675 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6676 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6677 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6678 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6679 (2, channel_id, required),
6680 (3, channel_type, option),
6681 (4, counterparty, required),
6682 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6683 (6, funding_txo, option),
6684 (7, config, option),
6685 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6686 (9, confirmations, option),
6687 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6688 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6689 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6690 (16, balance_msat, required),
6691 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6692 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6693 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6694 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6695 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6696 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6697 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6698 (26, is_outbound, required),
6699 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6700 (30, is_usable, required),
6701 (32, is_public, required),
6702 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6703 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6704 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6705 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6708 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6709 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6710 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6711 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6712 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6716 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6718 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6719 outbound_scid_alias,
6723 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6724 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6726 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6727 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6728 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6729 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6730 confirmations_required,
6732 force_close_spend_delay,
6733 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6734 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6735 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6736 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6737 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6738 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6739 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6744 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6745 (2, channels, vec_type),
6746 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6747 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6750 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6752 (0, onion_packet, required),
6753 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6756 (0, payment_data, required),
6757 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6758 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6760 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6761 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6762 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6766 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6767 (0, routing, required),
6768 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6769 (4, payment_hash, required),
6770 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6771 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6772 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6776 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6777 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6779 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6781 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6782 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6783 reason.write(writer)?;
6785 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6786 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6789 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6790 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6791 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6792 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6799 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6800 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6801 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6804 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6805 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6806 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6807 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6811 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6812 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6813 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6814 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6815 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6818 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6819 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6820 // messages contained in the variants.
6821 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6822 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6823 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6825 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6826 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6827 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6828 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6829 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6832 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6834 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6835 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6836 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6838 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6843 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6848 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6849 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6850 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6851 (2, outpoint, required),
6852 (4, htlc_id, required),
6853 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6856 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6857 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6858 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6859 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6860 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6862 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6863 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6864 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6865 (2, self.value, required),
6866 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6867 (4, payment_data, option),
6868 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6869 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6870 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6876 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6877 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6878 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6880 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6881 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6882 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6883 let mut total_value_received = None;
6884 let mut total_msat = None;
6885 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6886 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6887 (0, prev_hop, required),
6888 (1, total_msat, option),
6889 (2, value, required),
6890 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6891 (4, payment_data, option),
6892 (5, total_value_received, option),
6893 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6894 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6896 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6898 if payment_data.is_some() {
6899 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6901 if total_msat.is_none() {
6902 total_msat = Some(value);
6904 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6907 if total_msat.is_none() {
6908 if payment_data.is_none() {
6909 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6911 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6913 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6917 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6920 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6921 total_value_received,
6922 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6929 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6930 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6931 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6935 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6936 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6937 let mut payment_id = None;
6938 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6939 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6940 (0, session_priv, required),
6941 (1, payment_id, option),
6942 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6943 (4, path, vec_type),
6944 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6946 if payment_id.is_none() {
6947 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6949 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6951 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6952 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6954 let path = path.unwrap();
6955 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6956 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6957 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6960 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6961 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6962 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6964 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6967 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6968 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6973 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6974 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6976 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6978 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6979 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6980 (0, session_priv, required),
6981 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6982 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6983 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6984 (4, *path, vec_type),
6985 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6988 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6990 field.write(writer)?;
6997 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6998 (0, forward_info, required),
6999 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7000 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7001 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7002 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7005 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7007 (0, htlc_id, required),
7008 (2, err_packet, required),
7013 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7014 (0, payment_secret, required),
7015 (2, expiry_time, required),
7016 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7017 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7018 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7021 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7023 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7024 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7025 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7026 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7027 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7028 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7032 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7033 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7035 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7037 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7039 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7040 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7041 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7044 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7047 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7048 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7049 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7052 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7053 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7055 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7056 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7057 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7058 unfunded_channels += 1;
7063 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7065 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7066 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7067 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7068 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7069 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7070 channel.write(writer)?;
7077 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7078 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7079 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7080 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7081 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7082 for forward in pending_forwards {
7083 forward.write(writer)?;
7088 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7090 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7091 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7092 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7094 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7095 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7096 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7097 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7098 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7099 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7100 htlc.write(writer)?;
7102 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7105 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7106 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7107 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7108 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7109 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7110 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7111 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7114 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7115 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7116 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7117 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7118 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7120 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7121 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7122 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7123 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7124 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7125 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7126 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7131 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7132 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7133 for event in events.iter() {
7134 event.write(writer)?;
7137 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7138 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7139 for event in background_events.iter() {
7141 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7143 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7144 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7149 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7150 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7151 // likely to be identical.
7152 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7153 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7155 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7156 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7157 hash.write(writer)?;
7158 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7161 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7162 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7163 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7164 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7165 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7168 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7169 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7171 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7172 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7173 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7174 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7177 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7178 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7182 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7183 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7184 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7186 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7187 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7188 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7194 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7195 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7196 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7197 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7200 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7201 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7202 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7203 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7204 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7207 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7208 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7209 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7210 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7211 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7212 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7213 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7214 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7215 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7216 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7223 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7225 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7227 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7228 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7229 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7230 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7231 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7232 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7233 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7234 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7235 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7236 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7237 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7238 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7239 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7241 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7242 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7244 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7245 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7247 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7248 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7249 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7250 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7251 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7252 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7254 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7255 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7257 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7258 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7259 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7260 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7261 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7262 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7266 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7267 pub entropy_source: ES,
7269 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7270 pub node_signer: NS,
7272 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7273 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7275 pub signer_provider: SP,
7277 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7279 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7280 pub fee_estimator: F,
7281 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7283 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7284 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7285 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7286 pub chain_monitor: M,
7288 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7289 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7290 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7291 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7292 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7293 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7295 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7297 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7298 /// deserialization.
7300 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7301 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7302 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7304 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7305 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7307 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7308 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7309 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7310 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7312 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7315 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7316 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7319 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7320 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7322 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7323 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7324 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7325 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7326 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7327 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7331 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7332 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7333 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7334 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7335 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7337 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7338 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7343 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7344 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7345 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7346 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7348 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7349 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7350 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7351 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7352 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7353 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7357 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7358 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7359 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7363 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7364 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7366 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7367 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7368 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7369 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7370 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7371 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7375 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7376 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7378 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7379 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7380 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7382 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7384 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7385 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7386 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7387 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7388 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7389 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7390 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7391 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7392 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7393 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7395 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7396 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7397 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7398 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7399 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7400 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7401 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7402 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7403 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7404 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7405 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7406 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7407 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7408 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7409 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7410 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7411 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7412 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7413 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7414 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7415 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7416 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7417 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7418 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7419 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7420 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7421 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7422 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7424 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7425 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7426 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7427 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7428 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7430 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7431 let mut found_htlc = false;
7432 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7433 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7436 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7437 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7438 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7439 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7440 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7441 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7442 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7443 log_info!(args.logger,
7444 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7445 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7446 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7450 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7451 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7452 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7454 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7455 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7457 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7458 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7459 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7460 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7463 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7464 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7465 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7469 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7470 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7471 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7472 // safely discard the channel.
7473 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7474 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7475 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7476 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7477 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7480 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7481 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7482 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7483 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7484 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7485 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7489 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7490 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7491 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7492 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7493 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7495 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7499 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7500 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7501 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7502 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7503 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7504 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7505 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7506 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7507 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7509 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7512 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7513 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7514 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7515 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7517 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7518 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7519 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7521 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7524 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7525 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7526 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7527 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7528 let peer_state = PeerState {
7529 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7530 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7531 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7532 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7533 is_connected: false,
7535 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7538 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7539 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7540 for _ in 0..event_count {
7541 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7542 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7547 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7548 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7549 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7551 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7552 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7553 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7554 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7556 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7559 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7563 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7564 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7566 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7567 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7568 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7569 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7570 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7574 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7575 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7576 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7577 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7578 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7579 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7580 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7582 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7587 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7588 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7589 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7590 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7591 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7592 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7593 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7594 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7595 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7596 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7597 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7598 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7599 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7600 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7601 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7602 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7603 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7604 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7605 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7606 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7608 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7609 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7612 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7613 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7616 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7617 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7620 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7621 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7622 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7623 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7624 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7625 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7627 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7629 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7630 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7631 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7635 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7636 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7637 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7638 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7639 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7640 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7641 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7643 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7644 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7645 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7646 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7647 if path.is_empty() {
7648 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7649 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7652 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7653 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7654 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7655 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7657 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7658 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7659 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7662 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7663 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7664 retry_strategy: None,
7665 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7666 payment_params: None,
7667 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7668 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7669 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7670 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7671 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7672 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7673 total_msat: path_amt,
7674 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7676 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7677 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7682 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7684 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7685 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7686 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7687 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7689 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7690 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7691 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7692 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7693 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7694 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7695 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7696 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7697 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7698 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7699 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7704 !forwards.is_empty()
7706 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7707 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7708 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7709 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7710 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7711 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7712 intercepted_id != ev_id
7719 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7720 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7721 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7722 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7723 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7724 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7725 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7726 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7727 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7728 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7729 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7730 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7731 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7740 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7741 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7742 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7743 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7744 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7745 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7746 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7747 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7751 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7752 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7754 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7755 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7756 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7757 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7759 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7760 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7763 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7764 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7765 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7766 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7767 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7769 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7770 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7771 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7772 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7773 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7774 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7775 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7776 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7778 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7779 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7783 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7785 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7787 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7788 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7790 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7794 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7795 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7797 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7799 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7801 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7802 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7803 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7804 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7808 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7809 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7812 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7813 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7814 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7816 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7817 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7818 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7820 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7821 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7822 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7823 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7824 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7825 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7827 if chan.is_usable() {
7828 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7829 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7830 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7831 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7838 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7840 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7841 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7842 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7843 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7844 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7845 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7846 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7847 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7848 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7849 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7850 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7852 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7853 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7855 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7856 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7857 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7858 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7860 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7861 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7862 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7863 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7865 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7866 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7867 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7868 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7870 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7871 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7872 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7873 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7874 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7875 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7876 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7879 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7880 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7883 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7886 purpose: payment_purpose,
7887 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7893 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7894 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7895 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7897 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7898 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7902 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7904 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7905 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7906 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7907 router: args.router,
7909 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7911 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7912 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7913 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7914 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7916 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7917 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7918 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7919 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7920 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7921 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7923 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7928 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7930 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7932 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7933 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7934 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7935 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7937 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7938 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7939 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7941 logger: args.logger,
7942 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7945 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7946 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7947 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7948 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7949 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7952 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7953 //connection or two.
7955 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7961 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7962 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7963 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7964 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7965 use core::time::Duration;
7966 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7967 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7968 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7969 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7970 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7971 use crate::ln::msgs;
7972 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7973 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7974 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7975 use crate::util::test_utils;
7976 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7977 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7980 fn test_notify_limits() {
7981 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7982 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7983 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7984 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7985 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7986 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7988 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7989 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7990 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7991 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7992 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7994 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7996 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7997 // to connect messages with new values
7998 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7999 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8000 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8001 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8002 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8003 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8005 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8006 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8007 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8008 // ... but the last node should not.
8009 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8010 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8011 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8012 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8014 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8015 // about the channel.
8016 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8017 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8018 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8020 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8022 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8023 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8024 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8025 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8026 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8027 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8029 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8030 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8031 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8033 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8034 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8035 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8036 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8037 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8038 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8040 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8041 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8042 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8043 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8044 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8045 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8046 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8047 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8049 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8050 // the channel info has updated.
8051 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8052 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8053 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8054 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8055 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8056 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8060 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8061 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8066 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8067 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8069 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8070 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8071 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8072 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8074 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8075 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8076 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8077 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8078 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8079 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8080 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8081 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8083 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8084 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8085 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8087 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8088 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8089 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8091 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8093 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8094 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8095 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8097 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8098 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8099 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8101 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8102 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8103 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8104 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8105 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8106 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8107 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8108 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8109 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8111 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8112 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8113 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8115 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8116 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8117 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8119 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8120 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8121 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8122 // lightning messages manually.
8123 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8124 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8127 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8128 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8129 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8131 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8132 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8134 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8135 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8137 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8138 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8139 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8141 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8142 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8143 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8145 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8147 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8149 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8150 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8154 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8155 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8156 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8158 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8159 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8160 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8161 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8163 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8166 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8167 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8168 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8169 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8174 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8175 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8176 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8177 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8179 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8184 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8185 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8186 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8187 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8188 // fails as expected.
8189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8192 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8193 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8194 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8195 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8197 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8198 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8199 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8201 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8202 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8203 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8204 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8206 let route = find_route(
8207 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8208 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8210 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8211 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8213 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8215 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8216 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8217 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8219 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8220 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8221 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8222 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8223 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8225 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8226 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8227 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8228 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8229 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8230 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8231 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8232 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8233 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8235 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8236 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8238 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8239 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8240 let route = find_route(
8241 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8242 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8244 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8245 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8247 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8249 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8250 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8251 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8253 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8254 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8255 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8256 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8258 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8260 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8261 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8264 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8265 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8266 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8268 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8269 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8270 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8271 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8272 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8273 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8274 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8275 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8276 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8278 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8279 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8283 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8284 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8285 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8286 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8289 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8291 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8292 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8294 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8295 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8296 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8297 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8299 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8300 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8301 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8302 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8303 let route = find_route(
8304 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8305 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8308 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8309 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8310 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8311 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8312 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8313 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8316 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8317 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8318 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8319 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8320 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8321 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8322 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8324 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8328 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8329 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8335 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8336 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8338 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8339 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8340 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8341 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8343 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8344 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8345 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8346 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8347 let route = find_route(
8348 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8349 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8352 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8353 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8354 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8355 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8356 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8357 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8358 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8359 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8362 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8363 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8364 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8365 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8366 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8367 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8368 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8370 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8374 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8375 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8376 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8377 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8378 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8380 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8381 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8382 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8383 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8385 // Marshall an MPP route.
8386 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8387 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8388 route.paths.push(path);
8389 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8390 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8391 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8392 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8393 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8394 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8396 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8397 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8399 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8400 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8402 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8407 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8408 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8409 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8410 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8411 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8413 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8415 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8416 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8418 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8419 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8421 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8424 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8425 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8426 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8427 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8428 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8429 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8432 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8435 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8436 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8441 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8442 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8446 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8448 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8449 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8451 total_msat: 100_000,
8454 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8455 // payment verification fails as expected.
8456 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8457 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8458 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8459 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8461 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8465 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8466 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8470 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8471 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8472 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8473 // the channel is successfully closed.
8474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8479 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8480 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8481 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8482 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8483 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8485 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8486 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8488 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8489 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8490 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8491 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8494 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8496 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8497 // as it has the funding transaction.
8498 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8499 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8500 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8503 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8505 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8507 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8509 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8510 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8511 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8513 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8516 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8517 // as it has the funding transaction.
8518 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8519 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8520 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8523 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8524 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8526 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8527 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8528 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8529 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8531 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8532 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8533 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8534 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8536 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8537 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8539 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8540 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8541 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8542 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8543 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8544 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8545 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8549 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8550 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8551 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8552 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8553 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8554 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8555 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8558 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8560 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8561 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8562 // closing transaction).
8563 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8564 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8567 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8568 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8569 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8570 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8571 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8574 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8576 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8578 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8579 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8580 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8582 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8584 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8585 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8588 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8589 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8590 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8593 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8594 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8595 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8598 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8600 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8601 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8603 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8604 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8606 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8607 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8612 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8613 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8614 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8615 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8616 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8617 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8618 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8619 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8622 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8623 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8624 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8626 // Test the API functions.
8627 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8629 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8631 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8633 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8635 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8637 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8639 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8643 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8644 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8648 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8650 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8652 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8653 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8655 let mut funding_tx = None;
8656 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8657 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8658 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8661 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8662 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8663 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8664 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8665 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8667 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8669 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8671 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8673 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8674 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8675 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8677 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8680 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8681 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8682 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8683 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8684 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8686 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8687 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8689 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8690 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8691 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8692 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8693 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8694 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8695 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8697 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8698 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8699 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8700 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8702 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8703 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8704 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8705 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8706 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8707 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8708 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8710 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8711 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8712 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8713 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8715 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8716 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8717 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8718 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8720 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8721 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8723 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8724 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8725 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8726 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8727 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8730 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8731 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8733 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8734 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8735 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8737 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8738 // "protected" and can connect again.
8739 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8740 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8741 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8742 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8744 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8746 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8747 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8751 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8752 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8756 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8758 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8760 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8761 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8763 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8764 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8765 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8766 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8769 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8771 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8772 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8773 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8775 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8776 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8777 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8779 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8780 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8781 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8782 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8786 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8787 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8788 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8789 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8790 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8791 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8792 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8794 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8796 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8798 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8799 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8801 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8802 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8803 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8804 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8805 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8806 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8808 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8809 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8811 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8812 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8816 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8817 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8820 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8821 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8822 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8823 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8824 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8825 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8826 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8828 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8829 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8830 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8831 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8837 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8838 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8840 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8841 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8842 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8844 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8845 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8849 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8854 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8855 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8856 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8857 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8860 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8861 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8862 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8866 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8867 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8868 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8870 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8871 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8873 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8874 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8879 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8880 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8882 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8883 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8885 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8889 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8891 use crate::chain::Listen;
8892 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8893 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8894 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8895 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8896 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8897 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8898 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8899 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8900 use crate::util::test_utils;
8901 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8903 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8904 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8905 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8907 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8911 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
8912 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8913 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8914 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8915 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8916 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8917 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
8919 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8920 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
8922 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
8923 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
8925 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
8927 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
8932 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8933 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8936 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8937 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8938 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8940 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8942 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8943 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8944 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8945 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8946 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8948 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8949 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8951 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8952 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8953 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8954 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8956 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8958 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8960 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8961 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8962 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8963 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8964 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8966 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8968 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8970 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8971 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8972 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8973 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8974 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8977 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8978 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8979 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8981 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8982 } else { panic!(); }
8984 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8985 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8986 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8988 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8989 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8991 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8994 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8995 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8996 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8998 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8999 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9004 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9007 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9010 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9011 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9013 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9014 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9015 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9016 match msg_events[0] {
9017 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9018 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9019 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9023 match msg_events[1] {
9024 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9028 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9029 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9031 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9032 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9037 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9038 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9040 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9041 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9046 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9047 macro_rules! send_payment {
9048 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9049 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9050 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9051 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9052 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9054 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9055 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9057 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9058 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9059 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9060 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9061 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9062 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9063 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9064 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9065 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9066 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9067 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9070 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9071 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9072 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9074 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9075 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9076 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9077 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9078 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9080 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9083 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9084 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9085 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9086 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9088 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9093 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9094 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);