1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
195 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
198 session_priv: SecretKey,
199 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
200 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
201 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
202 payment_id: PaymentId,
203 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
206 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
207 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
208 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
210 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
212 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
214 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
217 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
218 payment_id.hash(hasher);
219 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
220 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
227 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
228 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
230 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
231 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
232 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
233 payment_secret: None,
238 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
239 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
241 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
250 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
252 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
257 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
259 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
260 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
261 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
262 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
263 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
265 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
266 err: msgs::LightningError,
267 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
268 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
270 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
272 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
274 err: LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 shutdown_finish: None,
288 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
290 err: LightningError {
292 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
295 shutdown_finish: None,
299 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
300 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
303 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
305 err: LightningError {
307 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
308 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
314 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
315 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
319 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
322 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
324 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
326 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
328 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
330 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
341 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
342 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
350 shutdown_finish: None,
355 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
356 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
357 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
358 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
359 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
361 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
362 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
363 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
364 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
365 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
366 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
367 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
369 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
373 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
374 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
375 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
376 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
377 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
378 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
379 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
380 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
381 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
382 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
383 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
384 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
386 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
387 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
388 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
389 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
392 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
393 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
394 /// quite some time lag.
395 enum BackgroundEvent {
396 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
397 /// commitment transaction.
398 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
401 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
402 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
404 latest_features: InitFeatures,
407 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
408 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
410 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
412 struct PendingInboundPayment {
413 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
414 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
415 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
416 /// this payment being removed.
418 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
419 user_payment_id: u64,
420 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
421 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
422 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
425 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
426 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
427 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
429 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
432 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
433 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
434 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
435 pending_amt_msat: u64,
436 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
438 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
439 starting_block_height: u32,
441 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
442 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
443 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
445 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
449 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
450 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
452 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
456 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
458 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
463 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
464 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
465 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
466 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
467 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
468 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
471 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
474 /// panics if part_amt_msat is None and !self.is_fulfilled
475 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: Option<u64>) -> bool {
476 let remove_res = match self {
477 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
478 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
479 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
480 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
484 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
485 *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat.expect("We must only not provide an amount if the payment was already fulfilled");
491 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
492 let insert_res = match self {
493 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
494 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
495 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
497 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
500 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
501 *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
507 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
511 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
518 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
519 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
520 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
521 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
522 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
523 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
524 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
525 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
527 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
528 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
529 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
530 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
531 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
532 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
533 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
534 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
535 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
537 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
538 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
540 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
541 /// to individual Channels.
543 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
544 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
545 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
546 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
548 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
549 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
550 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
551 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
552 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
553 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
554 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
556 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
557 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
558 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
559 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
562 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
563 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
564 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
565 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
566 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
568 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
569 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
570 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
571 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
572 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
573 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
574 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
575 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
576 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
577 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
580 default_configuration: UserConfig,
581 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
587 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
589 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
590 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
592 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
593 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
594 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
595 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
597 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
598 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
599 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
600 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
601 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
602 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
604 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
605 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
606 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
607 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
608 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
609 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
610 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
611 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
613 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
615 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
616 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
618 our_network_key: SecretKey,
619 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
621 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
622 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
623 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
625 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
626 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
627 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
628 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
630 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
631 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
632 /// are currently open with that peer.
633 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
634 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
637 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
638 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
640 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
641 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
642 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
643 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
644 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
645 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
646 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
647 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
648 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
650 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
657 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
659 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
660 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
661 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
662 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
663 pub struct ChainParameters {
664 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
665 pub network: Network,
667 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
669 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
670 pub best_block: BestBlock,
673 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
679 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
680 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
681 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
682 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
683 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
684 /// updates are ready for persistence).
686 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
687 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
688 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
689 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
690 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
692 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
693 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
696 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
697 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
698 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
701 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
702 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
704 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
705 persistence_notifier: notifier,
706 should_persist: persist_check,
707 _read_guard: read_guard,
712 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
714 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
715 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
720 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
721 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
723 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
725 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
726 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
727 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
728 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
729 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
731 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
732 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
734 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
736 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
737 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
738 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
739 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
740 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
741 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
742 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
744 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
745 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
747 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
748 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
749 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
750 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
752 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
753 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
754 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
755 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
756 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
757 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
760 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
762 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
763 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
766 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
768 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
769 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
770 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
771 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
772 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
773 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
774 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
775 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
776 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
777 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
778 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
781 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
782 /// to better separate parameters.
783 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
784 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
785 /// The node_id of our counterparty
786 pub node_id: PublicKey,
787 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
788 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
789 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
790 pub features: InitFeatures,
791 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
792 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
793 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
795 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
797 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
798 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
799 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
800 /// payments to us through this channel.
801 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
804 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
805 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
806 pub struct ChannelDetails {
807 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
808 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
809 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
810 /// lifetime of the channel.
811 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
812 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
813 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
814 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
815 /// our counterparty already.
817 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
818 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
819 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
820 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
821 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
822 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
823 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
824 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
825 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
826 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
827 /// this value on chain.
829 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
831 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
833 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
834 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
835 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
836 pub user_channel_id: u64,
837 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
838 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
839 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
840 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
842 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
843 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
844 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
845 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
846 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
847 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
848 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
849 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
850 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
852 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
853 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
854 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
855 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
856 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
857 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
858 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
859 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
860 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
862 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
864 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
865 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
866 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
867 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
868 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
869 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
870 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
871 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
872 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
874 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
875 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
876 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
877 pub is_outbound: bool,
878 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
879 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
880 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
881 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
882 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
884 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
885 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
886 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
887 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
889 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
891 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
895 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
896 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
898 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
899 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
900 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
901 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
902 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
903 ParameterError(APIError),
904 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
905 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
906 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
909 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
911 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
912 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
913 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
914 /// paths than the ones selected).
915 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
916 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
917 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
918 /// in over-/re-payment.
920 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
921 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
922 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
924 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
925 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
926 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
927 /// with the latest update_id.
928 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
931 macro_rules! handle_error {
932 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
935 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
936 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
938 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
939 // entering the macro.
940 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
941 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
944 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
946 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
947 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
948 if let Some(update) = update_option {
949 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
953 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
954 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
955 channel_id, user_channel_id,
956 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
961 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
962 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
964 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
965 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
966 action: err.action.clone()
970 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
971 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
974 // Return error in case higher-API need one
981 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
982 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
983 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
985 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
986 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
988 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
990 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
991 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
993 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
994 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
995 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
996 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
998 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
999 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1000 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1002 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1003 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1004 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1005 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1007 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1008 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1009 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1015 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1016 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1020 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1022 $entry.remove_entry();
1030 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1031 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1035 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1037 $entry.remove_entry();
1045 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1046 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1048 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1049 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1050 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1057 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1058 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1059 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1061 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1063 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1064 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1065 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1066 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1068 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1069 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1070 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1071 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1072 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1073 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1074 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1075 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1076 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1077 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1078 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1081 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1082 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1083 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1084 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1085 match $action_type {
1086 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1087 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1089 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1090 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1092 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1093 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1094 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1095 if !$resend_commitment {
1096 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1099 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1101 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1102 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1106 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1107 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1109 $entry.remove_entry();
1113 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1114 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1118 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1119 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1120 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1122 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1123 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1127 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1128 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1129 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1130 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1131 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1134 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1139 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1140 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1141 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1142 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1143 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1144 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1146 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1147 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1149 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1150 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1151 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1152 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1155 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1156 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1157 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1158 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1159 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1160 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1161 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1162 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1163 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1164 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1165 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1166 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1169 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1170 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1171 // before it should be allowed to.
1172 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1173 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1174 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1177 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1178 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1179 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1180 msg: announcement_sigs,
1183 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1186 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1187 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1188 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1189 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1190 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1191 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1192 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1193 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1194 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1195 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1196 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1197 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1198 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1199 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1200 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1201 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1202 let mut order = $order;
1204 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1206 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1210 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1211 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1212 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1213 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1218 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1219 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1220 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1221 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1222 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1227 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1231 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1236 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1237 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1238 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1243 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1244 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1245 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1246 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1247 assert!(res.is_ok());
1250 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1254 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1255 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1256 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1258 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1260 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1261 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1266 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1267 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1268 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1269 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1270 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1273 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1275 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1276 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1278 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1280 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1282 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1283 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1284 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1285 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1286 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1287 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1290 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1291 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1292 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1296 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1298 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1299 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1300 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1301 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1302 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1303 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1305 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1306 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1308 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1309 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1312 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1313 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1315 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1317 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1318 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1319 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1320 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1328 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1329 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1330 &self.default_configuration
1333 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1335 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1336 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1337 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1338 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1339 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1342 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1343 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1345 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1346 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1347 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1349 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1350 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1351 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1352 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1353 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1354 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1356 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1357 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1358 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1359 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1360 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1361 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1365 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1366 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1367 Some(peer_state) => {
1368 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1369 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1370 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1371 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1373 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1376 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1379 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1380 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1382 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1383 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1384 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1386 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1387 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1389 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1395 node_id: their_network_key,
1398 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1401 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1402 let mut res = Vec::new();
1404 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1406 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1407 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1408 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1409 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1410 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1411 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1412 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1413 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1414 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1415 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1416 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1418 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1419 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1420 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1421 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1422 inbound_capacity_msat,
1423 outbound_capacity_msat,
1424 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1425 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1426 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1427 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1428 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1429 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1430 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1434 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1435 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1436 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1437 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1443 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1444 /// more information.
1445 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1446 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1449 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1450 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1452 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1453 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1455 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1456 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1457 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1458 // really wanted anyway.
1459 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1462 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1463 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1464 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1465 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1466 Some(transaction) => {
1467 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1471 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1472 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1473 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1474 reason: closure_reason
1478 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1481 let counterparty_node_id;
1482 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1483 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1484 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1485 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1486 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1488 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1490 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1491 Some(peer_state) => {
1492 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1493 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1494 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1496 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1498 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1500 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1501 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1502 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1503 let (result, is_permanent) =
1504 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1506 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1512 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1513 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1517 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1518 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1519 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1520 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1524 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1532 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1533 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1536 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1540 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1541 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1542 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1544 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1545 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1547 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1548 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1549 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1550 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1552 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1554 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1555 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1556 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1557 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1558 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1561 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1562 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1563 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1565 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1566 /// the channel being closed or not:
1567 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1568 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1569 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1570 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1571 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1572 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1573 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1575 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1577 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1578 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1579 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1580 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1581 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1585 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1586 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1587 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1588 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1589 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1591 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1592 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1593 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1594 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1595 // ignore the result here.
1596 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1600 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1601 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1602 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1604 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1605 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1606 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1607 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1608 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1609 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1612 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1613 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1615 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1616 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1617 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1620 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1622 chan.remove_entry().1
1624 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1627 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1628 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1629 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1630 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1631 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1636 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1639 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1640 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1641 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1643 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1644 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1645 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1646 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1647 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1648 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1649 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1659 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1660 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1661 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1662 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1663 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1667 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1668 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1669 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1671 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1672 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1673 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1674 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1675 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1676 failure_code: $err_code,
1677 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1682 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1683 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1686 let shared_secret = {
1687 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1688 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1691 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1693 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1694 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1695 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1696 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1697 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1698 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1699 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1700 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1703 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1704 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1705 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1706 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1707 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1710 let mut channel_state = None;
1711 macro_rules! return_err {
1712 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1714 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1715 if channel_state.is_none() {
1716 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1718 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1719 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1720 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1721 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1722 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1727 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1728 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1729 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1730 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1732 let error_code = match err {
1733 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1734 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1735 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1736 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1737 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1739 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1742 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1743 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1744 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1751 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1754 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1755 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1756 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1757 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1758 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1759 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1760 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1761 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1762 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1763 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1764 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1765 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1769 // final_expiry_too_soon
1770 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1771 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1772 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1773 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1774 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1775 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1776 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1778 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1779 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1780 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1782 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1783 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1784 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1787 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1788 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1789 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1790 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1791 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1792 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1793 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1794 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1796 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1798 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1799 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1800 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1801 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1802 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1803 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1804 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1805 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1806 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1809 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1811 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1814 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1819 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1820 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1821 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1822 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1824 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1826 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1827 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1828 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1829 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1832 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1833 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1834 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1836 // Check two things:
1837 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1838 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1839 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1841 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1843 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1844 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1845 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1847 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1849 let blinding_factor = {
1850 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1851 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1852 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1853 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1856 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1858 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1860 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1863 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1864 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1867 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1868 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1869 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1870 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1871 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1875 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1876 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1877 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1880 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1881 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1882 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1883 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1887 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1888 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1889 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1890 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1891 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1892 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1893 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1894 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1895 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1896 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1897 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1899 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1902 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1904 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1905 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1906 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1907 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1908 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1911 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1912 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1913 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1914 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1915 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1916 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1917 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1919 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1920 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1922 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1923 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1924 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1925 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1926 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1928 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1929 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1931 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1932 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1933 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1934 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1935 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1937 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1938 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1940 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1941 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1942 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1943 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1949 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1950 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1951 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1952 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1954 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1955 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1957 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1958 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1959 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1961 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1963 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1968 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1971 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1972 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1973 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1975 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1976 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1977 if !chan.should_announce() {
1978 return Err(LightningError {
1979 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1980 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1983 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1984 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1987 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1988 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1989 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1990 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1991 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1992 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1993 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1994 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1995 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1999 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2001 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2002 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2004 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2005 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2006 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2007 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2008 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2009 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2010 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2011 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2014 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2015 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2017 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2023 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2024 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2025 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2026 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2027 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2028 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2030 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2031 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2032 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2033 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2034 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2036 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2038 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2040 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2041 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2043 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2044 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2045 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2046 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2047 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2048 err: "Payment already completed"
2053 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2054 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2055 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2058 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2059 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2061 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2062 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2064 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2065 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2067 let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2068 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2070 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2071 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2073 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2074 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2075 channel_state, chan);
2077 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2078 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2079 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2080 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2081 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2082 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2083 total_msat: total_value,
2085 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
2089 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2090 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2091 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2092 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2093 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2094 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2095 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2096 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2097 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2100 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2101 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2102 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2103 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2104 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2105 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2106 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2107 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2115 } else { unreachable!(); }
2119 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2120 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2122 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2127 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2129 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2130 /// fields for more info.
2132 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2133 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2134 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2135 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2136 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2137 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2139 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2141 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2142 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2143 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2145 /// In general, a path may raise:
2146 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2147 /// node public key) is specified.
2148 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2149 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2151 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2152 /// relevant updates.
2154 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2155 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2156 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2158 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2159 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2160 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2161 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2163 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2164 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2165 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2166 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2167 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2170 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2171 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2172 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2174 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2175 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2176 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2177 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2178 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2180 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2181 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2183 let mut total_value = 0;
2184 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2185 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2186 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2187 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2188 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2189 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2190 continue 'path_check;
2192 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2193 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2194 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2195 continue 'path_check;
2198 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2199 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2201 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2202 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2204 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2205 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2206 total_value = amt_msat;
2209 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2210 let mut results = Vec::new();
2211 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2212 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2214 let mut has_ok = false;
2215 let mut has_err = false;
2216 for res in results.iter() {
2217 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2218 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2219 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2220 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2227 if has_err && has_ok {
2228 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2230 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2236 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2238 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2239 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2240 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2241 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2243 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2244 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2245 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2246 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2247 if path.len() == 0 {
2248 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2249 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2254 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2255 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2256 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2258 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2259 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2261 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2262 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2263 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2264 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2267 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2269 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2270 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2271 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2274 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2275 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2276 err: "Payment already completed"
2281 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2282 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2286 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2289 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2290 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2291 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2292 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2293 /// never reach the recipient.
2295 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2297 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2298 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2300 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2302 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2303 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2304 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2306 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2308 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2309 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2310 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2315 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2316 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2317 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2318 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2320 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2322 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2324 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2325 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2326 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2327 } else { unreachable!(); })
2330 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2332 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2333 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2336 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2337 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2342 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2343 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2344 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2349 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2359 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2360 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2361 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2365 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2367 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2368 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2370 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2372 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2373 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2374 /// keys per-channel).
2376 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2377 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2378 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2380 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2381 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2382 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2384 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2385 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2388 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2389 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2390 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2391 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2395 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2396 let mut output_index = None;
2397 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2398 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2399 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2400 if output_index.is_some() {
2401 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2402 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2405 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2406 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2407 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2410 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2413 if output_index.is_none() {
2414 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2415 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2418 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2422 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2423 if !chan.should_announce() {
2424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2428 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2430 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2432 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2433 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2435 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2436 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2437 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2438 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2439 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2444 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2445 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2446 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2448 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2451 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2452 // smaller than 500:
2453 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2455 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2456 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2457 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2458 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2459 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2460 /// our network addresses.
2462 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2463 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2465 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2466 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2467 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2468 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2470 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2472 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2473 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2476 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2477 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2480 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2481 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2482 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2484 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2485 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2486 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2487 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2488 rgb, alias, addresses,
2489 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2490 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2492 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2493 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2495 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2496 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2498 let mut announced_chans = false;
2499 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2500 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2501 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2503 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2508 announced_chans = true;
2510 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2511 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2512 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2516 if announced_chans {
2517 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2518 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2519 signature: node_announce_sig,
2520 contents: announcement
2526 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2528 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2529 /// Will likely generate further events.
2530 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2533 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2534 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2535 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2537 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2538 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2540 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2541 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2542 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2543 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2545 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2546 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2547 match forward_info {
2548 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2549 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2550 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2551 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2552 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2553 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2554 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2556 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2557 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2560 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2561 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2562 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2563 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2564 // problem, not ours.
2571 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2572 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2573 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2574 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2575 match forward_info {
2576 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2577 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2579 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2580 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2582 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2583 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2584 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2585 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2586 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2588 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2590 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2591 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2593 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2595 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2596 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2597 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2603 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2605 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2606 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2607 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2608 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2609 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2610 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2611 // this channel currently :/.
2617 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2618 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2620 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2622 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2624 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2627 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2629 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2630 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2631 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2634 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2636 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2637 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2638 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2639 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2640 // messages when we can.
2641 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2642 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2643 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2650 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2651 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2654 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2655 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2656 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2657 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2658 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2659 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2661 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2663 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2664 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2665 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2667 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2668 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2670 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2672 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2676 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2677 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2680 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2681 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2682 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2683 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2684 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2685 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2686 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2687 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2688 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2690 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2698 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2699 match forward_info {
2700 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2701 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2702 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2703 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2704 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2705 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2706 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2707 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2709 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2712 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2713 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2714 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2715 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2716 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2717 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2719 value: amt_to_forward,
2724 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2726 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2727 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2728 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2730 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2731 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2732 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2733 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2734 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2736 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2741 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2742 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2743 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2744 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2745 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2746 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2747 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2748 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2750 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2751 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2752 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2753 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2755 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2756 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2758 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2759 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2761 amt: amt_to_forward,
2762 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2765 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2767 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2775 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2778 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2779 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2782 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2784 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2785 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2786 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2787 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2788 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2790 let mut total_value = 0;
2791 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2792 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2793 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2794 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2796 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2800 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2801 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2802 total_value += htlc.value;
2803 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2804 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2805 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2807 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2808 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2810 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2812 _ => unreachable!(),
2815 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2816 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2817 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2818 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2821 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2822 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2824 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2825 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2826 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2827 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2831 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2832 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2834 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2836 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2837 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2844 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2845 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2853 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2854 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2857 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2858 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2861 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2862 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2863 events.append(&mut new_events);
2866 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2868 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2869 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2871 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2872 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2873 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2874 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2875 if background_events.is_empty() {
2879 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2881 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2882 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2883 // monitor updating completing.
2884 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2891 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2892 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2893 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2894 self.process_background_events();
2897 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2898 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2899 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2900 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2902 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2903 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2905 if !chan.is_live() {
2906 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2907 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2908 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2911 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2913 let mut retain_channel = true;
2914 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2917 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2918 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2922 let ret_err = match res {
2923 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2924 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2925 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2926 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2929 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2930 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2931 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2932 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2933 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2934 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2935 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2936 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2946 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2950 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2951 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2952 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2953 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2954 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2955 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2956 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2958 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2960 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2962 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2964 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2965 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2966 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2967 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2968 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2970 handle_errors.push(err);
2980 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2982 /// This currently includes:
2983 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2984 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2985 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2988 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2989 /// estimate fetches.
2990 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2991 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2992 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2993 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2995 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2997 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2999 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3000 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3001 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3002 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3003 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3004 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3005 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3006 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3008 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3010 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3012 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3013 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3014 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3015 if needs_close { return false; }
3018 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3019 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3020 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3021 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3022 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3023 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3025 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3029 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3030 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3032 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3033 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3034 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3038 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3039 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3048 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3049 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3055 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3056 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3057 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3058 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3059 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3060 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3063 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3064 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3065 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3066 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3067 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3068 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3069 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3070 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3071 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3072 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3073 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3079 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3080 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3081 // be surfaced to the user.
3082 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3083 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3085 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3086 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3087 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3088 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3089 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3090 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3092 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3097 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3098 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3099 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3101 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3102 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3103 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3104 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3105 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3106 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)) &&
3107 !payment.get().is_fulfilled()
3109 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3110 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3112 rejected_by_dest: false,
3113 network_update: None,
3114 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3116 short_channel_id: None,
3126 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3133 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3134 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3135 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3136 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3137 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3138 /// still-available channels.
3139 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3140 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3141 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3142 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3145 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3146 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3147 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3149 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
3150 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3151 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3152 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3153 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3154 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3155 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)) {
3156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3159 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3160 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3163 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3164 all_paths_failed = true;
3167 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3171 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3172 match &onion_error {
3173 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3175 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3177 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3178 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3179 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3180 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3181 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3182 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3183 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3184 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3191 error_code: onion_error_code,
3193 error_data: onion_error_data
3197 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3203 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3204 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3205 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3206 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3208 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3209 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3210 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3211 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3212 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3213 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3214 network_update: None,
3217 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3220 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3222 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3229 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3230 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3231 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3232 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3233 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3235 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3237 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3241 let mut forward_event = None;
3242 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3243 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3245 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3247 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3250 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3253 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3254 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3255 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3256 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3257 time_forwardable: time
3264 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3265 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3266 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3268 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3269 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3270 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3271 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3273 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3275 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3276 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3277 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3278 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3282 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3283 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3284 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3285 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3287 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3288 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3289 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3290 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3292 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3293 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3294 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3295 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3296 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3298 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3299 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3300 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3306 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3307 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3308 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3310 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3311 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3312 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3313 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3314 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3315 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3316 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3318 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3319 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3320 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3321 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3322 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3323 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3324 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3325 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3327 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3328 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3329 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3330 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3331 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3332 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3334 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3339 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3340 // which were generated.
3341 channel_state.take();
3343 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3344 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3345 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3352 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3353 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3354 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3355 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3356 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3358 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3362 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3363 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3364 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3365 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3366 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3367 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3368 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3369 payment_preimage, e);
3370 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3371 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3372 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3373 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3376 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3377 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3378 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3379 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3380 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3381 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3382 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3383 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3384 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3385 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3391 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3393 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3396 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3397 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3398 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3399 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3400 payment_preimage, e);
3402 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3403 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3405 chan.remove_entry();
3407 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3410 } else { unreachable!(); }
3413 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3414 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3415 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3416 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3417 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3418 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3419 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3420 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3421 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3422 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3430 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3432 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3433 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3434 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3435 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3436 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3437 let found_payment = if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3438 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3439 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3441 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3442 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3443 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3445 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3446 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3447 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
3448 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3455 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3456 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3457 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3459 payment_hash: payment_hash
3463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3466 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3467 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3468 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3469 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3470 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3471 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3472 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3475 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3476 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3477 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3478 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3479 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3482 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3483 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3484 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3485 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3486 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3487 payment_preimage, e);
3489 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3490 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3491 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3492 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3495 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3496 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3497 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3498 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3502 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3503 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3504 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3507 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3508 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3510 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3518 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3519 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3520 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3523 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3526 let chan_restoration_res;
3527 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3528 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3529 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3530 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3534 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3538 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3539 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3540 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3541 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3542 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3543 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3544 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3545 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3546 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3549 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3550 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3553 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3555 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3556 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3557 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3558 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3562 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3563 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3564 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3567 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3568 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3569 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3570 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3574 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3575 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3576 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3578 entry.insert(channel);
3584 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3585 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3586 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3590 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3593 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3594 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3599 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3600 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3601 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3602 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3604 user_channel_id: user_id,
3609 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3610 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3611 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3612 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3613 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3614 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3616 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3617 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3619 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3624 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3625 // lock before watch_channel
3626 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3628 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3629 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3630 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3631 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3632 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3633 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3634 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3635 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3636 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3637 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3640 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3641 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3642 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3643 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3644 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3645 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3649 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3650 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3651 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3652 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3653 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3656 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3657 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3666 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3668 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3669 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3670 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3671 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3672 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3673 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3674 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3676 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3677 Ok(update) => update,
3678 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3680 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3681 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3682 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3683 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3684 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3685 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3686 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3687 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3697 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3698 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3702 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3703 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3704 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3705 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3707 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3710 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3711 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3712 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3713 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3714 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3715 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3716 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3717 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3718 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3719 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3720 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3721 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3722 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3723 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3724 msg: announcement_sigs,
3726 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3727 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3728 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3729 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3738 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3739 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3740 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3741 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3742 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3744 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3746 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3747 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3750 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3751 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3752 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3753 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3756 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3757 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3759 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3760 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3761 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3762 let (result, is_permanent) =
3763 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3765 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3771 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3772 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3773 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3783 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3784 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3787 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3791 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3792 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3793 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3794 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3795 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3797 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3798 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3800 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3801 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3802 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3803 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3808 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3809 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3810 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3811 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3812 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3813 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3814 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3816 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3817 } else { (tx, None) }
3819 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3822 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3823 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3824 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3826 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3827 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3828 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3829 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3833 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3838 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3839 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3840 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3841 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3843 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3844 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3845 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3846 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3848 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3849 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3851 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3853 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3857 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3858 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3859 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3860 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3861 match pending_forward_info {
3862 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3863 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3864 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3865 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3866 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3867 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3868 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3869 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3873 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3874 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3875 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3876 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3877 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3878 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3879 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3880 // no problem just calling this
3881 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3882 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3885 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3887 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3888 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3889 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3892 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3894 _ => pending_forward_info
3897 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3904 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3905 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3906 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3907 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3908 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3910 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3913 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3918 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3922 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3923 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3924 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3925 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3926 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3927 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3928 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3930 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3937 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3938 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3939 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3940 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3942 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3945 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3946 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3947 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3949 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3956 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3957 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3958 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3959 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3961 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3964 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3965 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3966 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3967 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3968 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3969 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3970 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3975 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3976 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3978 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3979 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3980 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3982 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3983 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3984 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3985 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3986 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3987 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3988 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3989 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3991 commitment_signed: msg,
3997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4002 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4003 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4004 let mut forward_event = None;
4005 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4006 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4007 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4008 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4010 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4011 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4012 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4013 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4014 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4017 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4018 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4021 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4022 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4027 match forward_event {
4029 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4030 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4031 time_forwardable: time
4039 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4040 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4042 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4043 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4044 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4046 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4047 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4049 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4050 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4051 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4052 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4053 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4054 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4055 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4056 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4057 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4058 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4059 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4061 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4062 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4063 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4064 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4065 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4067 } else { unreachable!(); }
4070 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4071 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4072 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4076 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4077 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4078 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4079 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4080 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4085 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4087 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4088 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4090 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4091 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4093 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4094 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4101 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4102 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4103 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4104 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4106 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4107 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4109 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4116 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4117 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4118 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4120 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4122 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4125 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4129 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4130 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4131 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4132 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4133 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4141 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4142 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4143 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4144 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4145 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4146 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4148 // It's not a local channel
4149 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4152 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4154 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4155 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4156 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4157 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4158 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4159 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4163 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4164 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4165 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4166 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4168 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4173 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4176 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4177 let chan_restoration_res;
4178 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4179 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4180 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4182 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4184 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4185 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4187 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4188 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4189 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4190 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4191 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4192 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4193 let mut channel_update = None;
4194 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4195 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4196 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4199 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4200 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4201 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4202 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4203 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4204 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4205 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4208 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4209 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4210 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4213 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4218 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4219 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4221 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4222 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4227 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4228 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4229 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4230 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4231 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4232 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4233 match monitor_event {
4234 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4235 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4237 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4240 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4243 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4244 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4245 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4246 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4247 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4248 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4249 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4250 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4251 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4252 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4254 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4255 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4256 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4260 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4261 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4263 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4265 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4266 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4267 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4268 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4269 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4274 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4275 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4280 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4281 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4284 has_pending_monitor_events
4287 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4288 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4289 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4290 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4291 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4292 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4295 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4296 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4297 /// update was applied.
4299 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4300 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4301 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4302 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4303 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4304 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4305 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4306 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4308 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4309 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4310 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4311 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4312 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4314 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4315 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4316 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4317 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4318 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4320 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4321 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4322 has_monitor_update = true;
4323 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4324 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4325 if close_channel { return false; }
4327 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4328 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4329 updates: commitment_update,
4336 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4337 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4338 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4345 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4346 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4347 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4350 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4351 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4357 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4358 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4359 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4360 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4361 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4362 let mut has_update = false;
4364 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4365 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4366 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4367 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4368 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4370 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4371 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4372 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4373 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4375 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4376 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4379 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4380 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4381 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4382 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4383 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4386 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4387 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4392 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4394 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4395 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4401 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4402 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4409 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4410 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4416 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4417 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4419 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4420 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4421 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4422 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4423 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4424 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4425 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4426 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4427 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4428 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4429 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4430 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4431 assert!(should_broadcast);
4432 } else { unreachable!(); }
4433 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4435 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4439 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4440 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4442 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4444 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4445 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4446 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4448 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4449 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4450 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4451 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4452 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4453 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4454 // never fail a payment too early.
4455 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4457 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4460 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4465 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4468 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4469 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4471 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4472 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4473 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4475 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4477 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4478 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4479 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4480 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4481 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4482 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4483 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4486 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4487 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4490 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4491 /// stored external to LDK.
4493 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4494 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4495 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4497 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4498 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4500 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4501 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4502 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4503 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4504 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4506 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4507 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4508 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4509 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4511 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4512 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4513 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4514 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4515 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4517 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4518 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4519 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4520 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4521 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4523 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4524 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4525 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4527 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4529 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4530 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4532 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4533 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4534 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4535 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4536 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4539 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4540 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4541 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4542 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4543 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4548 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4549 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4553 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4554 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4555 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4556 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4557 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4560 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4561 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4562 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4563 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4565 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4566 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4567 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4568 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4571 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4572 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4574 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4575 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4578 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4579 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4580 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4582 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4583 events.replace(pending_events);
4592 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4594 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4595 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4596 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4597 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4600 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4602 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4603 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4605 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4606 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4607 /// restarting from an old state.
4608 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4609 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4610 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4612 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4613 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4614 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4615 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4618 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4619 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4620 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4623 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4624 handler.handle_event(&event);
4632 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4634 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4635 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4636 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4637 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4640 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4642 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4643 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4644 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4645 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4646 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4649 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4650 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4651 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4654 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4656 let new_height = height - 1;
4658 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4659 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4660 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4661 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4662 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4663 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4666 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4670 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4672 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4673 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4674 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4675 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4678 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4679 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4680 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4681 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4683 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4684 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4687 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4690 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4691 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4692 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4693 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4695 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4696 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4698 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4700 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4702 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4704 macro_rules! max_time {
4705 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4707 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4708 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4709 // having an explicit local time source.
4710 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4711 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4712 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4713 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4714 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4720 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4721 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4722 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4723 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4724 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4727 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4728 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4729 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4730 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4731 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4732 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4738 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4739 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4740 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4741 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4742 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4743 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4749 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4750 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4751 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4752 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4753 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4754 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4755 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4756 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4761 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4763 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4764 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4765 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4766 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4769 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4770 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4772 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4773 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4774 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4775 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4776 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4778 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4779 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4781 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4782 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4783 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4784 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4785 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4786 let res = f(channel);
4787 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4788 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4789 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4790 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4791 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4795 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4796 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4797 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4798 msg: funding_locked,
4800 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4801 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4802 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4803 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4804 msg: announcement_sigs,
4806 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4808 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4809 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4810 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4813 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4815 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4817 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4818 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4819 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4821 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4822 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4823 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4824 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4825 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4829 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4831 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4832 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4839 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4840 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4841 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4842 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4843 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4844 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4845 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4846 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4847 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4848 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4849 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4850 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4851 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4856 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4861 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4863 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4864 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4868 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4869 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4870 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4872 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4873 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4874 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4875 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4878 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4879 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4881 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4882 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4885 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4886 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4887 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4888 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4889 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4893 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4894 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4895 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4896 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4900 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4901 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4902 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4903 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4904 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4905 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4908 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4909 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4910 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4913 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4915 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4918 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4920 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4923 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4924 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4925 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4928 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4930 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4933 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4935 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4938 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4940 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4943 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4945 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4948 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4950 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4953 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4955 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4958 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4960 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4963 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4965 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4968 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4970 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4973 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4975 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4978 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4979 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4980 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4983 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4984 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4985 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4988 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4993 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4995 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4998 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5000 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5001 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5005 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5006 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5007 if no_connection_possible {
5008 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5009 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5010 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5011 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5012 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5014 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5015 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5016 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5020 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5027 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5028 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5029 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5030 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5031 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5032 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5033 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5035 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5038 no_channels_remain = false;
5044 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5046 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5047 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5048 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5049 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5050 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5051 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5052 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5053 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5054 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5055 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5056 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5057 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5058 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5059 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5060 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5061 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5062 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5063 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5064 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5068 if no_channels_remain {
5069 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5072 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5073 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5077 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5078 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5080 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5083 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5084 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5085 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5086 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5087 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5090 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5091 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5096 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5097 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5098 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5099 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5100 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5101 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5102 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5103 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5104 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5108 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5109 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5110 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5116 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5119 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5122 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5123 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5124 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5125 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5126 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5130 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5131 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5136 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5137 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5138 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5139 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5140 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5141 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5144 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5147 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5153 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5154 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5159 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5160 let result = *guard;
5168 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5169 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5170 let current_time = Instant::now();
5172 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5173 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5178 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5179 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5180 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5181 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5182 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5184 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5185 let result = *guard;
5186 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5190 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5191 None => return result,
5197 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5199 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5200 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5201 *persistence_lock = true;
5202 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5207 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5208 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5210 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5212 (0, onion_packet, required),
5213 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5216 (0, payment_data, required),
5217 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5219 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5220 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5221 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5225 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5226 (0, routing, required),
5227 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5228 (4, payment_hash, required),
5229 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5230 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5234 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5235 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5237 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5239 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5240 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5241 reason.write(writer)?;
5243 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5244 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5247 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5248 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5249 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5250 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5257 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5258 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5259 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5262 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5263 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5264 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5265 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5269 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5270 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5271 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5272 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5273 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5276 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5277 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5278 // messages contained in the variants.
5279 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5280 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5281 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5283 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5284 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5285 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5286 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5287 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5290 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5291 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5292 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5293 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5294 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5296 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5301 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5306 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5307 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5308 (2, outpoint, required),
5309 (4, htlc_id, required),
5310 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5313 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5314 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5315 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5316 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5319 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5320 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5321 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5326 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5327 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5328 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5334 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5335 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5336 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5338 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5339 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5340 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5344 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5345 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5346 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5348 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5350 if payment_data.is_some() {
5351 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5353 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5356 if payment_data.is_none() {
5357 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5359 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5363 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5371 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5372 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5373 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5376 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5377 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5378 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5379 let mut payment_id = None;
5380 let mut payment_secret = None;
5381 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5382 (0, session_priv, required),
5383 (1, payment_id, option),
5384 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5385 (3, payment_secret, option),
5386 (4, path, vec_type),
5388 if payment_id.is_none() {
5389 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5391 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5393 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5394 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5395 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5396 path: path.unwrap(),
5397 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5401 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5402 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5407 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5408 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5410 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
5412 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5413 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5414 (0, session_priv, required),
5415 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5416 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5417 (3, payment_secret, option),
5418 (4, path, vec_type),
5421 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5423 field.write(writer)?;
5430 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5431 (0, LightningError) => {
5435 (0, failure_code, required),
5436 (2, data, vec_type),
5440 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5442 (0, forward_info, required),
5443 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5444 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5445 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5448 (0, htlc_id, required),
5449 (2, err_packet, required),
5453 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5454 (0, payment_secret, required),
5455 (2, expiry_time, required),
5456 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5457 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5458 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5463 (0, session_privs, required),
5466 (0, session_privs, required),
5469 (0, session_privs, required),
5470 (2, payment_hash, required),
5471 (4, payment_secret, option),
5472 (6, total_msat, required),
5473 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5474 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5478 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5479 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5480 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5481 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5482 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5485 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5486 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5488 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5490 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5492 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5493 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5494 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5497 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5498 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5499 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5500 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5501 unfunded_channels += 1;
5504 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5505 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5506 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5507 channel.write(writer)?;
5511 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5512 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5513 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5514 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5515 for forward in pending_forwards {
5516 forward.write(writer)?;
5520 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5521 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5522 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5523 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5524 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5525 htlc.write(writer)?;
5529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5530 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5531 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5532 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5533 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5534 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5537 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5538 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5539 for event in events.iter() {
5540 event.write(writer)?;
5543 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5544 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5545 for event in background_events.iter() {
5547 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5549 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5550 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5555 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5556 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5558 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5559 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5560 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5561 hash.write(writer)?;
5562 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5565 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5566 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5567 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5568 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5569 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5570 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5573 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5574 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5576 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5577 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5578 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5579 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5582 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5586 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5587 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5588 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5592 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5597 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5598 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5599 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5606 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5608 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5610 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5611 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5612 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5613 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5614 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5615 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5616 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5617 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5618 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5619 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5620 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5621 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5622 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5624 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5625 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5627 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5628 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5630 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5631 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5632 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5633 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5634 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5635 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5637 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5638 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5639 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5640 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5641 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5642 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5645 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5646 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5648 pub keys_manager: K,
5650 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5652 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5653 pub fee_estimator: F,
5654 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5656 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5657 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5658 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5659 pub chain_monitor: M,
5661 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5662 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5663 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5664 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5665 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5666 /// deserialization.
5668 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5669 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5670 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5672 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5673 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5675 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5676 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5677 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5678 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5680 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5683 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5684 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5687 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5688 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5689 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5690 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5691 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5692 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5695 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5696 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5697 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5698 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5699 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5701 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5702 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5707 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5708 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5709 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5710 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5711 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5712 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5713 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5714 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5717 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5718 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5719 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5723 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5724 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5725 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5726 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5727 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5728 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5731 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5732 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5734 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5735 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5736 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5738 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5740 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5741 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5742 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5743 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5744 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5745 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5746 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5747 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5748 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5749 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5750 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5751 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5752 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5753 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5754 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5755 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5756 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5757 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5758 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5759 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5760 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5761 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5762 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5763 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5764 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5765 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5766 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5767 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5768 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5769 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5770 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5771 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5772 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5773 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5774 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5775 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5776 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5777 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5778 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5781 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5782 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5784 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5787 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5788 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5789 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5790 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5791 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5792 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5796 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5797 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5798 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5802 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5803 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5804 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5805 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5806 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5807 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5808 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5809 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5810 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5812 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5815 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5816 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5817 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5818 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5819 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5820 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5821 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5822 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5824 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5827 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5828 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5829 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5830 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5831 let peer_state = PeerState {
5832 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5834 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5837 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5838 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5839 for _ in 0..event_count {
5840 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5841 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5845 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5846 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5847 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5848 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5849 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5850 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5851 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5852 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5856 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5857 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5858 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5859 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5860 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5861 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5865 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5866 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5868 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5869 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5870 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5871 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5872 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5876 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5877 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5878 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5879 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5880 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5881 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5882 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5884 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5885 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5889 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5890 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5891 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5892 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5893 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5894 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5896 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5897 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5898 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5899 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5900 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5901 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5903 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5905 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
5906 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
5907 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
5908 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
5909 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
5910 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
5911 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
5913 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
5914 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
5915 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
5916 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
5917 if path.is_empty() {
5918 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
5919 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5921 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
5922 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
5923 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
5924 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
5925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5926 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, path_amt);
5927 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
5928 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5931 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
5932 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
5933 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5935 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
5936 total_msat: path_amt,
5937 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
5939 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
5940 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
5949 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5950 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5952 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5953 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5956 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5958 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5959 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5960 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5962 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5964 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5969 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5971 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5972 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5974 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5975 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5978 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5979 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5981 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5983 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5984 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5985 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5986 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5988 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5989 logger: args.logger,
5990 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5993 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5994 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5997 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5998 //connection or two.
6000 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6006 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6007 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6008 use core::time::Duration;
6009 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6010 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6011 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6012 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6014 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6015 use routing::router::{Payee, get_keysend_route, get_route};
6016 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6017 use util::errors::APIError;
6018 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6019 use util::test_utils;
6021 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6023 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6024 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6026 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6029 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6030 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6032 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6033 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6034 thread::spawn(move || {
6036 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6037 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6038 *persistence_lock = true;
6041 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6047 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6048 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6050 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6053 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6058 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6060 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6063 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6070 fn test_notify_limits() {
6071 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6072 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6073 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6074 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6075 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6076 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6078 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6079 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6080 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6081 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6082 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6084 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6086 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6087 // to connect messages with new values
6088 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6089 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6090 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6091 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6093 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6094 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6095 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6096 // ... but the last node should not.
6097 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6098 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6099 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6100 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6102 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6103 // about the channel.
6104 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6105 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6106 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6108 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6110 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6111 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6112 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6113 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6114 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6115 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6117 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6118 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6119 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6121 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6122 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6123 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6124 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6125 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6126 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6128 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6129 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6130 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6131 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6132 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6133 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6134 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6135 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6137 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6138 // the channel info has updated.
6139 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6140 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6141 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6142 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6143 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6144 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6148 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6149 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6155 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6157 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6158 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6159 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6160 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6161 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6162 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6163 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6165 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6166 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6167 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6169 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6170 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6172 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6173 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6174 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6175 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6176 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6178 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6179 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6180 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6182 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6183 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6184 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6185 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6186 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6187 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6188 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6189 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6190 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6192 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6193 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6195 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6196 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6197 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6199 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6200 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6201 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6202 // lightning messages manually.
6203 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6205 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6206 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6207 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6209 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6210 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6212 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6213 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6215 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6216 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6217 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6219 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6220 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6221 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6223 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6225 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6227 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6228 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6231 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6232 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6233 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6235 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
6236 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6237 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6244 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6245 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6246 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6247 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6248 // fails as expected.
6249 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6250 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6252 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6253 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6254 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6255 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6257 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6258 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6259 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6261 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6262 let payee = Payee::new(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id())
6263 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6264 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6265 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6267 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6268 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6269 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6270 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6271 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6273 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6274 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6275 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6277 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6278 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6279 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6280 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6281 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6282 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6283 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6284 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6285 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6287 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6288 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6290 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6291 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6292 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6293 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6295 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6297 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6298 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6299 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6301 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6302 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6303 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6305 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6307 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6308 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6311 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6312 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6313 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6315 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6316 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6317 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6318 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6319 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6320 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6321 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6322 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6323 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6325 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6326 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6330 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6331 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6332 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6336 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6338 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6339 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6340 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6341 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6343 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6344 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6345 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6346 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6347 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6348 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6349 nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6351 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6352 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6353 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6356 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6357 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6358 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6359 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6360 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6361 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6362 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6364 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6368 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6369 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6373 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6375 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6376 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6377 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6378 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6380 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6381 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6382 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6383 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6384 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6385 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6386 nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
6388 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6389 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6390 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6391 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6394 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6395 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6396 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6397 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6398 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6399 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6400 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6402 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6406 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6410 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6412 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6413 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6414 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6415 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6417 // Marshall an MPP route.
6418 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6419 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6420 route.paths.push(path);
6421 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6422 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6423 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6424 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6425 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6426 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6428 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6429 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6430 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6431 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6436 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6439 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6440 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6441 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6442 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6443 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6444 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6445 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6446 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6447 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6448 use util::test_utils;
6449 use util::config::UserConfig;
6450 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6452 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6453 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6454 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6456 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6460 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6461 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6462 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6463 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6464 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6465 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6466 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6471 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6472 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6475 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6476 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6477 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6479 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6480 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6482 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6483 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6485 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6486 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6488 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6489 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6490 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6491 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6492 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6494 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6496 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6498 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6499 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6500 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6501 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6502 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6504 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6506 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6508 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6509 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6510 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6511 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6512 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6515 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6516 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6517 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6519 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6520 } else { panic!(); }
6522 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6523 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6525 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6528 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6531 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6532 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6534 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6535 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6536 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6537 match msg_events[0] {
6538 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6539 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6540 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6544 match msg_events[1] {
6545 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6549 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6551 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6552 macro_rules! send_payment {
6553 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6554 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6555 let payee = Payee::new($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6556 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6557 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6558 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6559 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6561 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6562 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6564 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6565 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6567 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6568 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6569 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6570 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6571 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6572 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6573 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6574 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6576 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6577 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6578 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6580 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6581 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6582 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6583 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6584 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6586 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6589 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6590 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6591 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6592 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6594 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6599 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6600 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);