1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
46 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
48 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
49 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
50 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
51 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
52 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
80 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
82 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
83 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
84 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
85 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
86 crate::sign::KeysManager,
90 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
91 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
94 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
97 use crate::prelude::*;
99 use core::cell::RefCell;
101 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
102 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
103 use core::time::Duration;
104 use core::ops::Deref;
106 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
107 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
108 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
110 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
112 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
113 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
114 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
116 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
117 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
118 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
119 // before we forward it.
121 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
122 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
123 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
124 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
125 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
127 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
130 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
131 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
133 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
134 /// do with the HTLC.
135 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
136 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
138 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
139 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
140 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
141 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
142 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
143 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
145 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
147 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
148 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
150 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
151 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
152 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
153 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
154 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
156 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
157 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
158 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
159 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
160 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
161 /// blinded path was not used.
163 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
164 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
165 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
167 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
168 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
169 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
170 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
173 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
175 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
176 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
177 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
178 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
179 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
180 requires_blinded_error: bool,
182 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
183 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
184 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
186 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
187 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
189 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
190 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
191 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
192 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
193 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
194 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
195 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
197 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
198 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
199 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
200 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
202 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
203 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
204 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
206 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
207 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
208 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
209 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
210 requires_blinded_error: bool,
214 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
215 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
216 pub struct BlindedForward {
217 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
218 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
219 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
220 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
221 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
222 /// the introduction node.
223 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
226 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
227 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
228 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
230 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
231 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
238 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
240 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
242 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
243 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
244 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
245 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
247 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
248 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
249 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
250 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
251 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
253 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
255 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
256 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
257 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
259 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
260 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
261 /// it along another path).
263 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
264 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
265 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
266 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
267 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
268 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
269 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
270 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
271 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
273 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
276 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
278 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
280 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
283 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
284 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
285 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
286 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
289 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
290 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
291 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
292 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
293 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
296 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
297 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
298 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
300 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
301 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
302 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
305 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
306 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
308 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
309 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
310 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
315 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
318 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
323 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
327 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
328 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
329 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
330 pub enum BlindedFailure {
331 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
332 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 FromIntroductionNode,
334 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
335 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
339 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
340 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
341 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
342 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
343 short_channel_id: u64,
344 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
346 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
347 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
348 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
349 channel_id: ChannelId,
351 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
352 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
357 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
359 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
360 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
361 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
363 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
364 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
367 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
368 struct ClaimableHTLC {
369 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
371 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
373 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
374 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
375 sender_intended_value: u64,
376 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
378 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
379 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
380 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
381 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
383 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
384 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
387 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
388 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
389 events::ClaimedHTLC {
390 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
391 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
392 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
393 value_msat: val.value,
394 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
399 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
400 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
402 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
403 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
404 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
407 /// Number of bytes in the id.
408 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
411 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
412 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
417 impl Readable for PaymentId {
418 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
419 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
424 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
425 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
426 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
430 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
432 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
433 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
434 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
436 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
437 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
442 impl Readable for InterceptId {
443 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
444 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
449 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
450 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
451 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
452 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
453 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
456 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
458 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
459 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
460 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
462 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
463 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
468 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
469 (0, short_channel_id, required),
470 (2, htlc_id, required),
472 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
473 (0, session_priv, required),
478 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
479 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
480 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
481 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
482 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
485 session_priv: SecretKey,
486 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
487 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
488 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
489 payment_id: PaymentId,
492 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
493 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
494 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
496 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
498 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
500 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
503 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
504 payment_id.hash(hasher);
505 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
511 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
513 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
514 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
515 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
516 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
517 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
518 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
522 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
523 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
524 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
525 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
526 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
527 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
529 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
535 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
536 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
538 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
539 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
540 pub enum FailureCode {
541 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
542 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
543 TemporaryNodeFailure,
544 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
545 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
546 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
547 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
548 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
549 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
550 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
551 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
552 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
553 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
555 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
556 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
557 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
560 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
561 fn into(self) -> u16 {
563 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
564 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
565 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
566 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
571 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
572 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
573 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
574 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
575 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
577 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 err: msgs::LightningError,
579 closes_channel: bool,
580 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
582 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
584 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
586 err: LightningError {
588 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
589 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
595 closes_channel: false,
596 shutdown_finish: None,
600 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
601 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
604 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
605 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
606 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
607 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
608 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
609 // commitment upon reconnecting.
610 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
612 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
615 err: LightningError { err, action },
616 closes_channel: true,
617 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
621 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
624 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
626 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
627 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
631 log_level: Level::Warn,
634 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
636 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
638 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
640 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
641 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
648 closes_channel: false,
649 shutdown_finish: None,
653 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
658 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
659 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
660 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
661 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
662 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
664 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
665 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
666 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
667 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
668 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
669 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
670 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
672 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
676 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
677 struct ClaimingPayment {
679 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
680 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
681 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
682 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
683 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
685 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
686 (0, amount_msat, required),
687 (2, payment_purpose, required),
688 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
689 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
690 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
691 (9, onion_fields, option),
694 struct ClaimablePayment {
695 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
696 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
697 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
700 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
701 struct ClaimablePayments {
702 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
703 /// failed/claimed by the user.
705 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
706 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
708 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
709 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
710 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
712 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
713 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
714 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
715 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
718 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
719 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
720 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
721 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
723 enum BackgroundEvent {
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
725 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
726 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
727 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
729 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
730 /// are regenerated on startup.
731 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
732 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
733 /// channel to continue normal operation.
735 /// In general this should be used rather than
736 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
737 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
738 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
740 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
741 /// are regenerated on startup.
742 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
743 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
744 funding_txo: OutPoint,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
746 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
748 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
749 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
751 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
752 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
753 channel_id: ChannelId,
758 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
759 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
760 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
761 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
762 /// event can be generated.
763 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
764 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
765 /// operation of another channel.
767 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
768 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
769 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
770 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
772 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
773 event: events::Event,
774 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
776 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
777 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
778 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
780 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
781 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
782 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
783 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
784 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
786 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
787 /// stored for later processing.
788 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
789 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
790 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
791 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
792 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
796 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
797 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
798 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
799 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
800 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
801 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
802 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
803 (4, blocking_action, required),
804 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
805 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
806 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
808 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
809 (0, event, upgradable_required),
810 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
811 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
812 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
813 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
814 // downgrades to prior versions.
815 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
819 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
820 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
821 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
822 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
823 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
824 channel_id: ChannelId,
827 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
828 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
829 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
830 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
831 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
832 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
833 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
837 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
838 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
839 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
840 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
841 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
842 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
844 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
845 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
846 channel_id: ChannelId,
847 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
852 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
853 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
854 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
855 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
856 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
861 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
862 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
866 /// State we hold per-peer.
867 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
868 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
870 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
871 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
872 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
874 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
875 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
876 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
877 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
878 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
879 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
880 latest_features: InitFeatures,
881 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
882 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
883 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
884 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
885 /// user but which have not yet completed.
887 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
888 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
889 /// for a missing channel.
890 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
891 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
892 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
894 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
895 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
896 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
897 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
899 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
900 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
901 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
902 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
903 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
904 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
905 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
906 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
907 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
908 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
909 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
910 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
911 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
912 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
913 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
914 pub is_connected: bool,
917 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
918 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
919 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
920 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
921 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
922 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
925 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
927 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
928 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
929 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
930 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
931 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
932 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
935 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
936 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
939 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
940 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
941 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
944 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
945 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
946 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
947 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
951 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
952 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
953 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
954 /// The original OpenChannel message.
955 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
956 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
957 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
960 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
961 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
962 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
964 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
965 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
967 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
970 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
971 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
972 struct PendingInboundPayment {
973 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
974 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
975 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
976 /// this payment being removed.
978 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
979 user_payment_id: u64,
980 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
981 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
982 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
985 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
986 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
987 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
988 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
989 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
990 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
991 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
992 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
994 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
995 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
996 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1004 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1007 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1008 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1009 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1014 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1015 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1016 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1017 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1018 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1019 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1020 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1021 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1022 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1024 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1025 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1026 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1035 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1038 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1039 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1040 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1045 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1047 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1049 pub trait AChannelManager {
1050 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1051 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1053 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1055 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1057 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1059 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1060 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1061 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1062 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1063 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1064 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1065 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1066 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1067 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1068 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1069 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1071 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1073 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1075 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1076 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1077 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1078 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1079 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1080 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1081 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1082 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1083 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1084 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1085 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1088 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1089 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1091 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1092 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1093 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1094 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1095 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1100 type Watch = M::Target;
1102 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1104 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1106 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1108 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1109 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1111 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1113 type Router = R::Target;
1115 type Logger = L::Target;
1117 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1120 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1121 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1123 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1124 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1126 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1127 /// closing channels
1128 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1129 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1130 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1131 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1133 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1134 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1136 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1137 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1138 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1139 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1140 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1141 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1143 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1144 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1146 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1148 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1149 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1150 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1151 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1152 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1154 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1155 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1156 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1158 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1159 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1160 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1162 /// # Initialization
1164 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1165 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1166 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1167 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1168 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1171 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1172 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1173 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1174 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1175 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1176 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1177 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1178 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1180 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1183 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1184 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1185 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1186 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1188 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1190 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1191 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1192 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1193 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1195 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1196 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1197 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1198 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1199 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1200 /// # mut reader: R,
1201 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1202 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1203 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1204 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1207 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1208 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1209 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1210 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1213 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1214 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1215 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1216 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1217 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1219 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1220 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1222 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1225 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1226 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1227 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1235 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1236 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1237 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1238 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1239 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1240 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1241 /// as documented by those traits
1242 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1244 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1245 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1246 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1248 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1249 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1251 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1252 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1253 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1254 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1258 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1259 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1260 /// currently open channels.
1263 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1265 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1266 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1267 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1268 /// for details in channels {
1269 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1274 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1275 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1276 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1277 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1279 /// ## Opening Channels
1281 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1282 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1283 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1286 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1287 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1288 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1289 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1291 /// # trait Wallet {
1292 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1293 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1294 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1297 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1298 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1299 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1300 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1301 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1302 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1303 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1306 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1307 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1308 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1309 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1310 /// user_channel_id, ..
1312 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1313 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1314 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1316 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1317 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1319 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1320 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1323 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1324 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1326 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1327 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1330 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1331 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1332 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1340 /// ## Accepting Channels
1342 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1343 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1344 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1347 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1348 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1349 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1351 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1353 /// # unimplemented!()
1356 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1357 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1358 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1359 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1360 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1361 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1362 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1364 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1365 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1370 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1371 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1372 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1374 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1375 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1384 /// ## Closing Channels
1386 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1387 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1388 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1389 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1390 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1393 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1394 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1395 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1396 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1398 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1399 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1401 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1402 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1403 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1404 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1407 /// // On the event processing thread
1408 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1409 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1410 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1411 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1421 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1422 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1423 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1424 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1425 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1428 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1429 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1430 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1431 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1433 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1435 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1436 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1437 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1438 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1439 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1440 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1442 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1443 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1444 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1447 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1448 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1450 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1451 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1452 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1453 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1454 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1456 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1457 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1460 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1463 /// // On the event processing thread
1464 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1465 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1466 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1467 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1468 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1469 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1471 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1472 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1474 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1475 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1476 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1477 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1482 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1483 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1484 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1492 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1493 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1496 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1497 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1498 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1499 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1501 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1502 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1503 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1505 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1506 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1507 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1508 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1509 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1510 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1512 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1513 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1516 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1517 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1519 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1521 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1522 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1523 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1529 /// // On the event processing thread
1530 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1531 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1532 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1539 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1541 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1542 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1543 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1544 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1545 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1546 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1549 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1550 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1551 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1553 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1554 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1555 /// let offer = channel_manager
1556 /// .create_offer_builder()?
1558 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1559 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1560 /// # let offer = builder
1561 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1562 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1564 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1566 /// // On the event processing thread
1567 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1568 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1569 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1570 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1571 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1573 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1574 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1579 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1580 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1589 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1590 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1591 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1594 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1595 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1596 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1598 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1599 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1600 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1602 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1603 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1604 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1605 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1607 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1608 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1611 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1612 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1614 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1616 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1620 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1622 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1624 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1628 /// // On the event processing thread
1629 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1630 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1631 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1632 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1639 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1641 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1642 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1643 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1644 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1647 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1648 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1649 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1650 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1652 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1653 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1654 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1655 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1656 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1657 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1658 /// let refund = channel_manager
1659 /// .create_refund_builder(
1660 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1663 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1664 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1665 /// # let refund = builder
1666 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1667 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1669 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1671 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1672 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1674 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1676 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1680 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1682 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1684 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1688 /// // On the event processing thread
1689 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1690 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1691 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1699 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1700 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1703 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1704 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1705 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1707 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1708 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1709 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1710 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1711 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1712 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1715 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1718 /// // On the event processing thread
1719 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1720 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1721 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1722 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1723 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1724 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1726 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1727 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1732 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1733 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1734 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1744 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1745 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1746 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1747 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1749 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1750 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1751 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1752 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1753 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1754 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1755 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1756 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1757 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1759 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1760 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1761 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1763 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1765 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1766 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1767 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1768 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1769 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1771 /// # DoS Mitigation
1773 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1774 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1775 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1776 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1778 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1779 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1780 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1784 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1785 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1786 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1787 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1788 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1790 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1791 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1792 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1793 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1794 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1795 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1796 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1797 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1798 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1799 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1800 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1801 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1802 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1803 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1804 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1805 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1806 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1807 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1808 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1809 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1810 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1811 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1812 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1813 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1814 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1815 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1816 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1817 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1818 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1819 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1820 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1821 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1822 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1823 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1824 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1825 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1826 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1827 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1828 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1829 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1832 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1833 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1834 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1835 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1836 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1840 // `pending_offers_messages`
1842 // `total_consistency_lock`
1844 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1846 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1848 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1850 // |__`per_peer_state`
1852 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1854 // |__`claimable_payments`
1856 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1860 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1862 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1864 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1868 // |__`pending_events`
1870 // |__`pending_background_events`
1872 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1874 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1875 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1876 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1877 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1878 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1879 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1883 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1884 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1885 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1891 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1893 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1895 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1896 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1898 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1899 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1900 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1901 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1903 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1904 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1906 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1907 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1908 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1909 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1910 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1911 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1912 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1913 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1915 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1917 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1918 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1920 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1922 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1923 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1924 /// and via the classic SCID.
1926 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1927 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1929 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1931 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1933 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1934 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1935 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1937 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1938 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1940 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1942 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1943 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1944 /// and via the classic SCID.
1946 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1947 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1949 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1950 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1952 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1953 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1955 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1956 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1958 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1959 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1960 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1961 /// active channel list on load.
1963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1964 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1966 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1968 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1969 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1970 /// the handling of the events.
1972 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1973 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1976 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1977 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1978 /// would break backwards compatability.
1979 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1980 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1981 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1983 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1985 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1987 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1989 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1991 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1992 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1993 /// confirmation depth.
1995 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1996 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1997 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1999 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2001 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2003 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2005 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2007 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2009 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2010 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2011 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2013 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2014 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2016 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2017 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2018 /// keeping additional state.
2019 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2021 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2022 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2023 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2024 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2026 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2027 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2029 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2030 /// are currently open with that peer.
2032 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2033 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2036 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2038 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2039 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2040 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2041 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2042 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2044 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2045 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2046 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2047 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2048 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2050 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2051 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2053 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2054 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2055 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2056 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2057 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2059 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2060 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2062 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2063 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2064 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2065 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2066 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2068 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2070 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2072 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2073 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2074 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2075 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2076 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2077 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2078 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2079 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2080 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2081 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2082 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2084 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2085 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2086 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2088 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2090 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2091 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2093 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2095 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2096 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2100 signer_provider: SP,
2105 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2107 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2108 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2109 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2110 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2111 pub struct ChainParameters {
2112 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2113 pub network: Network,
2115 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2117 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2118 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2121 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2125 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2126 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2129 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2130 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2131 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2132 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2133 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2134 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2136 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2137 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2138 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2139 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2140 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2141 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2143 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2144 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2147 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2148 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2149 /// events to handle.
2151 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2152 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2154 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2155 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2158 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2159 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2160 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2161 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2163 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2164 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2165 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2166 should_persist: move || {
2167 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2168 // processing and return that.
2169 let notify = persist_check();
2170 match (notify, force_notify) {
2171 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2172 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2173 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2174 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2175 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2178 _read_guard: read_guard,
2182 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2183 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2184 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2185 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2186 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2187 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2189 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2190 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2191 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2192 should_persist: persist_check,
2193 _read_guard: read_guard,
2198 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2199 fn drop(&mut self) {
2200 match (self.should_persist)() {
2201 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2202 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2203 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2205 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2206 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2207 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2212 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2213 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2215 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2217 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2218 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2219 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2220 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2221 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2223 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2224 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2226 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2228 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2229 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2230 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2231 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2232 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2233 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2234 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2235 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2236 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2237 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2238 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2239 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2240 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2242 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2243 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2245 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2246 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2247 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2248 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2250 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2251 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2252 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2253 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2254 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2255 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2257 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2259 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2260 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2262 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2264 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2265 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2267 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2268 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2269 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2271 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2272 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2273 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2275 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2276 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2277 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2278 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2280 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2281 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2282 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2284 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2285 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2286 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2288 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2289 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2290 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2291 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2292 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2293 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2294 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2295 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2296 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2297 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2298 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2301 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2302 /// to better separate parameters.
2303 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2304 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2305 /// The node_id of our counterparty
2306 pub node_id: PublicKey,
2307 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2308 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2309 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2310 pub features: InitFeatures,
2311 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2312 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2313 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2315 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2317 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2318 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2319 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2320 /// payments to us through this channel.
2321 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2322 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2323 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2324 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2325 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2326 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2327 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2330 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2331 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2332 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2333 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2334 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2335 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2336 /// lifetime of the channel.
2337 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2338 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2339 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2340 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2341 /// our counterparty already.
2342 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2343 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2345 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2346 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2347 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2348 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2350 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2351 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2353 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2354 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2356 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2357 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2358 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2359 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2360 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2361 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2362 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2363 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2364 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2367 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2369 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2370 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2371 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2372 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2373 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2374 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2375 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2377 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2378 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2380 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2381 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2382 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2383 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2384 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2385 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2386 /// this value on chain.
2388 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2390 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2392 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2393 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2394 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2395 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2396 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2397 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
2398 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2400 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2401 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2402 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2403 pub user_channel_id: u128,
2404 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2405 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2407 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2408 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2409 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2410 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2411 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2413 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2414 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2415 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2416 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2418 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2419 pub balance_msat: u64,
2420 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2421 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2422 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2423 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2425 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2427 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2428 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2429 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2430 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2431 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2432 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2433 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2434 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2436 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2437 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2438 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2439 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2440 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2441 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2442 /// route which is valid.
2443 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2444 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2445 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2446 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2447 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2448 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2450 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2451 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2452 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2453 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2454 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2455 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2456 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2457 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2460 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2462 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2463 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2464 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2465 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2466 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2468 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2469 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2470 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2471 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2472 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2473 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2474 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2476 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2477 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2478 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2479 pub is_outbound: bool,
2480 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2481 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2482 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2483 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2484 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2486 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2487 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2488 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2489 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2490 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2491 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2492 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2494 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2495 pub is_usable: bool,
2496 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2497 pub is_public: bool,
2498 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2499 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2500 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2501 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2502 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2503 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2505 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2506 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2507 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2509 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2510 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2511 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2513 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2514 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2517 impl ChannelDetails {
2518 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2519 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2520 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2522 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2523 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2524 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2525 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2528 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2529 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2530 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2532 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2533 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2534 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2535 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2538 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2539 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2540 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2543 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2544 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2546 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2547 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2548 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2550 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2551 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2552 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2553 features: latest_features,
2554 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2555 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2556 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2557 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2558 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2559 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2560 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2561 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2562 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2563 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2565 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2566 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2567 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2568 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2569 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2570 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2571 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2572 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2573 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2574 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2575 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2576 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2577 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2578 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2579 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2580 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2581 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2582 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2583 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2584 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2585 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2586 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2587 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2588 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2589 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2590 config: Some(context.config()),
2591 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2592 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2593 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2598 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2599 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2600 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2601 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2602 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2603 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2604 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2605 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2606 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2608 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2610 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2611 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2613 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2614 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2615 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2616 /// to drop the channel.
2620 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2621 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2622 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2623 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2624 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2626 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2627 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2628 payment_id: PaymentId,
2630 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2632 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2633 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2634 payment_id: PaymentId,
2635 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2637 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2638 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2639 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2642 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2643 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2644 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2646 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2647 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2648 payment_id: PaymentId,
2649 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2650 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2651 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2653 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2654 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2655 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2657 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2658 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2659 payment_id: PaymentId,
2660 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2661 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2665 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2667 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2669 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2670 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2671 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2672 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2674 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2675 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2676 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2679 macro_rules! handle_error {
2680 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2681 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2682 // entering the macro.
2683 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2684 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2688 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2689 let mut msg_event = None;
2691 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2692 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2693 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2694 let logger = WithContext::from(
2695 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2697 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2699 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2700 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2701 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2702 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2707 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2710 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2712 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2713 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2714 action: err.action.clone()
2718 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2719 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2720 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2721 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2722 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2726 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2733 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2734 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2735 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2736 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2738 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2739 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2740 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2742 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2743 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2744 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2745 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2746 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2748 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2749 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2751 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2755 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2756 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2757 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2759 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2760 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2762 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2763 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2765 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2766 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2767 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2768 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2769 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2770 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2772 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2777 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2778 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2780 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2781 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2783 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2784 match $channel_phase {
2785 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2786 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2788 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2789 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2791 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2792 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2794 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2795 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2796 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2798 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2799 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2800 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2806 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2807 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2811 let key = *$entry.key();
2812 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2814 $entry.remove_entry();
2822 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2823 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2827 let key = *$entry.key();
2828 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2830 $entry.remove_entry();
2838 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2839 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2841 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2842 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2848 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2849 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2850 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2851 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2852 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2854 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2855 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2856 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2857 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2858 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2859 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2860 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2861 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2862 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2863 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2868 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2869 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2870 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2871 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2872 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2873 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2874 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2875 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2876 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2877 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2879 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2884 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2885 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2886 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2887 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2888 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2889 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2890 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2891 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2892 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2894 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2899 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2900 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2901 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2902 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2903 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2904 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2905 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2906 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2907 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2908 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2909 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2910 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2912 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2913 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2914 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2920 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2921 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2923 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2924 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2925 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2926 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2927 updates.announcement_sigs);
2928 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2929 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2932 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2933 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2934 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2935 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2937 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2938 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2939 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2940 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2941 let mut batch_completed = false;
2942 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2943 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2944 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2945 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2947 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2948 channel_state.2 = true;
2950 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2952 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2954 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2957 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2958 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2959 if batch_completed {
2960 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2961 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2962 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2963 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2964 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2965 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2966 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2967 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2968 chan.set_batch_ready();
2969 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2970 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2974 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2975 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2976 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2981 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2983 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2984 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2986 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2987 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2989 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2990 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2991 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2992 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2997 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2998 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2999 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
3000 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
3002 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
3003 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
3004 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
3005 panic!("{}", err_str);
3007 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
3008 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
3009 &$chan.context.channel_id());
3012 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3018 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3019 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3020 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3022 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3023 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3024 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3025 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3026 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3027 // filter for uniqueness here.
3028 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3029 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3030 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3031 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3033 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3034 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3036 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3037 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3038 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3044 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3045 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3046 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3047 while !processed_all_events {
3048 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3055 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3056 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3057 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3059 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3060 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3061 result = $self.process_background_events();
3063 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3064 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3065 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3066 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3070 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3071 let num_events = pending_events.len();
3072 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3073 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3076 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3078 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3079 $event_to_handle = event;
3081 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3082 post_event_actions.push(action);
3087 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3088 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3089 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3090 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3091 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3092 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3095 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3096 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3097 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3098 processed_all_events = false;
3102 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3103 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3104 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3106 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3107 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3108 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3114 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3116 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3117 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3118 ES::Target: EntropySource,
3119 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3120 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3121 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3125 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3127 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3129 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3130 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3132 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3134 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3135 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3136 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3139 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3140 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3141 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3143 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3144 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3145 current_timestamp: u32,
3147 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3148 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3149 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3150 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3152 default_configuration: config.clone(),
3153 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3154 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3159 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3161 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3162 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3163 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3164 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3165 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3166 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3167 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3168 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3169 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3171 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3174 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3175 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3177 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3179 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3181 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3183 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3184 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3185 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3186 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3187 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3188 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3189 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3190 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3192 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3193 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3203 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3204 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3205 &self.default_configuration
3208 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3209 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3210 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3213 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3214 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3216 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3218 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3222 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3227 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3229 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3230 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3231 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3232 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3233 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3235 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3236 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3238 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3239 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3240 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3242 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3243 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3244 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3246 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3247 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3249 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3250 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3251 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3252 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3253 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3254 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3256 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3257 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3258 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3259 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3260 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3261 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3265 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3266 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3268 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3270 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3271 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3273 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3275 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3276 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3277 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3282 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3283 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3284 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3285 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3286 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3287 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3291 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3296 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3298 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3299 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3302 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3304 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3310 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3311 node_id: their_network_key,
3314 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3317 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3318 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3319 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3320 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3321 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3322 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3323 // the same channel.
3324 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3326 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3328 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3329 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3330 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3331 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3332 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3333 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3334 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3338 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3339 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3340 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3348 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3349 /// more information.
3350 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3351 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3352 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3353 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3354 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3355 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3356 // the same channel.
3357 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3359 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3360 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3361 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3362 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3363 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3364 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3365 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3366 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3374 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3375 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3377 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3378 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3380 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3381 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3382 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3383 // really wanted anyway.
3384 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3387 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3388 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3389 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3392 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3395 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3396 let context_to_details = |context| {
3397 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3399 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3401 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3402 .map(context_to_details)
3408 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3409 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3411 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3412 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3413 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3415 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3416 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3417 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3418 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3419 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3420 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3422 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3423 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3424 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3426 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3427 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3428 payment_id: *payment_id,
3429 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3430 total_msat: *total_msat,
3433 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3434 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3436 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3437 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3439 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3444 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3447 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3448 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3453 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3454 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3456 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3457 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3459 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3460 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3461 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3462 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3463 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3464 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3465 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3466 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3468 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3469 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3470 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3471 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3472 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3476 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3477 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3479 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3480 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3481 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3482 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3485 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3486 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3490 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3492 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3493 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3500 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3501 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3502 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3503 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3506 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3507 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3513 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3514 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3515 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3517 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3518 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3520 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3521 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3522 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3523 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3525 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3527 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3528 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3529 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3532 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3533 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3534 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3535 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3536 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3537 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3540 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3541 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3542 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3544 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3545 /// the channel being closed or not:
3546 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3547 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3548 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3549 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3550 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3551 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3552 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3554 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3555 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3556 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3557 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3559 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3561 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3562 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3563 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3566 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3567 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3568 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3569 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3570 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3573 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3574 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3575 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3576 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3577 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3580 let logger = WithContext::from(
3581 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3584 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3585 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3586 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3587 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3588 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3589 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3590 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3592 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3593 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3594 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3595 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3596 // ignore the result here.
3597 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3599 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3600 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3601 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3602 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3603 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3604 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3605 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3606 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3607 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3608 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3609 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3610 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3613 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3616 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3617 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3622 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3623 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3624 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3625 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3626 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3627 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3628 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3629 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3632 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3633 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3634 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3638 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3639 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3643 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3644 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3645 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3646 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3648 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3649 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3650 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3651 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3652 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3653 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3655 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3657 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3658 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3659 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3660 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3661 mem::drop(peer_state);
3662 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3664 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3665 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3666 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3668 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3669 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3670 // Unfunded channel has no update
3671 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3673 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3674 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3675 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3676 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3677 // Unfunded channel has no update
3678 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3681 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3682 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3683 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3684 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3686 (None, *peer_node_id)
3688 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3691 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3692 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3693 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3694 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3699 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3702 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3703 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3704 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3705 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3706 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3707 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3708 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3709 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3710 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3711 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3712 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3713 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3724 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3725 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3726 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3728 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3729 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3730 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3733 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3734 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3735 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3737 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3738 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3739 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3740 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3741 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3744 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3745 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3746 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3747 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3748 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3752 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3753 /// local transaction(s).
3754 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3755 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3756 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3760 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3761 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3762 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3763 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3764 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3765 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3766 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3767 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3769 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3770 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3771 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3772 // we don't have the channel here.
3773 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3776 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3777 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3778 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3779 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3780 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3781 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3782 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3783 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3784 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3785 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3786 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3787 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3789 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3792 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3793 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3794 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3796 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3797 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3798 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3804 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3805 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3806 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3807 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3809 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3810 None => return None,
3811 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3814 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3815 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3820 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3821 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3824 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3828 fn can_forward_htlc(
3829 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3830 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3831 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3832 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3835 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3837 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3838 // intercept forward.
3839 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3840 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3841 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3843 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3848 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3849 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3850 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3852 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3853 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3855 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3861 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3862 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3863 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3864 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3865 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3866 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3867 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3868 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3869 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3870 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3872 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3873 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3875 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3876 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3877 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3879 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3880 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3881 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3882 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3883 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3884 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3885 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3887 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3891 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3892 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3894 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3895 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3896 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3897 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3898 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3899 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3900 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3904 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3905 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3907 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3909 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3910 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3911 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3912 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3913 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3917 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3918 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3920 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3922 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3923 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3926 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3927 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3928 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3929 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3932 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3933 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3934 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3935 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3936 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3937 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3938 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3942 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3945 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3946 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3947 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3948 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3949 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3950 macro_rules! return_err {
3951 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3953 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3954 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3955 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3956 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3957 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3958 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3959 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3960 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3961 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3965 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3966 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3967 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3968 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3969 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3975 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3977 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3978 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3979 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3980 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3983 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3984 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3985 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3986 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3987 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3989 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3992 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3993 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3994 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3995 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3996 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
4002 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
4003 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
4004 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
4006 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
4007 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
4008 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4010 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4011 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4012 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4013 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4014 return Err(LightningError {
4015 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4016 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4019 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4020 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4022 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4023 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4024 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4027 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4028 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4029 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4030 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4032 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4033 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4034 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4036 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4037 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4038 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4039 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4040 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4041 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4042 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4046 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4049 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4050 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4051 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4052 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4054 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4055 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4056 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4057 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4058 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4061 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4062 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4064 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4065 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4066 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4067 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4068 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4069 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4070 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4071 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4073 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4074 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4075 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4077 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4079 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4086 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4087 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4088 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4089 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
4090 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
4094 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4095 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4096 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4099 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4100 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4101 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4102 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4104 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4105 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4106 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4108 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
4109 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4113 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4114 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4116 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
4117 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4118 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4120 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4123 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
4125 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4126 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4128 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4129 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4130 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4131 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4132 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4133 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4134 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4135 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4136 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4137 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4139 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4140 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
4141 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4142 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4144 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4145 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4147 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4148 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4149 Some(monitor_update) => {
4150 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4152 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4153 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4154 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4155 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4156 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4157 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4158 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4166 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4169 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4170 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4171 // `channel_by_id` map.
4172 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4173 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4177 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4178 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4180 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4185 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4187 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4188 /// fields for more info.
4190 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4191 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4193 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4195 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4196 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4197 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4198 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4199 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4201 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4202 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4203 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4204 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4205 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4207 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4208 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4209 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4210 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4212 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4214 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4215 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4216 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4218 /// In general, a path may raise:
4219 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4220 /// node public key) is specified.
4221 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4222 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4223 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4224 /// relevant updates.
4226 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4227 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4228 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4230 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4231 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4232 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4233 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4234 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4235 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4236 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4237 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4238 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4239 self.pending_outbound_payments
4240 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4241 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4242 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4245 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4246 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4247 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4248 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4249 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4250 self.pending_outbound_payments
4251 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4252 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4253 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4254 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4258 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4259 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4261 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4262 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4263 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4267 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4268 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4269 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4273 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4274 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4277 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4278 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4279 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4280 self.pending_outbound_payments
4281 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4282 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4283 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4284 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4285 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4289 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4290 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4291 /// retries are exhausted.
4293 /// # Event Generation
4295 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4296 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4298 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4299 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4300 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4302 /// # Requested Invoices
4304 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4305 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4306 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4307 /// once the invoice has been received.
4309 /// # Restart Behavior
4311 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4312 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4313 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4315 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4316 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4318 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4321 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4322 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4323 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4324 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4325 /// never reach the recipient.
4327 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4328 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4330 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4331 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4333 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4334 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4335 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4337 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4338 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4339 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4342 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4343 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4345 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4348 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4349 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4350 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4352 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4353 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4354 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4355 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4358 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4359 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4360 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4361 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4362 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4364 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4365 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4366 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4369 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4372 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4373 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4376 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4377 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4379 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4380 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4381 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4382 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4383 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4384 let payment_params =
4385 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4387 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4389 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4392 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4393 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4395 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4396 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4397 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4398 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4400 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4401 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4402 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4403 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4404 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4405 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4406 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4407 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4408 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4409 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4411 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4412 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4413 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4414 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4418 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4420 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4421 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4424 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4426 let mut res = Vec::new();
4428 for mut path in route.paths {
4429 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4430 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4431 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4432 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4433 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4436 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4439 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4440 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4442 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4444 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4445 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4450 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4453 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4458 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4459 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4460 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4462 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4463 let used_liquidity =
4464 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4466 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4467 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4469 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4472 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4477 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4478 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4479 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4486 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4487 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4488 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4489 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4490 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4491 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4492 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4493 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4494 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4496 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4497 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4499 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4500 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4501 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4503 let err = if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = $err {
4504 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4505 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4506 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4507 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4508 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4509 } else { unreachable!(); };
4511 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4512 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4513 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4516 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4517 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4519 let chan_err = ChannelError::Close(err.to_owned());
4520 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4521 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4525 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4526 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4528 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4529 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4530 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4531 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4536 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4537 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4539 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4540 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4543 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4544 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4545 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4549 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4550 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4551 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4555 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4557 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4560 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4561 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4565 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4566 funding_txo, o.get()
4568 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4569 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4570 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4571 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4572 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4573 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4576 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4583 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4584 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4585 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4589 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4591 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4592 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4594 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4595 /// across the p2p network.
4597 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4598 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4600 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4601 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4602 /// keys per-channel).
4604 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4605 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4606 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4608 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4609 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4610 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4612 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4613 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4614 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4615 /// for more details.
4617 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4618 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4619 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4620 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4623 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4625 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4626 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4628 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4629 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4630 /// signature for each channel.
4632 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4633 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4634 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4635 let mut result = Ok(());
4637 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4638 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4639 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4640 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4641 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4646 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4647 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4648 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4652 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4653 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4654 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4655 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4656 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4657 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4658 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4659 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4661 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4662 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4667 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4668 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4669 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4670 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4674 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4675 match states.entry(txid) {
4676 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4677 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4678 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4682 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4685 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4686 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4687 temporary_channel_id,
4688 counterparty_node_id,
4689 funding_transaction.clone(),
4692 let mut output_index = None;
4693 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4694 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4695 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4696 if output_index.is_some() {
4697 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4699 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4702 if output_index.is_none() {
4703 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4705 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4706 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4707 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4708 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4709 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4710 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4716 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4717 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4718 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4719 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4720 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4721 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4722 .into_iter().flatten()
4723 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4725 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4726 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4728 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4731 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4732 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4733 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4734 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4735 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4736 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4737 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4738 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4739 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4740 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4741 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4742 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4744 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4751 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4752 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4753 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4759 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4761 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4762 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4763 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4764 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4766 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4767 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4769 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4770 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4772 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4774 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4775 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4776 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4777 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4778 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4779 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4780 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4781 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4782 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4783 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4784 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4785 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4786 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4792 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4793 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4794 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4795 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4797 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4798 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4799 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4800 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4804 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4805 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4806 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4807 config.apply(config_update);
4808 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4811 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4812 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4813 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4814 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4815 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4816 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4817 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4824 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4825 debug_assert!(false);
4826 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4828 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4829 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4836 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4838 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4839 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4840 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4841 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4843 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4844 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4846 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4847 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4849 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4851 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4852 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4853 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4854 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4855 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4856 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4857 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4858 pub fn update_channel_config(
4859 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4860 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4861 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4864 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4865 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4867 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4868 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4870 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4871 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4872 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4873 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4874 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4876 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4877 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4878 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4881 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4884 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4885 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4886 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4887 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4888 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4889 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4892 let next_hop_scid = {
4893 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4894 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4895 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4898 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4899 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4900 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4901 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4902 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4905 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4907 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4908 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4909 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4912 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4913 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4914 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4915 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4916 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4923 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4924 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4925 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4928 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4929 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4930 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4931 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4934 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4936 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4937 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4938 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4939 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4940 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4943 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4944 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4945 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4946 payment.prev_channel_id,
4947 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4948 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4950 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4954 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4955 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4957 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4960 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4961 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4964 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4965 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4966 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4969 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4970 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4971 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4972 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4973 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4974 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4975 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4976 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4977 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4978 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4981 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4982 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4983 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4984 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4989 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4990 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4991 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4993 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4994 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4995 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4996 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4997 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4998 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4999 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
5001 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
5002 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
5006 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
5010 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
5011 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5012 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5013 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
5014 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
5015 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
5016 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
5017 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
5020 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
5021 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
5022 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
5023 incoming_channel_details
5025 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5029 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5030 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5031 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5032 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5033 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5035 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5037 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5042 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5043 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5045 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5046 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5047 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
5048 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5049 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5053 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5054 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5055 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5056 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5061 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5062 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5063 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5065 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5066 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5069 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5070 None => continue 'outer_loop,
5073 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5074 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5075 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5076 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5078 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5079 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5080 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5082 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5083 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5088 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5089 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5090 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5092 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5093 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5095 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5096 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5097 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5102 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5103 // proposed to as a batch.
5104 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5105 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5106 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5107 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5108 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5109 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5110 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5111 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5113 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5114 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5115 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5116 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5119 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5120 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5121 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5122 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5128 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5130 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5131 /// Will likely generate further events.
5132 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5135 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5137 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5138 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5139 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5141 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5142 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5144 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5145 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5146 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5147 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5149 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5150 match forward_info {
5151 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5152 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5153 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5154 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5155 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5158 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5159 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5160 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
5161 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5163 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5164 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5165 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5166 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5167 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5168 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5170 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5171 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5174 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5175 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5177 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5180 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5181 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5187 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5188 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5190 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5194 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5195 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5197 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5201 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5202 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5203 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5204 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5205 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5206 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5207 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5210 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5211 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5212 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5213 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5214 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5216 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5218 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5219 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5223 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5224 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5225 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5226 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5227 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5228 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5230 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5231 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5237 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5240 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5243 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5244 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5245 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5246 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5247 // problem, not ours.
5253 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5254 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5255 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5257 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5261 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5262 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5263 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5264 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5265 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5268 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5269 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5270 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5271 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5272 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5273 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5274 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5275 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5276 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5277 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5278 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5279 onion_packet, blinded, ..
5280 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5283 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
5284 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5285 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5286 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5287 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5288 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5289 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5290 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5291 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5292 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5293 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5294 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5296 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5297 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5298 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5299 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5300 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5301 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5304 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5305 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5306 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5309 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5310 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5312 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5314 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5315 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5316 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5317 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5323 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5324 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5326 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5327 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5328 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5330 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5331 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5332 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5333 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5335 Some((res, htlc_id))
5338 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5339 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5340 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5341 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5343 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5345 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5346 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5347 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5353 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5357 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5358 match forward_info {
5359 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5360 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5361 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5362 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5363 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5366 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5367 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5368 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5369 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5370 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5371 requires_blinded_error: _
5373 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5374 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5375 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5376 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5377 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5379 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5380 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5381 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5383 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5384 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5388 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5389 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5392 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5395 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5396 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5397 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5398 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5399 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5400 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5401 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5402 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5403 phantom_shared_secret,
5406 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5407 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5408 // if routing nodes overpay
5409 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5410 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5412 total_value_received: None,
5413 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5416 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5419 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5421 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5422 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5423 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5424 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5425 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5426 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5428 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5429 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5430 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5431 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5432 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5433 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5434 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5435 phantom_shared_secret,
5438 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5439 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5441 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5444 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5445 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5446 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5447 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5448 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5451 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5452 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5453 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5454 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5455 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5456 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5457 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5459 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5460 .entry(payment_hash)
5461 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5462 .or_insert_with(|| {
5463 committed_to_claimable = true;
5465 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5468 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5469 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5470 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5471 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5473 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5474 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5475 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5477 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5478 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5479 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5482 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5484 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5485 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5486 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5487 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5488 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5489 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5490 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5491 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5492 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5493 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5495 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5497 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5498 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5499 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5500 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5501 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5502 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5504 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5505 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5506 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5507 committed_to_claimable = true;
5509 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5510 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5511 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5512 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5513 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5514 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5515 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5516 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5517 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5521 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5522 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5523 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5524 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5525 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5527 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5529 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5530 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5532 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5533 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5534 committed_to_claimable = true;
5537 payment_claimable_generated
5541 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5542 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5543 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5544 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5545 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5546 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5547 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5548 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5550 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5551 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5552 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5553 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5554 Ok(result) => result,
5556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5557 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5560 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5561 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5562 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5563 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5564 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5565 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5568 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5570 payment_data.payment_secret,
5573 check_total_value!(purpose);
5575 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5576 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5577 check_total_value!(purpose);
5581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5582 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5583 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5584 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5586 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5587 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5588 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5589 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5590 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5591 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5592 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5593 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5595 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5596 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5597 payment_data.payment_secret,
5600 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5601 if payment_claimable_generated {
5602 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5608 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5609 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5617 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5618 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5619 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5620 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5622 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5623 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5625 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5627 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5628 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5629 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5631 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5633 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5634 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5635 events.append(&mut new_events);
5638 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5640 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5641 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5642 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5644 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5646 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5647 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5648 if background_events.is_empty() {
5649 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5652 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5654 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5655 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5656 // monitor updating completing.
5657 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5659 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5660 let mut updated_chan = false;
5662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5663 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5664 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5665 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5666 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5668 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5669 updated_chan = true;
5670 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5671 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5673 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5681 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5682 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5685 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5687 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5690 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5691 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5693 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5694 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5695 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5696 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5697 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5703 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5706 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5707 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5708 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5709 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5710 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5713 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5714 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5716 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5718 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5719 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5720 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5722 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5723 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5724 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5725 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5727 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5728 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5730 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5731 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5735 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5736 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5737 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5738 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5739 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5740 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5741 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5743 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5744 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5746 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5747 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5748 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5749 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5750 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5751 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5753 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5758 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5759 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5767 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5769 /// This currently includes:
5770 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5771 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5772 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5774 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5775 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5776 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5777 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5778 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5779 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5780 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5781 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5783 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5784 /// estimate fetches.
5786 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5787 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5788 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5789 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5790 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5792 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5793 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5795 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5796 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5797 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5798 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5800 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5801 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5802 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5803 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5804 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5805 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5807 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5808 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5809 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5811 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5812 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5813 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5814 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5815 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5816 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5817 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5818 channel_id: *chan_id,
5819 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5831 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5832 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5833 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5834 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5835 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5836 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5838 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5839 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5844 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5845 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5847 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5848 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5849 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5850 if needs_close { return false; }
5853 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5854 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5855 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5856 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5857 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5858 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5859 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5860 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5862 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5863 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5864 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5865 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5866 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5870 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5872 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5875 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5877 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5878 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5879 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5880 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5881 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5885 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5887 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5893 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5895 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5896 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5897 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5898 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5899 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5900 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5901 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5902 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5903 channel_id: *chan_id,
5904 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5912 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5913 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5914 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5916 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5917 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5918 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5920 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5922 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5923 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5925 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5926 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5927 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5928 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5933 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5934 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5935 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5936 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5937 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5938 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5939 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5940 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5941 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5947 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5949 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5950 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5955 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5956 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5957 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5958 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5959 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5960 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5961 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5962 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5963 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5964 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5965 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5967 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5968 // have no channels to the peer.
5969 let remove_entry = {
5970 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5971 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5974 entry.remove_entry();
5977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5982 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5983 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5984 // This should be unreachable
5985 debug_assert!(false);
5988 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5989 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5990 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5991 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5992 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5993 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5994 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5997 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5998 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5999 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
6001 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
6002 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
6009 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
6010 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
6011 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
6012 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
6013 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6016 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6017 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6020 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
6021 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6024 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6025 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
6026 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
6027 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
6028 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
6029 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6030 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6033 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6034 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6037 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6038 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6039 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6040 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6041 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6048 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6049 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6050 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6052 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6053 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6054 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6055 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6057 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6058 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6059 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6060 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6061 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6062 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6065 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6066 /// reason for the failure.
6068 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6069 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6072 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6073 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6074 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6075 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6076 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6077 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6083 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6084 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6085 match failure_code {
6086 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6087 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6088 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6089 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6090 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6091 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6093 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6094 let fail_data = match data {
6095 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6098 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6103 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6104 /// that we want to return and a channel.
6106 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6108 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6109 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6110 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6111 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6112 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6113 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6114 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6116 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6118 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6119 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6121 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6126 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6127 /// that we want to return and a channel.
6128 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6129 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6130 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6131 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6132 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6133 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6134 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6135 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6137 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6138 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6139 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6140 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6142 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6143 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6144 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6145 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6146 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6150 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6151 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6152 // be surfaced to the user.
6153 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6154 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6155 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6157 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6159 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6162 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6164 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6165 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6167 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6168 debug_assert!(false);
6169 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6174 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6177 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6178 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6179 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6180 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6184 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6185 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6186 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6189 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6190 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6191 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6192 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6193 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6194 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6195 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6196 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6197 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6198 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6201 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6202 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6203 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6206 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6207 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6208 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6209 let mut push_forward_event;
6211 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6212 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6213 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6214 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6216 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6217 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6218 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6221 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
6222 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6223 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6225 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6226 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6227 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6228 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6229 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6231 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6233 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6234 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6236 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6237 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6241 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6242 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6244 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6248 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6249 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6250 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6251 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6253 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6256 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6259 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6260 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6261 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6262 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6263 failed_next_destination: destination,
6270 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6271 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6273 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6274 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6275 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6276 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6278 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6279 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6280 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6281 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6283 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6284 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6285 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6287 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6288 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6289 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6290 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6291 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6292 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6293 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6294 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6295 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6298 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6299 /// even type numbers.
6303 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6304 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6306 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6307 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6308 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6311 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6312 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6317 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6318 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6319 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6320 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6321 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6322 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6323 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6324 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6329 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
6330 .entry(payment_hash)
6332 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6333 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6336 .or_insert_with(|| {
6337 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6338 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6340 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6341 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6344 sender_intended_value,
6345 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6349 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6350 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6351 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6352 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6353 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6354 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6355 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6356 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6357 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6358 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6359 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6368 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6370 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6371 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6372 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6373 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6374 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6375 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6376 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6377 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6378 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6380 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6381 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6382 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6383 debug_assert!(false);
6387 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6389 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6390 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6391 debug_assert!(false);
6395 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6396 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6398 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6399 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6400 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6401 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6404 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6405 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6406 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6407 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6411 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6412 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6413 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6414 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6415 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6416 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6417 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6420 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6421 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6422 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6423 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id), Some(payment_hash));
6424 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6425 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6430 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6431 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6432 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6433 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6434 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6435 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6436 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6438 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6441 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6442 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6443 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6444 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6448 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6449 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6450 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6451 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6453 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6454 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6455 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6456 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6458 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6459 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6460 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6461 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6465 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6466 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6467 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6471 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6472 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6473 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6476 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6477 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6478 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6479 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6480 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6481 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6482 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6483 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6486 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6487 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6488 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6490 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6493 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6494 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6496 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6497 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6498 // monitor update as a background event.
6499 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6500 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6501 counterparty_node_id,
6502 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6503 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6504 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6508 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6509 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6514 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6516 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6518 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6519 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6520 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6521 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6522 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6524 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6526 debug_assert!(false,
6527 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6530 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6531 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6532 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6533 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6534 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6536 let mut found_blocker = false;
6537 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6538 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6539 // which case we need to only remove the one
6540 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6541 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6542 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6543 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6545 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6548 debug_assert!(false);
6557 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6558 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6559 counterparty_node_id: None,
6560 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6563 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6567 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6568 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6569 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6570 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6571 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6572 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6573 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6574 // again on restart.
6575 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6576 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6577 payment_preimage, update_res);
6580 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6581 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6583 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6584 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6585 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6586 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6587 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6588 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6589 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6590 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6591 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6592 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6595 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6596 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6597 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6598 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6599 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6600 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6604 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6605 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6608 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6609 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6610 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6611 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6614 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6615 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6616 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6617 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6618 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6620 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6621 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6622 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6624 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6625 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6628 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6629 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6630 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6631 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6632 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6633 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6634 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6635 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6636 let chan_to_release =
6637 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6638 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6640 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6641 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6642 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6643 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6648 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6649 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6650 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6651 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6652 // in the background.
6653 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6654 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6655 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6656 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6658 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6659 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6660 funding_txo, update, ..
6662 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6663 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6664 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6665 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6667 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6673 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6674 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6675 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6677 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6678 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6680 monitor_update.updates[0],
6681 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6686 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6687 // immediately once we get going.
6688 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6691 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6693 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6696 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6697 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6698 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6699 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6700 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6701 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6702 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6706 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6707 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6708 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6711 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6712 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6713 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6714 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6715 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6716 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6717 prev_user_channel_id,
6718 next_user_channel_id,
6719 total_fee_earned_msat,
6721 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6722 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6724 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6728 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6729 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6730 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6736 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6737 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6738 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6741 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6742 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6743 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6744 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6746 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6748 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6749 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6750 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6752 payment_purpose: purpose,
6755 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6758 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6762 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6764 sender_intended_total_msat,
6768 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6769 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6771 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6772 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6773 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6776 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6777 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6779 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6780 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6781 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6782 downstream_channel_id,
6783 Some(blocking_action),
6790 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6791 /// update completion.
6792 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6793 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6794 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6795 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6796 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6797 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6798 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6799 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6800 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6801 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6802 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6803 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6804 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6805 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6806 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6807 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6809 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6810 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6812 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6813 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6814 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6815 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6817 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6818 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6819 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6822 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6823 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6825 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6826 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6827 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6832 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6833 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6834 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6835 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6840 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6841 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6842 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6843 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6844 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6849 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6853 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6859 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6860 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6861 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6865 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6866 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6867 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6870 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6873 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6874 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6876 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6877 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6879 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6880 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6881 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6882 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6883 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6888 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6889 let mut peer_state_lock;
6890 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6891 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6892 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6895 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6898 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6899 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6900 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6901 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6902 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6905 let remaining_in_flight =
6906 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6907 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6910 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6911 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6912 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6913 remaining_in_flight);
6914 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6917 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6920 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6922 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6923 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6926 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6927 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6928 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6930 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6931 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6932 /// used to accept such channels.
6934 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6935 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6936 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6937 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6940 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6941 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6943 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6944 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6945 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6947 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6948 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6950 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6951 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6953 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6954 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6956 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6957 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6958 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6959 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6962 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6964 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6967 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6968 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6969 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6970 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6972 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6973 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6975 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6977 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6979 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6981 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6982 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6983 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6985 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6986 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6987 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6988 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6989 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6990 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6991 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6994 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6995 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7003 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
7004 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7005 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
7006 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
7008 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
7012 Ok(mut channel) => {
7014 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
7015 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
7016 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
7017 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7018 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7019 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7020 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
7023 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7024 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
7025 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7027 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7029 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7030 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7031 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7032 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
7033 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7034 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7035 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7036 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
7039 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7040 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7041 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7043 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7047 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7048 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7049 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7051 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7052 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7053 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7056 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7063 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7064 /// or 0-conf channels.
7066 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7067 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7068 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7069 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7070 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7071 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7073 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7074 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7075 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7076 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7077 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7078 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7079 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7083 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7086 fn unfunded_channel_count(
7087 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7089 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7090 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7092 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7093 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7094 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7095 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7096 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7098 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7101 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7102 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7103 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7106 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7107 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7108 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7109 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7110 // included in the unfunded count.
7111 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7112 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7113 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7116 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7117 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7120 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7121 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7122 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7123 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7128 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7131 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7132 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7133 // likely to be lost on restart!
7134 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7135 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7136 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7139 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7140 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7141 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7144 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7145 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7146 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7147 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7148 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7151 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7153 debug_assert!(false);
7154 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7155 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7156 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7158 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7159 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7161 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7162 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7163 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7164 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7165 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7166 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7168 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7169 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7170 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7173 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7174 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7176 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7177 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7180 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7181 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7183 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7184 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7185 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7188 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7189 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7190 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7191 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7193 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7195 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7196 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7197 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7198 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7199 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7200 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7203 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7204 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7205 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7210 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7211 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7212 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7213 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7214 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7215 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7216 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7219 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7224 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7225 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7226 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7227 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7228 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7230 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7232 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7233 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7236 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7237 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7239 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7240 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7241 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7243 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7247 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7248 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7249 // likely to be lost on restart!
7250 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7254 debug_assert!(false);
7255 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7259 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7261 match phase.get_mut() {
7262 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7263 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7264 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7267 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7274 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7275 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7276 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7277 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7278 channel_value_satoshis: value,
7280 user_channel_id: user_id,
7285 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7286 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7291 debug_assert!(false);
7292 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7297 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7298 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7299 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7300 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
7301 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7303 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7304 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7305 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7306 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7307 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7308 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7309 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7310 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7311 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7315 Some(mut phase) => {
7316 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7317 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7318 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7320 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7323 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7325 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7326 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7327 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7328 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7329 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7330 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7332 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7333 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7334 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7337 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7339 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7342 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7343 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7344 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7345 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7347 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7348 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7349 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7350 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7351 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7353 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7354 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7355 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7356 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7357 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7358 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7359 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7364 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7365 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7366 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7368 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7372 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7373 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7374 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7382 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7383 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7385 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7387 debug_assert!(false);
7388 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7391 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7392 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7393 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7395 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7396 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7397 let logger = WithContext::from(
7399 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7400 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7404 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7406 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7407 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7408 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7409 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7410 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7411 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7412 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7413 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7414 } else { unreachable!(); }
7417 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7418 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7419 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7420 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7421 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7422 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7423 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7427 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7428 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7429 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7430 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7431 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7432 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7436 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7443 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7444 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7445 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7446 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7447 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7449 debug_assert!(false);
7450 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7453 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7454 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7456 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7457 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7458 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7459 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7460 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7461 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7462 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7463 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7464 msg: announcement_sigs,
7466 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7467 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7468 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7469 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7470 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7471 // announcement_signatures.
7472 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7473 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7474 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7475 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7482 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7483 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7488 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7489 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7493 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7498 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7499 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7500 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7502 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7503 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7505 debug_assert!(false);
7506 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7508 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7509 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7510 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7511 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7513 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7514 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7515 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7516 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7518 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7521 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7522 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7523 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7524 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7526 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7527 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7528 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7529 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7530 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7531 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7535 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7536 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7537 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7538 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7541 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7542 let context = phase.context_mut();
7543 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7544 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7545 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7546 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7548 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7549 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7550 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7551 let context = phase.context_mut();
7552 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7553 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7554 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7558 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7561 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7562 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7563 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7564 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7566 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7567 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7573 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7575 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7577 debug_assert!(false);
7578 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7580 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7581 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7582 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7583 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7584 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7585 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7586 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7587 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7588 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7589 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7590 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7595 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7596 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7597 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7598 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7599 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7600 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7601 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7603 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7604 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7607 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7610 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7611 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7612 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7613 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7615 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7616 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7617 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7618 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7623 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7624 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7625 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7630 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7631 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7632 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7633 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7635 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7636 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7637 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7638 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7640 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7641 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7643 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7644 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7645 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7647 debug_assert!(false);
7648 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7652 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7654 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7655 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7656 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7657 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7658 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7659 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7661 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7663 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7664 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7665 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7666 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7667 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7668 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7669 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7670 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7671 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7672 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7673 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7674 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7678 match pending_forward_info {
7679 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7680 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7682 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7683 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7684 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7685 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7686 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7688 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7689 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7690 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7691 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7692 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7695 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7701 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7703 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7704 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7707 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7712 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7714 let next_user_channel_id;
7715 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7719 debug_assert!(false);
7720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7724 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7726 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7727 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7728 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7729 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7731 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7733 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7734 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7735 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7737 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7738 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7739 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7740 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7741 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7742 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7743 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7744 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7747 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7748 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7754 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7755 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7756 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7762 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7763 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7764 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7768 debug_assert!(false);
7769 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7773 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7774 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7775 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7776 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7778 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7779 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7787 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7788 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7789 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7791 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7793 debug_assert!(false);
7794 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7796 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7797 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7798 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7800 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7801 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7802 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7804 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7805 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7807 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7808 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7816 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7817 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7818 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7820 debug_assert!(false);
7821 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7823 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7824 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7825 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7827 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7828 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7829 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7830 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7831 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7832 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7833 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7837 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7838 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7845 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7846 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7847 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7848 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7849 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7850 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7854 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7858 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7859 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7860 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7864 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7865 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7866 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7867 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7868 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7869 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7870 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7871 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7872 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7873 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7874 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7876 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7877 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7879 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7880 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7881 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7882 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7884 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7885 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7888 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7889 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7891 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7892 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7893 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7895 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7896 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7897 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7898 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7899 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7902 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7903 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7905 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7906 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7907 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7908 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7909 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7910 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7911 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7912 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7913 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7914 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7915 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7916 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7919 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7920 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7921 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7926 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7927 // payments are being processed.
7928 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7929 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7930 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7937 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7938 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7941 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7942 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7943 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7949 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7950 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7951 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7952 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7953 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7955 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7956 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7957 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7958 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7959 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7960 // real by taking more time.
7961 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7962 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7963 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7968 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7969 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7970 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7971 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7972 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7973 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7974 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7976 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7977 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7978 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7979 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7980 channel_funding_outpoint,
7982 counterparty_node_id,
7987 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7988 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7989 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7991 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7992 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7993 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7994 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7996 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7997 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7998 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8004 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8005 let htlcs_to_fail = {
8006 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8007 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8009 debug_assert!(false);
8010 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8011 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
8012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8013 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8015 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8016 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8017 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8018 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
8019 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
8020 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
8021 *counterparty_node_id)
8023 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
8024 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
8025 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
8026 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
8027 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
8028 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
8029 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8033 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8034 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8040 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8044 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8046 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8048 debug_assert!(false);
8049 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8051 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8052 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8053 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8054 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8055 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8056 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8057 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8059 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8060 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8068 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8069 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8070 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8072 debug_assert!(false);
8073 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8077 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8079 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8080 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8081 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8084 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8085 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8086 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8087 msg, &self.default_configuration
8088 ), chan_phase_entry),
8089 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8090 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8091 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8094 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8095 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8098 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8103 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8104 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8105 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8106 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8108 // It's not a local channel
8109 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8113 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8114 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8115 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8119 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8121 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8122 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8123 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8124 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8125 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8126 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8127 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8129 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8131 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8132 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8133 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8134 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8136 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8137 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8138 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8139 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8142 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8146 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8147 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8150 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8152 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8155 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8156 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8159 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8161 debug_assert!(false);
8162 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8163 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8167 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
8168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8170 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8172 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8173 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8174 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8175 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8176 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8177 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8178 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8179 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8180 let mut channel_update = None;
8181 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8182 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8183 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8186 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8187 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8188 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8189 // they have the latest channel parameters.
8190 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8191 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8192 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8197 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8198 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8199 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8200 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8201 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8202 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8203 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8204 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8208 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8209 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8213 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8215 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8216 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8217 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8218 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8219 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8220 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8222 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8223 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8224 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8225 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8226 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8227 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8228 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8229 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8230 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8231 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8232 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8233 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8234 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8235 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8236 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8237 next_funding_txid: None,
8240 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8241 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8242 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8248 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8249 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8251 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8254 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8255 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8256 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8258 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8259 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8260 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8261 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8262 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8263 match monitor_event {
8264 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8265 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
8266 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8267 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8268 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8269 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8270 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8272 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8273 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8274 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8275 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8278 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8279 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8280 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8282 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8283 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8284 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8285 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8288 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8289 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8290 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8291 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8292 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8293 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8294 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8295 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8296 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8299 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8301 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8302 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8303 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8304 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8308 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8309 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8311 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8319 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8320 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8326 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8327 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8330 has_pending_monitor_events
8333 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8334 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8335 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8337 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8338 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8339 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8342 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8343 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8344 /// update was applied.
8345 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8346 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8347 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8349 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8350 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8351 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8352 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8355 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8358 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8359 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8360 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8362 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8363 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8364 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8365 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8366 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8367 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8369 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8370 has_monitor_update = true;
8372 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8373 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8374 continue 'peer_loop;
8383 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8384 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8385 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8391 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8392 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8394 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8395 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8397 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8398 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8399 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8402 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8403 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8405 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8406 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8407 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8408 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8413 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8419 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8420 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8423 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8424 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8425 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8431 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8436 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8437 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8440 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8441 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8445 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8448 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8449 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8455 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8456 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8457 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8458 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8459 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8460 let mut has_update = false;
8461 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8463 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8465 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8468 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8469 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8471 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8472 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8473 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8474 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8475 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8477 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8478 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8481 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8482 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8483 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8485 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8486 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8487 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8488 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8489 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8490 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8495 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8496 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8497 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8503 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8504 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8509 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8515 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8516 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8519 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8520 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8526 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8527 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8529 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8530 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8531 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8532 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8533 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8534 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8535 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8536 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8537 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8538 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8539 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8540 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8541 assert!(should_broadcast);
8542 } else { unreachable!(); }
8543 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8544 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8545 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8548 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8553 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8554 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8555 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8556 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8560 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8561 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8562 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8563 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8564 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8566 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8570 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8575 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8577 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8578 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8579 pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8580 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8581 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8582 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8583 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8585 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8586 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8587 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8589 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8596 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8597 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8598 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8602 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8603 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8605 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8606 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8607 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8610 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8611 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8612 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8614 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8615 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8619 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8620 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8621 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8622 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8623 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8625 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8629 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8630 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8635 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8636 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8637 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8639 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8640 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8641 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8642 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8643 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8644 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8645 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8646 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8647 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8648 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8649 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8650 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8652 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8653 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8654 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8656 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8657 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8662 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8663 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8664 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8665 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8667 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8673 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8675 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8676 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8677 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8678 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8679 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8680 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8684 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8685 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8686 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8687 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8690 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8692 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8694 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8695 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8696 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8698 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8699 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8700 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8701 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8702 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8703 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8704 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8706 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8707 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8711 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8712 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8715 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8716 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8717 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8721 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8722 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8723 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8724 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8728 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8729 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8730 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8735 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8736 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8737 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8738 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8741 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8742 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8743 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8744 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8745 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8746 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8747 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8748 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8749 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8750 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8751 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8752 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8753 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8754 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8755 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8757 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8758 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8760 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8762 let builder = match quantity {
8764 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8766 let builder = match amount_msats {
8768 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8770 let builder = match payer_note {
8772 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8774 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8775 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8779 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8780 self.pending_outbound_payments
8781 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8782 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8784 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8786 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8787 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8788 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8789 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8790 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8791 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8792 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8793 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8794 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8795 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8796 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8798 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8800 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8801 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8802 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8803 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8806 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8808 debug_assert!(false);
8809 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8815 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8818 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8819 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8820 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8824 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8825 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8826 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8827 /// received and no retries will be made.
8832 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8833 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8836 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8837 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8838 &self, refund: &Refund
8839 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8840 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8841 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8842 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8844 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8845 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8847 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8848 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8851 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8853 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8854 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8855 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8856 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8857 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8859 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8861 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8862 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8863 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8865 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8866 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8867 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8869 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8870 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8871 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8873 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8874 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8875 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8876 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8878 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8879 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8880 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8881 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8882 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8885 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8887 for path in refund.paths() {
8888 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8889 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8890 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8891 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8893 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8899 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8903 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8906 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8907 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8909 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8910 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8911 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8913 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8915 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8916 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8920 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8921 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8923 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8925 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8926 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8928 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8929 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8930 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8931 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8932 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8933 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8934 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8935 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8936 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8937 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8940 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8941 /// stored external to LDK.
8943 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8944 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8945 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8947 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8948 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8951 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8952 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8953 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8954 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8956 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8957 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8958 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8959 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8960 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8962 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8963 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8964 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8965 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8966 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8968 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8969 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8971 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8972 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8976 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8977 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8979 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8981 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8982 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8984 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8985 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8986 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8987 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8988 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8989 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8990 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8993 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8994 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8996 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8997 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8998 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
9001 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
9003 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
9004 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
9005 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
9006 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9008 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
9010 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
9011 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
9012 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
9015 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
9016 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
9019 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
9020 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
9021 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
9022 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
9023 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
9024 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9026 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
9027 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
9028 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
9029 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
9030 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
9032 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
9034 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
9038 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9039 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9043 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9044 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9046 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9047 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9048 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9049 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9051 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9052 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9053 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9054 Some(_) => continue,
9055 None => return scid_candidate
9060 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9062 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9063 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9065 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9066 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9067 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9071 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9072 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9073 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9075 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9076 /// times to get a unique scid.
9077 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9078 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9079 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9081 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9082 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9083 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9084 return scid_candidate
9088 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9089 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9090 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9091 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9093 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9094 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9097 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9098 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9100 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9101 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9102 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9111 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9112 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9113 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9114 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9115 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9119 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9120 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9121 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9122 events.push_back((event, None));
9126 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9127 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9128 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9132 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9133 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9137 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9138 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9141 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9142 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9143 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9144 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9145 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9146 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9147 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9149 let logger = WithContext::from(
9150 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
9153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9154 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9155 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9156 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9157 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9158 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9159 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9160 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9162 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9166 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9167 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9168 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9169 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9170 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9171 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9176 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9178 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9179 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9180 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9181 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9183 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9184 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9185 if further_update_exists {
9186 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9191 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9198 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9199 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9205 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9206 for action in actions {
9208 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9209 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9211 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9217 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9218 /// using the given event handler.
9220 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9221 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9225 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9229 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9231 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9232 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9233 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9234 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9235 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9236 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9240 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9241 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9242 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9243 /// is always placed next to each other.
9245 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9246 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9247 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9248 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9250 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9251 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9252 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9253 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9254 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9255 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9256 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9258 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9259 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9260 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9261 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9264 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9265 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9267 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9268 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9271 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9272 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9273 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9274 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9275 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9276 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9277 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9278 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9280 if peer_state.is_connected {
9281 is_any_peer_connected = true
9285 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9286 if is_any_peer_connected {
9287 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9288 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9291 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9292 events.replace(pending_events);
9301 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9303 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9304 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9305 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9306 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9307 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9308 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9312 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9314 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9315 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9316 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9318 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9322 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9324 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9325 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9326 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9327 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9328 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9329 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9333 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9335 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9336 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9337 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9338 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9339 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9342 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9343 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9346 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9347 let _persistence_guard =
9348 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9349 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9350 let new_height = height - 1;
9352 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9353 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9354 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9355 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9356 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9357 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9360 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9364 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9366 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9367 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9368 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9369 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9370 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9371 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9375 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9376 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9377 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9378 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9380 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9381 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9383 let _persistence_guard =
9384 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9385 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9386 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9387 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9389 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9390 if height < last_best_block_height {
9391 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9392 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9396 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9397 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9398 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9399 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9401 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9402 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9404 let _persistence_guard =
9405 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9406 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9407 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9409 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9411 macro_rules! max_time {
9412 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9414 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9415 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9416 // having an explicit local time source.
9417 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9418 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9419 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9420 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9421 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9427 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9428 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9429 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9430 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9434 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9435 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9436 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9437 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9438 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9439 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9440 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9441 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9442 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9443 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9444 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9451 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9452 let _persistence_guard =
9453 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9454 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9455 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9456 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9457 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9458 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9459 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9460 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9465 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9467 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9468 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9469 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9470 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9471 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9472 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9476 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9477 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9479 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9480 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9481 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9482 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9483 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9485 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9486 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9489 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9492 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9494 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9496 // Retain unfunded channels.
9497 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9498 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9499 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9500 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9501 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9502 let res = f(channel);
9503 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9504 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9505 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9506 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9507 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9509 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9510 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9511 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9512 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9513 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9514 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9515 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9516 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9521 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9526 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9527 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9530 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9531 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9532 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9533 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9534 msg: announcement_sigs,
9536 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9537 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9540 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9541 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9542 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9547 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9548 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9549 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9550 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9551 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9552 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9553 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9554 // is always consistent.
9555 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9556 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9557 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9558 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9559 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9562 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9563 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9564 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9565 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9566 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9567 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9568 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9569 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9570 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9574 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9575 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9576 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9577 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9578 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9579 data: reason_message,
9592 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9593 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9594 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9595 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9596 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9597 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9598 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9599 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9600 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9601 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9603 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9604 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9605 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9609 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9612 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9613 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9614 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9615 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9616 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9617 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9618 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9619 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9620 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9621 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9622 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9623 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9626 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9627 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9628 _ => unreachable!(),
9630 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9631 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9632 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9633 let logger = WithContext::from(
9634 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9636 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9642 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9644 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9645 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9649 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9650 /// may have events that need processing.
9652 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9653 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9655 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9656 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9657 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9658 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9661 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9663 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9664 /// indicates this should be checked.
9665 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9666 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9669 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9670 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9671 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9674 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9675 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9676 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9677 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9680 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9681 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9682 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9683 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9686 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9687 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9689 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9690 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9691 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9692 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9693 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9696 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9697 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9698 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9699 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9702 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9703 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9704 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9705 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9708 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9709 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9710 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9711 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9714 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9715 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9716 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9717 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9721 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9722 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9724 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9725 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9726 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9727 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9728 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9729 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9733 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9734 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9735 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9736 // change to the contents.
9737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9738 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9739 let persist = match &res {
9740 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9741 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9742 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9744 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9746 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9751 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9752 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9753 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9754 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9757 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9758 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9759 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9760 // change to the contents.
9761 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9762 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9763 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9767 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9768 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9769 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9770 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9773 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9775 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9778 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9780 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9783 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9784 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9785 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9786 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9787 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9789 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9790 let persist = match &res {
9791 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9792 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9794 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9799 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9800 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9801 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9802 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9806 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9807 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9808 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9809 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9813 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9814 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9815 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9816 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9820 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9821 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9822 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9823 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9826 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9828 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9831 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9833 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9836 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9837 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9838 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9839 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9841 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9842 let persist = match &res {
9843 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9844 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9845 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9847 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9852 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9854 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9857 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9858 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9859 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9860 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9862 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9863 let persist = match &res {
9864 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9865 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9866 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9868 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9873 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9874 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9875 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9876 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9878 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9879 let persist = match &res {
9880 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9881 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9882 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9884 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9889 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9891 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9894 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9896 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9899 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9900 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9901 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9902 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9904 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9905 let persist = match &res {
9906 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9907 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9908 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9910 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9915 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9920 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9921 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9922 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9925 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9930 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9932 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9933 let persist = match &res {
9934 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9935 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9936 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9938 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9943 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9945 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9946 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9947 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9950 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9951 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9952 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9954 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9957 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9958 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9959 let context = match phase {
9960 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9961 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9962 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9963 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9968 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9969 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9970 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9973 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9974 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9977 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9978 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9981 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9982 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9986 // Clean up for removal.
9987 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9988 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9991 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9992 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9993 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9994 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9996 // V1 Channel Establishment
9997 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9998 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9999 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
10000 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
10001 // V2 Channel Establishment
10002 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
10003 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
10004 // Common Channel Establishment
10005 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
10006 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
10008 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
10010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
10011 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
10012 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
10013 // Interactive Transaction Construction
10014 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
10015 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
10016 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
10017 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
10018 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
10019 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
10020 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
10021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
10022 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
10023 // Channel Operations
10024 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
10025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
10026 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
10027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
10028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
10029 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
10031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
10032 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10033 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
10034 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
10035 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
10036 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
10039 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
10041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10042 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10043 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10047 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10048 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10049 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10050 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10053 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10055 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10057 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10058 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10062 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10063 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
10064 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10065 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10069 let mut res = Ok(());
10071 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10072 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10073 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10074 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10075 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10076 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10077 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10080 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10081 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10083 if inbound_peer_limited {
10085 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10087 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10088 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10089 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10090 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10091 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10092 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10093 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10094 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10095 is_connected: true,
10098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10099 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10100 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10102 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10103 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10104 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10105 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10108 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10111 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10112 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10117 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10119 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10120 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10123 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10125 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10127 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10128 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
10129 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10130 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10131 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10135 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10136 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10137 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10138 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10142 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10143 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10144 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10145 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10146 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10147 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10151 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10152 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10153 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10154 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10155 debug_assert!(false);
10158 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10159 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10160 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10161 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10162 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10163 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10164 debug_assert!(false);
10170 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10171 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10176 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10177 match &msg.data as &str {
10178 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10179 "link failed to shutdown" =>
10181 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10182 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10183 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10184 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10185 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10186 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10187 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10188 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10189 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10191 || -> NotifyOption {
10192 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10193 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10194 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10195 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10196 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10197 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10198 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10199 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10203 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10204 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10205 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10206 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10207 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10208 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10210 log_level: Level::Trace,
10213 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10214 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10215 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10217 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10228 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10229 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10230 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10231 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10232 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10235 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10236 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10237 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10238 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10240 for channel_id in channel_ids {
10241 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10242 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10246 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10248 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10249 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10252 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10253 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10254 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10255 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10256 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10262 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10263 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10264 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10265 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10266 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10272 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10273 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10274 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10278 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10279 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10283 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10284 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10287 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10288 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10291 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10292 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10295 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10296 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10297 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10298 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10301 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10302 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10303 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10304 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10307 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10308 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10309 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10310 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10313 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10314 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10315 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10316 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10319 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10320 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10321 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10322 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10325 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10326 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10327 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10328 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10331 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10332 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10333 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10334 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10337 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10338 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10339 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10340 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10343 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10344 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10345 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10346 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10350 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10351 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10353 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10354 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10355 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10356 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10357 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10362 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10363 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10364 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10367 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10368 let responder = match responder {
10369 Some(responder) => responder,
10370 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10372 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10375 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10376 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10378 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10379 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10381 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10382 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10386 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10387 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10388 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10390 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10392 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10393 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10397 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10398 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10399 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10401 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10402 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10404 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10406 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10407 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10411 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10412 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10413 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10416 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10417 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10418 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10419 payment_paths, payment_hash
10421 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10422 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10423 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10426 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10427 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10428 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10430 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10431 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10432 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10433 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10434 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10437 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10438 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10439 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10440 .and_then(|invoice| {
10442 let mut invoice = invoice;
10444 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10445 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10447 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10452 Ok(invoice) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10453 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10456 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10457 let response = invoice
10458 .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10459 .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10460 .and_then(|payment_id| {
10461 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10462 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10463 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10465 self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10467 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10468 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10473 match (responder, response) {
10474 (Some(responder), Err(e)) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10475 (None, Err(_)) => {
10478 "A response was generated, but there is no reply_path specified for sending the response."
10480 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10482 _ => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10485 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10487 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10492 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10493 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10497 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10498 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10500 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10501 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10502 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10503 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10504 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10505 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10509 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10510 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10514 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10515 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10516 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10517 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10518 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10522 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10523 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10525 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10526 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10527 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10528 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10529 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10532 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10533 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10534 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10535 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10538 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10539 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10540 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10541 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10544 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10545 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10546 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10547 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10550 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10551 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10552 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10553 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10554 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10555 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10556 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10557 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10558 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10559 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10560 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10561 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10562 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10563 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10564 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10565 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10566 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10567 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10568 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10569 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10570 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10575 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10576 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10578 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10579 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10580 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10581 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10584 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10585 (2, node_id, required),
10586 (4, features, required),
10587 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10588 (8, forwarding_info, option),
10589 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10590 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10593 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10594 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10595 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10596 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10597 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10598 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10599 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10600 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10601 (2, self.channel_id, required),
10602 (3, self.channel_type, option),
10603 (4, self.counterparty, required),
10604 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10605 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10606 (7, self.config, option),
10607 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10608 (9, self.confirmations, option),
10609 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10610 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10611 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10612 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10613 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10614 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10615 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10616 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10617 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10618 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10619 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10620 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10621 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10622 (32, self.is_public, required),
10623 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10624 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10625 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10626 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10627 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10628 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10629 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10635 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10636 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10637 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10638 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10639 (2, channel_id, required),
10640 (3, channel_type, option),
10641 (4, counterparty, required),
10642 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10643 (6, funding_txo, option),
10644 (7, config, option),
10645 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10646 (9, confirmations, option),
10647 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10648 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10649 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10650 (16, balance_msat, required),
10651 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10652 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10653 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10654 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10655 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10656 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10657 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10658 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10659 (26, is_outbound, required),
10660 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10661 (30, is_usable, required),
10662 (32, is_public, required),
10663 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10664 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10665 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10666 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10667 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10668 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10669 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10672 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10673 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10674 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10675 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10676 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10679 inbound_scid_alias,
10680 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10682 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10683 outbound_scid_alias,
10687 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10688 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10690 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10691 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10692 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10693 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10694 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10695 confirmations_required,
10697 force_close_spend_delay,
10698 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10699 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10700 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10701 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10702 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10703 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10704 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10705 channel_shutdown_state,
10706 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10707 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10712 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10713 (2, channels, required_vec),
10714 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10715 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10718 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10719 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10720 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10723 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10725 (0, onion_packet, required),
10726 (1, blinded, option),
10727 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10730 (0, payment_data, required),
10731 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10732 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10733 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10734 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10735 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10736 (9, payment_context, option),
10738 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10739 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10740 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10741 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10742 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10743 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10744 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10748 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10749 (0, routing, required),
10750 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10751 (4, payment_hash, required),
10752 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10753 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10754 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10755 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10759 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10760 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10762 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10763 0u8.write(writer)?;
10764 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10765 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10766 reason.write(writer)?;
10768 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10769 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10771 1u8.write(writer)?;
10772 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10773 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10774 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10775 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10782 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10783 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10784 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10787 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10788 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10789 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10790 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10794 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10795 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10796 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10797 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10798 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10801 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10802 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10803 // messages contained in the variants.
10804 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10805 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10806 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10808 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10809 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10810 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10811 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10812 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10815 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10816 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10817 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10818 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10819 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10821 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10826 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10831 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10832 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10833 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10836 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10837 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10838 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10839 (2, outpoint, required),
10840 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10841 (4, htlc_id, required),
10842 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10843 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10844 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10845 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10846 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10849 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10850 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10851 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10852 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10853 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10855 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10857 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10858 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10859 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10860 (2, self.value, required),
10861 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10862 (4, payment_data, option),
10863 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10864 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10865 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10866 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10872 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10873 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10874 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10875 (0, prev_hop, required),
10876 (1, total_msat, option),
10877 (2, value_ser, required),
10878 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10879 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10880 (5, total_value_received, option),
10881 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10882 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10883 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10885 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10886 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10887 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10889 if payment_data.is_some() {
10890 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10892 if total_msat.is_none() {
10893 total_msat = Some(value);
10895 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10898 if total_msat.is_none() {
10899 if payment_data.is_none() {
10900 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10902 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10904 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10908 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10911 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10912 total_value_received,
10913 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10915 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10916 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10921 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10922 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10923 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10926 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10927 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10928 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10929 let mut payment_id = None;
10930 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10931 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10932 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10933 (0, session_priv, required),
10934 (1, payment_id, option),
10935 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10936 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10937 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10938 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10940 if payment_id.is_none() {
10941 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10943 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10945 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10946 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10947 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10949 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10950 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10951 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10952 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10956 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10957 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10958 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10960 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10963 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10964 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10969 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10970 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10972 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10973 0u8.write(writer)?;
10974 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10975 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10976 (0, session_priv, required),
10977 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10978 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10979 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10980 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10981 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10982 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10985 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10986 1u8.write(writer)?;
10987 field.write(writer)?;
10994 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10995 (0, forward_info, required),
10996 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10997 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10998 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10999 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
11000 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
11001 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
11002 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
11005 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11006 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11007 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
11009 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
11013 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
11014 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
11015 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
11016 (0, htlc_id, required),
11017 (2, err_packet, required),
11020 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
11021 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
11022 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
11023 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
11024 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
11025 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
11026 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
11027 (0, htlc_id, required),
11028 (1, failure_code, required),
11029 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
11030 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
11038 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11039 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11040 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
11042 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
11044 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
11045 (0, htlc_id, required),
11046 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
11047 (2, err_packet, required),
11048 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
11050 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
11051 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
11052 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11054 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
11058 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11059 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11063 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11068 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11069 (0, payment_secret, required),
11070 (2, expiry_time, required),
11071 (4, user_payment_id, required),
11072 (6, payment_preimage, required),
11073 (8, min_value_msat, required),
11076 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11078 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11079 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11080 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11081 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11082 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11083 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11087 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11088 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11090 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11092 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11094 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11095 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11096 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11101 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11103 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11104 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11107 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11108 serializable_peer_count += 1;
11111 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11112 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11116 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11118 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11121 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11122 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11123 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11126 channel.write(writer)?;
11132 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11133 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11134 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11135 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11136 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11137 for forward in pending_forwards {
11138 forward.write(writer)?;
11143 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11144 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11145 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11146 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11149 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11150 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11151 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11153 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11154 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11155 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11156 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11157 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11158 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11159 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11160 htlc.write(writer)?;
11162 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11163 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11166 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11167 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11168 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11169 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11170 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11171 // per_peer_state lock at all.
11172 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11175 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11176 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11177 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11178 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11179 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11181 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11182 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11183 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11184 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11185 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11186 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11187 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11192 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11193 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11194 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11195 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11196 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11197 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11198 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11199 // well save the space and not write any events here.
11200 0u64.write(writer)?;
11202 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11203 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11204 event.write(writer)?;
11208 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11209 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11210 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11211 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11212 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11213 0u64.write(writer)?;
11215 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11216 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11217 // likely to be identical.
11218 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11219 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11221 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11222 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11223 hash.write(writer)?;
11224 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11227 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11228 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11229 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11230 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11231 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11234 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11235 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11237 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11238 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11239 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11240 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11243 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11244 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11245 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11246 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11250 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11251 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11252 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11254 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11255 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11256 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11262 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11263 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11264 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11265 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11268 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11269 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11270 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11271 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11272 pending_claiming_payments = None;
11275 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11276 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11277 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11278 if !updates.is_empty() {
11279 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11280 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11285 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11286 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11287 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11288 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11289 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11290 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11291 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11292 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11293 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11294 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11295 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11296 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11297 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11298 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11305 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11306 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11307 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11308 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11311 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11312 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11313 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11314 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11315 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11316 // check that the event is sane here.
11317 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11318 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11319 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11320 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11326 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11327 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11328 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11329 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11330 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11331 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11334 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11335 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11336 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11337 events.push_back((ev, action));
11338 } else if action.is_some() {
11339 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11346 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11347 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11348 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11349 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11350 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11351 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11354 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11356 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11358 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11359 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11360 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11361 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11362 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11363 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11364 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11365 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11366 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11367 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11368 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11369 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11370 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11372 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11373 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11375 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11376 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11378 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11379 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11380 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11381 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11382 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11383 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11385 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11386 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11388 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11389 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11390 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11391 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11392 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11393 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11397 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11398 pub entropy_source: ES,
11400 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11401 pub node_signer: NS,
11403 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11404 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11406 pub signer_provider: SP,
11408 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11410 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11411 pub fee_estimator: F,
11412 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11414 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11415 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11416 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11417 pub chain_monitor: M,
11419 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11420 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11421 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11422 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11423 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11424 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11426 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11428 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11429 /// deserialization.
11431 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11432 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11433 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11435 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11436 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11438 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11439 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11440 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11441 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11443 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11446 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11447 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11450 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11451 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11453 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11454 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11455 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11456 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11457 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11458 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11462 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11463 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11464 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11465 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11466 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11468 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11469 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11470 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11476 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11477 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11478 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11479 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11481 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11482 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11483 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11484 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11485 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11490 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11491 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11492 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11496 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11497 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11499 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11500 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11501 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11502 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11503 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11504 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11508 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11509 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11511 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11512 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11513 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11515 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11517 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11518 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11519 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11520 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11521 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11522 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11523 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11524 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11525 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11526 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11527 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11529 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11530 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11531 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11532 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11533 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11534 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11535 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11536 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11537 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11538 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11539 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11540 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11541 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11542 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11543 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11545 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11546 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11547 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11549 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11550 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11551 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11553 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11554 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11555 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11557 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11558 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11559 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11561 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11562 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11563 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11566 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11567 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11568 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11569 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11570 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11571 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11572 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11573 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11575 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11576 let mut found_htlc = false;
11577 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11578 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11581 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11582 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11583 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11584 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11585 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11586 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11587 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11588 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11590 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11591 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11592 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11596 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11597 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11598 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11599 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11600 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11601 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11603 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11604 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11606 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11608 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11609 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11612 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11613 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11614 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11618 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11619 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11620 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11621 // safely discard the channel.
11622 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11623 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11624 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11625 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11626 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11627 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11628 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11629 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11632 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11633 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11634 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11635 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11636 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11637 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11641 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11642 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11643 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11644 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11645 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11647 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11648 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11649 counterparty_node_id: None,
11650 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11651 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11653 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11657 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11658 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11659 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11660 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11661 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11662 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11663 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11664 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11665 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11667 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11670 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11671 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11672 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11673 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11674 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11675 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11676 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11677 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11679 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11682 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11685 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11686 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11687 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11688 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11689 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11690 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11691 is_connected: false,
11695 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11696 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11697 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11698 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11699 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11700 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11701 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11702 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11705 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11706 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11707 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11708 for _ in 0..event_count {
11709 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11710 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11715 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11716 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11717 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11719 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11720 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11721 // on-startup monitor updates.
11722 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11723 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11725 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11729 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11730 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11732 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11733 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11734 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11735 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11736 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11740 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11741 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11742 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11743 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11744 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11745 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11746 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11748 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11749 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11753 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11754 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11755 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11756 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11757 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11758 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11759 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11760 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11761 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11762 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11763 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11764 let mut events_override = None;
11765 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11766 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11767 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11768 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11769 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11770 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11771 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11772 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11773 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11774 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11775 (8, events_override, option),
11776 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11777 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11778 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11779 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11780 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11782 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11783 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11784 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11787 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11788 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11791 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11792 pending_events_read = events;
11795 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11796 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11799 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11800 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11801 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11802 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11803 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11804 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11806 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11808 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11809 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11810 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11813 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11814 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11815 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11816 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11817 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11819 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11820 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11821 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11823 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11824 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11825 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11826 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11827 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11829 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11830 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11831 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11832 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11833 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11834 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11835 pending_background_events.push(
11836 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11837 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11838 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11839 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11840 update: update.clone(),
11843 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11844 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11845 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11846 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11847 pending_background_events.push(
11848 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11849 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11850 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11853 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11854 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11855 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11857 max_in_flight_update_id
11861 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11862 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11863 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11864 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11865 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11866 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11868 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11870 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11871 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11872 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11873 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11874 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11875 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11876 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11877 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11878 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11881 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11882 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11883 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11884 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11885 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11886 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11887 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11888 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11889 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11890 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11891 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11894 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11895 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11896 debug_assert!(false);
11897 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11902 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11903 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11904 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11905 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11906 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11907 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11908 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11909 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11910 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11911 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11913 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11914 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11915 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11917 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11918 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11919 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11920 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11921 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11922 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11923 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11924 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11930 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11931 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11933 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11934 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11935 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11936 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11939 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11940 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11941 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11942 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11943 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11944 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11945 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11947 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11948 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11949 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11950 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11951 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11952 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11953 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11954 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11955 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11958 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11959 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11960 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11961 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11962 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11963 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11964 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11965 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11968 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11969 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11970 retry_strategy: None,
11971 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11972 payment_params: None,
11973 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11974 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11975 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11976 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11977 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11978 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11979 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11980 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11981 total_msat: path_amt,
11982 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11983 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11985 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11986 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11991 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11992 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11993 match htlc_source {
11994 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11995 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11996 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11997 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11999 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
12000 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
12001 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
12002 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
12003 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
12004 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
12005 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
12006 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
12007 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
12009 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12010 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12014 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
12016 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
12017 forwards.retain(|forward| {
12018 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
12019 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
12020 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12021 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12026 !forwards.is_empty()
12028 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
12029 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
12030 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12031 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12032 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
12033 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
12034 intercepted_id != ev_id
12041 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
12042 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
12043 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
12044 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
12045 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
12046 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
12047 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
12048 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
12049 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
12050 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
12051 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
12053 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
12054 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
12055 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
12056 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
12058 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
12059 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
12060 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
12067 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12068 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12070 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12072 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12073 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12074 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12075 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12076 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12077 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12078 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12079 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12080 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12081 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12084 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12085 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12086 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12087 // channel still live case here.
12091 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12092 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12097 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12098 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12099 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12100 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12101 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12102 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12103 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12104 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12108 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12109 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12111 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12112 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12113 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12114 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12116 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12117 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12118 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12120 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12121 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12123 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12124 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12126 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12129 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12130 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12131 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12133 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12137 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12138 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12139 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12140 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12143 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12144 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
12145 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12146 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
12147 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12148 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12149 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12150 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12152 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12153 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12157 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12159 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12161 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12162 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12164 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12165 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12170 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12171 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12173 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12175 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12177 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12178 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12179 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12180 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12184 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12185 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12186 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12187 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12188 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12189 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12190 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
12191 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12192 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12194 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12195 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12196 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12198 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12199 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12200 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12201 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12202 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12203 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12205 if chan.context.is_usable() {
12206 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12207 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12208 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12209 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12210 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12214 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12215 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12216 debug_assert!(false);
12217 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12222 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12224 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12225 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12226 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12227 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12228 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12229 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12230 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12231 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12232 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12233 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12234 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12236 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12237 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12239 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12240 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12241 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12242 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12244 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12245 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12246 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12247 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12249 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12250 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12251 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12252 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12254 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12255 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12256 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12259 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12260 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
12261 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12264 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12265 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12268 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12271 purpose: payment.purpose,
12272 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12273 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12274 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12280 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12281 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12282 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12283 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
12284 for action in actions.iter() {
12285 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12286 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12287 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12289 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12291 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12292 blocked_channel_id);
12293 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12294 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12295 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12297 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12298 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12299 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12300 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12304 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12305 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12309 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12311 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12312 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12316 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12318 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12319 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12320 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12321 router: args.router,
12323 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12325 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12326 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12327 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12328 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12330 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12331 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12332 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12333 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12334 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12335 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12336 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12338 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12340 our_network_pubkey,
12343 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12345 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12347 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12348 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12349 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12350 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12351 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12353 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12354 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12356 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12358 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12360 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12362 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12363 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12364 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12366 logger: args.logger,
12367 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12370 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12371 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12372 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12373 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12374 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12377 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12378 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12379 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12380 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12381 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12382 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12383 downstream_channel_id, None
12387 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12388 //connection or two.
12390 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12396 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12397 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12398 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12399 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12400 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12401 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12402 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12403 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12404 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12405 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12406 use crate::prelude::*;
12407 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12408 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12409 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12410 use crate::util::test_utils;
12411 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12412 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12415 fn test_notify_limits() {
12416 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12417 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12418 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12419 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12420 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12421 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12423 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12424 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12425 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12426 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12427 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12429 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12431 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12432 // to connect messages with new values
12433 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12434 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12435 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12436 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12437 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12438 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12440 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12442 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12443 // ... but the last node should not.
12444 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12445 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12446 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12447 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12449 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12450 // about the channel.
12451 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12452 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12453 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12455 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12457 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12458 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12459 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12460 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12461 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12462 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12464 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12465 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12466 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12468 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12469 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12470 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12471 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12472 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12473 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12475 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12476 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12477 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12478 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12479 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12480 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12481 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12482 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12484 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12485 // the channel info has updated.
12486 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12487 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12488 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12489 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12490 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12491 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12495 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12496 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12498 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12499 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12500 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12501 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12502 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12504 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12505 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12506 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12507 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12509 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12510 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12511 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12512 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12513 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12514 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12515 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12516 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12518 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12519 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12520 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12522 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12523 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12524 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12526 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12527 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12528 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12529 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12530 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12532 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12533 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12534 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12536 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12537 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12538 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12539 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12540 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12541 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12542 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12543 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12544 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12546 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12547 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12548 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12550 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12551 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12552 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12554 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12555 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12556 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12557 // lightning messages manually.
12558 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12559 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12562 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12563 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12564 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12565 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12567 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12568 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12570 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12571 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12573 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12574 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12575 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12577 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12578 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12579 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12581 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12583 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12585 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12586 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12589 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12590 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12591 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12592 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12594 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12595 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12596 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12597 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12602 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12603 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12604 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12605 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12612 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12613 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12614 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12617 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12618 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12619 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12620 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12621 // fails as expected.
12622 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12623 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12624 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12625 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12626 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12627 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12630 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12631 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12634 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12635 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12636 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12638 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12639 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12640 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12642 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12643 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12644 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12645 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12646 let route = find_route(
12647 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12648 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12650 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12651 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12653 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12654 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12655 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12656 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12657 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12659 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12660 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12661 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12662 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12663 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12665 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12666 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12667 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12668 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12669 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12670 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12671 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12672 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12673 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12675 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12676 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12678 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12679 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12680 let route = find_route(
12681 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12682 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12684 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12685 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12687 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12689 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12690 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12691 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12693 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12694 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12695 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12696 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12700 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12701 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12704 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12705 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12706 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12708 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12709 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12710 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12711 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12712 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12713 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12714 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12715 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12716 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12718 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12719 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12721 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12722 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12723 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12724 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12726 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12728 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12729 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12730 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12732 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12733 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12734 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12737 let route = find_route(
12738 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12739 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12741 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12742 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12743 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12745 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12746 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12747 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12748 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12749 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12751 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12752 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12753 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12755 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12756 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12757 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12758 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12759 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12760 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12761 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12762 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12763 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12765 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12766 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12770 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12771 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12772 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12778 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12779 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12781 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12782 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12783 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12784 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12785 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12786 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12787 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12788 let route = find_route(
12789 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12790 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12793 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12794 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12795 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12796 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12797 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12798 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12801 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12802 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12803 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12804 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12805 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12806 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12809 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12813 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12814 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12815 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12816 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12817 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12818 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12819 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12820 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12821 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12823 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12824 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12826 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12827 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12828 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12829 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12830 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12831 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12832 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12833 let route = find_route(
12834 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12835 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12838 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12839 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12840 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12841 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12842 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12843 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12844 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12845 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12848 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12849 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12850 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12851 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12852 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12853 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12854 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12856 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12860 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12864 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12866 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12867 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12868 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12869 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12871 // Marshall an MPP route.
12872 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12873 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12874 route.paths.push(path);
12875 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12876 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12877 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12878 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12879 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12880 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12882 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12883 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12885 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12886 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12888 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12893 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12894 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12895 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12896 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12897 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12899 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12901 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12903 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12905 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12906 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12907 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12910 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12911 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12912 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12915 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12916 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12917 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12919 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12920 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12922 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12923 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12925 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12926 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12927 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12929 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12930 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12931 }, false).unwrap();
12933 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12934 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12935 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12936 match &node_0_events[0] {
12937 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12941 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12942 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12943 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12948 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12949 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12950 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12951 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12952 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12954 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12956 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12957 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12959 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12960 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12962 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12965 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12966 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12967 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12968 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12969 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12970 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12973 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12976 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12977 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12982 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12983 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12987 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12989 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12990 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12992 total_msat: 100_000,
12995 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12996 // payment verification fails as expected.
12997 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12998 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12999 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
13000 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
13002 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
13006 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
13007 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
13011 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
13012 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
13013 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
13014 // the channel is successfully closed.
13015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13020 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13021 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13022 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
13023 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13024 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13026 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
13027 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
13029 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
13030 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
13031 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13032 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13035 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13037 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
13038 // as it has the funding transaction.
13039 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13040 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13041 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13044 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13046 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13048 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13050 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13051 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13052 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13054 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13057 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
13058 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
13059 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13060 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13061 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13064 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13065 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13067 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13068 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13069 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13070 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13072 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13073 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13074 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13075 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13077 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13078 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13080 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13081 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13082 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13083 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13084 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13085 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13086 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13090 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13091 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13092 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13093 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13094 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13095 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13096 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13099 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13101 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13102 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13103 // closing transaction).
13104 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13105 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13106 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13108 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13109 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13110 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13111 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13112 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13115 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13117 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13119 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13120 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13121 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13123 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13125 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13126 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13129 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13130 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13131 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13134 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13135 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13136 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13139 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13140 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13141 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13144 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13145 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13146 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13149 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13151 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13152 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13154 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13155 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13157 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13158 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13163 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13164 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13165 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13166 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13167 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13168 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13169 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13170 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13173 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13174 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13175 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13177 // Test the API functions.
13178 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13180 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13182 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13184 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13186 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13188 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13190 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13194 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13195 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13196 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13197 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13198 // the given `channel_id`.
13199 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13200 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13201 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13202 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13204 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13207 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13209 // Test the API functions.
13210 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13212 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13214 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13216 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13218 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13220 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13224 fn test_connection_limiting() {
13225 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13229 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13231 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13233 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13234 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13236 let mut funding_tx = None;
13237 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13238 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13239 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13242 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13243 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13244 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13245 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13246 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13248 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13250 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13252 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13254 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13256 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13258 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13261 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13262 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13263 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13264 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13265 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13266 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13268 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13269 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13271 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13272 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13273 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13274 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13275 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13276 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13277 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13280 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13281 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13282 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13283 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13284 }, true).unwrap_err();
13286 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13287 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13288 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13289 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13290 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13291 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13292 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13294 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13295 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13297 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13298 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13299 }, true).unwrap_err();
13301 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13302 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13303 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13304 }, false).unwrap();
13305 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13307 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13308 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13310 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13311 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13312 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13313 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13314 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13316 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13317 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13318 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13320 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13321 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13322 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13324 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13325 // "protected" and can connect again.
13326 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13327 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13328 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13330 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13332 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13334 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13335 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13339 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13340 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13344 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13346 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13348 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13349 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13351 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13352 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13353 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13354 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13357 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13359 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13360 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13361 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13363 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13364 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13365 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13367 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13368 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13369 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13370 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13374 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13375 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13376 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13379 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13380 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13384 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13386 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13387 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13389 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13390 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13391 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13392 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13393 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13394 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13397 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13398 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13400 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13401 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13403 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13405 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13406 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13409 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13410 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13411 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13412 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13413 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13415 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13416 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13418 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13419 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13420 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13421 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13427 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13428 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13430 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13431 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13432 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13434 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13435 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13439 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13443 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13444 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13445 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13446 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13447 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13448 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13449 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13450 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13451 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13452 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13453 payment_metadata: None,
13454 keysend_preimage: None,
13455 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13456 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13458 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13460 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13461 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13462 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13463 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13464 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13465 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13466 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13468 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13469 } else { panic!(); }
13471 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13472 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13473 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13474 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13475 payment_metadata: None,
13476 keysend_preimage: None,
13477 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13478 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13480 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13482 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13483 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13484 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13485 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13489 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13490 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13491 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13492 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13493 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13495 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13496 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13497 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13498 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13499 payment_metadata: None,
13500 keysend_preimage: None,
13501 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13502 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13504 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13505 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13506 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13508 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13509 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13510 // is not satisfied.
13511 assert!(result.is_ok());
13515 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13516 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13517 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13518 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13519 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13521 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13522 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13524 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13525 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13526 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13527 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13528 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13530 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13531 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13533 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13534 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13535 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13536 match &msg_events[0] {
13537 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13538 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13540 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13541 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13542 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13545 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13548 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13549 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13551 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13552 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13553 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13555 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13559 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13560 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13561 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13562 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13565 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13566 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13567 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13571 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13572 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13573 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13575 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13576 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13578 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13579 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13581 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13584 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13585 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13587 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13588 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13590 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13591 // not have generated any events.
13592 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13596 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13597 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13598 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13599 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13600 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13601 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13602 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13603 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13605 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13606 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13607 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13609 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13610 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13611 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13612 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13615 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13616 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13619 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13620 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13623 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13624 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13625 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13626 ..Default::default()
13628 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13629 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13632 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13633 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13636 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13637 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13638 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13639 ..Default::default()
13641 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13643 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13644 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13646 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13647 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13650 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13651 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13652 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13653 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13654 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13657 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13658 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13659 ..Default::default()
13661 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13664 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13665 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13666 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13667 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13671 fn test_payment_display() {
13672 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13673 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13674 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13675 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13676 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13677 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13681 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13682 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13683 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13684 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13685 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13686 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13688 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13689 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13690 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13691 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13692 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13693 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13694 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13695 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13697 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13698 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13699 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13702 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13703 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13705 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13706 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13708 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13709 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13710 }, false).unwrap();
13711 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13712 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13713 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13715 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13717 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13718 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13719 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13720 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13721 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13722 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13723 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13724 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13725 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13726 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13727 } else { panic!() };
13728 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13729 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13730 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13731 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13733 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13735 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13736 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13737 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13742 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13743 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13744 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13745 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13748 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13749 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13750 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13752 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13753 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13755 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13756 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13759 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13760 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13761 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13763 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13767 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13768 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13769 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13771 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13776 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13777 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13778 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13779 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13781 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13782 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13783 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13785 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13787 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13788 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13789 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13790 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13792 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13793 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13795 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13801 use crate::chain::Listen;
13802 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13803 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13804 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13805 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13806 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13807 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13808 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13809 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13810 use crate::util::test_utils;
13811 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13813 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13814 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13815 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13816 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13818 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13820 use criterion::Criterion;
13822 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13823 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13824 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13825 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13826 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13827 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13828 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13830 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13831 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13833 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13834 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13836 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13838 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13841 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13842 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13845 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13846 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13847 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13849 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13850 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13852 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13853 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13854 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13855 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13856 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13858 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13859 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13860 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13862 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13863 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13864 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13865 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13867 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13868 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13869 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13871 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13872 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13873 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13874 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13875 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13877 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13878 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13879 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13881 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13882 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13884 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13885 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13886 }, false).unwrap();
13887 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13888 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13889 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13892 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13893 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13894 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13896 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13897 } else { panic!(); }
13899 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13900 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13901 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13902 match events_b[0] {
13903 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13904 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13909 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13910 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13911 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13912 match events_a[0] {
13913 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13914 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13919 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13921 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13922 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13923 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13925 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13926 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13927 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13928 match msg_events[0] {
13929 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13930 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13931 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13935 match msg_events[1] {
13936 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13940 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13941 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13942 match events_a[0] {
13943 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13944 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13949 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13950 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13951 match events_b[0] {
13952 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13953 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13958 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13959 macro_rules! send_payment {
13960 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13961 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13962 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13963 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13964 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13965 payment_count += 1;
13966 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13967 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13969 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13970 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13971 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13972 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13973 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13974 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13975 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13976 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13977 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13978 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13979 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13981 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13982 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13983 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13984 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13986 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13987 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13988 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13989 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13990 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13992 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13995 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13996 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13997 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13998 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
14000 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
14004 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
14005 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
14006 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);