1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
43 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
44 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
46 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
48 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
49 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
50 use util::config::UserConfig;
51 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
52 use util::{byte_utils, events};
53 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
54 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
55 use util::logger::Logger;
56 use util::errors::APIError;
59 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
60 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
61 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
62 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
63 use std::time::Duration;
64 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
65 use std::time::Instant;
66 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
68 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
70 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
72 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
73 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
74 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
76 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
77 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
78 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
79 // before we forward it.
81 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
82 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
83 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
84 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
85 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
87 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
88 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
90 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
91 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
94 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
95 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
101 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
102 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
103 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
104 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
105 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
110 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
111 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
114 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
115 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
116 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
117 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
118 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
121 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
123 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
125 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
126 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
127 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
129 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
131 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
135 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
139 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
140 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
141 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
142 short_channel_id: u64,
144 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
146 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
147 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
151 struct ClaimableHTLC {
152 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
154 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
155 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
156 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
157 /// are part of the same payment.
158 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
162 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
163 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
164 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
165 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
168 session_priv: SecretKey,
169 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
170 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
171 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
176 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
177 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
179 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
180 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
185 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
186 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
188 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
196 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
197 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
198 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
199 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
200 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
204 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
205 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
206 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
207 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
209 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
211 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
212 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
213 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
214 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
215 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
217 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
218 err: msgs::LightningError,
219 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
221 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
223 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
225 err: LightningError {
227 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
228 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
234 shutdown_finish: None,
238 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
240 err: LightningError {
242 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
244 shutdown_finish: None,
248 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
249 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
252 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
254 err: LightningError {
256 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
257 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
263 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
267 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
270 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
272 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
274 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
283 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
293 shutdown_finish: None,
298 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
299 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
300 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
301 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
302 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
304 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
305 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
306 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
307 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
308 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
310 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
312 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
316 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
317 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
318 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
319 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
320 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
321 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
322 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
323 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
324 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
325 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
326 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
327 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
328 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
330 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
331 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
332 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
333 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
336 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
337 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_chan_freshness_every_min, so may be processed with
338 /// quite some time lag.
339 enum BackgroundEvent {
340 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
341 /// commitment transaction.
342 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
345 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
346 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
348 latest_features: InitFeatures,
351 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
352 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
354 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
355 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
356 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
357 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
358 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
359 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
360 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
361 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
363 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
364 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
365 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
366 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
367 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
368 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
369 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
370 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
371 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
373 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
374 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
376 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
377 /// to individual Channels.
379 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
380 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
381 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
382 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
384 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
385 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
386 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
387 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
388 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
389 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
390 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
392 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
393 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
394 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
395 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
398 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
399 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
400 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
401 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
402 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
404 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
405 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
406 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
407 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
408 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
409 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
410 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
411 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
412 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
413 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
416 default_configuration: UserConfig,
417 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
423 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
425 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
426 last_block_hash: RwLock<BlockHash>,
427 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
429 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
430 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
431 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
432 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
433 our_network_key: SecretKey,
435 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
436 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
437 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
439 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
440 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
441 /// are currently open with that peer.
442 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
443 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
445 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
447 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
448 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
449 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
450 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
451 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
452 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
453 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
454 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
455 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
457 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
464 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
466 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
467 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
468 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
469 pub struct ChainParameters {
470 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
471 pub network: Network,
473 /// The hash of the latest block successfully connected.
474 pub latest_hash: BlockHash,
476 /// The height of the latest block successfully connected.
478 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
479 pub latest_height: usize,
482 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
483 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
484 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
485 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
486 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
487 /// updates are ready for persistence).
488 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
489 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
490 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
491 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
494 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
495 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
496 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
499 persistence_notifier: notifier,
500 _read_guard: read_guard,
505 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
507 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
511 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
512 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
513 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
514 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
515 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
516 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
518 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
519 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
520 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
521 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
522 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
523 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
524 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
526 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
527 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
528 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
529 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
530 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
531 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
534 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
536 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
537 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
540 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
542 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
544 pub struct ChannelDetails {
545 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
546 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
547 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
548 /// lifetime of the channel.
549 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
550 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
551 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
552 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
553 /// The node_id of our counterparty
554 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
555 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
556 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
557 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
558 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
559 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
560 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
561 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
563 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
564 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
565 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
566 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
567 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
568 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
569 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
570 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
571 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
572 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
573 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
574 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
575 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
579 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
580 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
582 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
583 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
584 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
585 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
586 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
587 ParameterError(APIError),
588 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
589 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
590 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
593 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
595 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
596 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
597 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
598 /// paths than the ones selected).
599 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
600 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
601 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
602 /// in over-/re-payment.
604 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
605 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
606 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
608 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
609 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
610 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
611 /// with the latest update_id.
612 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
615 macro_rules! handle_error {
616 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
619 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
620 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
622 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
623 // entering the macro.
624 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
627 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
629 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
630 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
631 if let Some(update) = update_option {
632 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
638 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
639 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
641 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
642 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
643 action: err.action.clone()
647 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
648 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
651 // Return error in case higher-API need one
658 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
659 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
662 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
663 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
665 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
666 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
667 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
668 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
669 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
671 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
673 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
678 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
679 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
682 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
683 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
685 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
686 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
687 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
688 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
689 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
691 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
693 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
694 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
695 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
696 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
697 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
699 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
700 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
706 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
707 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
708 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
710 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
712 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
713 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
714 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
715 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
716 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
718 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
719 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
720 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
721 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
722 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
723 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
724 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
725 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
726 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
727 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
730 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
731 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
732 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
733 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
735 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
736 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
738 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
739 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
741 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
742 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
743 if !$resend_commitment {
744 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
747 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
749 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
750 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
756 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
757 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
758 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
760 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
761 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
765 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
766 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
767 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
768 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
769 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
772 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
777 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
778 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
779 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
780 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
781 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
784 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
786 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
787 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
789 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
791 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
793 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
794 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
795 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
796 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
797 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
798 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
801 default_configuration: config.clone(),
802 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
803 fee_estimator: fee_est,
807 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(params.latest_height),
808 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(params.latest_hash),
811 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
812 by_id: HashMap::new(),
813 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
814 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
815 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
816 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
818 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
820 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
822 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
824 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
825 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
826 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
827 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
835 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
837 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
838 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
839 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
840 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
842 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
843 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
845 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
846 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
847 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
848 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
849 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
852 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
853 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
854 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
857 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
858 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
860 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
861 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
862 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
863 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
864 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
866 panic!("RNG is bad???");
869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
871 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
872 node_id: their_network_key,
878 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
879 let mut res = Vec::new();
881 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
882 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
883 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
884 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
885 res.push(ChannelDetails {
886 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
887 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
888 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
889 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
890 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
891 inbound_capacity_msat,
892 outbound_capacity_msat,
893 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
894 is_live: channel.is_live(),
898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
899 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
900 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
901 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
907 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
908 /// more information.
909 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
910 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
913 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
914 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
916 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
917 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
918 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
919 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
920 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
921 // really wanted anyway.
922 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
925 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
926 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
927 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
929 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
930 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
933 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
934 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
935 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
936 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
938 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
939 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
940 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
943 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
944 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
945 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
947 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
948 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
950 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
953 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
954 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
956 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
957 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
962 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
963 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
964 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
973 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
974 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
975 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
976 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
977 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
979 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
980 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
981 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
982 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
983 // ignore the result here.
984 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
988 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
990 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
991 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
992 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
993 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
994 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
995 // Error or Ok here doesn't matter - the result is only exposed publicly
996 // when peer_node_id is None anyway.
1000 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1001 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1003 chan.remove_entry().1
1005 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1008 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1009 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1010 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1011 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1012 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1020 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1021 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1022 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1024 self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None)
1027 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1028 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1029 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1030 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1031 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1035 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1036 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1037 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1039 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1040 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1041 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1042 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1043 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1044 failure_code: $err_code,
1045 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1050 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1051 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1054 let shared_secret = {
1055 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1056 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1059 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1061 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1062 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1063 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1064 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1065 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1066 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1067 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1068 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1071 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1072 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1073 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1074 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1075 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1078 let mut channel_state = None;
1079 macro_rules! return_err {
1080 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1082 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1083 if channel_state.is_none() {
1084 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1086 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1087 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1088 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1089 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1090 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1095 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1096 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1097 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1098 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1100 let error_code = match err {
1101 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1102 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1103 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1104 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1105 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1107 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1110 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1111 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1112 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1119 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1122 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1123 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1124 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1125 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1126 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1127 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1128 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1129 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1130 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1131 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1132 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1133 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1137 // final_expiry_too_soon
1138 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1139 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1140 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1141 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1142 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1143 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1145 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1146 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1147 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1149 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1150 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1151 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1154 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1155 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1156 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1157 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1160 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1161 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1162 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1163 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1165 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1166 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1168 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1170 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1171 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1172 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1173 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1176 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1177 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1178 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1180 // Check two things:
1181 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1182 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1183 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1185 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1187 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1188 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1189 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1191 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1193 let blinding_factor = {
1194 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1195 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1196 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1197 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1200 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1202 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1204 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1207 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1208 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1211 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1212 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1213 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1214 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1215 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1219 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1220 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1221 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1224 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1225 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1226 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1227 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1231 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1232 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1233 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1234 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1235 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1236 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1237 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1238 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1239 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1240 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1242 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1244 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1245 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1247 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1248 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1249 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1250 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1251 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1252 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1253 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1255 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1256 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1258 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1259 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1260 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1262 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1263 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1265 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1266 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1267 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1268 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1269 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1271 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1272 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1274 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1275 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1276 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1277 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1283 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1284 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1285 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1286 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1288 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1289 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1291 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1292 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1293 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1295 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1297 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1302 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1305 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1306 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1307 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1308 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1309 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1313 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1315 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1316 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1318 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1319 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1320 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1321 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1322 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1323 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1324 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1325 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1328 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1329 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1331 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1337 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1338 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1340 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1341 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1343 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1344 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1345 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1346 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1347 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1349 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1353 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1354 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1355 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1356 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1357 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1360 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1361 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1363 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1364 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1366 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1367 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1369 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1371 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1372 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1373 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1375 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1376 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1377 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1378 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1379 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1380 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1381 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1382 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1383 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1386 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1387 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1388 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1389 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1390 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1391 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1392 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1400 } else { unreachable!(); }
1404 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1405 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1407 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1412 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1414 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1415 /// fields for more info.
1417 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1418 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1419 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1420 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1421 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1422 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1424 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1426 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1427 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1428 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1430 /// In general, a path may raise:
1431 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1432 /// node public key) is specified.
1433 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1434 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1436 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1437 /// relevant updates.
1439 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1440 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1441 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1443 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1444 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1445 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1446 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1448 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1449 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1450 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1451 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1452 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1453 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1455 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1456 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1457 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1458 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1459 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1461 let mut total_value = 0;
1462 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1463 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1464 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1465 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1466 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1467 continue 'path_check;
1469 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1470 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1471 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1472 continue 'path_check;
1475 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1476 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1478 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1479 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1482 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1483 let mut results = Vec::new();
1484 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1485 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1487 let mut has_ok = false;
1488 let mut has_err = false;
1489 for res in results.iter() {
1490 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1491 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1492 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1493 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1500 if has_err && has_ok {
1501 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1503 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1509 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1511 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1512 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1514 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1516 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1517 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1518 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1522 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1524 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1525 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1526 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1527 } else { unreachable!(); })
1532 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1533 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1536 Err(_) => { return; }
1540 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1541 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1542 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1545 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1547 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1555 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1556 if !chan.should_announce() {
1557 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1561 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1563 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1565 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1566 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1568 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1569 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1570 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1571 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1572 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1577 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1578 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1579 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1581 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1584 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1585 // smaller than 500:
1586 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1588 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1589 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1590 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1592 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1593 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1595 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1596 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1597 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1598 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1600 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1601 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1604 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1605 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1608 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1609 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1610 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1611 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1612 rgb, alias, addresses,
1613 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1614 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1616 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1618 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1619 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1620 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1621 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1622 contents: announcement
1627 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1629 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1630 /// Will likely generate further events.
1631 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1634 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1635 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1636 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1638 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1639 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1641 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1642 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1643 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1644 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1646 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1647 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1648 match forward_info {
1649 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1650 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1651 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1652 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1653 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1654 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1655 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1657 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1658 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1661 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1662 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1663 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1664 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1665 // problem, not ours.
1672 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1673 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1674 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1675 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1676 match forward_info {
1677 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1678 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1680 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1681 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1682 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1683 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1684 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1685 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1686 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1687 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1689 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1691 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1692 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1694 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1696 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1697 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1698 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1704 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1706 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1707 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1708 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1709 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1710 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1711 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1712 // this channel currently :/.
1718 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1719 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1721 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1722 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1723 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1725 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1726 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1728 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1730 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1731 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1732 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1735 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1737 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1738 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1739 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1740 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1741 // messages when we can.
1742 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1743 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1744 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1751 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1752 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1755 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1756 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1757 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1758 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1759 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1760 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1762 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1763 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1764 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1765 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1766 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1768 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1770 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1772 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1776 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1777 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1780 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1781 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1782 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1783 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1784 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1785 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1786 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1788 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1796 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1797 match forward_info {
1798 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1799 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1800 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1801 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1802 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1803 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1804 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1805 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1806 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1809 let mut total_value = 0;
1810 let payment_secret_opt =
1811 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1812 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1813 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1814 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1816 value: amt_to_forward,
1817 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1818 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1820 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1821 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1822 total_value += htlc.value;
1823 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1824 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1826 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1828 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1829 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1830 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1831 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1832 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1833 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1837 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1838 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1839 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1840 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1841 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1843 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1846 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1847 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1849 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1854 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1856 payment_secret: None,
1857 amt: amt_to_forward,
1861 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1862 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1864 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1865 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1873 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1877 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1878 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1881 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1882 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1883 events.append(&mut new_events);
1886 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1888 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
1889 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
1891 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
1892 fn process_background_events(&self) {
1893 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
1894 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
1895 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
1897 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
1898 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
1899 // monitor updating completing.
1900 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
1906 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1907 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
1908 self.process_background_events();
1911 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1912 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1913 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1915 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1917 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
1918 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1920 self.process_background_events();
1922 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1923 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1924 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1925 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1926 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1932 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1934 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1935 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1940 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1941 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1942 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1943 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1944 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1945 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1948 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1949 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1950 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1951 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1952 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1953 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1954 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1955 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1957 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1958 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1959 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1965 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1966 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1967 // be surfaced to the user.
1968 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1969 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1971 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1972 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1973 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1974 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1975 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1976 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1978 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1983 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1984 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1985 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1987 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1988 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1989 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1991 rejected_by_dest: false,
2003 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2004 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2005 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2006 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2007 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2008 /// still-available channels.
2009 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2010 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2011 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2012 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2015 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2016 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2017 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2019 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2021 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2022 match &onion_error {
2023 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2025 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2027 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2028 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2029 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2030 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2031 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2032 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2033 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2038 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2039 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2040 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2041 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2043 error_code: onion_error_code,
2045 error_data: onion_error_data
2049 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2055 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2056 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2057 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2058 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2060 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2061 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2062 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2063 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2064 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2065 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2067 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2069 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2075 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2076 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2077 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2078 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2079 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2080 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2082 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2084 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2088 let mut forward_event = None;
2089 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2090 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2092 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2093 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2094 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2097 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2100 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2101 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2102 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2103 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2104 time_forwardable: time
2111 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2112 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2113 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2115 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2116 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2117 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2118 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2119 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2120 /// motivated attackers.
2122 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2123 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2125 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2126 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2127 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2131 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2132 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2133 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2134 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2136 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2137 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2138 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2139 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2141 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2142 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2143 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2144 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2145 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2148 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2149 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2150 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2152 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2156 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2157 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2158 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2163 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2164 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2165 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2166 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2167 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2168 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2169 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2170 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2172 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2173 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2174 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2176 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2178 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2179 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2180 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2181 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2182 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2183 } else { errs.push(e); }
2185 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2187 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2189 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2194 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2195 // which were generated.
2196 channel_state.take();
2198 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2199 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2200 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2207 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2208 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2209 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2210 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2211 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2217 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2218 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2219 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2220 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2221 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2222 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2223 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2224 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2226 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2230 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2231 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2232 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2233 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2234 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2235 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2236 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2237 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2246 // TODO: Do something with e?
2247 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2248 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2249 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2250 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2251 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2252 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2253 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2257 } else { unreachable!(); }
2260 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2262 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2263 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2264 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2265 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2269 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2270 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2271 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2274 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2275 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2276 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2277 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2280 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2281 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2282 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2283 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2284 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2285 payment_preimage, e);
2289 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2291 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2292 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2293 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2299 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2300 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2301 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2304 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2305 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2308 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2309 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2311 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2312 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2313 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2314 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2316 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2317 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2318 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2319 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2320 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2321 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2322 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2323 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2324 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2327 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2328 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2329 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2330 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2333 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2334 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2335 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2336 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2337 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2341 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2345 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2346 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2347 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2349 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2351 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2352 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2354 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2359 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2360 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2361 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2362 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2363 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2368 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2372 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2377 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2378 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2379 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2380 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2383 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2384 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2385 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2388 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2389 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2390 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2391 msg: announcement_sigs,
2394 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2398 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2400 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2401 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2403 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2405 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2406 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2410 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2411 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2412 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2415 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2416 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2417 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2418 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2419 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2422 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2423 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2424 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2426 entry.insert(channel);
2432 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2433 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2434 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2435 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2436 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2438 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2441 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2442 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2447 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2448 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2449 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2450 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2452 user_channel_id: user_id,
2457 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2458 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2459 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2460 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2462 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2463 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2464 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2465 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2467 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2469 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2472 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2473 // lock before watch_channel
2474 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2476 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2477 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2478 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2479 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2480 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2481 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2482 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2483 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2484 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2485 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2488 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2489 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2490 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2491 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2492 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2493 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2497 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2498 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2499 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2503 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2504 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2505 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2514 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2515 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2516 let last_block_hash = *self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap();
2517 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2518 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2519 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2521 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2524 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, last_block_hash, &self.logger) {
2525 Ok(update) => update,
2526 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2528 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2529 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2531 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2533 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2537 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2539 user_channel_id: user_id,
2544 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2545 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2546 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2547 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2548 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2549 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2550 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2552 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2553 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2554 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2555 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2556 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2557 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2558 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2559 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2560 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2561 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2562 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2563 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2564 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2565 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2566 msg: announcement_sigs,
2571 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2575 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2576 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2577 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2578 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2580 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2582 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2583 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2585 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2586 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2587 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2588 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2592 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2593 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2594 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2598 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2599 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2600 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2602 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2603 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2608 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2609 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2611 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2612 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2613 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2614 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2622 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2623 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2624 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2625 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2626 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2628 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2629 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2631 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2632 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2633 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2634 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2639 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2640 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2641 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2642 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2643 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2644 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2645 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2647 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2648 } else { (tx, None) }
2650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2653 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2654 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2655 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2657 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2658 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2659 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2660 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2668 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2669 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2670 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2671 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2673 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2674 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2675 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2676 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2678 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2679 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2681 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2683 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2684 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2687 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2688 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2689 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2690 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2691 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2692 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2693 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2694 match pending_forward_info {
2695 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2696 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2697 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2698 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2699 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2700 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2701 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2705 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2706 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2707 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2708 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2709 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2710 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2711 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2712 // no problem just calling this
2713 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2714 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2716 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2717 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2718 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2721 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2723 _ => pending_forward_info
2726 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2733 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2734 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2736 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2739 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2742 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2747 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2751 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2752 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2753 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2754 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2756 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2757 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2759 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2766 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2767 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2768 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2771 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2774 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2775 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2776 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2778 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2785 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2786 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2787 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2788 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2790 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2791 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2793 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2794 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2795 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2796 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2797 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2798 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2799 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2804 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2805 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2806 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2808 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2809 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2810 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2812 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2814 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2815 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2816 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2817 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2818 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2819 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2821 commitment_signed: msg,
2825 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2827 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2833 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2838 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2839 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2840 let mut forward_event = None;
2841 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2842 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2843 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2844 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2846 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2847 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2848 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2849 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2852 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2853 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2856 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
2857 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2862 match forward_event {
2864 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2865 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2866 time_forwardable: time
2874 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2875 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2877 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2878 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2879 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2881 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2882 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2884 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2885 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2886 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2887 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2888 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2889 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2890 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2891 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2893 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2895 } else { unreachable!(); }
2898 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2899 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2900 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2904 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2905 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2906 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2910 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
2912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2915 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2917 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
2918 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2921 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
2928 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2929 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2930 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2933 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2936 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2943 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2944 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2945 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2947 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2949 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2950 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2952 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2953 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2956 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2957 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2958 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2960 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2961 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2963 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2964 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2965 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2966 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2968 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2969 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2972 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2973 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2979 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2981 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2982 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2983 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2984 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2985 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2986 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2987 contents: announcement,
2989 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2997 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2998 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2999 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3000 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3001 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3003 // It's not a local channel
3007 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3008 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3009 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3010 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3011 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3013 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3020 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3021 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3022 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3024 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3026 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3027 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3029 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3030 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3031 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3032 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3033 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3034 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3035 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3036 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3037 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3038 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3039 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3040 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3041 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3043 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3044 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3046 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3047 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3050 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3051 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3052 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3056 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3057 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3058 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3059 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3064 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3065 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3066 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3067 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3073 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3077 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3082 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3083 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3084 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3094 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3095 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3096 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3097 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3098 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3100 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3102 let counterparty_node_id;
3103 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3104 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3105 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3107 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3110 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3111 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3113 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3114 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3116 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3117 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3119 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3120 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3121 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3123 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3126 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3127 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3128 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3129 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3130 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3131 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3132 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3133 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3143 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3144 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3145 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3149 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3150 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3151 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3153 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3154 match monitor_event {
3155 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3156 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3157 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3158 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3160 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3161 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3164 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3165 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3166 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3167 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3168 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3169 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3170 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3171 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3172 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3174 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3175 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3176 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3186 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3187 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3191 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3192 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3194 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3195 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3196 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3197 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3198 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3199 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3200 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3201 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3202 // timer_chan_freshness_every_min, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3203 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3204 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3205 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3206 assert!(should_broadcast);
3207 } else { unreachable!(); }
3208 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3210 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3215 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3216 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3217 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3218 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3222 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3223 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3224 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3225 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3227 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3228 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3229 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3234 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3235 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3236 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3237 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3238 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3241 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3242 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3243 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3244 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3246 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3247 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3248 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3253 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3255 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3256 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3257 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3258 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3261 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3262 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3263 ChannelManager::block_connected(self, &block.header, &txdata, height);
3266 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _height: u32) {
3267 ChannelManager::block_disconnected(self, header);
3271 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3272 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3273 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3274 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3275 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3278 /// Updates channel state based on transactions seen in a connected block.
3279 pub fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3280 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3281 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3282 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3283 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", block_hash, height);
3286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3288 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3289 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = block_hash;
3291 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3292 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3294 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3295 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3296 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3297 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3298 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3299 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3300 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3301 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3302 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3303 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3304 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3308 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3309 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3310 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3311 msg: funding_locked,
3313 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3314 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3315 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3316 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3317 msg: announcement_sigs,
3320 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3322 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3324 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3325 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3326 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3327 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3331 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3332 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3333 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3334 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3336 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3337 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3339 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. Close the channel.
3340 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3341 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3342 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3354 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3355 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3356 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3357 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3358 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3359 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3360 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3361 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3362 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3363 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3364 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3365 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3370 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3374 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3376 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3377 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3381 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3382 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3383 // having an explicit local time source.
3384 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3385 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3386 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3387 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3388 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3394 /// Updates channel state based on a disconnected block.
3396 /// If necessary, the channel may be force-closed without letting the counterparty participate
3397 /// in the shutdown.
3398 pub fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader) {
3399 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3400 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3401 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3402 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3404 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3405 *self.last_block_hash.write().unwrap() = header.prev_blockhash;
3407 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3409 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3410 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3411 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3412 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3413 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3414 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3415 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3416 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3418 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3419 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3431 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3434 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3435 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3436 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3438 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3439 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3440 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3441 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3444 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3445 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3447 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3448 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3451 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3452 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3453 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3454 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3455 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3460 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3461 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3462 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3463 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3464 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3465 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3468 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3470 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3473 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3475 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3478 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3480 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3483 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3484 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3485 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3488 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3490 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3493 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3495 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3498 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3500 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3503 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3504 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3505 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3508 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3509 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3510 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3513 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3515 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3518 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3519 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3520 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3523 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3525 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3528 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3530 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3533 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3535 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3538 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3539 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3540 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3543 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3545 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3548 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3550 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3553 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3555 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3556 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3557 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3559 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3560 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3561 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3562 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3563 if no_connection_possible {
3564 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3565 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3566 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3567 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3568 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3570 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3571 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3582 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3583 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3584 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3585 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3586 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3587 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3588 // reestablish logic.
3589 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3590 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3591 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3592 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3593 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3595 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3596 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3597 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3601 no_channels_remain = false;
3607 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3609 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3610 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3611 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3614 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3615 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3616 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3617 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3620 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3621 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3622 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3623 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3624 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3630 if no_channels_remain {
3631 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3634 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3635 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3637 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3638 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3639 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3644 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3645 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3650 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3651 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3653 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3654 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3657 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3658 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3663 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3664 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3665 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3666 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3667 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3668 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3669 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3670 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3671 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3675 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3676 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3677 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3683 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3686 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3689 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3690 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3691 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3692 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3693 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3697 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3698 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3703 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3704 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3705 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3706 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3707 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3708 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3711 impl PersistenceNotifier {
3714 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
3720 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3721 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3722 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
3723 let result = *guard;
3731 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3732 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3733 let current_time = Instant::now();
3735 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
3736 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3737 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
3738 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
3739 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
3740 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
3741 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
3743 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
3744 let result = *guard;
3745 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
3749 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
3750 None => return result,
3756 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
3758 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
3759 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
3760 *persistence_lock = true;
3761 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
3766 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3767 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3769 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3770 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3771 match &self.routing {
3772 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3774 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3775 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3777 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3779 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3780 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3783 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3784 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3785 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3786 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3791 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3792 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3793 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3794 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3795 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3796 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3797 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3799 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3800 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3801 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3803 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3805 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3806 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3807 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3808 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3813 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3814 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3816 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3818 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3820 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3822 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3829 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3830 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3831 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3832 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3833 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3834 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3839 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3840 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3842 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3844 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3846 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3848 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3855 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3856 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3857 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3858 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3859 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3860 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3865 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3869 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3872 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3879 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3880 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3882 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3884 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3886 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3888 path.write(writer)?;
3889 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3890 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3897 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3898 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3899 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3900 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3901 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3902 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3903 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3904 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3906 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3911 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3912 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3914 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3918 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3920 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3921 data.write(writer)?;
3928 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3929 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3930 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3931 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3932 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3933 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3934 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3936 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3941 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3942 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3944 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3946 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3947 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
3948 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3949 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3951 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3953 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3954 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3961 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3962 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3963 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3964 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3965 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3966 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
3967 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3968 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3970 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3971 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3972 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3974 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3979 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3980 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3981 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3982 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3983 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3986 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3987 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3989 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3990 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3992 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3993 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3994 self.last_block_hash.read().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3996 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3997 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3998 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3999 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4000 unfunded_channels += 1;
4003 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4004 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4005 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4006 channel.write(writer)?;
4010 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4011 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4012 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4013 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4014 for forward in pending_forwards {
4015 forward.write(writer)?;
4019 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4020 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4021 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4022 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4023 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4024 htlc.write(writer)?;
4028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4029 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4030 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4031 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4032 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4033 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4036 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4037 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4038 for event in events.iter() {
4039 event.write(writer)?;
4042 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4043 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4044 for event in background_events.iter() {
4046 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4048 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4049 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4054 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4060 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4062 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4064 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4065 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4066 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4067 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4068 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4069 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4070 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4071 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4072 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4073 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4074 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4076 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4077 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4079 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4080 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4081 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4082 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4083 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4084 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4085 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4086 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4087 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4088 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4089 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4092 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4093 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4095 pub keys_manager: K,
4097 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4099 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4100 pub fee_estimator: F,
4101 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4103 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4104 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4105 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4106 pub chain_monitor: M,
4108 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4109 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4110 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4111 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4112 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4113 /// deserialization.
4115 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4116 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4117 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4119 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4120 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4122 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4123 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4124 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4125 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4127 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4130 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4131 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4134 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4135 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4136 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4137 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4138 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4139 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4142 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4143 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4144 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4145 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4146 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4148 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4149 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4154 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4155 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4156 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4157 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4158 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4159 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4160 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4161 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4164 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4165 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4166 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4170 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4171 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4172 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4173 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4174 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4175 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4178 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4179 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4180 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4181 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4182 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4185 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4186 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4187 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4189 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4191 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4192 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4193 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4194 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4195 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4196 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4197 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4198 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4199 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4200 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4201 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4202 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4203 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4204 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4205 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4206 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4207 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4208 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4209 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4210 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4211 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4212 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4213 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4215 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4216 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4218 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4221 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4225 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4226 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4227 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4231 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4232 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4233 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4234 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4235 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4236 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4237 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4238 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4239 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4241 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4244 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4245 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4246 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4247 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4248 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4249 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4250 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4251 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4253 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4256 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4257 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4258 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4259 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4260 let peer_state = PeerState {
4261 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4263 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4266 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4267 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4268 for _ in 0..event_count {
4269 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4270 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4275 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4276 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4277 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4278 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4279 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4280 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4284 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4286 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4287 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4289 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4291 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4292 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4293 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4295 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
4296 last_block_hash: RwLock::new(last_block_hash),
4299 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4304 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4306 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4308 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4310 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4312 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4313 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4314 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4315 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4317 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4318 logger: args.logger,
4319 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4322 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4323 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4326 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4327 //connection or two.
4329 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4335 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4337 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4339 use std::time::Duration;
4342 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4343 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4344 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4346 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4347 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4348 thread::spawn(move || {
4350 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4351 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4352 *persistence_lock = true;
4355 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4361 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4362 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4364 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4367 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4372 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4374 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4377 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {