1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
116 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
122 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
123 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
127 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
128 /// may overshoot this in either case)
129 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
130 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
133 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
134 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
135 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
136 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
139 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
140 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
141 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
142 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
143 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
146 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
147 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
149 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
150 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
151 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
154 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
155 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
157 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
158 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
161 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
162 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
165 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
169 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
170 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
171 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
172 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
173 short_channel_id: u64,
175 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
176 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
178 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
179 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
184 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
186 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
187 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
188 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
191 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
194 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
195 struct ClaimableHTLC {
196 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
198 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
200 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
201 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
202 sender_intended_value: u64,
203 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
205 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
206 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
207 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
208 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
212 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
214 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
215 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
216 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
218 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
219 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
224 impl Readable for PaymentId {
225 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
226 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
231 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
233 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
234 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
235 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
237 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
238 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
243 impl Readable for InterceptId {
244 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
245 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
250 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
251 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
252 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
253 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
254 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
257 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
260 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
261 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
264 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
268 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
269 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
270 (0, short_channel_id, required),
271 (2, htlc_id, required),
273 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
274 (0, session_priv, required),
279 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
283 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
286 session_priv: SecretKey,
287 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
288 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
289 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
290 payment_id: PaymentId,
293 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
294 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
295 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
297 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
299 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
301 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
304 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
305 payment_id.hash(hasher);
306 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
312 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
314 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
316 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
317 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
323 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
324 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
325 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
326 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
327 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
328 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
330 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
336 struct ReceiveError {
342 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
343 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
345 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
346 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
347 pub enum FailureCode {
348 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
349 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
350 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
351 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
352 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
353 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
354 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
355 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
356 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
357 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
358 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
361 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
363 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
364 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
365 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
366 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
367 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
369 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
370 err: msgs::LightningError,
371 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
372 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
374 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
378 err: LightningError {
380 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
381 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
388 shutdown_finish: None,
392 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
393 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
396 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
398 err: LightningError {
400 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
401 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
408 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
412 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
415 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
418 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
422 log_level: Level::Warn,
425 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
429 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
445 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
446 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
447 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
448 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
449 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
451 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
452 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
453 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
454 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
455 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
456 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
457 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
459 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
463 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
464 struct ClaimingPayment {
466 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
467 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
470 (0, amount_msat, required),
471 (2, payment_purpose, required),
472 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
475 struct ClaimablePayment {
476 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
477 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
478 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
481 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
482 struct ClaimablePayments {
483 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
484 /// failed/claimed by the user.
486 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
487 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
489 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
490 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
491 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
493 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
494 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
495 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
496 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
499 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
500 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
501 /// quite some time lag.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
504 /// commitment transaction.
505 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
509 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
510 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
511 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
512 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
513 /// event can be generated.
514 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
515 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
516 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
520 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
521 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
524 /// State we hold per-peer.
525 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
526 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
528 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
529 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
531 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
532 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
533 latest_features: InitFeatures,
534 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
535 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
536 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
537 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
538 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
540 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
541 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
542 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
543 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
545 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
546 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
547 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
548 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
549 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
550 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
551 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
552 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
553 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
554 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
558 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
559 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
560 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
561 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
562 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
563 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
566 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
570 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
571 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
573 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
576 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
577 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
578 struct PendingInboundPayment {
579 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
580 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
581 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
582 /// this payment being removed.
584 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
585 user_payment_id: u64,
586 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
587 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
588 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
591 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
596 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
597 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
598 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
600 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
601 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
609 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
611 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
616 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
617 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
618 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
619 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
620 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
621 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
622 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
623 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
624 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
626 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
627 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
629 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
630 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
631 pub trait AChannelManager {
632 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
633 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
634 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
635 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
636 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
637 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
638 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
639 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
640 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
641 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
642 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
643 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
644 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
646 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
648 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
649 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
652 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
653 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
655 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
656 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
657 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
658 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
659 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
660 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
661 R::Target: Router + Sized,
662 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
664 type Watch = M::Target;
666 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
668 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
670 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
672 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
673 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
675 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
677 type Router = R::Target;
679 type Logger = L::Target;
681 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
684 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
685 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
687 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
688 /// to individual Channels.
690 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
691 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
692 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
693 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
695 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
696 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
697 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
698 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
699 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
700 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
701 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
703 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
704 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
705 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
707 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
708 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
709 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
710 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
711 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
713 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
714 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
715 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
716 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
718 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
719 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
720 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
722 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
723 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
724 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
725 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
726 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
728 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
729 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
730 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
731 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
732 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
733 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
734 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
735 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
738 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
739 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
740 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
741 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
742 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
746 // `total_consistency_lock`
748 // |__`forward_htlcs`
750 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
752 // |__`per_peer_state`
754 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
756 // | |__`claimable_payments`
758 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
764 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
766 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
770 // | |__`pending_events`
772 // | |__`pending_background_events`
774 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
776 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
777 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
778 ES::Target: EntropySource,
779 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
780 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
781 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
785 default_configuration: UserConfig,
786 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
787 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
793 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
795 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
797 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
798 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
800 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
801 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
802 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
803 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
805 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
808 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
809 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
810 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
811 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
812 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
813 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
814 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
815 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
817 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
822 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
824 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
825 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
826 /// and via the classic SCID.
828 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
829 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
831 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
833 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
835 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
836 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
837 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
839 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
840 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
842 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
843 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
845 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
846 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
848 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
849 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
850 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
851 /// active channel list on load.
853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
856 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
858 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
859 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
860 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
862 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
863 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
864 /// the handling of the events.
866 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
867 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
870 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
871 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
872 /// would break backwards compatability.
873 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
874 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
875 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
877 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
878 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
880 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
882 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
883 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
884 /// confirmation depth.
886 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
887 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
888 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
890 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
892 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
894 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
896 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
898 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
900 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
901 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
902 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
904 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
905 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
907 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
908 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
909 /// keeping additional state.
910 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
912 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
913 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
914 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
915 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
917 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
918 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
920 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
921 /// are currently open with that peer.
923 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
924 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
927 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
929 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
930 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
931 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
932 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
933 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
935 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
936 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
937 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
938 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
939 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
940 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
941 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
942 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
943 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
944 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
945 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
946 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
947 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
949 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
958 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
960 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
961 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
962 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
963 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
964 pub struct ChainParameters {
965 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
966 pub network: Network,
968 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
970 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
971 pub best_block: BestBlock,
974 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
980 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
981 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
982 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
983 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
984 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
985 /// updates are ready for persistence).
987 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
988 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
989 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
990 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
991 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
993 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
994 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
997 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
998 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
999 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1002 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1003 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1005 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1006 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1007 should_persist: persist_check,
1008 _read_guard: read_guard,
1013 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1014 fn drop(&mut self) {
1015 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1016 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1021 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1022 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1024 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1026 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1027 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1028 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1029 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1030 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1032 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1033 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1035 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1037 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1038 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1039 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1040 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1041 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1042 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1043 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1044 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1045 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1046 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1047 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1048 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1049 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1051 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1052 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1054 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1055 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1056 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1057 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1059 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1060 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1061 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1062 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1063 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1064 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1067 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1069 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1070 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1073 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1075 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1076 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1078 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1079 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1080 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1081 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1083 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1084 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1085 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1087 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1088 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1089 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1091 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1092 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1093 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1094 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1096 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1097 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1098 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1100 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1101 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1102 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1104 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1105 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1106 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1107 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1108 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1109 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1110 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1111 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1112 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1113 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1114 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1117 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1118 /// to better separate parameters.
1119 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1120 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1121 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1122 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1123 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1124 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1125 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1126 pub features: InitFeatures,
1127 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1128 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1129 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1131 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1133 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1134 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1135 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1136 /// payments to us through this channel.
1137 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1138 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1139 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1140 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1141 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1142 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1143 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1146 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1147 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1148 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1149 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1150 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1151 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1152 /// lifetime of the channel.
1153 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1154 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1155 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1156 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1157 /// our counterparty already.
1159 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1160 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1161 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1162 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1164 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1165 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1166 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1167 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1169 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1170 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1172 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1173 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1175 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1176 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1177 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1178 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1179 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1180 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1181 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1182 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1183 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1186 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1188 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1189 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1190 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1191 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1192 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1193 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1194 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1196 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1197 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1199 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1200 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1201 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1202 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1203 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1204 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1205 /// this value on chain.
1207 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1209 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1211 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1212 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1213 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1214 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1216 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1217 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1218 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1220 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1221 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1222 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1223 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1224 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1226 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1227 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1228 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1229 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1231 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1232 pub balance_msat: u64,
1233 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1234 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1235 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1236 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1238 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1240 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1241 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1242 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1243 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1244 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1245 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1246 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1247 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1249 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1250 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1251 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1252 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1253 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1254 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1255 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1257 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1258 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1259 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1260 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1261 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1262 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1263 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1264 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1265 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1267 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1269 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1270 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1271 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1272 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1273 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1275 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1276 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1277 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1278 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1279 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1280 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1281 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1283 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1284 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1285 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1286 pub is_outbound: bool,
1287 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1288 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1289 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1290 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1291 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1293 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1294 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1295 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1296 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1298 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1299 pub is_usable: bool,
1300 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1301 pub is_public: bool,
1302 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1303 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1304 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1305 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1306 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1307 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1309 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1310 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1313 impl ChannelDetails {
1314 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1315 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1316 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1318 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1319 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1320 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1321 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1324 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1325 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1326 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1328 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1329 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1330 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1331 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1334 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1335 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1337 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1338 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1339 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1341 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1342 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1343 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1344 features: latest_features,
1345 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1346 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1347 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1348 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1349 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1350 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1351 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1352 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1353 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1354 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1356 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1357 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1358 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1359 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1360 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1361 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1362 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1363 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1364 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1365 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1366 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1367 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1368 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1369 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1370 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1371 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1372 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1373 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1374 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1375 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1376 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1377 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1378 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1379 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1380 config: Some(channel.config()),
1385 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1386 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1387 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1388 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1389 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1391 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1393 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1394 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1395 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1398 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1399 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1400 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1402 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1403 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1404 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1406 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1407 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1408 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1410 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1411 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1415 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1417 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1419 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1420 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1421 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1422 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1424 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1425 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1426 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1429 macro_rules! handle_error {
1430 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1431 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1432 // entering the macro.
1433 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1434 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1438 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1439 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1441 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1442 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1443 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1444 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1448 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1449 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1450 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1451 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1456 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1457 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1459 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1460 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1461 action: err.action.clone()
1465 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1466 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1467 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1468 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1469 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1473 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1480 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1481 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1482 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1483 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1484 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1485 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1487 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1488 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1489 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1490 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1491 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1493 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1494 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1496 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1500 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1501 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1502 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1504 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1505 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1507 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1508 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1510 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1511 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1512 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1513 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1514 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1515 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1521 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1522 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1526 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1528 $entry.remove_entry();
1536 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1537 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1541 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1543 $entry.remove_entry();
1551 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1552 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1554 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1555 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1561 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1562 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1563 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1564 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1565 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1567 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1568 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1569 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1570 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1571 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1572 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1573 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1574 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1575 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1576 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1581 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1582 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1583 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1584 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1585 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1586 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1587 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1588 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1589 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1591 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1596 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1597 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1598 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1599 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1600 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1601 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1602 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1603 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1604 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1606 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1611 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1612 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1613 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1614 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1615 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1616 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1617 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1618 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1619 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1620 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1621 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1623 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1624 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1625 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1631 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1632 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1634 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1635 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1636 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1637 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1638 updates.announcement_sigs);
1639 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1640 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1643 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1644 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1645 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1647 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1649 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1650 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1652 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1653 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1654 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1655 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1660 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1661 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1662 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1663 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1664 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1666 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1667 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1668 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1671 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1672 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1673 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1674 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1675 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1676 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1677 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1678 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1682 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1683 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1684 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1685 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1686 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1688 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1694 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1695 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1699 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1700 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1701 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1702 while !processed_all_events {
1703 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1707 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1710 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1711 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1712 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1714 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1715 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1716 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1717 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1721 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1722 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1723 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1724 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1727 for event in pending_events {
1728 $event_to_handle = event;
1733 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1734 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1735 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1736 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1739 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1740 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1746 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1748 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1749 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1750 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1751 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1752 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1753 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1757 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1759 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1760 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1762 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1764 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1765 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1766 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1769 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1770 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1771 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1772 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1773 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1774 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1775 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1776 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1778 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1779 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1780 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1785 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1787 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1788 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1789 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1790 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1791 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1792 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1793 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1794 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1796 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1799 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1800 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1802 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1804 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1806 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1808 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1809 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1810 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1811 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1812 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1822 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1823 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1824 &self.default_configuration
1827 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1828 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1829 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1832 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1833 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1835 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1837 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1841 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1846 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1848 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1849 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1850 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1851 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1852 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1854 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1855 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1857 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1858 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1859 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1861 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1862 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1863 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1865 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1866 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1867 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1868 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1869 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1870 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1872 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1873 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1874 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1875 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1876 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1877 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1881 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1882 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1886 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1887 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1889 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1891 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1892 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1893 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1894 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1895 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1896 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1900 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1905 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1907 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1908 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1909 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1911 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1913 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1919 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1920 node_id: their_network_key,
1923 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1926 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1927 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1928 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1929 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1930 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1931 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1932 // the same channel.
1933 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1935 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1936 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1937 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1938 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1939 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1940 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1941 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1942 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1950 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1951 /// more information.
1952 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1953 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1956 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1957 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1959 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1960 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1962 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1963 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1964 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1965 // really wanted anyway.
1966 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1969 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1970 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1971 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1974 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1975 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1977 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1978 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1981 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1987 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1988 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1990 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1991 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1992 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1994 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1995 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1996 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1997 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1998 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1999 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2000 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2001 total_msat: *total_msat,
2004 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2005 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2007 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2008 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2010 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2015 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2016 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2017 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2018 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2019 Some(transaction) => {
2020 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
2024 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2025 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2026 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2027 reason: closure_reason
2031 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2034 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2035 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2036 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2038 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2039 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2041 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2042 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2043 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2045 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2046 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2047 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2048 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
2049 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2051 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2052 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2053 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2055 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2059 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2060 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2061 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2062 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2063 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2066 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2067 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2068 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2069 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2073 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2081 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2082 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2083 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2087 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2091 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2092 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2093 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2095 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2096 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2098 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2099 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2100 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2101 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2103 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2105 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2106 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2107 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2110 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2111 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2112 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2113 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2114 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2115 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
2118 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2119 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2120 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2122 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2123 /// the channel being closed or not:
2124 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2125 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2126 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2127 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2128 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2129 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2130 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2132 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2134 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2135 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2136 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2139 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2140 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2141 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2142 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2143 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2144 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2148 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2149 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2150 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2151 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2152 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2153 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2154 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2155 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2157 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2158 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2159 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2160 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2161 // ignore the result here.
2162 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2166 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2167 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2168 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2169 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2171 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2172 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2174 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2175 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2176 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2177 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2178 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2180 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2182 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2184 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2187 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2188 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2189 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2190 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2191 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2196 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2199 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2201 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2202 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2203 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2204 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2205 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2206 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2207 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2208 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2209 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2210 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2221 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2222 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2223 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2225 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2226 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2227 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2230 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2231 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2232 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2234 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2235 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2236 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2237 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2238 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2241 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2242 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2243 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2244 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2245 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2249 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2250 /// local transaction(s).
2251 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2252 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2253 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2257 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2258 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2260 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2261 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2262 return Err(ReceiveError {
2263 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2265 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2268 // final_expiry_too_soon
2269 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2270 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2272 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2273 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2274 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2275 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2276 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2277 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2278 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2279 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2280 return Err(ReceiveError {
2281 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2282 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2285 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2286 return Err(ReceiveError {
2288 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2289 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2293 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2294 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2295 return Err(ReceiveError {
2296 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2297 err_data: Vec::new(),
2298 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2301 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2302 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2303 return Err(ReceiveError {
2304 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2305 err_data: Vec::new(),
2306 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2308 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2309 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2312 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2313 phantom_shared_secret,
2315 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2316 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2317 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2318 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2319 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2320 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2321 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2322 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2323 return Err(ReceiveError {
2324 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2325 err_data: Vec::new(),
2326 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2330 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2333 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2336 return Err(ReceiveError {
2337 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2338 err_data: Vec::new(),
2339 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2344 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2347 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2348 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2349 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2350 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2354 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2355 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2356 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2358 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2359 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2360 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2361 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2362 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2363 failure_code: $err_code,
2369 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2370 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2373 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2374 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2375 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2377 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2378 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2379 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2380 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2381 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2382 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2383 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2384 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2386 macro_rules! return_err {
2387 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2389 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2390 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2391 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2392 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2393 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2394 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2400 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2402 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2403 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2405 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2406 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2410 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2411 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2413 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2415 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2416 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2417 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2418 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2419 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2421 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2424 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2425 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2426 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2428 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2429 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2430 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2433 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2434 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2435 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2436 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2440 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2441 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2442 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2445 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2446 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2447 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2448 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2449 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2454 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2455 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2456 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2457 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2458 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2459 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2460 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2461 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2462 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2463 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2464 // phantom or an intercept.
2465 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2466 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2467 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2471 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2474 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2476 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2477 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2478 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2479 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2480 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2482 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2483 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2484 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2486 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2487 // have no consistency guarantees.
2488 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2492 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2493 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2494 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2495 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2496 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2498 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2499 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2500 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2501 // we don't have the channel here.
2502 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2504 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2506 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2507 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2508 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2509 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2510 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2511 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2512 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2513 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2514 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2515 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2516 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2518 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2521 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2522 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2524 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2525 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2529 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2530 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2531 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2532 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2534 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2541 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2542 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2543 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2544 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2545 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2546 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2548 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2549 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2551 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2552 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2553 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2554 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2555 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2556 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2557 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2558 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2559 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2560 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2566 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2567 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2568 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2569 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2571 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2572 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2574 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2575 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2576 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2578 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2579 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2580 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2581 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2582 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2583 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2584 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2588 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2593 pending_forward_info
2596 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2597 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2598 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2600 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2601 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2602 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2604 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2605 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2606 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2607 if !chan.should_announce() {
2608 return Err(LightningError {
2609 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2610 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2613 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2614 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2616 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2617 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2620 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2621 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2622 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2623 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2625 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2626 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2627 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2629 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2630 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2631 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2632 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2633 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2634 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2638 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2640 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2641 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2642 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2644 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2645 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2646 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2647 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2648 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2651 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2652 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2654 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2655 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2656 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2657 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2658 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2659 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2660 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2661 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2663 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2664 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2665 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2667 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2669 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2676 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2677 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2678 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2681 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2682 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2683 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2685 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2686 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2687 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2689 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2690 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2691 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2692 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2693 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2695 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2697 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2698 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2699 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2700 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2704 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2705 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2708 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2709 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2710 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2712 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2713 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2714 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2716 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2717 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2719 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2720 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2721 Some(monitor_update) => {
2722 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2723 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2724 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2727 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2728 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2729 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2730 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2731 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2732 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2733 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2734 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2740 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2741 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2742 // `channel_by_id` map.
2743 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2744 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2749 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2750 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2752 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2757 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2759 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2760 /// fields for more info.
2762 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2763 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2765 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2767 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2768 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2769 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2770 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2771 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2773 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2774 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2775 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2776 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2777 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2779 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2780 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2781 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2782 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2784 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2786 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2787 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2788 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2790 /// In general, a path may raise:
2791 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2792 /// node public key) is specified.
2793 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2794 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2796 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2797 /// relevant updates.
2799 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2800 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2801 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2803 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2804 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2805 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2806 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2807 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2808 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2809 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2810 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2811 self.pending_outbound_payments
2812 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2813 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2814 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2817 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2818 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2819 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2820 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2821 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2822 self.pending_outbound_payments
2823 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2824 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2825 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2826 &self.pending_events,
2827 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2828 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2832 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2833 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2835 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2836 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2837 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2841 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2842 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2843 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2847 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2848 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2852 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2853 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2854 /// retries are exhausted.
2856 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2857 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2859 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2860 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2861 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2863 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2864 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2866 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2867 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2868 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2870 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2873 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2874 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2875 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2876 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2877 /// never reach the recipient.
2879 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2880 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2882 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2883 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2885 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2887 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2888 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2889 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2891 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2892 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2893 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2894 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2895 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2898 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2899 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2901 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2904 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2905 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2906 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2908 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2909 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2910 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2911 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2912 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2913 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2916 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2917 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2918 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2919 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2920 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2922 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2923 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2924 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2927 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2930 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2931 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2934 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2935 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2936 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2937 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2938 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2940 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2941 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2945 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2947 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2949 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2950 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2951 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2952 } else { unreachable!(); });
2954 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2956 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2957 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2959 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2960 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2961 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2967 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2969 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2970 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2975 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2976 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2979 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2981 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2983 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2984 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2985 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2986 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2995 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2996 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2997 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3001 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3003 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3004 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3006 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3007 /// across the p2p network.
3009 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3010 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3012 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3013 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3014 /// keys per-channel).
3016 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3017 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3018 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3020 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3021 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3022 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3024 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3025 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3026 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3027 /// for more details.
3029 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3030 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3031 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3034 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3035 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3036 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3037 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3042 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3043 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3044 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3045 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3046 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3047 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3048 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3049 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3053 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3054 let mut output_index = None;
3055 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3056 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3057 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3058 if output_index.is_some() {
3059 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3060 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3063 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3064 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3065 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3068 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3071 if output_index.is_none() {
3072 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3073 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3076 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3080 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3082 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3083 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3084 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3085 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3087 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3088 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3090 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3091 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3093 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3095 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3096 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3097 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3098 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3099 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3100 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3101 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3102 pub fn update_channel_config(
3103 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3104 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3105 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3106 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3107 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3112 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3114 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3115 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3116 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3117 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3118 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3119 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3120 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3121 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3122 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3126 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3127 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3128 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3131 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3132 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3133 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3134 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3135 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3143 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3144 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3146 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3147 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3149 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3150 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3151 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3152 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3153 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3155 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3156 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3158 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3161 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3162 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3163 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3164 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3165 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3168 let next_hop_scid = {
3169 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3170 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3171 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3172 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3173 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3174 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3176 if !chan.is_usable() {
3177 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3178 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3181 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3183 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3184 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3189 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3190 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3191 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3194 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3195 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3196 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3198 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3200 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3201 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3204 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3205 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3206 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3207 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3208 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3210 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3214 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3215 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3217 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3220 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3221 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3224 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3225 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3226 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3229 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3230 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3231 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3232 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3233 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3234 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3235 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3238 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3239 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3240 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3241 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3246 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3248 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3249 /// Will likely generate further events.
3250 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3253 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3254 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3255 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3257 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3258 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3260 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3261 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3262 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3264 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3265 match forward_info {
3266 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3267 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3268 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3269 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3270 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3273 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3274 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3275 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3277 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3278 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3279 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3280 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3281 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3282 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3285 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3286 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3288 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3291 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3292 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3298 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3299 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3301 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3305 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3306 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3308 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3312 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3313 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3314 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3315 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3316 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3318 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3319 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3320 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3321 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3322 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3324 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3326 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3327 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3331 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3332 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3333 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3334 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3340 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3343 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3346 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3347 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3348 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3349 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3350 // problem, not ours.
3356 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3357 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3359 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3363 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3364 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3365 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3366 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3369 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3370 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3371 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3373 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3376 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3377 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3378 match forward_info {
3379 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3380 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3381 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3382 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3383 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3387 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3388 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3389 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3390 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3391 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3392 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3393 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3395 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3396 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3397 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3399 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3402 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3404 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3405 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3406 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3407 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3412 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3413 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3415 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3417 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3418 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3420 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3423 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3425 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3426 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3427 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3436 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3437 match forward_info {
3438 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3439 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3440 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3441 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3444 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3445 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3446 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3448 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3449 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3450 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3452 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3453 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3454 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3455 None, None, onion_fields)
3458 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3461 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3462 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3463 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3464 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3465 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3466 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3467 phantom_shared_secret,
3469 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3470 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3471 // if routing nodes overpay
3472 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3473 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3475 total_value_received: None,
3476 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3481 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3483 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3484 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3485 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3486 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3487 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3488 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3490 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3491 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3492 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3493 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3494 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3495 phantom_shared_secret,
3497 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3498 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3500 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3503 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3504 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3505 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3506 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3507 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3510 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3511 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3512 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3514 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3515 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3516 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3519 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3520 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3521 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3523 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3524 .entry(payment_hash)
3525 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3526 .or_insert_with(|| {
3527 committed_to_claimable = true;
3529 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3532 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3533 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3534 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3537 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3539 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3540 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3541 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3543 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3546 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3547 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3548 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3549 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3550 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3551 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3552 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3553 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3554 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3555 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3556 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3558 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3560 _ => unreachable!(),
3563 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3564 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3565 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3566 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3567 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3569 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3570 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3571 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3572 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3573 committed_to_claimable = true;
3575 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3576 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3577 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3578 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3579 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3580 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3584 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3585 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3586 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3587 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3589 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3591 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3592 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3594 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3595 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3596 committed_to_claimable = true;
3599 payment_claimable_generated
3603 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3604 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3605 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3606 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3607 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3608 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3609 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3610 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3611 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3612 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3613 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3614 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3615 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3616 Ok(result) => result,
3618 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3619 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3622 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3623 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3624 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3626 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3627 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3630 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3632 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3633 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3634 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3635 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3637 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3639 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3640 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3641 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3642 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3643 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3644 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3645 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3646 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3648 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3649 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3650 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3654 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3655 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3657 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3661 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3662 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3668 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3669 if payment_data.is_none() {
3670 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3671 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3673 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3674 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3675 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3676 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3677 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3678 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3679 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3680 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3682 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3683 if payment_claimable_generated {
3684 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3690 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3691 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3699 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3700 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3701 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3702 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3703 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3704 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3706 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3707 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3709 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3711 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3712 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3713 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3715 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3717 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3718 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3719 events.append(&mut new_events);
3722 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3724 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3725 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3727 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3728 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3729 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3730 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3731 if background_events.is_empty() {
3735 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3737 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3738 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3739 // monitor updating completing.
3740 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3747 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3748 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3749 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3750 self.process_background_events();
3753 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3754 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3755 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3756 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3757 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3758 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3759 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3761 if !chan.is_live() {
3762 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3763 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3764 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3766 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3767 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3769 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3770 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3774 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3775 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3776 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3777 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3778 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3779 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3780 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3782 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3785 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3786 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3787 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3788 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3789 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3790 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3798 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3800 /// This currently includes:
3801 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3802 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3803 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3805 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3806 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3807 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3809 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3810 /// estimate fetches.
3812 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3813 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3814 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3815 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3816 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3817 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3819 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3821 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3822 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3823 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3825 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3826 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3829 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3830 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3831 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3832 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3833 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3835 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3836 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3837 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3838 if needs_close { return false; }
3841 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3842 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3843 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3844 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3845 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3846 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3847 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3848 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3850 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3851 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3852 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3853 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3857 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3859 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3862 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3864 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3865 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3866 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3871 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3873 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3879 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3883 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3884 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3889 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3890 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3891 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3892 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3893 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3894 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3895 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3896 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3897 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3898 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3899 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3901 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3902 // have no channels to the peer.
3903 let remove_entry = {
3904 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3905 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3908 entry.remove_entry();
3911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3916 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3917 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3918 // This should be unreachable
3919 debug_assert!(false);
3922 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3923 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3924 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3925 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3926 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3927 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3928 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3931 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3932 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3933 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3935 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3936 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3943 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3944 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3945 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3946 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3947 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3950 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3951 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3954 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3956 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3957 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3958 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3959 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3960 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3967 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3968 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3969 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3971 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3972 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3973 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3974 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3976 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3977 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3978 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3979 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3980 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3981 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3984 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3985 /// reason for the failure.
3987 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3988 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3989 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3991 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3992 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3993 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
3994 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3995 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3996 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3997 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4002 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4003 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4004 match failure_code {
4005 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4006 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4007 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4008 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4009 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4010 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4015 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4016 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4018 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4020 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4021 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4022 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4023 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4024 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4025 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4026 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4028 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4030 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4031 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4033 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4038 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4039 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4040 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4041 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4042 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4043 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4044 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4045 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4046 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4047 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4049 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4050 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4051 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4052 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4054 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4055 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4056 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4057 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4058 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4062 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4063 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4064 // be surfaced to the user.
4065 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4066 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4067 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4069 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4071 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4072 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4073 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4074 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4076 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4080 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4083 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4084 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4085 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4086 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4090 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4091 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4092 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4093 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4094 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4095 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4096 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4097 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4098 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4101 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4102 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4103 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4106 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4107 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4108 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4111 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4112 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4113 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4114 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4116 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4117 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4118 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4120 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4121 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4122 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4123 push_forward_ev = true;
4125 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4127 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4130 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4133 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4134 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4135 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4136 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4137 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4138 failed_next_destination: destination,
4144 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4145 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4147 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4148 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4149 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4150 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4152 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4153 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4154 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4155 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4157 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4158 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4159 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4160 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4161 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4162 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4163 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4164 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4169 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4170 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4171 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4172 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4173 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4174 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4175 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4176 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4181 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4182 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4183 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4185 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4186 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4187 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4188 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4193 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4195 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4196 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4197 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4198 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4199 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4200 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4201 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4202 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4203 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4204 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4205 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4206 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4207 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4208 debug_assert!(false);
4212 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4214 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4215 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4216 debug_assert!(false);
4220 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4222 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4223 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4224 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4225 if sources.len() != 1 {
4226 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4227 debug_assert!(false);
4233 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4235 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4236 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4237 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4238 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4241 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4242 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4243 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4244 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4248 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4249 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4250 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4251 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4253 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4254 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4255 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4256 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4257 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4262 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4263 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4264 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4265 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4266 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4267 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4270 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4273 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4274 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4275 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4276 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4280 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4281 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4282 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4283 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4286 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4287 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4288 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4289 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4293 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4294 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4295 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4298 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4299 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4300 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4301 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4302 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4303 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4305 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4306 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4307 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4308 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4309 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4311 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4312 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4313 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4314 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4315 if let Err(e) = res {
4316 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4317 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4318 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4319 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4320 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4327 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4328 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4329 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4333 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4334 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4335 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4336 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4337 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4338 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4339 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4340 // again on restart.
4341 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4342 payment_preimage, update_res);
4344 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4345 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4346 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4347 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4348 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4349 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4353 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4354 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4357 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4359 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4360 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4362 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4363 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4364 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4365 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4366 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4367 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4368 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4371 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4372 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4374 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4376 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4379 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4383 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4384 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4385 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4391 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4392 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4393 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4396 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4397 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4399 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4400 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4401 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4402 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4403 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4407 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4408 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4414 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4415 /// update completion.
4416 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4417 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4418 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4419 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4420 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4421 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4423 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4424 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4425 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4426 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4427 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4428 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4430 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4432 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4433 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4434 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4435 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4438 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4439 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4441 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4442 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4443 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4448 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4449 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4450 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4451 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4456 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4457 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4458 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4459 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4460 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4465 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4469 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4475 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4476 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4477 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4481 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4482 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4483 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4489 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4490 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4492 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4493 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4495 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4496 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4497 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4498 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4499 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4505 let mut peer_state_lock;
4506 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4507 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4508 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4509 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4511 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4516 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4517 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4518 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4521 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4524 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4526 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4527 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4530 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4531 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4532 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4534 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4535 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4536 /// used to accept such channels.
4538 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4539 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4540 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4541 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4544 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4545 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4547 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4548 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4549 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4551 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4552 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4554 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4555 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4557 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4558 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4560 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4561 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4562 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4563 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4566 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4569 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4570 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4571 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4572 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4573 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4574 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4575 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4576 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4578 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4579 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4582 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4583 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4584 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4585 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4586 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4587 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4590 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4591 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4594 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4595 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4596 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4597 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4598 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4599 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4600 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4601 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4604 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4605 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4606 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4610 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4611 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4612 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4616 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4622 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4623 /// or 0-conf channels.
4625 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4626 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4627 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4628 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4629 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4630 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4632 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4633 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4634 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4635 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4636 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4637 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4638 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4642 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4645 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4646 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4648 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4649 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4650 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4651 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4653 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4656 num_unfunded_channels
4659 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4660 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4661 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4664 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4665 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4668 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4669 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4670 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4671 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4673 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4674 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4675 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4676 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4679 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4681 debug_assert!(false);
4682 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4684 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4685 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4687 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4688 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4689 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4690 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4691 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4692 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4694 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4695 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4696 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4699 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4700 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4701 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4702 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4703 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4706 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4707 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4708 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4711 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4712 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4716 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4718 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4719 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4722 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4723 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4726 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4727 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4728 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4731 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4732 pending_events.push(
4733 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4734 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4735 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4736 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4737 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4738 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4743 entry.insert(channel);
4749 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4750 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4751 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4752 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4754 debug_assert!(false);
4755 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4759 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4760 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4761 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4762 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4767 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4768 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4769 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4770 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4771 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4773 user_channel_id: user_id,
4778 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4779 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4781 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4782 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4784 debug_assert!(false);
4785 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4788 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4789 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4790 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4793 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4798 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4799 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4800 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4802 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4803 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4806 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4807 funding_msg.channel_id))
4809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4810 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4814 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4815 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4816 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4817 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4818 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4819 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4820 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4824 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4826 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4827 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4828 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4830 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4831 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4832 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4833 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4834 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4835 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4836 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4837 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4845 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4846 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4848 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4850 debug_assert!(false);
4851 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4854 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4855 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4856 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4858 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4859 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4860 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4861 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4862 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4863 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4864 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4865 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4866 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4867 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4876 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4877 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4878 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4880 debug_assert!(false);
4881 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4885 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4887 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4888 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4889 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4890 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4891 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4892 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4893 msg: announcement_sigs,
4895 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4896 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4897 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4898 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4899 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4900 // announcement_signatures.
4901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4902 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4903 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4904 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4911 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4912 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4921 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4922 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4923 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4924 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4925 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4927 debug_assert!(false);
4928 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4930 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4931 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4932 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4935 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4936 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4937 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4938 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4941 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4942 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4943 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4944 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4946 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4947 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4948 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4949 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4950 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4951 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4956 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4957 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4958 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4959 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4960 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4964 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4967 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4968 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4969 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4970 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4976 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4978 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4980 debug_assert!(false);
4981 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4983 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4986 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4987 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4988 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4989 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4990 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4991 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4996 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4997 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4998 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4999 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5000 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5001 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5002 } else { (tx, None) }
5004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5007 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5008 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5009 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5011 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5012 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5013 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5019 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5024 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5025 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5026 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5027 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5029 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5030 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5031 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5032 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5034 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5036 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5038 debug_assert!(false);
5039 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5041 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5042 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5043 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5046 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5047 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5048 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5049 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5050 match pending_forward_info {
5051 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5052 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5053 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5054 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5056 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5057 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5058 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5059 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5060 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5063 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5065 _ => pending_forward_info
5068 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5070 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5075 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5076 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5078 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5080 debug_assert!(false);
5081 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5085 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5087 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5089 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5092 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5096 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5100 debug_assert!(false);
5101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5105 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5107 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5114 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5115 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5116 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5118 debug_assert!(false);
5119 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5123 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5124 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5125 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5126 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5127 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5129 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5136 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5138 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5140 debug_assert!(false);
5141 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5143 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5144 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5145 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5147 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5148 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5149 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5150 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5151 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5152 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5159 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5160 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5161 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5162 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5163 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5164 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5165 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5166 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5167 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5168 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5169 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5171 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5172 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5174 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5175 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5176 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5178 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5179 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5182 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5183 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5185 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5186 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5187 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5189 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5190 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5191 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5192 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5193 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5196 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5197 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5200 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5201 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5202 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5203 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5204 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5205 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5206 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5209 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5210 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5211 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5216 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5217 // payments are being processed.
5218 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5219 push_forward_event = true;
5221 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5222 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5229 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5230 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5233 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5234 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5235 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5237 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5241 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5242 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5243 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5244 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5245 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5247 if !forward_ev_exists {
5248 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5250 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5255 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5256 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5257 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5258 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5260 debug_assert!(false);
5261 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5262 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5264 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5266 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5267 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5268 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5269 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5270 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5271 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5272 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5277 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5281 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5282 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5283 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5285 debug_assert!(false);
5286 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5288 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5289 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5290 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5292 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5294 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5299 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5301 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5303 debug_assert!(false);
5304 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5306 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5307 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5308 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5309 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5310 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5311 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5314 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5315 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5316 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5317 msg, &self.default_configuration
5319 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5320 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5321 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5324 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5329 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5330 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5331 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5332 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5334 // It's not a local channel
5335 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5339 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5340 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5341 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5345 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5347 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5348 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5349 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5350 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5351 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5352 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5354 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5356 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5357 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5358 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5359 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5361 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5362 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5365 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5367 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5370 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5372 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5375 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5377 debug_assert!(false);
5378 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5380 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5381 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5382 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5384 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5385 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5386 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5387 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5388 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5389 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5390 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5391 let mut channel_update = None;
5392 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5393 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5394 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5397 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5398 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5399 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5400 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5401 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5402 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5403 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5408 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5409 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5410 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5411 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5412 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5413 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5417 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5421 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5422 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5425 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5426 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5431 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5432 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5433 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5435 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5436 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5437 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5438 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5439 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5440 match monitor_event {
5441 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5442 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5443 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5444 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5447 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5448 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5449 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5452 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5453 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5454 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5455 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5457 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5458 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5459 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5460 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5463 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5465 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5468 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5469 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5470 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5471 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5472 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5473 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5477 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5478 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5480 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5482 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5483 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5484 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5493 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5494 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5500 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5501 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5504 has_pending_monitor_events
5507 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5508 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5509 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5511 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5512 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5513 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5514 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5516 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5521 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5522 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5523 /// update was applied.
5524 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5525 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5526 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5527 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5529 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5530 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5531 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5532 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5534 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5535 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5537 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5538 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5539 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5540 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5541 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5542 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5543 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5544 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5545 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5547 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5548 has_monitor_update = true;
5550 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5551 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5552 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5553 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5554 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5555 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5556 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5558 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5560 continue 'peer_loop;
5569 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5570 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5571 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5574 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5575 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5581 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5582 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5583 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5584 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5585 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5586 let mut has_update = false;
5588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5590 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5591 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5592 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5593 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5594 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5595 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5596 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5597 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5599 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5600 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5603 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5604 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5605 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5606 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5607 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5612 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5614 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5615 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5616 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5622 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5623 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5631 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5632 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5638 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5639 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5641 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5642 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5643 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5644 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5645 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5646 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5647 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5648 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5649 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5650 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5651 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5652 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5653 assert!(should_broadcast);
5654 } else { unreachable!(); }
5655 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5657 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5661 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5662 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5664 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5665 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5668 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5671 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5672 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5674 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5675 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5676 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5677 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5678 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5679 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5680 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5681 // never fail a payment too early.
5682 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5684 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5692 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5695 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5696 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5698 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5699 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5700 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5701 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5703 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5705 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5706 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5710 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5711 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5713 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5715 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5716 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5718 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5719 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5720 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5721 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5722 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5723 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5724 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5725 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5726 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5727 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5728 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5731 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5732 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5734 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5737 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5739 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5741 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5742 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5743 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5744 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5745 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5748 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5749 /// stored external to LDK.
5751 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5752 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5753 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5755 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5756 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5759 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5760 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5761 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5762 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5764 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5765 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5766 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5767 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5768 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5770 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5771 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5772 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5773 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5774 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5776 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5777 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5779 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5780 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5784 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5785 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5787 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5789 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5790 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5792 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5793 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5794 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5795 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5796 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5797 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5798 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5801 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5802 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5804 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5807 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5809 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5811 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5812 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5815 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5816 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5818 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5819 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5820 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5823 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5824 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5826 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5827 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5828 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5829 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5831 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5832 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5833 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5834 Some(_) => continue,
5835 None => return scid_candidate
5840 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5842 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5843 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5845 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5846 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5847 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5851 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5852 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5853 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5855 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5856 /// times to get a unique scid.
5857 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5858 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5859 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5861 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5862 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5863 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5864 return scid_candidate
5868 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5869 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5870 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5871 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5874 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5875 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5876 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5877 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5878 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5879 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5880 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5890 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5891 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5892 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5893 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5897 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5898 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5899 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5904 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5905 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5906 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5910 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5911 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5915 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5916 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5919 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5920 /// using the given event handler.
5922 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5923 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5927 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
5931 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5933 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5934 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5935 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5936 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5937 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5938 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5942 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5943 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5944 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5945 /// is always placed next to each other.
5947 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5948 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5949 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5950 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5952 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5953 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5954 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5955 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5956 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5957 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5958 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5960 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5961 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5962 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5963 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5966 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5967 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5969 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5970 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5973 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5975 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5976 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5978 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5979 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5983 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5984 events.replace(pending_events);
5993 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5995 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5996 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5997 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5998 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5999 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6000 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6004 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6006 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6007 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6008 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6010 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6014 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6016 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6017 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6018 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6019 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6020 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6021 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6025 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6027 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6028 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6029 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6030 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6031 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6034 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6035 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6038 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6040 let new_height = height - 1;
6042 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6043 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6044 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6045 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6046 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6047 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6050 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6054 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6056 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6057 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6058 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6059 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6060 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6061 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6065 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6066 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6067 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6068 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6070 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6071 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6074 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6075 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6077 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6078 if height < last_best_block_height {
6079 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6080 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6084 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6085 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6086 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6087 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6089 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6090 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6094 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6096 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6098 macro_rules! max_time {
6099 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6101 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6102 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6103 // having an explicit local time source.
6104 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6105 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6106 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6107 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6108 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6114 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6115 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6116 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6117 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6121 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6122 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6123 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6124 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6125 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6126 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6127 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6128 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6135 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6137 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6138 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6139 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6140 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6141 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6142 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6147 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6149 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6150 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6151 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6152 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6153 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6154 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6158 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6159 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6161 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6162 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6163 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6164 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6165 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6167 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6168 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6171 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6172 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6173 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6174 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6175 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6176 let res = f(channel);
6177 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6178 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6179 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6180 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6181 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6183 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6184 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6185 if channel.is_usable() {
6186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6187 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6189 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6199 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6200 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6203 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6205 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6206 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6207 msg: announcement_sigs,
6209 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6210 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6213 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6214 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6215 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6220 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6221 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6222 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6223 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6224 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6225 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6226 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6227 // is always consistent.
6228 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6229 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6230 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6231 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6232 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6235 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6236 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6237 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6238 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6239 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6240 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6245 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6246 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6247 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6248 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6249 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6250 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6251 data: reason_message,
6261 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6262 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6263 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6264 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6265 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6266 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6267 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6268 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6269 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6270 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6272 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6273 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6274 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6278 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6281 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6282 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6283 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6284 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6285 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6286 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6287 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6288 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6289 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6292 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6293 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6294 _ => unreachable!(),
6296 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6297 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6298 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6299 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6305 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6307 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6308 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6312 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6314 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6315 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6317 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6318 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6321 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6322 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6323 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6326 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6327 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6328 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6329 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6332 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6333 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6334 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6335 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6338 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6339 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6341 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6342 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6343 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6344 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6345 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6348 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6349 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6350 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6351 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6354 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6355 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6356 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6357 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6360 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6361 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6362 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6363 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6367 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6368 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6370 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6371 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6372 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6373 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6374 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6375 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6379 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6381 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6384 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6386 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6389 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6391 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6394 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6396 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6399 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6401 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6404 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6405 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6406 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6409 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6411 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6414 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6415 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6416 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6419 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6421 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6424 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6426 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6429 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6430 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6431 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6434 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6435 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6436 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6439 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6441 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6444 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6446 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6449 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6451 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6454 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6455 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6456 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6459 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6464 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6466 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6469 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6471 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6472 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6474 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6475 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6476 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6477 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6478 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6479 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6480 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6481 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6482 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6483 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6484 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6489 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6491 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6492 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6493 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6494 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6495 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6496 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6497 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6498 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6499 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6500 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6501 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6502 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6503 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6504 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6505 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6506 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6507 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6508 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6509 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6510 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6511 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6514 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6515 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6516 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6517 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6520 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6522 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6524 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6525 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6529 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6530 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6531 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6537 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6538 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6539 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6540 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6541 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6542 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6545 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6546 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6548 if inbound_peer_limited {
6551 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6552 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6553 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6554 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6555 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6560 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6561 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6563 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6564 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6565 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6566 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6571 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6572 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6577 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6579 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6580 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6581 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6582 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6583 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6584 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6585 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6586 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6587 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6588 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6589 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6593 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6594 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6595 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6600 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6601 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6602 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6603 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6604 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6613 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6617 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6620 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6621 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6622 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6623 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6624 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6625 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6626 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6627 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6629 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6630 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6631 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6635 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6636 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6637 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6638 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6641 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6642 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6643 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6644 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6652 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6653 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6657 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6658 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6661 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6662 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6666 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6667 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6668 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6669 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6672 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6673 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6675 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6676 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6677 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6678 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6679 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6682 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6683 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6684 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6685 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6688 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6689 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6690 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6691 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6694 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6695 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6696 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6697 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6698 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6699 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6700 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6701 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6702 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6703 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6704 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6705 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6706 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6707 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6708 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6709 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6710 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6711 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6713 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6714 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6715 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6721 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6722 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6724 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6725 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6726 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6727 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6730 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6731 (2, node_id, required),
6732 (4, features, required),
6733 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6734 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6735 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6736 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6739 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6740 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6741 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6742 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6743 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6744 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6745 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6746 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6747 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6748 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6749 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6750 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6751 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6752 (7, self.config, option),
6753 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6754 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6755 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6756 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6757 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6758 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6759 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6760 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6761 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6762 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6763 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6764 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6765 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6766 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6767 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6768 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6769 (32, self.is_public, required),
6770 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6771 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6772 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6773 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6779 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6780 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6781 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6782 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6783 (2, channel_id, required),
6784 (3, channel_type, option),
6785 (4, counterparty, required),
6786 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6787 (6, funding_txo, option),
6788 (7, config, option),
6789 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6790 (9, confirmations, option),
6791 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6792 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6793 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6794 (16, balance_msat, required),
6795 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6798 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6799 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6800 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6801 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6802 (26, is_outbound, required),
6803 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6804 (30, is_usable, required),
6805 (32, is_public, required),
6806 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6807 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6808 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6809 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6812 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6813 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6814 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6815 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6816 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6820 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6822 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6823 outbound_scid_alias,
6827 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6828 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6830 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6831 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6832 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6833 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6834 confirmations_required,
6836 force_close_spend_delay,
6837 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6838 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6839 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6840 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6841 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6842 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6843 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6848 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6849 (2, channels, vec_type),
6850 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6851 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6854 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6856 (0, onion_packet, required),
6857 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6860 (0, payment_data, required),
6861 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6862 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6863 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6865 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6866 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6867 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6868 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6872 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6873 (0, routing, required),
6874 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6875 (4, payment_hash, required),
6876 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6877 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6878 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6882 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6883 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6885 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6887 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6888 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6889 reason.write(writer)?;
6891 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6892 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6895 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6896 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6897 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6898 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6905 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6906 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6907 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6911 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6912 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6917 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6918 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6919 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6920 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6921 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6924 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6925 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6926 // messages contained in the variants.
6927 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6928 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6929 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6931 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6933 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6934 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6935 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6938 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6939 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6940 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6941 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6942 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6944 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6949 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6954 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6955 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6956 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6957 (2, outpoint, required),
6958 (4, htlc_id, required),
6959 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6962 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6963 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6964 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6965 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6966 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6968 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6969 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6970 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6971 (2, self.value, required),
6972 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6973 (4, payment_data, option),
6974 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6975 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6976 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6982 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6983 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6984 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6986 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6987 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6988 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6989 let mut total_value_received = None;
6990 let mut total_msat = None;
6991 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6992 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6993 (0, prev_hop, required),
6994 (1, total_msat, option),
6995 (2, value, required),
6996 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6997 (4, payment_data, option),
6998 (5, total_value_received, option),
6999 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7000 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7002 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7004 if payment_data.is_some() {
7005 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7007 if total_msat.is_none() {
7008 total_msat = Some(value);
7010 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7013 if total_msat.is_none() {
7014 if payment_data.is_none() {
7015 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7017 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7019 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7023 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7026 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7027 total_value_received,
7028 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7035 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7036 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7037 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7040 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7041 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7042 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7043 let mut payment_id = None;
7044 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7045 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7046 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7047 (0, session_priv, required),
7048 (1, payment_id, option),
7049 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7050 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7051 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7052 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7054 if payment_id.is_none() {
7055 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7057 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7059 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7060 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7061 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7063 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7064 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
7065 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7068 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7069 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7070 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7072 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7075 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7076 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7081 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7082 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7084 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7086 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7087 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7088 (0, session_priv, required),
7089 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7090 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7091 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7092 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7093 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7094 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7097 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7099 field.write(writer)?;
7106 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7107 (0, forward_info, required),
7108 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7109 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7110 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7111 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7114 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7116 (0, htlc_id, required),
7117 (2, err_packet, required),
7122 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7123 (0, payment_secret, required),
7124 (2, expiry_time, required),
7125 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7126 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7127 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7130 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7132 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7133 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7134 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7135 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7136 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7137 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7141 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7142 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7144 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7146 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7148 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7149 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7150 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7153 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7156 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7157 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7158 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7159 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7160 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7161 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7162 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7164 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7165 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7166 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7167 unfunded_channels += 1;
7172 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7174 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7175 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7176 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7177 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7178 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7179 channel.write(writer)?;
7186 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7187 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7188 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7189 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7190 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7191 for forward in pending_forwards {
7192 forward.write(writer)?;
7197 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7199 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7200 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7201 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7203 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7204 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7205 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7206 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7207 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7208 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7209 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7210 htlc.write(writer)?;
7212 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7213 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7216 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7217 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7218 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7219 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7220 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7221 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7222 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7225 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7226 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7227 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7228 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7229 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7231 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7232 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7233 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7234 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7235 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7236 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7237 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7242 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7243 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7244 for event in events.iter() {
7245 event.write(writer)?;
7248 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7249 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7250 for event in background_events.iter() {
7252 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7254 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7255 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7260 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7261 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7262 // likely to be identical.
7263 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7264 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7266 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7267 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7268 hash.write(writer)?;
7269 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7272 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7273 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7274 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7275 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7276 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7279 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7280 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7282 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7283 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7284 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7285 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7288 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7289 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7293 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7294 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7295 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7297 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7298 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7299 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7305 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7306 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7307 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7308 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7311 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7312 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7313 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7314 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7315 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7318 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7319 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7320 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7321 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7322 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7323 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7324 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7325 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7326 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7327 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7328 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7335 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7337 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7339 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7340 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7341 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7342 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7343 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7344 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7345 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7346 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7347 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7348 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7349 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7350 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7351 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7353 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7354 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7356 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7357 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7359 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7360 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7361 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7362 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7363 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7364 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7366 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7367 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7369 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7370 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7371 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7372 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7373 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7374 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7378 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7379 pub entropy_source: ES,
7381 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7382 pub node_signer: NS,
7384 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7385 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7387 pub signer_provider: SP,
7389 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7391 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7392 pub fee_estimator: F,
7393 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7395 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7396 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7397 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7398 pub chain_monitor: M,
7400 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7401 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7402 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7403 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7404 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7405 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7407 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7409 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7410 /// deserialization.
7412 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7413 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7414 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7416 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7417 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7419 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7420 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7421 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7422 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7424 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7427 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7428 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7431 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7432 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7434 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7435 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7436 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7437 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7438 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7439 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7443 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7444 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7445 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7446 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7447 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7449 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7450 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7455 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7456 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7457 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7458 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7460 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7461 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7462 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7463 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7464 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7465 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7469 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7470 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7471 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7475 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7476 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7478 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7479 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7480 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7481 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7482 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7483 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7487 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7488 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7490 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7491 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7494 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7496 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7497 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7498 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7499 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7500 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7501 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7502 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7503 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7504 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7505 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7507 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7508 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7509 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7510 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7511 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7512 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7513 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7514 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7515 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7516 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7517 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7518 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7519 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7520 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7521 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7522 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7523 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7524 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7525 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7526 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7527 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7528 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7529 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7530 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7531 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7532 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7533 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7534 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7536 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7537 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7538 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7539 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7540 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7542 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7543 let mut found_htlc = false;
7544 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7545 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7548 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7549 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7550 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7551 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7552 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7553 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7554 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7555 log_info!(args.logger,
7556 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7557 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7558 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7562 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7563 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7564 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7566 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7567 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7569 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7571 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7572 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7575 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7576 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7577 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7581 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7582 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7583 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7584 // safely discard the channel.
7585 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7586 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7587 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7588 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7589 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7592 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7593 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7594 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7595 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7596 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7597 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7601 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7602 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7603 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7604 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7605 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7607 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7611 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7612 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7613 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7614 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7615 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7616 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7617 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7618 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7619 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7621 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7624 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7625 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7626 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7627 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7628 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7629 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7630 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7631 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7633 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7636 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7637 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7638 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7639 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7640 let peer_state = PeerState {
7641 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7642 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7643 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7644 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7645 is_connected: false,
7647 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7650 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7651 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7652 for _ in 0..event_count {
7653 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7654 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7659 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7660 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7661 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7663 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7664 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7665 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7666 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7668 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7671 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7675 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7676 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7678 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7679 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7680 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7681 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7682 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7686 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7687 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7688 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7689 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7690 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7691 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7692 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7694 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7695 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7699 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7700 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7701 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7702 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7703 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7704 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7705 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7706 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7707 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7708 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7709 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7710 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7711 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7712 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7713 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7714 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7715 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7716 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7717 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7718 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7719 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7720 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7722 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7723 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7726 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7727 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7730 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7731 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7734 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7735 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7736 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7737 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7738 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7739 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7741 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7743 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7744 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7745 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7749 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7750 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7751 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7752 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7753 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7754 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7755 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7757 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7758 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7759 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7760 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7761 if path.hops.is_empty() {
7762 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7763 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7766 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
7767 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7768 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7769 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7771 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7772 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7773 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7776 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
7777 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7778 retry_strategy: None,
7779 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7780 payment_params: None,
7781 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7782 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7783 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7784 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7785 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7786 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7787 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7788 total_msat: path_amt,
7789 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7791 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7792 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7797 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7799 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7800 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7801 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7802 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7804 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7805 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7806 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7807 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7808 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7809 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7810 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7811 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7812 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7813 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7814 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7819 !forwards.is_empty()
7821 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7822 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7823 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7824 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7825 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7826 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7827 intercepted_id != ev_id
7834 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7835 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7836 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7837 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7838 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7839 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7840 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7841 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7842 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7843 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7844 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7845 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7846 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7855 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7856 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7857 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7858 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7859 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7860 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7861 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7862 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7866 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7867 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7869 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7870 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7871 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7872 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7874 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
7875 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7876 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7878 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
7879 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
7881 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7882 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
7884 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7887 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
7888 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7889 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7891 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7895 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7896 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7897 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7898 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7899 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7901 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7902 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7903 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7904 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7905 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7906 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7907 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7908 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7910 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7911 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7915 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7917 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7919 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7920 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7922 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7923 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7928 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7929 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7931 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7933 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7935 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7936 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7937 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7938 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7942 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7943 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7946 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7947 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7948 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7950 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7951 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7952 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7954 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7955 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7956 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7957 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7958 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7959 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7961 if chan.is_usable() {
7962 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7963 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7964 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7965 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7966 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7972 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7974 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7975 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7976 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7977 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7978 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7979 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7980 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7981 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7982 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7983 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7984 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7986 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7987 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7989 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7990 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7991 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7992 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7994 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7995 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7996 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7997 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7999 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8000 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8001 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8002 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8004 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8005 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8006 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8009 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8010 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8013 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8014 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8017 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8020 purpose: payment.purpose,
8021 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8027 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8028 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8029 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8031 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8032 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8036 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8038 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8039 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8040 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8041 router: args.router,
8043 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8045 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8046 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8047 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8048 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8050 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8051 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8052 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8053 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8054 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8055 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8057 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8062 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8064 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8066 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8067 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8068 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8069 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8070 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8072 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8073 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8074 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8076 logger: args.logger,
8077 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8080 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8081 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8082 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8083 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8084 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8087 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8088 //connection or two.
8090 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8096 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8097 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8098 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8099 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8100 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8101 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8102 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8103 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8104 use crate::ln::msgs;
8105 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8106 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8107 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8108 use crate::util::test_utils;
8109 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8110 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
8113 fn test_notify_limits() {
8114 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8115 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8119 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8121 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8122 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8123 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8124 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8125 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8127 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8129 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8130 // to connect messages with new values
8131 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8132 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8133 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8134 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8135 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8136 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8138 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8139 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8140 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8141 // ... but the last node should not.
8142 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8143 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8144 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8145 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8147 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8148 // about the channel.
8149 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8150 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8151 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8153 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8155 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8156 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8157 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8158 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8159 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8160 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8162 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8163 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8164 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8166 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8167 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8168 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8169 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8170 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8171 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8173 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8174 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8175 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8176 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8177 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8178 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8179 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8180 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8182 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8183 // the channel info has updated.
8184 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8185 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8186 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8187 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8188 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8189 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8193 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8194 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8196 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8198 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8199 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8200 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8202 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8203 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8204 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8205 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8207 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8208 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8209 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8210 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8211 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8212 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8213 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8214 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8216 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8217 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8218 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8220 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8221 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8222 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8224 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8225 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8226 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8227 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8228 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8231 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8232 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8234 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8235 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8236 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8237 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8238 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8239 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8241 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8242 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8244 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8245 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8246 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8248 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8250 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8252 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8253 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8254 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8255 // lightning messages manually.
8256 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8257 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8260 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8262 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8264 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8265 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8267 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8268 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8270 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8274 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8275 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8276 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8278 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8280 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8282 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8283 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8286 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8287 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8288 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8289 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8291 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8292 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8293 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8294 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8299 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8300 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8301 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8302 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8307 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8308 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8309 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8310 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8317 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8318 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8319 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8320 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8321 // fails as expected.
8322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8325 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8326 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8327 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8328 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8330 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8331 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8332 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8334 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8335 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8336 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8337 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8339 let route = find_route(
8340 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8341 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8343 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8344 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8346 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8347 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8348 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8349 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8350 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8352 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8353 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8354 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8355 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8356 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8358 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8359 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8360 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8361 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8362 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8363 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8364 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8365 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8366 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8368 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8369 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8371 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8372 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8373 let route = find_route(
8374 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8375 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8377 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8378 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8380 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8381 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8382 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8383 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8384 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8386 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8387 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8388 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8389 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8391 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8393 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8394 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8395 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8397 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8398 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8399 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8401 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8402 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8403 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8404 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8405 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8406 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8407 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8408 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8409 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8411 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8412 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8416 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8417 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8418 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8422 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8424 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8425 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8427 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8428 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8429 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8430 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8432 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8433 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8434 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8435 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8436 let route = find_route(
8437 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8438 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8441 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8442 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8443 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8444 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8445 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8446 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8449 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8450 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8451 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8452 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8453 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8454 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8455 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8457 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8461 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8462 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8463 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8464 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8465 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8466 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8468 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8469 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8471 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8472 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8473 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8474 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8476 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8477 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8478 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8479 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8480 let route = find_route(
8481 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8482 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8485 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8486 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8487 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8488 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8489 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8490 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8491 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8492 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8495 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8496 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8497 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8498 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8499 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8500 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8501 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8503 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8507 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8511 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8513 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8514 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8515 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8516 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8518 // Marshall an MPP route.
8519 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8520 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8521 route.paths.push(path);
8522 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8523 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8524 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8525 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8526 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8527 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8529 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8530 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8532 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8533 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8535 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8540 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8546 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8548 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8549 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8551 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8552 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8554 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8557 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8558 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8559 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8560 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8561 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8562 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8565 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8568 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8569 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8574 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8575 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8579 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8581 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8582 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8584 total_msat: 100_000,
8587 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8588 // payment verification fails as expected.
8589 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8590 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8591 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8592 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8594 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8598 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8599 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8603 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8604 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8605 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8606 // the channel is successfully closed.
8607 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8608 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8609 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8610 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8612 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8613 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8615 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8616 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8618 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8619 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8621 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8622 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8624 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8627 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8629 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8630 // as it has the funding transaction.
8631 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8632 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8633 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8636 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8638 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8640 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8642 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8643 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8644 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8646 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8649 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8650 // as it has the funding transaction.
8651 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8652 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8653 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8656 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8657 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8659 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8660 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8661 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8662 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8664 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8665 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8666 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8667 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8669 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8670 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8672 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8673 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8674 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8675 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8676 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8677 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8678 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8682 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8683 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8684 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8685 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8686 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8687 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8688 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8691 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8693 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8694 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8695 // closing transaction).
8696 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8697 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8698 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8700 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8701 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8702 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8703 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8704 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8707 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8709 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8711 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8712 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8713 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8715 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8717 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8718 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8721 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8722 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8723 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8726 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8727 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8728 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8731 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8733 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8734 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8736 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8737 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8739 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8740 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8745 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8746 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8747 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8748 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8749 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8750 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8751 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8752 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8755 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8756 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8757 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8759 // Test the API functions.
8760 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8762 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8764 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8766 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8768 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8770 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8772 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8776 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8777 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8778 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8780 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8781 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8783 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8785 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8786 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8788 let mut funding_tx = None;
8789 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8790 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8791 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8794 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8795 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8796 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8797 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8798 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8800 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8802 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8804 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8806 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8808 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8810 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8813 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8814 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8815 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8816 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8817 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8819 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8820 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8822 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8823 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8824 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8825 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8826 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8827 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8828 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8830 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8831 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8832 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8833 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8835 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8836 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8837 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8838 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8839 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8840 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8841 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8843 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8844 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8845 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8846 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8848 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8849 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8850 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8851 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8853 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8854 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8856 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8857 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8858 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8859 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8860 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8862 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8863 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8864 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8866 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8867 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8868 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8870 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8871 // "protected" and can connect again.
8872 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8873 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8874 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8875 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8877 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8879 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8880 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8884 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8885 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8889 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8891 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8893 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8894 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8896 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8897 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8898 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8899 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8902 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8904 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8905 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8906 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8908 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8909 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8910 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8912 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8913 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8914 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8915 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8919 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8920 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8921 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8922 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8923 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8924 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8925 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8927 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8929 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8931 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8932 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8934 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8935 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8936 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8937 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8938 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8939 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8941 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8942 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8944 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8945 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8949 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8950 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8953 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8954 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8955 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8956 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8957 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8958 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8959 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8961 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8962 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8963 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8964 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8970 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8971 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8973 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8974 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8975 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8977 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8978 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8980 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8982 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8987 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8988 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8989 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8990 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8993 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8994 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8995 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8999 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9000 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9001 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9003 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9004 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9006 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9007 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9009 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9012 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9013 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9015 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9016 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9018 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9022 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9024 use crate::chain::Listen;
9025 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9026 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9027 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9028 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9029 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9030 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9031 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9032 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9033 use crate::util::test_utils;
9034 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9036 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9037 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9038 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9040 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9044 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9045 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9046 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9047 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9048 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9049 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9050 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9052 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9053 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9055 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9056 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9058 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9060 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9065 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9066 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9069 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9070 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9071 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9073 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9075 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9076 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9077 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9078 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9079 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9081 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9082 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9084 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9085 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9086 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9087 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9089 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9091 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9093 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9094 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9095 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9096 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9097 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9099 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9101 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9103 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9104 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9105 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9106 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9107 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9110 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9111 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9112 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9114 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9115 } else { panic!(); }
9117 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9118 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9119 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9121 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9122 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9124 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9127 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9128 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9129 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9131 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9132 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9134 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9137 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9140 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9143 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9144 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9146 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9147 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9148 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9149 match msg_events[0] {
9150 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9151 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9152 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9156 match msg_events[1] {
9157 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9161 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9162 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9164 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9165 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9170 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9171 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9173 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9174 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9179 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9180 macro_rules! send_payment {
9181 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9182 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9183 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9184 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9185 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9187 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9188 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9190 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9191 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9192 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9193 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9194 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9195 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9196 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9197 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9198 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9199 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9200 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9202 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9203 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9204 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9205 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9207 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9208 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9209 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9210 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9211 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9213 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9216 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9217 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9218 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9219 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9221 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9226 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9227 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);