1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 const SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS: [u8; 65] = [0; 65];
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
61 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
62 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
63 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
64 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
65 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
66 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
67 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
68 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
69 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
70 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
71 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
72 short_channel_id: u64,
73 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
74 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
79 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
80 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
83 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
86 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
91 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
92 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
93 short_channel_id: u64,
95 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
98 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
99 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
100 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
101 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
104 session_priv: SecretKey,
105 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
106 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
107 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
124 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
132 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
135 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
136 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
137 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
139 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
141 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
142 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
143 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
144 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
145 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
147 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
148 err: msgs::LightningError,
149 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
151 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 err: LightningError {
157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160 data: err.to_string()
164 shutdown_finish: None,
168 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 err: LightningError {
172 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
174 shutdown_finish: None,
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
182 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 err: LightningError {
186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: err.to_string()
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
206 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
213 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
218 data: msg.to_string()
223 shutdown_finish: None,
228 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
229 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
230 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
231 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
232 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
234 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
236 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
238 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
259 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
260 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
261 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
268 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
269 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
270 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
272 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
273 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
274 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
275 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
278 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
279 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
281 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
282 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
284 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
285 /// to individual Channels.
287 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
288 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
289 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
290 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
292 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
293 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
294 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
295 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
296 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
297 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
298 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
300 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
301 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
302 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
303 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
306 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
307 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
308 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
309 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
310 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfec.
311 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
312 default_configuration: UserConfig,
313 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
314 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
315 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
316 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
319 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
321 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
322 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
323 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
326 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
328 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
329 our_network_key: SecretKey,
331 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
332 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
333 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
334 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
335 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
337 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
342 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
343 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
344 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
345 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
346 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
348 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
349 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
350 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
351 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
352 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
353 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
354 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
356 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
357 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
358 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
359 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
360 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
361 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
364 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
366 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
367 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
370 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
372 macro_rules! secp_call {
373 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
376 Err(_) => return Err($err),
381 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
382 pub struct ChannelDetails {
383 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
384 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
385 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
386 /// lifetime of the channel.
387 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
388 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
389 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
390 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
391 /// The node_id of our counterparty
392 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
393 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
394 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
395 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
397 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
398 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
399 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
400 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
401 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
402 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
403 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
404 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
405 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
406 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
407 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
408 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
409 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
413 macro_rules! handle_error {
414 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
417 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
418 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
419 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
420 if let Some(update) = update_option {
421 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
426 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
427 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
428 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
429 // Return error in case higher-API need one
436 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
437 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
440 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
441 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
443 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
444 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
445 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
446 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
447 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
449 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
451 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
456 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
457 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
460 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
461 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
463 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
464 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
465 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
466 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
467 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
469 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
471 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
472 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
473 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
474 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
475 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
477 if let Some(update) = update {
478 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
480 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
481 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
482 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
483 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
484 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
485 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
489 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
490 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
491 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
493 shutdown_res.0.clear();
494 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
500 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
501 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
502 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
504 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
506 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
507 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
508 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
509 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
510 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
512 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
513 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
514 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
515 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
516 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
517 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
518 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
519 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
520 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
521 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
524 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
525 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
526 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
527 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
529 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
530 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
532 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
533 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
535 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
536 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
537 if !$resend_commitment {
538 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
541 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
543 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
544 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
550 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
551 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
552 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
554 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
555 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
559 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
560 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
561 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
562 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
563 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
566 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
571 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
572 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
574 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
575 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
577 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
579 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
581 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
582 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
584 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
585 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
586 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
587 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
588 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
590 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner>>, secp256k1::Error> {
591 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
593 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
594 default_configuration: config.clone(),
595 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
596 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
597 monitor: monitor.clone(),
600 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
601 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
604 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
605 by_id: HashMap::new(),
606 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
607 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
608 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
609 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
611 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
613 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
614 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
624 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
626 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
627 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
628 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
629 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
631 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
632 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
634 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
635 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
636 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
637 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
638 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
641 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
642 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
644 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
645 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
646 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
648 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
649 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
651 panic!("RNG is bad???");
654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
657 node_id: their_network_key,
663 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
664 /// more information.
665 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
666 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
667 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
668 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
669 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
670 res.push(ChannelDetails {
671 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
672 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
673 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
674 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
675 inbound_capacity_msat,
676 outbound_capacity_msat,
677 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
678 is_live: channel.is_live(),
684 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
685 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
687 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
688 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
689 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
690 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
691 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
692 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
693 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
694 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
695 // really wanted anyway.
696 if channel.is_live() {
697 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
698 res.push(ChannelDetails {
699 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
700 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
701 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
702 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
703 inbound_capacity_msat,
704 outbound_capacity_msat,
705 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
713 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
714 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
715 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
717 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
718 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
719 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
721 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
722 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
723 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
724 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
726 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
727 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
728 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
731 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
732 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
733 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
735 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
736 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
738 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
741 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
742 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
744 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
750 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
751 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
752 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
761 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
762 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
763 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
764 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
765 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
767 for tx in local_txn {
768 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
769 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
773 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
774 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
775 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
776 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
779 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
780 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
781 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
782 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
783 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
790 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
791 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
792 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
793 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
794 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
800 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
801 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
802 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
803 for chan in self.list_channels() {
804 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
808 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
809 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
810 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
812 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
813 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
814 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
815 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
816 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
817 failure_code: $err_code,
818 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
823 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
824 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
827 let shared_secret = {
828 let mut arr = [0; 32];
829 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
832 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
834 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
835 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
836 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
837 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
838 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
839 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
840 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
841 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
844 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
845 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
846 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
847 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
848 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
851 let mut channel_state = None;
852 macro_rules! return_err {
853 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
855 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
856 if channel_state.is_none() {
857 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
859 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
860 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
861 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
862 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
863 })), channel_state.unwrap());
868 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
869 let next_hop_data = {
870 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
871 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
872 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
874 let error_code = match err {
875 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
876 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
878 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
884 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
887 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
888 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
889 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
890 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
891 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
892 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
893 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
894 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 19*65];
895 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
896 assert_ne!(new_packet_data[0..65], [0; 65][..]);
897 assert_ne!(new_packet_data[..], [0; 19*65][..]);
901 // final_expiry_too_soon
902 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
903 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
905 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
906 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
907 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
909 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
910 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
911 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
914 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
915 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
916 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
917 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
919 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
921 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
923 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
924 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
925 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
928 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
929 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
930 chacha.process(&SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
932 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
934 let blinding_factor = {
935 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
936 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
937 sha.input(&shared_secret);
938 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
941 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
943 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
945 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
948 hop_data: new_packet_data,
949 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
952 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
953 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
954 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
955 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
956 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
957 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
958 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
962 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
963 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
964 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
965 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
966 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
967 None => { // unknown_next_peer
968 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
970 Some(id) => id.clone(),
972 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
973 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
975 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
976 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
977 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
978 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
979 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
980 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
981 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
983 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
984 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
986 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
987 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
988 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
990 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
991 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
993 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
994 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
995 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
996 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
998 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
999 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1004 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1005 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1006 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1007 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1009 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1010 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1012 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1013 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1015 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1017 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1022 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1025 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1026 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1027 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1028 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1029 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1033 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1035 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1036 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1037 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1038 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1039 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1041 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1042 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1043 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1044 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1047 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1048 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1050 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1056 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1058 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1059 /// fields for more info.
1061 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1062 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1063 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1064 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1065 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1066 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1068 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1070 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1071 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1072 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1073 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1074 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1075 /// relevant updates.
1077 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1078 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1079 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1080 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1081 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1082 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1083 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1084 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1086 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1087 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1088 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1089 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1093 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1095 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1097 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1098 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1099 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1100 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1102 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1104 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1105 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1107 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1108 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1109 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1112 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1113 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1115 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1116 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1118 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1121 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1122 route: route.clone(),
1123 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1124 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1125 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1127 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1128 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1129 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1130 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1131 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1132 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1133 // something else in case we will resend later!
1134 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1137 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1138 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1139 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1140 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1141 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1142 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1143 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1151 } else { unreachable!(); }
1155 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1156 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1157 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1161 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1163 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1164 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1166 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1168 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1169 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1170 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1171 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1173 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1174 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1175 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1177 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1178 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1179 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1180 } else { unreachable!(); })
1185 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1186 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1187 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1189 Err(_) => { return; }
1192 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1193 // lock before add_update_monitor
1194 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1196 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1198 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1199 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1200 Err(_) => { return; },
1201 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1205 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1206 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1207 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1208 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1210 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1215 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1217 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1220 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1222 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1230 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1231 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1233 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1235 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1237 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1238 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1240 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1241 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1242 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1243 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1244 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1248 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1250 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1251 /// Will likely generate further events.
1252 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1253 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1255 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1256 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1257 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1259 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1260 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1262 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1263 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1264 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1265 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1267 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1268 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1269 match forward_info {
1270 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1271 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1272 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1273 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1274 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1276 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1278 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1279 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1280 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1281 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1282 // problem, not ours.
1289 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1290 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1291 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1292 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1293 match forward_info {
1294 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1295 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1296 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1297 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1298 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1299 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1301 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1303 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1304 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1306 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1308 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1309 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1314 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1316 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1317 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1318 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1319 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1320 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1321 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1322 // this channel currently :/.
1328 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1329 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1330 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1332 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1333 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1335 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1337 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1338 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1339 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1342 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1344 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1345 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1346 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1347 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1348 // messages when we can.
1349 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1350 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1351 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1358 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1359 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1362 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1363 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1364 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1365 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1366 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1367 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1369 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1370 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1371 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1372 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1373 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1375 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1377 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1379 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1380 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1381 Err(_) => { continue; },
1385 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1386 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1389 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1390 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1391 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1392 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1393 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1394 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1395 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1397 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1405 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1406 match forward_info {
1407 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1408 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1409 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1410 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1411 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1413 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1415 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1417 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1418 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1419 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1422 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1423 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1431 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1433 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1434 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1438 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1439 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1440 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1441 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1445 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1446 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1447 events.append(&mut new_events);
1450 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1451 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1452 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1454 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1455 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1456 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1457 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1458 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1459 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1460 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1461 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1462 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1467 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1469 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1470 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1475 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1476 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1477 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1478 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1479 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1480 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1481 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1483 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1484 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1485 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1486 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1487 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1488 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1489 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1490 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1496 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1497 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1498 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1499 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1500 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1501 /// still-available channels.
1502 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1503 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1504 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1505 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1509 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1510 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1511 match &onion_error {
1512 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1514 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1516 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1517 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1518 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1519 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1520 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1521 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1522 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1527 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1528 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1529 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1530 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1532 error_code: onion_error_code
1536 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1540 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1541 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1542 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1543 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1545 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1546 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1547 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1548 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1549 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1550 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1552 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1558 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1559 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1560 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1561 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1562 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1563 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1565 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1566 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1567 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1571 let mut forward_event = None;
1572 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1573 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1575 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1576 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1577 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1580 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1583 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1584 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1585 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1586 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1587 time_forwardable: time
1594 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1595 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1596 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1598 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1599 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1600 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1601 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1602 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1603 /// motivated attackers.
1605 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1606 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1607 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1609 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1611 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1612 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1613 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1614 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1615 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1616 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1617 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1618 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1619 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1620 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1621 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1622 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1624 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1630 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1631 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1633 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1634 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1635 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1636 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1640 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1641 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1642 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1644 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1645 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1647 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1648 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1649 // why it's missing.
1654 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1655 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1656 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1657 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1658 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1659 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1660 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1661 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1663 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1667 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1668 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1669 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1670 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1671 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1672 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1673 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1674 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1682 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1683 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1684 //TODO: Do something with e?
1688 } else { unreachable!(); }
1694 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1697 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1698 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1699 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1702 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1703 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1705 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1706 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1707 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1708 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1709 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1710 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1713 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1714 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1715 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1716 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1717 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1718 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1719 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1720 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1722 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1723 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1724 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1725 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1726 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1727 // on-chain confirmations.
1728 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1729 // should be written.
1730 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1731 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1733 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1734 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1735 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1741 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1744 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1745 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1746 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1748 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1750 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1751 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1752 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1753 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1758 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1759 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1760 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1761 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1762 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1767 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1771 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1776 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1777 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1778 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1779 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1782 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1783 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1784 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1787 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1788 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1789 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1790 msg: announcement_sigs,
1793 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1801 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1803 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1804 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1806 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1808 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1809 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1813 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1814 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1815 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1818 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1819 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1820 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1821 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1822 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1826 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1827 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1829 entry.insert(channel);
1835 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1836 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1837 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1838 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1839 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1841 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1842 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1844 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1845 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1850 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1851 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1852 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1853 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1854 output_script: output_script,
1855 user_channel_id: user_id,
1860 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1861 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1862 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1863 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1864 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1866 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1867 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1869 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1874 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1875 // lock before add_update_monitor
1876 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1878 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1879 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1880 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1881 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1882 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1885 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1886 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1887 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1888 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1889 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1890 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1894 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1895 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1896 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1897 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1898 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1900 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1901 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1902 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1911 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1912 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1913 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1914 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1915 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1917 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1918 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1920 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1921 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1922 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
1924 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1929 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1930 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1931 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1932 user_channel_id: user_id,
1937 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1938 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1939 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1940 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1942 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1945 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1946 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1947 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
1948 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
1949 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
1950 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
1951 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
1952 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
1953 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
1954 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
1955 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
1956 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1957 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1958 msg: announcement_sigs,
1963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1967 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1968 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1969 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1972 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1974 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1975 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1977 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1978 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1980 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1984 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
1985 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
1986 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1990 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1991 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1992 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1994 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1995 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
1997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2000 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2001 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2003 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2004 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2005 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2006 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2014 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2015 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2016 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2018 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2020 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2021 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2023 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2024 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2025 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2026 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2031 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2032 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2033 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2034 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2035 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2036 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2037 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2039 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2040 } else { (tx, None) }
2042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2045 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2046 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2047 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2049 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2050 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2051 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2052 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2060 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2061 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2062 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2063 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2065 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2066 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2067 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2068 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2070 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2071 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2073 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2075 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2076 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2078 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2079 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2080 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2081 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2082 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2083 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2084 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2085 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2086 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2087 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2088 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2089 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2090 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2091 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2093 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2094 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2095 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2096 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2100 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2101 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2102 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2103 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2104 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2105 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2110 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2117 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2118 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2120 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2121 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2123 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2124 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2126 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2128 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2131 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2135 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2136 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2137 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2138 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2139 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2140 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2141 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2143 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2150 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2151 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2152 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2153 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2154 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2155 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2156 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2158 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2159 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2161 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2168 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2169 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2170 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2171 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2173 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2176 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2178 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2179 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2180 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2182 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2183 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2184 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2186 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2187 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2188 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2189 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2190 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2191 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2192 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2193 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2195 commitment_signed: msg,
2199 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2200 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2201 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2207 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2212 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2213 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2214 let mut forward_event = None;
2215 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2216 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2217 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2218 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2220 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2221 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2223 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2226 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2231 match forward_event {
2233 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2234 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2235 time_forwardable: time
2243 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2244 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2245 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2246 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2247 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2249 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2250 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2252 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2253 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2254 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2255 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2256 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2257 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2258 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2260 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2263 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2264 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2265 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2269 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2270 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2271 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2275 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2277 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2280 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2281 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2283 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2288 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2289 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2290 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2291 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2293 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2296 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2298 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2303 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2304 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2305 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2307 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2309 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2310 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2312 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2313 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2316 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2317 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2318 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2320 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2321 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2322 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2323 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2324 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2327 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2329 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2330 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2331 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2332 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2333 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2334 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2335 contents: announcement,
2337 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2345 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2346 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2347 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2349 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2351 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2354 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2355 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2356 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2357 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2358 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2359 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2360 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2361 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2362 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2364 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2365 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2367 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2368 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2371 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2373 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2377 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2378 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2380 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2385 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2386 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2388 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2394 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2398 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2403 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2405 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2415 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2416 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2417 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2418 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2420 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2421 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2422 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2424 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2425 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2427 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2430 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2431 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2433 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2434 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2436 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2437 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2439 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2440 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2441 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2443 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2446 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2447 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2448 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2449 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2450 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2451 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2452 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2453 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2463 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2464 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2465 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2470 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2471 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2472 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2473 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2474 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2476 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2477 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2478 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2479 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2480 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2482 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2483 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2488 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2489 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2490 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2495 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2496 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2497 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2498 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2499 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2501 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2502 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2503 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2504 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2505 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2507 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2508 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2513 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2514 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2515 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2520 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2521 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2522 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2523 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2524 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2525 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2527 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2528 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2529 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2530 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2531 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2532 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2533 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2534 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2535 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2536 msg: funding_locked,
2538 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2539 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2540 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2541 msg: announcement_sigs,
2544 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2545 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2546 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2547 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2548 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2552 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2553 for tx in txn_matched {
2554 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2555 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2556 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2557 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2558 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2560 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2561 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2562 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2563 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2564 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2565 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2574 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2575 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2576 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2578 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2579 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2580 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2581 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2582 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2583 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2584 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2593 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2594 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2596 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2597 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2600 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2601 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2602 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2603 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2605 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2606 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2607 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2608 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2609 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2610 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2611 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2612 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2614 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2615 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2616 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2626 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2627 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2629 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2630 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2634 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2635 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2636 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2637 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2639 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2640 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2644 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2645 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2646 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2648 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2649 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2653 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2654 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2655 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2657 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2658 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2662 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2663 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2664 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2666 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2667 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2671 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2672 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2673 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2675 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2676 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2680 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2681 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2682 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2684 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2685 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2689 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2690 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2691 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2693 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2694 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2698 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2699 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2700 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2703 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2707 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2708 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2709 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2711 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2712 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2716 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2717 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2718 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2720 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2721 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2725 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2726 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2727 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2729 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2730 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2734 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2735 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2736 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2739 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2743 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2744 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2745 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2747 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2748 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2752 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2753 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2754 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2756 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2757 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2761 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2762 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2763 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2765 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2766 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2770 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2771 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2772 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2774 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2775 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2779 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2780 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2781 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2782 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2784 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2785 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2786 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2787 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2788 if no_connection_possible {
2789 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2790 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2791 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2792 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2793 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2795 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2796 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2797 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2807 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2808 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2809 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2810 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2811 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2812 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2813 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2814 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2816 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2817 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2818 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2826 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2828 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2829 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2830 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2831 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2832 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2833 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2834 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2835 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2836 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2837 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2838 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2839 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2840 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2841 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2842 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2846 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2847 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2849 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2850 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2851 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2856 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey) {
2857 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2859 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2860 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2861 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2862 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2863 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2864 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2865 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2866 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2867 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2868 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2872 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2873 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2874 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2880 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2883 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2884 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2886 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2887 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2888 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2889 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2893 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2898 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2899 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2901 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2902 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2903 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2904 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2905 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2906 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2907 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2908 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2913 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2914 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2915 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2916 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2917 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2918 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2919 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2920 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2921 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2926 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2929 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2931 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2933 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2935 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2942 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2943 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2944 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2945 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2946 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2947 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2952 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2953 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2955 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2957 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2959 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2961 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2968 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
2969 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
2970 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2971 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2972 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2973 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2978 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
2981 incoming_packet_shared_secret
2984 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
2985 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2987 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
2989 hop_data.write(writer)?;
2991 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
2993 route.write(writer)?;
2994 session_priv.write(writer)?;
2995 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3002 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3003 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3004 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3005 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3006 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3007 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3008 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3009 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3011 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3016 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3017 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3019 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3023 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3025 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3026 data.write(writer)?;
3033 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3034 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3035 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3036 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3037 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3038 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3039 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3041 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3046 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3047 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3049 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3051 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3052 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3053 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3055 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3057 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3058 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3065 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3066 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3067 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3068 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3069 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3070 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3071 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3073 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3074 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3075 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3077 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3082 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
3083 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3084 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3086 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3087 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3089 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3090 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3091 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3093 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3094 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3095 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3096 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3097 unfunded_channels += 1;
3100 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3101 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3102 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3103 channel.write(writer)?;
3107 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3108 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3109 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3110 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3111 for forward in pending_forwards {
3112 forward.write(writer)?;
3116 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3117 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3118 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3119 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3120 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3121 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3122 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3130 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3132 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3134 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3135 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3136 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3137 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3138 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3139 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3140 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3141 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3142 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3143 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3144 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3145 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
3146 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3147 /// deserialization.
3148 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3150 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3152 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3153 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3154 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3156 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3157 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3158 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3159 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3161 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3162 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3163 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3164 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3165 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3166 /// deserialization.
3167 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3168 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3169 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3170 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3172 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3173 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3175 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3176 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3177 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3178 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3180 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3182 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3185 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner>) {
3186 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3187 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3188 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3189 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3190 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3193 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3194 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3195 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3197 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3199 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3200 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3201 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3202 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3203 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3204 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3205 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3206 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3209 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3210 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3211 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3212 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3213 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3214 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3215 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3216 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3217 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3219 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3220 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3222 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3225 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3229 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3230 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3231 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3235 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3236 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3237 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3238 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3239 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3240 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3241 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3242 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3244 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3247 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3248 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3249 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3250 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3251 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3252 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3253 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3254 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3256 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3259 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3261 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3262 monitor: args.monitor,
3263 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3265 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3266 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3267 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3269 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3274 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3276 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3278 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3279 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3280 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3281 logger: args.logger,
3282 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3285 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3286 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3287 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3288 //connection or two.
3291 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))