]> git.bitcoin.ninja Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
69093d7f6a35ce22cc67fc2167ebc6e0d2974d4d
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::chain;
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::events;
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
50 use crate::ln::msgs;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
54 #[cfg(test)]
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66
67 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
68
69 use crate::io;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::{cmp, mem};
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::io::Read;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
77 use core::ops::Deref;
78
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
82
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 //
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 //
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
93 //
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102         Forward {
103                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107         },
108         Receive {
109                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
115         },
116         ReceiveKeysend {
117                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124         },
125 }
126
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
132         /// Amount received
133         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135         /// may overshoot this in either case)
136         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
141 }
142
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
147 }
148
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
154 }
155
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
158
159         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
162         // HTLCs.
163         //
164         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
166         prev_htlc_id: u64,
167         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
169 }
170
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
173         FailHTLC {
174                 htlc_id: u64,
175                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
176         },
177 }
178
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183         short_channel_id: u64,
184         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
185         htlc_id: u64,
186         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188
189         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
191         outpoint: OutPoint,
192 }
193
194 enum OnionPayload {
195         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196         Invoice {
197                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200         },
201         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
203 }
204
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208         cltv_expiry: u32,
209         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210         value: u64,
211         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213         sender_intended_value: u64,
214         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215         timer_ticks: u8,
216         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220         total_msat: u64,
221         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
223 }
224
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231                         value_msat: val.value,
232                 }
233         }
234 }
235
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
238 ///
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
242
243 impl PaymentId {
244         /// Number of bytes in the id.
245         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
246 }
247
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
250                 self.0.write(w)
251         }
252 }
253
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
257                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
258         }
259 }
260
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
264         }
265 }
266
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 ///
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
275                 self.0.write(w)
276         }
277 }
278
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
282                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
283         }
284 }
285
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
291 }
292 impl SentHTLCId {
293         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294                 match source {
295                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298                         },
299                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
301                 }
302         }
303 }
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307                 (2, htlc_id, required),
308         },
309         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310                 (0, session_priv, required),
311         };
312 );
313
314
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
320         OutboundRoute {
321                 path: Path,
322                 session_priv: SecretKey,
323                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326                 payment_id: PaymentId,
327         },
328 }
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332                 match self {
333                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
335                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336                         },
337                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
338                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
339                                 path.hash(hasher);
340                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
343                         },
344                 }
345         }
346 }
347 impl HTLCSource {
348         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349         #[cfg(test)]
350         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
356                 }
357         }
358
359         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365                 } else {
366                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
367                         true
368                 }
369         }
370 }
371
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
373         err_code: u16,
374         err_data: Vec<u8>,
375         msg: &'static str,
376 }
377
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 ///
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386         TemporaryNodeFailure,
387         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397         ///
398         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
401 }
402
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404     fn into(self) -> u16 {
405                 match self {
406                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
410                 }
411         }
412 }
413
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421         err: msgs::LightningError,
422         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 }
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427         #[inline]
428         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
429                 Self {
430                         err: LightningError {
431                                 err: err.clone(),
432                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
434                                                 channel_id,
435                                                 data: err
436                                         },
437                                 },
438                         },
439                         chan_id: None,
440                         shutdown_finish: None,
441                         channel_capacity: None,
442                 }
443         }
444         #[inline]
445         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
447         }
448         #[inline]
449         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450                 Self {
451                         err: LightningError {
452                                 err: err.clone(),
453                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
455                                                 channel_id,
456                                                 data: err
457                                         },
458                                 },
459                         },
460                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
463                 }
464         }
465         #[inline]
466         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
467                 Self {
468                         err: match err {
469                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
470                                         err: msg.clone(),
471                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
473                                                         channel_id,
474                                                         data: msg
475                                                 },
476                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
477                                         },
478                                 },
479                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480                                         err: msg,
481                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482                                 },
483                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484                                         err: msg.clone(),
485                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
487                                                         channel_id,
488                                                         data: msg
489                                                 },
490                                         },
491                                 },
492                         },
493                         chan_id: None,
494                         shutdown_finish: None,
495                         channel_capacity: None,
496                 }
497         }
498
499         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500                 self.chan_id.is_some()
501         }
502 }
503
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
509
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
517         CommitmentFirst,
518         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
519         RevokeAndACKFirst,
520 }
521
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
524         amount_msat: u64,
525         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
529 }
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531         (0, amount_msat, required),
532         (2, payment_purpose, required),
533         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
536 });
537
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
542 }
543
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547         /// failed/claimed by the user.
548         ///
549         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
551         ///
552         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
555
556         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
560 }
561
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
566 enum BackgroundEvent {
567         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
568         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
569         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
570         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
571         ///
572         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
573         /// are regenerated on startup.
574         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
575         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
576         /// channel to continue normal operation.
577         ///
578         /// In general this should be used rather than
579         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
580         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
581         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
582         ///
583         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584         /// are regenerated on startup.
585         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
586                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
587                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
588                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
589         },
590         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
591         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
592         /// on a channel.
593         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
594                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
595                 channel_id: ChannelId,
596         },
597 }
598
599 #[derive(Debug)]
600 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
601         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
602         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
603         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
604         /// event can be generated.
605         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
606         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
607         /// operation of another channel.
608         ///
609         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
610         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
611         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
612         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
613         /// outbound edge.
614         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
615                 event: events::Event,
616                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
617         },
618 }
619
620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
621         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
622         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
623                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
624                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
625                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
626                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
627                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
628                 // downgrades to prior versions.
629                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
630         },
631 );
632
633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
634 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
635         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
636                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
637                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
638         },
639 }
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
641         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
642                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
643                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
644         };
645 );
646
647 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
648 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
649 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
650 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
651         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
652         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
653         /// durably to disk.
654         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
655                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
656                 channel_id: ChannelId,
657                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
658                 htlc_id: u64,
659         },
660 }
661
662 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
663         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
664                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
665                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
666                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667                 }
668         }
669 }
670
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
672         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
673 ;);
674
675
676 /// State we hold per-peer.
677 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
678         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
679         ///
680         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
681         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
682         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
683         ///
684         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
685         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
686         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
687         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
688         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
689         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
690         latest_features: InitFeatures,
691         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
694         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
695         /// user but which have not yet completed.
696         ///
697         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
698         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
699         /// for a missing channel.
700         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
701         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
702         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
703         ///
704         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
705         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
706         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
707         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
708         ///
709         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
710         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
711         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
712         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
713         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
714         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
715         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
716         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
717         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
718         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
719         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
720         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
721         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
722         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
723         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
724         is_connected: bool,
725 }
726
727 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
728         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
729         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
730         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
731         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
732                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
733                         return false
734                 }
735                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
736                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
737                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
738         }
739
740         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
741         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
742                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
743         }
744
745         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
746         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
747                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
749         }
750 }
751
752 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
753 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
754 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
755         /// The original OpenChannel message.
756         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
757         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
758         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
759 }
760
761 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
762 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
763 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
764
765 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
766 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
767 ///
768 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
769 /// here.
770 ///
771 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
772 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
773 struct PendingInboundPayment {
774         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
775         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
776         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
777         /// this payment being removed.
778         expiry_time: u64,
779         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
780         user_payment_id: u64,
781         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
782         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
783         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
784 }
785
786 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
787 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
788 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
789 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
790 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
791 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
792 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
793 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
794 ///
795 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
796 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
797         Arc<M>,
798         Arc<T>,
799         Arc<KeysManager>,
800         Arc<KeysManager>,
801         Arc<KeysManager>,
802         Arc<F>,
803         Arc<DefaultRouter<
804                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
805                 Arc<L>,
806                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
807                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
808                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
809         >>,
810         Arc<L>
811 >;
812
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
814 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
815 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
816 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
817 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
818 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
819 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
820 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
821 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
822 ///
823 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
824 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
825         ChannelManager<
826                 &'a M,
827                 &'b T,
828                 &'c KeysManager,
829                 &'c KeysManager,
830                 &'c KeysManager,
831                 &'d F,
832                 &'e DefaultRouter<
833                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
834                         &'g L,
835                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
836                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
837                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
838                 >,
839                 &'g L
840         >;
841
842 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
843 ///
844 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
845 /// languages.
846 pub trait AChannelManager {
847         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
848         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
849         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
850         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
851         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
852         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
853         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
854         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
855         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
856         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
857         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
858         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
859         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
860         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
861         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
862         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
863         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
864         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
865         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
866         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
867         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
868         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
869         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
870         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
871         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
872         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
873         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
874         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
875         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
876         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
877         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
878         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
879         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
880         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
881         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
882         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
883 }
884
885 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
886 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
887 where
888         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
889         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
890         ES::Target: EntropySource,
891         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
892         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
893         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
894         R::Target: Router,
895         L::Target: Logger,
896 {
897         type Watch = M::Target;
898         type M = M;
899         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
900         type T = T;
901         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
902         type ES = ES;
903         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
904         type NS = NS;
905         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
906         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
907         type SP = SP;
908         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
909         type F = F;
910         type Router = R::Target;
911         type R = R;
912         type Logger = L::Target;
913         type L = L;
914         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
915 }
916
917 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
918 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
919 ///
920 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
921 /// to individual Channels.
922 ///
923 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
924 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
925 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
926 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
927 ///
928 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
929 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
930 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
931 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
932 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
933 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
934 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
935 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
936 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
937 ///
938 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
939 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
940 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
941 ///
942 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
943 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
944 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
945 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
946 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
947 ///
948 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
949 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
950 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
951 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
952 ///
953 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
954 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
955 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
956 ///
957 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
958 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
959 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
960 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
961 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
962 ///
963 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
964 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
965 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
966 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
967 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
968 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
969 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
970 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
971 //
972 // Lock order:
973 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
974 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
975 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
976 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
977 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
978 //
979 // Lock order tree:
980 //
981 // `total_consistency_lock`
982 //  |
983 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
984 //  |   |
985 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
986 //  |
987 //  |__`per_peer_state`
988 //  |   |
989 //  |   |__`pending_inbound_payments`
990 //  |       |
991 //  |       |__`claimable_payments`
992 //  |       |
993 //  |       |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
994 //  |           |
995 //  |           |__`peer_state`
996 //  |               |
997 //  |               |__`id_to_peer`
998 //  |               |
999 //  |               |__`short_to_chan_info`
1000 //  |               |
1001 //  |               |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1002 //  |               |
1003 //  |               |__`best_block`
1004 //  |               |
1005 //  |               |__`pending_events`
1006 //  |                   |
1007 //  |                   |__`pending_background_events`
1008 //
1009 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1010 where
1011         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1012         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1013         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1014         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1015         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1016         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1017         R::Target: Router,
1018         L::Target: Logger,
1019 {
1020         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1021         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1022         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1023         chain_monitor: M,
1024         tx_broadcaster: T,
1025         #[allow(unused)]
1026         router: R,
1027
1028         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1029         #[cfg(test)]
1030         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1031         #[cfg(not(test))]
1032         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1033         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1034
1035         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1036         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1037         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1038         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1039         ///
1040         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1041         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1042
1043         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1044         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1045         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1046         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1047         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1048         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1049         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1050         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1051         ///
1052         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1053         ///
1054         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1055         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1056
1057         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1058         ///
1059         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1060         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1061         /// and via the classic SCID.
1062         ///
1063         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1064         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1065         ///
1066         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1067         #[cfg(test)]
1068         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1069         #[cfg(not(test))]
1070         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1071         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1072         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1073         ///
1074         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1075         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1076
1077         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1078         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1079         ///
1080         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1081         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1082
1083         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1084         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1085         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1086         /// active channel list on load.
1087         ///
1088         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1089         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1090
1091         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1092         ///
1093         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1094         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1095         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1096         ///
1097         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1098         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1099         /// the handling of the events.
1100         ///
1101         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1102         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1103         ///
1104         /// TODO:
1105         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1106         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1107         /// would break backwards compatability.
1108         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1109         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1110         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1111         ///
1112         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1113         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1114
1115         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1116         ///
1117         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1118         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1119         /// confirmation depth.
1120         ///
1121         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1122         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1123         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1124         ///
1125         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1126         #[cfg(test)]
1127         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1128         #[cfg(not(test))]
1129         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1130
1131         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1132
1133         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1134
1135         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1136         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1137         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1138         ///
1139         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1140         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1141
1142         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1143         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1144         /// keeping additional state.
1145         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1146
1147         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1148         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1149         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1150         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1151
1152         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1153         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1154         ///
1155         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1156         /// are currently open with that peer.
1157         ///
1158         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1159         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1160         /// channels.
1161         ///
1162         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1163         ///
1164         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1165         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1166         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1167         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1168         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1169
1170         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1171         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1172         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1173         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1174         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1175         ///
1176         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1177         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1178         ///
1179         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1180         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1181         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1182         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1183         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1184
1185         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1186         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1187
1188         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1189         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1190         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1191         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1192         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1193         ///
1194         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1195         ///
1196         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1197         ///
1198         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1199         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1200         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1201         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1202         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1203         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1204         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1205         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1206         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1207         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1208         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1209         ///
1210         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1211         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1212         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1213
1214         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1215
1216         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1217         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1218
1219         entropy_source: ES,
1220         node_signer: NS,
1221         signer_provider: SP,
1222
1223         logger: L,
1224 }
1225
1226 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1227 ///
1228 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1229 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1230 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1231 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1232 pub struct ChainParameters {
1233         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1234         pub network: Network,
1235
1236         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1237         ///
1238         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1239         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1240 }
1241
1242 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1243 #[must_use]
1244 enum NotifyOption {
1245         DoPersist,
1246         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1247         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1248 }
1249
1250 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1251 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1252 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1253 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1254 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1255 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1256 ///
1257 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1258 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1259 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1260 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1261         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1262         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1263         should_persist: F,
1264         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1265         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1266 }
1267
1268 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1269         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1270         /// events to handle.
1271         ///
1272         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1273         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1274         /// isn't ideal.
1275         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1276                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1277         }
1278
1279         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1280         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1281                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1282                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1283
1284                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1285                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1286                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1287                         should_persist: move || {
1288                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1289                                 // processing and return that.
1290                                 let notify = persist_check();
1291                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1292                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1293                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1294                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1295                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1296                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1297                                 }
1298                         },
1299                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1300                 }
1301         }
1302
1303         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1304         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1305         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1306         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1307         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1308                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1309
1310                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1311                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1312                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1313                         should_persist: persist_check,
1314                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1315                 }
1316         }
1317 }
1318
1319 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1320         fn drop(&mut self) {
1321                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1322                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1323                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1324                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1325                         },
1326                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1327                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1328                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1329                 }
1330         }
1331 }
1332
1333 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1334 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1335 ///
1336 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1337 ///
1338 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1339 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1340 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1341 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1342 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1343
1344 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1345 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1346 ///
1347 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1348 ///
1349 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1350 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1351 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1352 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1353 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1354 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1355 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1356 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1357 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1358 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1359 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1360 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1361 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1362
1363 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1364 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1365 /// this value.
1366 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1367 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1368 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1369 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1370
1371 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1372 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1373 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1374 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1375 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1376 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1377 #[deny(const_err)]
1378 #[allow(dead_code)]
1379 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1380
1381 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1382 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1383 #[deny(const_err)]
1384 #[allow(dead_code)]
1385 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1386
1387 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1388 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1389
1390 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1391 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1392 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1393
1394 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1395 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1396 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1397
1398 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1399 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1400 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1401 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1402
1403 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1404 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1405 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1406
1407 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1408 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1409 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1410
1411 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1412 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1413 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1414         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1415         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1416         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1417         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1418         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1419         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1420         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1421         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1422 }
1423
1424 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1425 /// to better separate parameters.
1426 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1427 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1428         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1429         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1430         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1431         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1432         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1433         pub features: InitFeatures,
1434         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1435         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1436         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1437         ///
1438         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1439         ///
1440         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1441         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1442         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1443         /// payments to us through this channel.
1444         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1445         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1446         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1447         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1448         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1449         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1450         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1451 }
1452
1453 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1454 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1455 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1456         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1457         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1458         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1459         /// lifetime of the channel.
1460         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1461         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1462         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1463         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1464         /// our counterparty already.
1465         ///
1466         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1467         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1468         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1469         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1470         ///
1471         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1472         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1473         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1474         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1475         ///
1476         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1477         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1478         ///
1479         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1480         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1481         ///
1482         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1483         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1484         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1485         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1486         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1487         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1488         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1489         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1490         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1491         /// `Some(0)`).
1492         ///
1493         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1494         ///
1495         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1496         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1497         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1498         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1499         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1500         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1501         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1502         ///
1503         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1504         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1505         ///
1506         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1507         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1508         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1509         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1510         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1511         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1512         /// this value on chain.
1513         ///
1514         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1515         ///
1516         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1517         ///
1518         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1519         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1520         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1521         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1522         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1523         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1524         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1525         ///
1526         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1527         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1528         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1529         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1530         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1531         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1532         ///
1533         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1534         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1535         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1536         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1537         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1538         ///
1539         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1540         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1541         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1542         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1543         ///
1544         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1545         pub balance_msat: u64,
1546         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1547         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1548         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1549         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1550         ///
1551         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1552         ///
1553         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1554         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1555         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1556         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1557         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1558         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1559         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1560         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1561         ///
1562         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1563         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1564         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1565         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1566         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1567         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1568         /// route which is valid.
1569         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1570         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1571         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1572         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1573         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1574         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1575         ///
1576         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1577         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1578         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1579         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1580         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1581         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1582         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1583         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1584         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1585         ///
1586         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1587         ///
1588         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1589         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1590         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1591         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1592         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1593         ///
1594         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1595         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1596         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1597         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1598         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1599         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1600         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1601         ///
1602         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1603         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1604         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1605         pub is_outbound: bool,
1606         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1607         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1608         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1609         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1610         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1611         ///
1612         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1613         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1614         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1615         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1616         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1617         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1618         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1619         ///
1620         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1621         pub is_usable: bool,
1622         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1623         pub is_public: bool,
1624         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1625         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1626         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1627         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1628         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1629         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1630         ///
1631         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1632         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1633 }
1634
1635 impl ChannelDetails {
1636         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1637         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1638         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1639         ///
1640         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1641         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1642         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1643                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1644         }
1645
1646         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1647         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1648         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1649         ///
1650         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1651         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1652         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1653                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1654         }
1655
1656         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1657                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1658                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1659         ) -> Self
1660         where
1661                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1662                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1663         {
1664                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1665                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1666                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1667                 ChannelDetails {
1668                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1669                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1670                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1671                                 features: latest_features,
1672                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1673                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1674                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1675                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1676                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1677                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1678                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1679                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1680                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1681                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1682                         },
1683                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1684                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1685                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1686                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1687                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1688                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1689                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1690                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1691                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1692                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1693                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1694                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1695                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1696                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1697                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1698                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1699                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1700                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1701                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1702                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1703                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1704                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1705                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1706                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1707                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1708                         config: Some(context.config()),
1709                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1710                 }
1711         }
1712 }
1713
1714 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1715 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1716 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1717 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1718 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1719 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1720 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1721 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1722         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1723         NotShuttingDown,
1724         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1725         ShutdownInitiated,
1726         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1727         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1728         ResolvingHTLCs,
1729         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1730         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1731         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1732         /// to drop the channel.
1733         ShutdownComplete,
1734 }
1735
1736 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1737 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1738 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1739 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1740         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1741         AwaitingInvoice {
1742                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1743                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1744                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1745         },
1746         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1747         Pending {
1748                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1749                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1750                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1751                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1752                 /// abandoned.
1753                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1754                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1755                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1756                 total_msat: u64,
1757         },
1758         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1759         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1760         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1761         Fulfilled {
1762                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1763                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1764                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1765                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1766                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1767                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1768         },
1769         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1770         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1771         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1772         Abandoned {
1773                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1774                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1775                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1776                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1777                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1778         },
1779 }
1780
1781 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1782 ///
1783 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1784 #[derive(Clone)]
1785 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1786         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1787         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1788         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1789         /// route hints.
1790         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1791         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1792         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1793 }
1794
1795 macro_rules! handle_error {
1796         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1797                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1798                 // entering the macro.
1799                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1800                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1801
1802                 match $internal {
1803                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1804                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1805                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1806
1807                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1808                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1809                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1810                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1811                                                         msg: update
1812                                                 });
1813                                         }
1814                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1815                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1816                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1817                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1818                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1819                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1820                                                 }, None));
1821                                         }
1822                                 }
1823
1824                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1825                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1826                                 } else {
1827                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1828                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1829                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1830                                         });
1831                                 }
1832
1833                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1834                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1835                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1836                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1837                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1838                                         }
1839                                 }
1840
1841                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1842                                 Err(err)
1843                         },
1844                 }
1845         } };
1846         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1847                 match $internal {
1848                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1849                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1850                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1851                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1852                         },
1853                 }
1854         };
1855 }
1856
1857 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1858         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1859                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1860                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1861                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1862                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1863                 } else {
1864                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1865                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1866                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1867                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1868                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1869                         // stage.
1870                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1871                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1872                 }
1873                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1874         }}
1875 }
1876
1877 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1878 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1879         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1880                 match $err {
1881                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1882                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1883                         },
1884                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1885                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1886                         },
1887                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1888                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1889                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1890                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1891                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1892                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1893
1894                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1895                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1896                         },
1897                 }
1898         };
1899         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1900                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1901         };
1902         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1903                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1904         };
1905         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1906                 match $channel_phase {
1907                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1908                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1909                         },
1910                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1911                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1912                         },
1913                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1914                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1915                         },
1916                 }
1917         };
1918 }
1919
1920 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1921         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1922                 match $res {
1923                         Ok(res) => res,
1924                         Err(e) => {
1925                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1926                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1927                                 if drop {
1928                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1929                                 }
1930                                 break Err(res);
1931                         }
1932                 }
1933         }
1934 }
1935
1936 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1937         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1938                 match $res {
1939                         Ok(res) => res,
1940                         Err(e) => {
1941                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1942                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1943                                 if drop {
1944                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1945                                 }
1946                                 return Err(res);
1947                         }
1948                 }
1949         }
1950 }
1951
1952 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1953         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1954                 {
1955                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1956                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1957                         channel
1958                 }
1959         }
1960 }
1961
1962 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1963         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1964                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1965                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1966                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1967                 });
1968                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1969                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1970                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1971                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1972                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1973                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1974                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1975                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1976                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1977                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1978                 }
1979         }}
1980 }
1981
1982 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1983         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1984                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1985                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1986                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1987                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1988                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1989                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1990                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1991                         }, None));
1992                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1993                 }
1994         }
1995 }
1996
1997 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1998         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1999                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2000                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2001                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2002                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2003                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2004                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2005                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2006                         }, None));
2007                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2008                 }
2009         }
2010 }
2011
2012 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2013         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2014                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2015                         &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2016                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2017                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2018                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2019                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2020                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2021                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2022                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2023                         // now.
2024                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2025                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2026                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2027                                         msg,
2028                                 })
2029                         } else { None }
2030                 } else { None };
2031
2032                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2033                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2034
2035                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2036                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2037                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2038                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2039                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2040                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2041                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2042                 }
2043
2044                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2045                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2046                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2047                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2048
2049                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2050                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2051                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2052                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2053                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2054                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2055                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2056                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2057                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2058                                 ));
2059                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2060                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2061                                 } else {
2062                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2063                                 }
2064                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2065                         } else {
2066                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2067                         }
2068
2069                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2070                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2071                         if batch_completed {
2072                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2073                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2074                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2075                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2076                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2077                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2078                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2079                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2080                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2081                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2082                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2083                                                 }
2084                                         }
2085                                 }
2086                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2087                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2088                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2089                                 }
2090                         }
2091                 }
2092
2093                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2094
2095                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2096                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2097                 }
2098                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2099                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2100                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2101                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2102                 }
2103         } }
2104 }
2105
2106 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2107         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2108                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2109                 match $update_res {
2110                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2111                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2112                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2113                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2114                         },
2115                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2116                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2117                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2118                                 false
2119                         },
2120                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2121                                 $completed;
2122                                 true
2123                         },
2124                 }
2125         } };
2126         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2127                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2128                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2129         };
2130         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2131                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2132                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2133                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2134                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2135                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2136                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2137                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2138                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2139                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2140                         });
2141                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2142                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2143                         {
2144                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2145                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2146                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2147                                 }
2148                         })
2149         } };
2150 }
2151
2152 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2153         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2154                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2155                 while !processed_all_events {
2156                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2157                                 return;
2158                         }
2159
2160                         let mut result;
2161
2162                         {
2163                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2164                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2165                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2166
2167                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2168                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2169                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2170
2171                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2172                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2173                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2174                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2175                                 }
2176                         }
2177
2178                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2179                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2180                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2181                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2182                         }
2183
2184                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2185
2186                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2187                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2188                                 $handle_event;
2189                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2190                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2191                                 }
2192                         }
2193
2194                         {
2195                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2196                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2197                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2198                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2199                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2200                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2201                         }
2202
2203                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2204                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2205                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2206                                 processed_all_events = false;
2207                         }
2208
2209                         match result {
2210                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2211                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2212                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2213                                 },
2214                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2215                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2216                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2217                         }
2218                 }
2219         }
2220 }
2221
2222 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2223 where
2224         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2225         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2226         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2227         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2228         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2229         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2230         R::Target: Router,
2231         L::Target: Logger,
2232 {
2233         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2234         ///
2235         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2236         ///
2237         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2238         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2239         ///
2240         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2241         ///
2242         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2243         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2244         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2245         /// more details.
2246         ///
2247         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2248         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2249         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2250         pub fn new(
2251                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2252                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2253                 current_timestamp: u32,
2254         ) -> Self {
2255                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2256                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2257                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2258                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2259                 ChannelManager {
2260                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2261                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2262                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2263                         chain_monitor,
2264                         tx_broadcaster,
2265                         router,
2266
2267                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2268
2269                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2270                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2271                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2272                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2273                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2274                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2275                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2276                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2277
2278                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2279                         secp_ctx,
2280
2281                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2282                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2283
2284                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2285
2286                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2287
2288                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2289
2290                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2291                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2292                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2293                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2294                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2295                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2296                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2297                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2298
2299                         entropy_source,
2300                         node_signer,
2301                         signer_provider,
2302
2303                         logger,
2304                 }
2305         }
2306
2307         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2308         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2309                 &self.default_configuration
2310         }
2311
2312         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2313                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2314                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2315                 let mut i = 0;
2316                 loop {
2317                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2318                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2319                         } else {
2320                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2321                         }
2322                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2323                                 break;
2324                         }
2325                         i += 1;
2326                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2327                 }
2328                 outbound_scid_alias
2329         }
2330
2331         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2332         ///
2333         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2334         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2335         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2336         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2337         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2338         ///
2339         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2340         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2341         ///
2342         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2343         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2344         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2345         ///
2346         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2347         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2348         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2349         ///
2350         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2351         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2352         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2353         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2354         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2355         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2356         ///
2357         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2358         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2359         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2360         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2361                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2362                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2363                 }
2364
2365                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2366                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2367                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2368
2369                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2370
2371                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2372                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2373
2374                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2375                 let channel = {
2376                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2377                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2378                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2379                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2380                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2381                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2382                         {
2383                                 Ok(res) => res,
2384                                 Err(e) => {
2385                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2386                                         return Err(e);
2387                                 },
2388                         }
2389                 };
2390                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2391
2392                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2393                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2394                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2395                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2396                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2397                                 } else {
2398                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2399                                 }
2400                         },
2401                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2402                 }
2403
2404                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2405                         node_id: their_network_key,
2406                         msg: res,
2407                 });
2408                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2409         }
2410
2411         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2412                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2413                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2414                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2415                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2416                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2417                 // the same channel.
2418                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2419                 {
2420                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2421                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2422                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2423                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2424                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2425                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2426                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2427                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2428                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2429                                                 _ => None,
2430                                         })
2431                                         .filter(f)
2432                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2433                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2434                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2435                                         })
2436                                 );
2437                         }
2438                 }
2439                 res
2440         }
2441
2442         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2443         /// more information.
2444         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2445                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2446                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2447                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2448                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2449                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2450                 // the same channel.
2451                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2452                 {
2453                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2454                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2455                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2456                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2457                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2458                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2459                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2460                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2461                                         res.push(details);
2462                                 }
2463                         }
2464                 }
2465                 res
2466         }
2467
2468         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2469         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2470         ///
2471         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2472         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2473         /// are.
2474         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2475                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2476                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2477                 // really wanted anyway.
2478                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2479         }
2480
2481         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2482         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2483                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2484                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2485
2486                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2487                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2488                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2489                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2490                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2491                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2492                         };
2493                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2494                                 .iter()
2495                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2496                                 .map(context_to_details)
2497                                 .collect();
2498                 }
2499                 vec![]
2500         }
2501
2502         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2503         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2504         ///
2505         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2506         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2507         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2508         ///
2509         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2510         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2511                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2512                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2513                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2514                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2515                                 },
2516                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2517                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2518                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2519                                 },
2520                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2521                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2522                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2523                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2524                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2525                                         })
2526                                 },
2527                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2528                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2529                                 },
2530                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2531                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2532                                 },
2533                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2534                         })
2535                         .collect()
2536         }
2537
2538         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2539         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2540                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2541                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2542                         Some(transaction) => {
2543                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2544                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2545                                 }, None));
2546                         },
2547                         None => {},
2548                 }
2549                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2550                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2551                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2552                         reason: closure_reason,
2553                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2554                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2555                 }, None));
2556         }
2557
2558         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2559                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2560
2561                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2562                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2563                 loop {
2564                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2565
2566                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2567                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2568
2569                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2570                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2571
2572                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2573                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2574                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2575                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2576                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2577                                                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2578                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2579                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2580                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2581
2582                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2583                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2584                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2585                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2586                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2587                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2588                                                 });
2589
2590                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2591                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2592
2593                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2594                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2595                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2596                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2597                                                         break;
2598                                                 }
2599
2600                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2601                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2602                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2603                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2604                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2605                                                                         });
2606                                                                 }
2607                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2608                                                                 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2609                                                         }
2610                                                 }
2611                                                 break;
2612                                         }
2613                                 },
2614                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2615                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2616                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2617                                         //
2618                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2619                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2620                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2621                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2622                                 },
2623                         }
2624                 }
2625
2626                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2627                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2628                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2629                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2630                 }
2631
2632                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2633                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2634                 }
2635
2636                 Ok(())
2637         }
2638
2639         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2640         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2641         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2642         ///
2643         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2644         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2645         ///    estimate.
2646         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2647         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2648         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2649         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2650         ///
2651         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2652         ///
2653         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2654         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2655         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2656         /// channel.
2657         ///
2658         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2659         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2660         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2661         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2662         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2663                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2664         }
2665
2666         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2667         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2668         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2669         ///
2670         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2671         /// the channel being closed or not:
2672         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2673         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2674         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2675         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2676         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2677         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2678         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2679         ///
2680         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2681         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2682         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2683         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2684         ///
2685         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2686         ///
2687         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2688         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2689         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2690         /// channel.
2691         ///
2692         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2693         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2694         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2695         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2696         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2697                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2698         }
2699
2700         fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2701                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2702                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2703                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2704                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2705                 }
2706
2707                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2708                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2709                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2710                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2711                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2712                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2713                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2714                 }
2715                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2716                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2717                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2718                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2719                         // ignore the result here.
2720                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2721                 }
2722                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2723                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2724                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2725                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2726                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2727                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2728                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2729                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2730                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2731                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2732                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2733                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2734                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2735                                         }
2736                                 }
2737                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2738                         }
2739                         debug_assert!(
2740                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2741                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2742                         );
2743                 }
2744                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2745                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2746                 }
2747         }
2748
2749         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2750         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2751         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2752         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2753                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2754                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2755                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2756                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2757                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2758                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2759                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2760                         } else {
2761                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2762                         };
2763                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2764                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2765                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2766                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2767                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2768                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2769                                 match chan_phase {
2770                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2771                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2772                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2773                                         },
2774                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2775                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2776                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2777                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2778                                         },
2779                                 }
2780                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2781                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2782                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2783                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2784                                 // events anyway.
2785                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2786                         } else {
2787                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2788                         }
2789                 };
2790                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2791                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2792                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2793                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2794                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2795                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2796                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2797                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2798                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2799                                         msg: update
2800                                 });
2801                         }
2802                 }
2803
2804                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2805         }
2806
2807         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2808                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2809                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2810                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2811                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2812                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2813                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2814                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2815                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2816                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2817                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2818                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2819                                                         },
2820                                                 }
2821                                         );
2822                                 }
2823                                 Ok(())
2824                         },
2825                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2826                 }
2827         }
2828
2829         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2830         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2831         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2832         /// channel.
2833         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2834         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2836         }
2837
2838         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2839         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2840         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2841         ///
2842         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2843         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2844         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2845         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2846                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2847         }
2848
2849         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2850         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2851         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2852                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2853                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2854                 }
2855         }
2856
2857         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2858         /// local transaction(s).
2859         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2860                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2861                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2862                 }
2863         }
2864
2865         fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2866                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2867                 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2868                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2869         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2870                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2871                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2872                         version: 0,
2873                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2874                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2875                         hmac: hop_hmac,
2876                 };
2877
2878                 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2879                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2880                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2881                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2882                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2883                                         msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2884                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2885                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2886                                 }),
2887                 };
2888
2889                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2890                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2891                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2892                                 short_channel_id,
2893                         },
2894                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2895                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2896                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2897                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2898                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2899                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2900                 })
2901         }
2902
2903         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2904                 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2905                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2906                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2907         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2908                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2909                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2910                                 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2911                         } =>
2912                                 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2913                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2914                                 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2915                         } => {
2916                                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2917                                 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2918                         }
2919                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2920                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2921                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2922                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2923                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2924                                 })
2925                         },
2926                 };
2927                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2928                 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2929                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2930                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2931                                 err_code: 18,
2932                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2933                         })
2934                 }
2935                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2936                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2937                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2938                 //
2939                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2940                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2941                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2942                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2943                 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2944                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2945                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2946                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2947                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2948                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2949                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2950                         });
2951                 }
2952                 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2953                         (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2954                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2955                 {
2956                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2957                                 err_code: 19,
2958                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2959                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2960                         });
2961                 }
2962
2963                 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2964                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2965                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2966                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2967                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2968                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2969                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2970                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2971                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2972                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2973                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2974                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2975                                 });
2976                         }
2977                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2978                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2979                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2980                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2981                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2982                                 });
2983                         }
2984                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2985                                 payment_data,
2986                                 payment_preimage,
2987                                 payment_metadata,
2988                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2989                                 custom_tlvs,
2990                         }
2991                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2992                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2993                                 payment_data: data,
2994                                 payment_metadata,
2995                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2996                                 phantom_shared_secret,
2997                                 custom_tlvs,
2998                         }
2999                 } else {
3000                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3001                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3002                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
3003                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3004                         });
3005                 };
3006                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3007                         routing,
3008                         payment_hash,
3009                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3010                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3011                         outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3012                         outgoing_cltv_value,
3013                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3014                 })
3015         }
3016
3017         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3018                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3019         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3020                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3021                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3022                                 {
3023                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3024                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3025                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3026                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3027                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3028                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
3029                                         }));
3030                                 }
3031                         }
3032                 }
3033
3034                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3035                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3036                 }
3037
3038                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3039                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3040                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3041
3042                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3043                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3044                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3045                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3046                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3047                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3048                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3049                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3050                 }
3051                 macro_rules! return_err {
3052                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3053                                 {
3054                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3055                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3056                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3057                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3058                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3059                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3060                                         }));
3061                                 }
3062                         }
3063                 }
3064
3065                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3066                         shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3067                         msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3068                 ) {
3069                         Ok(res) => res,
3070                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3071                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3072                         },
3073                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3074                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3075                         },
3076                 };
3077                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3078                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3079                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3080                                         short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3081                                 }, ..
3082                         } => {
3083                                 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3084                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3085                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3086                         },
3087                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3088                         // inbound channel's state.
3089                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3090                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3091                                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3092                         {
3093                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3094                         }
3095                 };
3096
3097                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3098                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3099                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3100                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3101                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3102                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3103                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3104                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3105                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3106                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3107                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3108                                         {
3109                                                 None
3110                                         } else {
3111                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3112                                         }
3113                                 },
3114                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3115                         };
3116                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3117                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3118                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3119                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3120                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3121                                 }
3122                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3123                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3124                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3125                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3126                                 ).flatten() {
3127                                         None => {
3128                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3129                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3130                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3131                                         },
3132                                         Some(chan) => chan
3133                                 };
3134                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3135                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3136                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3137                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3138                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3139                                 }
3140                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3141                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3142                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3143                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3144                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3145                                 }
3146                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3147
3148                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3149                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3150                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3151                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3152                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3153                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3154                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3155                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3156                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3157                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3158                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3159                                         } else {
3160                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3161                                         }
3162                                 }
3163                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3164                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3165                                 }
3166                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3167                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3168                                 }
3169                                 chan_update_opt
3170                         } else {
3171                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3172                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3173                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3174                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3175                                         break Some((
3176                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3177                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
3178                                         ));
3179                                 }
3180                                 None
3181                         };
3182
3183                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3184                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3185                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3186                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3187                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3188                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3189                         }
3190                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3191                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3192                         }
3193                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3194                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3195                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3196                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3197                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3198                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3199                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3200                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3201                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3202                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3203                         }
3204
3205                         break None;
3206                 }
3207                 {
3208                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3209                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3210                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3211                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3212                                 }
3213                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3214                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3215                                 }
3216                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3217                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3218                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3219                                 }
3220                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3221                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3222                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3223                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3224                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3225                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3226                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3227                                 // instead.
3228                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3229                         }
3230                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3231                 }
3232                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3233         }
3234
3235         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3236                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3237                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3238         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3239                 macro_rules! return_err {
3240                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3241                                 {
3242                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3243                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3244                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3245                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3246                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3247                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3248                                         }));
3249                                 }
3250                         }
3251                 }
3252                 match decoded_hop {
3253                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3254                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3255                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3256                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3257                                 {
3258                                         Ok(info) => {
3259                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3260                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3261                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3262                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3263                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3264                                         },
3265                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3266                                 }
3267                         },
3268                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3269                                 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3270                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3271                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3272                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3273                                 }
3274                         }
3275                 }
3276         }
3277
3278         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3279         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3280         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3281         ///
3282         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3283         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3284         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3285         ///
3286         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3287         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3288         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3289                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3290                         return Err(LightningError {
3291                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3292                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3293                         });
3294                 }
3295                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3296                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3297                 }
3298                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3299                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3300         }
3301
3302         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3303         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3304         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3305         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3306         ///
3307         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3308         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3309         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3310         ///
3311         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3312         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3313         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3314                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3315                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3316                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3317                         Some(id) => id,
3318                 };
3319
3320                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3321         }
3322
3323         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3324                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3325                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3326
3327                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3328                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3329                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3330                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3331                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3332                 };
3333
3334                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3335                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3336                         short_channel_id,
3337                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3338                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3339                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3340                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3341                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3342                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3343                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3344                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3345                 };
3346                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3347                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3348                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3349                 // channel.
3350                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3351
3352                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3353                         signature: sig,
3354                         contents: unsigned
3355                 })
3356         }
3357
3358         #[cfg(test)]
3359         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3360                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3361                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3362                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3363                         session_priv_bytes
3364                 })
3365         }
3366
3367         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3368                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3369                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3370                         session_priv_bytes
3371                 } = args;
3372                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3373                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3374
3375                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3376                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3377                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3378                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3379                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3380
3381                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3382                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3383                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3384
3385                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3386                         .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3387
3388                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3389                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3390                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3391                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3392                         };
3393
3394                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3395                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3396                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3397                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3398                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3399                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3400                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3401                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3402                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3403                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3404                                                 }
3405                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3406                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3407                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3408                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3409                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3410                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3411                                                                 payment_id,
3412                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3413                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3414                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3415                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3416                                                                         false => {
3417                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3418                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3419                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3420                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3421                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3422                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3423                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3424                                                                         },
3425                                                                         true => {},
3426                                                                 }
3427                                                         },
3428                                                         None => {},
3429                                                 }
3430                                         },
3431                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3432                                 };
3433                         } else {
3434                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3435                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3436                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3437                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3438                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3439                         }
3440                         return Ok(());
3441                 };
3442
3443                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3444                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3445                         Err(e) => {
3446                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3447                         },
3448                 }
3449         }
3450
3451         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3452         ///
3453         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3454         /// fields for more info.
3455         ///
3456         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3457         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3458         ///
3459         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3460         ///
3461         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3462         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3463         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3464         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3465         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3466         ///
3467         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3468         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3469         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3470         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3471         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3472         ///
3473         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3474         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3475         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3476         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3477         ///
3478         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3479         ///
3480         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3481         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3482         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3483         ///
3484         /// In general, a path may raise:
3485         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3486         ///    node public key) is specified.
3487         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3488         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3489         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3490         ///    relevant updates.
3491         ///
3492         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3493         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3494         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3495         ///
3496         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3497         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3498         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3499         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3500         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3501         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3502         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3503                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3504                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3505                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3506                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3507                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3508                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3509         }
3510
3511         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3512         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3513         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3514                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3515                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3516                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3517                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3518                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3519                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3520                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3521         }
3522
3523         #[cfg(test)]
3524         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3525                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3526                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3527                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3528                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3529                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3530         }
3531
3532         #[cfg(test)]
3533         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3534                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3535                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3536         }
3537
3538         #[cfg(test)]
3539         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3540                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3541         }
3542
3543
3544         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3545         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3546         /// retries are exhausted.
3547         ///
3548         /// # Event Generation
3549         ///
3550         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3551         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3552         ///
3553         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3554         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3555         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3556         ///
3557         /// # Restart Behavior
3558         ///
3559         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3560         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3561         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3562                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3563                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3564         }
3565
3566         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3567         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3568         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3569         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3570         /// never reach the recipient.
3571         ///
3572         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3573         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3574         ///
3575         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3576         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3577         ///
3578         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3579         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3580                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3581                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3582                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3583                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3584                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3585         }
3586
3587         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3588         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3589         ///
3590         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3591         /// payments.
3592         ///
3593         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3594         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3595                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3596                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3597                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3598                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3599                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3600                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3601         }
3602
3603         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3604         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3605         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3606         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3607                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3608                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3609                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3610                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3611                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3612         }
3613
3614         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3615         /// payment probe.
3616         #[cfg(test)]
3617         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3618                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3619         }
3620
3621         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3622         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3623         ///
3624         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3625         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3626                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3627                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3628         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3629                 let payment_params =
3630                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3631
3632                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3633
3634                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3635         }
3636
3637         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3638         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3639         ///
3640         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3641         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3642         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3643         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3644         ///
3645         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3646         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3647         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3648         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3649         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3650         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3651         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3652                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3653         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3654                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3655
3656                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3657                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3658                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3659                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3660
3661                 let route = self
3662                         .router
3663                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3664                         .map_err(|e| {
3665                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3666                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3667                         })?;
3668
3669                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3670
3671                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3672
3673                 for mut path in route.paths {
3674                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3675                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3676                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3677                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3678                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3679                                         break;
3680                                 } else {
3681                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3682                                         log_debug!(
3683                                                 self.logger,
3684                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3685                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3686                                         );
3687                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3688                                         path.hops.pop();
3689                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3690                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3691                                         }
3692                                 }
3693                         }
3694
3695                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3696                                 log_debug!(
3697                                         self.logger,
3698                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3699                                 );
3700                                 continue;
3701                         }
3702
3703                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3704                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3705                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3706                                 }) {
3707                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3708                                         let used_liquidity =
3709                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3710
3711                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3712                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3713                                         {
3714                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3715                                                 continue;
3716                                         } else {
3717                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3718                                         }
3719                                 }
3720                         }
3721
3722                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3723                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3724                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3725                         })?);
3726                 }
3727
3728                 Ok(res)
3729         }
3730
3731         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3732         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3733         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3734                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3735                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3736         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3737                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3738                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3739                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3740
3741                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3742                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3743                 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3744                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3745                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3746
3747                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3748                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3749                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3750                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3751                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3752                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3753                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3754                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3755                                 match funding_res {
3756                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3757                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3758                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3759                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3760
3761                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3762                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3763                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3764                                                 });
3765                                         },
3766                                 }
3767                         },
3768                         Some(phase) => {
3769                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3770                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3771                                         err: format!(
3772                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3773                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3774                                 })
3775                         },
3776                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3777                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3778                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3779                                 }),
3780                 };
3781
3782                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3783                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3784                         msg,
3785                 });
3786                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3787                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3788                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3789                         },
3790                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3791                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3792                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3793                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3794                                 }
3795                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3796                         }
3797                 }
3798                 Ok(())
3799         }
3800
3801         #[cfg(test)]
3802         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3803                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3804                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3805                 })
3806         }
3807
3808         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3809         ///
3810         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3811         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3812         ///
3813         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3814         /// across the p2p network.
3815         ///
3816         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3817         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3818         ///
3819         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3820         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3821         /// keys per-channel).
3822         ///
3823         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3824         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3825         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3826         ///
3827         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3828         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3829         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3830         ///
3831         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3832         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3833         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3834         /// for more details.
3835         ///
3836         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3837         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3838         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3839                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3840         }
3841
3842         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3843         ///
3844         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3845         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3846         ///
3847         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3848         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3849         /// signature for each channel.
3850         ///
3851         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3852         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3853                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3854                 let mut result = Ok(());
3855
3856                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3857                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3858                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3859                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3860                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3861                                         }));
3862                                 }
3863                         }
3864                 }
3865                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3866                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3867                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3868                         }));
3869                 }
3870                 {
3871                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3872                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3873                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3874                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3875                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3876                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3877                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3878                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3879                                 }));
3880                         }
3881                 }
3882
3883                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3884                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3885                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3886                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3887                 } else {
3888                         None
3889                 };
3890                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3891                         match states.entry(txid) {
3892                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3893                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3894                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3895                                         }));
3896                                         None
3897                                 },
3898                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3899                         }
3900                 });
3901                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3902                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3903                                 temporary_channel_id,
3904                                 counterparty_node_id,
3905                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3906                                 is_batch_funding,
3907                                 |chan, tx| {
3908                                         let mut output_index = None;
3909                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3910                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3911                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3912                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3913                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3914                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3915                                                                 });
3916                                                         }
3917                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3918                                                 }
3919                                         }
3920                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3921                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3922                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3923                                                 });
3924                                         }
3925                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3926                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3927                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3928                                         }
3929                                         Ok(outpoint)
3930                                 })
3931                         );
3932                 }
3933                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3934                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3935                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3936                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3937                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3938                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3939                                 .into_iter().flatten()
3940                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3941                         );
3942                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3943                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3944                         );
3945                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3946                         {
3947                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3948                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3949                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3950                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3951                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3952                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
3953                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3954                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3955                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3956                                                 });
3957                                 }
3958                         }
3959                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3960                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3961                         }
3962                 }
3963                 result
3964         }
3965
3966         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3967         ///
3968         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3969         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3970         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3971         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3972         ///
3973         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3974         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3975         ///
3976         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3977         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3978         ///
3979         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3980         ///
3981         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3982         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3983         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3984         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3985         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3986         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3987         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3988         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3989                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3990         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3991                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3992                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3993                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3994                         });
3995                 }
3996
3997                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3998                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3999                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4000                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4001                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4002                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4003                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4004                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4005                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4006                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4007                                 });
4008                         };
4009                 }
4010                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4011                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4012                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4013                                 config.apply(config_update);
4014                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4015                                         continue;
4016                                 }
4017                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4018                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4019                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4020                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4021                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4022                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4023                                                         msg,
4024                                                 });
4025                                         }
4026                                 }
4027                                 continue;
4028                         } else {
4029                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4030                                 debug_assert!(false);
4031                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4032                                         err: format!(
4033                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4034                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4035                                 });
4036                         };
4037                 }
4038                 Ok(())
4039         }
4040
4041         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4042         ///
4043         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4044         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4045         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4046         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4047         ///
4048         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4049         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4050         ///
4051         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4052         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4053         ///
4054         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4055         ///
4056         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4057         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4058         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4059         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4060         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4061         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4062         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4063         pub fn update_channel_config(
4064                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4065         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4066                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4067         }
4068
4069         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4070         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4071         ///
4072         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4073         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4074         ///
4075         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4076         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4077         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4078         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4079         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4080         ///
4081         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4082         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4083         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4084         /// than expected.
4085         ///
4086         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4087         /// backwards.
4088         ///
4089         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4090         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4091         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4092         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4093         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4094         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4095                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4096
4097                 let next_hop_scid = {
4098                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4099                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4100                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4101                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4102                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4103                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4104                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4105                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4106                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4107                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4108                                                 })
4109                                         }
4110                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4111                                 },
4112                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4113                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4114                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4115                                 }),
4116                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4117                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4118                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4119                                 })
4120                         }
4121                 };
4122
4123                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4124                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4125                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4126                         })?;
4127
4128                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4129                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4130                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4131                         },
4132                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4133                 };
4134                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4135                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4136                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4137                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4138                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4139                 };
4140
4141                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4142                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4143                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4144                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4145                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4146                 )];
4147                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4148                 Ok(())
4149         }
4150
4151         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4152         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4153         ///
4154         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4155         /// backwards.
4156         ///
4157         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4158         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4159                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4160
4161                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4162                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4163                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4164                         })?;
4165
4166                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4167                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4168                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4169                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4170                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4171                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4172                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4173                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4174                         });
4175
4176                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4177                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4178                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4179                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4180
4181                 Ok(())
4182         }
4183
4184         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4185         ///
4186         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4187         /// Will likely generate further events.
4188         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4189                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4190
4191                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4192                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4193                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4194                 {
4195                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4196                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4197
4198                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4199                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4200                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4201                                                 () => {
4202                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4203                                                                 match forward_info {
4204                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4205                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4206                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4207                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4208                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4209                                                                                 }
4210                                                                         }) => {
4211                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4212                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4213                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4214
4215                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4216                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4217                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4218                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4219                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4220                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4221                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4222                                                                                                 });
4223
4224                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4225                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4226                                                                                                 } else {
4227                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4228                                                                                                 };
4229
4230                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4231                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4232                                                                                                         reason
4233                                                                                                 ));
4234                                                                                                 continue;
4235                                                                                         }
4236                                                                                 }
4237                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4238                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4239                                                                                                 {
4240                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4241                                                                                                 }
4242                                                                                         }
4243                                                                                 }
4244                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4245                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4246                                                                                                 {
4247                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4248                                                                                                 }
4249                                                                                         }
4250                                                                                 }
4251                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4252                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4253                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4254                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4255                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4256                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4257                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4258                                                                                                 ) {
4259                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4260                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4261                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4262                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4263                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4264                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4265                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4266                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4267                                                                                                         },
4268                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4269                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4270                                                                                                         },
4271                                                                                                 };
4272                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4273                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4274                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4275                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4276                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4277                                                                                                                 {
4278                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4279                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4280                                                                                                                 }
4281                                                                                                         },
4282                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4283                                                                                                 }
4284                                                                                         } else {
4285                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4286                                                                                         }
4287                                                                                 } else {
4288                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4289                                                                                 }
4290                                                                         },
4291                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4292                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4293                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4294                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4295                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4296                                                                         }
4297                                                                 }
4298                                                         }
4299                                                 }
4300                                         }
4301                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4302                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4303                                                 None => {
4304                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4305                                                         continue;
4306                                                 }
4307                                         };
4308                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4309                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4310                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4311                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4312                                                 continue;
4313                                         }
4314                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4315                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4316                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4317                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4318                                                         match forward_info {
4319                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4320                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4321                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4322                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4323                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4324                                                                         },
4325                                                                 }) => {
4326                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4327                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4328                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4329                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4330                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4331                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4332                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4333                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4334                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4335                                                                         });
4336                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4337                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4338                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4339                                                                                 &self.logger)
4340                                                                         {
4341                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4342                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4343                                                                                 } else {
4344                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4345                                                                                 }
4346                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4347                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4348                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4349                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4350                                                                                 ));
4351                                                                                 continue;
4352                                                                         }
4353                                                                 },
4354                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4355                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4356                                                                 },
4357                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4358                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4359                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4360                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4361                                                                         ) {
4362                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4363                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4364                                                                                 } else {
4365                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4366                                                                                 }
4367                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4368                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4369                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4370                                                                                 continue;
4371                                                                         }
4372                                                                 },
4373                                                         }
4374                                                 }
4375                                         } else {
4376                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4377                                                 continue;
4378                                         }
4379                                 } else {
4380                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4381                                                 match forward_info {
4382                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4383                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4384                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4385                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4386                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4387                                                                 }
4388                                                         }) => {
4389                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4390                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4391                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4392                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4393                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4394                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4395                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4396                                                                         },
4397                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4398                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4399                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4400                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4401                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4402                                                                                 };
4403                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4404                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4405                                                                         },
4406                                                                         _ => {
4407                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4408                                                                         }
4409                                                                 };
4410                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4411                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4412                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4413                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4414                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4415                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4416                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4417                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4418                                                                         },
4419                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4420                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4421                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4422                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4423                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4424                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4425                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4426                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4427                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4428                                                                         onion_payload,
4429                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4430                                                                 };
4431
4432                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4433
4434                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4435                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4436                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4437                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4438                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4439                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4440                                                                                 );
4441                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4442                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4443                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4444                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4445                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4446                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4447                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4448                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4449                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4450                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4451                                                                                 ));
4452                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4453                                                                         }
4454                                                                 }
4455                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4456                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4457                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4458                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4459                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4460                                                                 }
4461
4462                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4463                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4464                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4465                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4466                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4467                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4468                                                                                 };
4469                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4470                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4471                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4472                                                                                 }
4473                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4474                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4475                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4476                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4477                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4478                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4479                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4480                                                                                                 }
4481                                                                                         });
4482                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4483                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4484                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4485                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4486                                                                                 }
4487                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4488                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4489                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4490                                                                                 }
4491                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4492                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4493                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4494                                                                                         }
4495                                                                                 } else {
4496                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4497                                                                                 }
4498                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4499                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4500                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4501                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4502                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4503                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4504                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4505                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4506                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4507                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4508                                                                                         }
4509                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4510                                                                                 }
4511                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4512                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4513                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4514                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4515                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4516                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4517                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4518                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4519                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4520                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4521                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4522                                                                                         }
4523                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4524                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4525                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4526                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4527                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4528                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4529                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4530                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4531                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4532                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4533                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4534                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4535                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4536                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4537                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4538                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4539                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4540                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4541                                                                                         }, None));
4542                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4543                                                                                 } else {
4544                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4545                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4546                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4547                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4548                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4549                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4550                                                                                         }
4551                                                                                 }
4552                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4553                                                                         }}
4554                                                                 }
4555
4556                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4557                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4558                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4559                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4560                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4561                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4562                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4563                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4564                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4565                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4566                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4567                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4568                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4569                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4570                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4571                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4572                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4573                                                                                                         }
4574                                                                                                 };
4575                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4576                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4577                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4578                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4579                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4580                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4581                                                                                                         }
4582                                                                                                 }
4583                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4584                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4585                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4586                                                                                                 };
4587                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4588                                                                                         },
4589                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4590                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4591                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4592                                                                                         }
4593                                                                                 }
4594                                                                         },
4595                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4596                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4597                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4598                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4599                                                                                 }
4600                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4601                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4602                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4603                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4604                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4605                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4606                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4607                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4608                                                                                 } else {
4609                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4610                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4611                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4612                                                                                         };
4613                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4614                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4615                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4616                                                                                         }
4617                                                                                 }
4618                                                                         },
4619                                                                 };
4620                                                         },
4621                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4622                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4623                                                         }
4624                                                 }
4625                                         }
4626                                 }
4627                         }
4628                 }
4629
4630                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4631                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4632                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4633                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4634
4635                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4636                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4637                 }
4638                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4639
4640                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4641                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4642                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4643                 // network stack.
4644                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4645
4646                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4647                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4648                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4649         }
4650
4651         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4652         ///
4653         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4654         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4655                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4656
4657                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4658
4659                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4660                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4661                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4662                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4663                 }
4664
4665                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4666                         match event {
4667                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4668                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4669                                         // monitor updating completing.
4670                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4671                                 },
4672                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4673                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4674                                         {
4675                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4676                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4677                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4678                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4679                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4680                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4681                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4682                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4683                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4684                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4685                                                                         } else {
4686                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4687                                                                         }
4688                                                                 },
4689                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4690                                                         }
4691                                                 }
4692                                         }
4693                                         if !updated_chan {
4694                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4695                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4696                                         }
4697                                 },
4698                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4699                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4700                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4701                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4702                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4703                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4704                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4705                                                 } else {
4706                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4707                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4708                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4709                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4710                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4711                                                 }
4712                                         }
4713                                 },
4714                         }
4715                 }
4716                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4717         }
4718
4719         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4720         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4721         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4722                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4723                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4724         }
4725
4726         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4727                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4728                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4729                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4730                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4731                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4732                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4733                         }
4734                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4735                 }
4736                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4737                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4738                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4739                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4740                 }
4741                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4742                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4743
4744                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4745                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4746         }
4747
4748         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4749         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4750         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4751         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4752         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4753         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4754                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4755                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4756
4757                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4758                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4759
4760                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4761                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4762                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4763                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4764                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4765                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4766                                 ) {
4767                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4768                                                 min_mempool_feerate
4769                                         } else {
4770                                                 normal_feerate
4771                                         };
4772                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4773                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4774                                 }
4775                         }
4776
4777                         should_persist
4778                 });
4779         }
4780
4781         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4782         ///
4783         /// This currently includes:
4784         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4785         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4786         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4787         ///    the channel.
4788         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4789         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4790         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4791         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4792         ///
4793         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4794         /// estimate fetches.
4795         ///
4796         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4797         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4798         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4799                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4800                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4801
4802                         let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4803                         let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4804
4805                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4806                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4807                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4808                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4809
4810                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4811                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4812                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4813                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4814                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4815                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4816                         | {
4817                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4818                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4819                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4820                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4821                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4822                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4823                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4824                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4825                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4826                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4827                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4828                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4829                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4830                                                         },
4831                                                 },
4832                                         });
4833                                         false
4834                                 } else {
4835                                         true
4836                                 }
4837                         };
4838
4839                         {
4840                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4841                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4842                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4843                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4844                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4845                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4846                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4847                                                 match phase {
4848                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4849                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4850                                                                         min_mempool_feerate
4851                                                                 } else {
4852                                                                         normal_feerate
4853                                                                 };
4854                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4855                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4856
4857                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4858                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4859                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4860                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4861                                                                 }
4862
4863                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4864                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4865                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4866                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4867                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4868                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4869                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4870                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4871                                                                                 n += 1;
4872                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4873                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4874                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4875                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4876                                                                                                         msg: update
4877                                                                                                 });
4878                                                                                         }
4879                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4880                                                                                 } else {
4881                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4882                                                                                 }
4883                                                                         },
4884                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4885                                                                                 n += 1;
4886                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4887                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4888                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4889                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4890                                                                                                         msg: update
4891                                                                                                 });
4892                                                                                         }
4893                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4894                                                                                 } else {
4895                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4896                                                                                 }
4897                                                                         },
4898                                                                         _ => {},
4899                                                                 }
4900
4901                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4902
4903                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4904                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4905                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4906                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4907                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4908                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4909                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4910                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4911                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4912                                                                                         },
4913                                                                                 },
4914                                                                         });
4915                                                                 }
4916
4917                                                                 true
4918                                                         },
4919                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4920                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4921                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4922                                                         },
4923                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4924                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4925                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4926                                                         },
4927                                                 }
4928                                         });
4929
4930                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4931                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4932                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4933                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4934                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4935                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4936                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4937                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4938                                                                         },
4939                                                                 }
4940                                                         );
4941                                                 }
4942                                         }
4943                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4944
4945                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4946                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4947                                         }
4948                                 }
4949                         }
4950
4951                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4952                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4953                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4954                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4955                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4956                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4957                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4958                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4959                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4960                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4961                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4962                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4963                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4964                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
4965                                                         let remove_entry = {
4966                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4967                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4968                                                         };
4969                                                         if remove_entry {
4970                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
4971                                                         }
4972                                                 },
4973                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4974                                         }
4975                                 }
4976                         }
4977
4978                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4979                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4980                                         // This should be unreachable
4981                                         debug_assert!(false);
4982                                         return false;
4983                                 }
4984                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4985                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4986                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4987                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4988                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4989                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4990                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4991                                         {
4992                                                 return true;
4993                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4994                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4995                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4996                                         }) {
4997                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4998                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4999                                                 return false;
5000                                         }
5001                                 }
5002                                 true
5003                         });
5004
5005                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5006                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5007                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5008                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5009                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5010                         }
5011
5012                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5013                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5014                         }
5015
5016                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5017                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5018                         }
5019
5020                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
5021
5022                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5023                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5024                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5025                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5026                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5027                         }
5028
5029                         should_persist
5030                 });
5031         }
5032
5033         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5034         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5035         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5036         ///
5037         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5038         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5039         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5040         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5041         ///
5042         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5043         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5044         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5045         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5046         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5047                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5048         }
5049
5050         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5051         /// reason for the failure.
5052         ///
5053         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5054         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5055                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5056
5057                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5058                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5059                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5060                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5061                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5062                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5063                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5064                         }
5065                 }
5066         }
5067
5068         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5069         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5070                 match failure_code {
5071                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5072                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5073                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5074                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5075                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5076                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5077                         },
5078                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5079                                 let fail_data = match data {
5080                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5081                                         None => Vec::new(),
5082                                 };
5083                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5084                         }
5085                 }
5086         }
5087
5088         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5089         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5090         ///
5091         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5092         /// forwarding
5093         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5094                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5095                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5096                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5097                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5098                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5099                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5100                 } else {
5101                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5102                 };
5103                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5104                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5105                 } else {
5106                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5107                 }
5108         }
5109
5110
5111         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5112         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5113         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5114                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5115                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5116                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5117                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5118                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5119                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5120                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5121                         }
5122                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5123                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5124                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5125                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5126                 } else {
5127                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5128                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5129                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5130                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5131                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5132                 }
5133         }
5134
5135         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5136         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5137         // be surfaced to the user.
5138         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5139                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5140                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5141         ) {
5142                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5143                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5144                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5145                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5146                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5147                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5148                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5149                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5150                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5151                                                 } else {
5152                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5153                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5154                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5155                                                 }
5156                                         },
5157                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5158                                 }
5159                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5160                 };
5161
5162                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5163                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5164                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5165                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5166                 }
5167         }
5168
5169         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5170         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5171         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5172                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5173                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5174                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5175                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5176                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5177                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5178                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5179                 }
5180
5181                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5182                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5183                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5184                 //timer handling.
5185
5186                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5187                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5188                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5189                 match source {
5190                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5191                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5192                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5193                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5194                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5195                         },
5196                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5197                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5198                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5199
5200                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5201                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5202                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5203                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5204                                 }
5205                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5206                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5207                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5208                                         },
5209                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5210                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5211                                         }
5212                                 }
5213                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5214                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5215                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5216                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5217                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5218                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5219                                 }, None));
5220                         },
5221                 }
5222         }
5223
5224         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5225         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5226         ///
5227         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5228         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5229         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5230         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5231         ///
5232         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5233         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5234         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5235         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5236         ///
5237         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5238         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5239         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5240         ///
5241         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5242         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5243         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5244         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5245         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5246         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5247         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5248         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5249                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5250         }
5251
5252         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5253         /// even type numbers.
5254         ///
5255         /// # Note
5256         ///
5257         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5258         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5259         ///
5260         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5261         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5262                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5263         }
5264
5265         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5266                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5267
5268                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5269
5270                 let mut sources = {
5271                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5272                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5273                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5274                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5275                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5276                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5277                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5278                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5279                                                 break;
5280                                         }
5281                                 }
5282
5283                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5284                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5285                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5286                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5287                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5288                                 });
5289                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5290                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5291                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5292                                                 &payment_hash);
5293                                 }
5294
5295                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5296                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5297                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5298                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5299                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5300                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5301                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5302                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5303                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5304                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5305                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5306                                                 }
5307                                                 return;
5308                                         }
5309                                 }
5310
5311                                 payment.htlcs
5312                         } else { return; }
5313                 };
5314                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5315
5316                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5317                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5318                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5319                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5320                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5321                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5322                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5323                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5324                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5325                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5326                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5327                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5328                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5329                                 debug_assert!(false);
5330                                 valid_mpp = false;
5331                                 break;
5332                         }
5333                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5334
5335                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5336                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5337                                 debug_assert!(false);
5338                                 valid_mpp = false;
5339                                 break;
5340                         }
5341                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5342                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5343                 }
5344                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5345                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5346                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5347                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5348                         return;
5349                 }
5350                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5351                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5352                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5353                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5354                         return;
5355                 }
5356                 if valid_mpp {
5357                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5358                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5359                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5360                                         |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5361                                 {
5362                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5363                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5364                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5365                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5366                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5367                                 }
5368                         }
5369                 }
5370                 if !valid_mpp {
5371                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5372                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5373                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5374                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5375                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5376                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5377                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5378                         }
5379                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5380                 }
5381
5382                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5383                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5384                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5385                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5386                 }
5387         }
5388
5389         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5390                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5391         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5392                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5393
5394                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5395                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5396                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5397                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5398
5399                 {
5400                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5401                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5402                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5403                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5404                                 None => None
5405                         };
5406
5407                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5408                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5409                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5410                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5411
5412                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5413                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5414                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5415                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5416                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5417                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5418                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5419
5420                                                 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5421                                                         if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5422                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5423                                                                         chan_id, action);
5424                                                                 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5425                                                         }
5426                                                         if !during_init {
5427                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5428                                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5429                                                         } else {
5430                                                                 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5431                                                                 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5432                                                                 // monitor update as a background event.
5433                                                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5434                                                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5435                                                                                 counterparty_node_id,
5436                                                                                 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5437                                                                                 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5438                                                                         });
5439                                                         }
5440                                                 }
5441                                         }
5442                                         return Ok(());
5443                                 }
5444                         }
5445                 }
5446                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5447                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5448                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5449                                 payment_preimage,
5450                         }],
5451                 };
5452
5453                 if !during_init {
5454                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5455                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5456                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5457                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5458                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5459                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5460                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5461                                 // again on restart.
5462                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5463                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5464                         }
5465                 } else {
5466                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5467                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5468                         // event.
5469                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5470                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5471                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5472                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5473                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5474                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5475                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5476                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5477                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5478                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5479                                 )));
5480                 }
5481                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5482                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5483                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5484                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5485                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5486                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5487                 Ok(())
5488         }
5489
5490         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5491                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5492         }
5493
5494         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5495                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5496                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5497         ) {
5498                 match source {
5499                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5500                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5501                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5502                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5503                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5504                                 }
5505                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5506                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5507                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5508                                 };
5509                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5510                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5511                                         &self.logger);
5512                         },
5513                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5514                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5515                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5516                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5517                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5518                                                 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5519                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5520                                                                 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5521                                                         } else { None };
5522
5523                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5524                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5525                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5526                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5527                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5528                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5529                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5530                                                                 },
5531                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5532                                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5533                                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5534                                                                         } else {
5535                                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5536                                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5537                                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5538                                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5539                                                                                 // closed.
5540                                                                                 None
5541                                                                         },
5542                                                         })
5543                                                 } else { None }
5544                                         });
5545                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5546                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5547                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5548                                 }
5549                         },
5550                 }
5551         }
5552
5553         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5554         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5555                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5556         }
5557
5558         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5559                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5560                         match action {
5561                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5562                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5563                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5564                                                 amount_msat,
5565                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5566                                                 receiver_node_id,
5567                                                 htlcs,
5568                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5569                                         }) = payment {
5570                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5571                                                         payment_hash,
5572                                                         purpose,
5573                                                         amount_msat,
5574                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5575                                                         htlcs,
5576                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5577                                                 }, None));
5578                                         }
5579                                 },
5580                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5581                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5582                                 } => {
5583                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5584                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5585                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5586                                         }
5587                                 },
5588                         }
5589                 }
5590         }
5591
5592         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5593         /// update completion.
5594         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5595                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5596                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5597                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5598                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5599         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5600                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5601                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5602                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5603                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5604                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5605                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5606                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5607
5608                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5609
5610                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5611                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5612                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5613                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5614                 }
5615
5616                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5617                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5618                 }
5619                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5620                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5621                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5622                                 msg,
5623                         });
5624                 }
5625
5626                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5627                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5628                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5629                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5630                                         updates: update,
5631                                 });
5632                         }
5633                 } }
5634                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5635                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5636                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5637                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5638                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5639                                 });
5640                         }
5641                 } }
5642                 match order {
5643                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5644                                 handle_cs!();
5645                                 handle_raa!();
5646                         },
5647                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5648                                 handle_raa!();
5649                                 handle_cs!();
5650                         },
5651                 }
5652
5653                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5654                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5655                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5656                 }
5657
5658                 {
5659                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5660                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5661                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5662                 }
5663
5664                 htlc_forwards
5665         }
5666
5667         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5668                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5669
5670                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5671                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5672                         None => {
5673                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5674                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5675                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5676                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5677                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5678                                         None => return,
5679                                 }
5680                         }
5681                 };
5682                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5683                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5684                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5685                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5686                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5687                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5688                 let channel =
5689                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5690                                 chan
5691                         } else {
5692                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5693                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5694                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5695                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5696                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5697                                 return;
5698                         };
5699                 let remaining_in_flight =
5700                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5701                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5702                                 pending.len()
5703                         } else { 0 };
5704                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5705                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5706                         remaining_in_flight);
5707                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5708                         return;
5709                 }
5710                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5711         }
5712
5713         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5714         ///
5715         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5716         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5717         /// the channel.
5718         ///
5719         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5720         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5721         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5722         ///
5723         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5724         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5725         /// used to accept such channels.
5726         ///
5727         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5728         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5729         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5730                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5731         }
5732
5733         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5734         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5735         ///
5736         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5737         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5738         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5739         ///
5740         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5741         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5742         ///
5743         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5744         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5745         ///
5746         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5747         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5748         ///
5749         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5750         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5751         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5752                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5753         }
5754
5755         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5756                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5757
5758                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5759                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5760                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5761                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5762                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5763                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5764                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5765                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5766
5767                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5768                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5769                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5770                 // succeed.
5771                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5772                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5773                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5774                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5775                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5776                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5777                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5778                         }
5779                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5780                 }?;
5781
5782                 if accept_0conf {
5783                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5784                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5785                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5786                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5787                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5788                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5789                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5790                                 }
5791                         };
5792                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5793                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5794                 } else {
5795                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5796                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5797                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5798                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5799                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5800                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5801                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5802                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5803                                         }
5804                                 };
5805                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5806                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5807                         }
5808                 }
5809
5810                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5811                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5812                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5813
5814                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5815                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5816                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5817                 });
5818
5819                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5820
5821                 Ok(())
5822         }
5823
5824         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5825         /// or 0-conf channels.
5826         ///
5827         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5828         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5829         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5830         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5831                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5832                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5833                 {
5834                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5835                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5836                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5837                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5838                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5839                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5840                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5841                                 }
5842                         }
5843                 }
5844                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5845         }
5846
5847         fn unfunded_channel_count(
5848                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5849         ) -> usize {
5850                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5851                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5852                         match phase {
5853                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5854                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5855                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5856                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5857                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5858                                         {
5859                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5860                                         }
5861                                 },
5862                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5863                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5864                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5865                                         }
5866                                 },
5867                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5868                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5869                                         continue;
5870                                 }
5871                         }
5872                 }
5873                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5874         }
5875
5876         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5877                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5878                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5879                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5880                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5881                 }
5882
5883                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5884                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5885                 }
5886
5887                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5888                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5889                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5890                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5891                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5892
5893                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5894                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5895                     .ok_or_else(|| {
5896                                 debug_assert!(false);
5897                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5898                         })?;
5899                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5900                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5901
5902                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5903                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5904                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5905                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5906                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5907                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5908                 {
5909                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5910                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5911                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5912                 }
5913
5914                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5915                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5916                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5917                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5918                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5919                 }
5920
5921                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5922                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5923                 if channel_exists {
5924                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5925                 }
5926
5927                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5928                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5929                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5930                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5931                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5932                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5933                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5934                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5935                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5936                         }, None));
5937                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5938                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5939                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5940                         });
5941                         return Ok(());
5942                 }
5943
5944                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5945                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5946                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5947                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5948                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5949                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5950                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5951                 {
5952                         Err(e) => {
5953                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5954                         },
5955                         Ok(res) => res
5956                 };
5957
5958                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5959                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5960                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5961                 }
5962                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5963                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5964                 }
5965
5966                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5967                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5968
5969                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5970                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5971                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5972                 });
5973                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5974                 Ok(())
5975         }
5976
5977         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5978                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5979                 // likely to be lost on restart!
5980                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5981                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5982                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5983                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
5984                                         debug_assert!(false);
5985                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5986                                 })?;
5987                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5988                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5989                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5990                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5991                                         match phase.get_mut() {
5992                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5993                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5994                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5995                                                 },
5996                                                 _ => {
5997                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5998                                                 }
5999                                         }
6000                                 },
6001                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6002                         }
6003                 };
6004                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6005                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6006                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6007                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6008                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6009                         output_script,
6010                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6011                 }, None));
6012                 Ok(())
6013         }
6014
6015         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6016                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6017
6018                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6019                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6020                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6021                                 debug_assert!(false);
6022                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6023                         })?;
6024
6025                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6026                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6027                 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6028                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6029                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6030                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6031                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6032                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6033                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6034                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6035                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6036                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6037                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6038                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6039                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6040                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6041                                                 },
6042                                         }
6043                                 },
6044                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6045                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6046                                 },
6047                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6048                         };
6049
6050                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6051                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6052                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6053                         },
6054                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6055                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6056                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6057                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6058                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6059                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6060                                                         funding_msg.channel_id))
6061                                         },
6062                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6063                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6064                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6065                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6066                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6067
6068                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6069                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6070                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6071                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6072                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6073                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6074                                                                 msg: funding_msg,
6075                                                         });
6076
6077                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6078                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6079                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6080                                                         } else {
6081                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6082                                                         }
6083                                                         Ok(())
6084                                                 } else {
6085                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6086                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6087                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6088                                                                 funding_msg.channel_id));
6089                                                 }
6090                                         }
6091                                 }
6092                         }
6093                 }
6094         }
6095
6096         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6097                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6098                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6099                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6100                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6101                                 debug_assert!(false);
6102                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6103                         })?;
6104
6105                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6106                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6107                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6108                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6109                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6110                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6111                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6112                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6113                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6114                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6115                                                         Ok(())
6116                                                 } else {
6117                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6118                                                 }
6119                                         },
6120                                         _ => {
6121                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6122                                         },
6123                                 }
6124                         },
6125                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6126                 }
6127         }
6128
6129         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6130                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6131                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6132                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6133                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6134                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6135                                 debug_assert!(false);
6136                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6137                         })?;
6138                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6139                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6140                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6141                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6142                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6143                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6144                                                 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6145                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6146                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6147                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6148                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6149                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6150                                                 });
6151                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6152                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6153                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6154                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6155                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6156                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6157                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6158                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6159                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6160                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6161                                                                 msg,
6162                                                         });
6163                                                 }
6164                                         }
6165
6166                                         {
6167                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6168                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6169                                         }
6170
6171                                         Ok(())
6172                                 } else {
6173                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6174                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6175                                 }
6176                         },
6177                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6178                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6179                         }
6180                 }
6181         }
6182
6183         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6184                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6185                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6186                 {
6187                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6188                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6189                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6190                                         debug_assert!(false);
6191                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6192                                 })?;
6193                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6194                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6195                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6196                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6197                                 match phase {
6198                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6199                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6200                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6201                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6202                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6203                                                 }
6204
6205                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6206                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6207                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6208                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6209
6210                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6211                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6212                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6213                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6214                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6215                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6216                                                                 msg,
6217                                                         });
6218                                                 }
6219                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6220                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6221                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6222                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6223                                                 }
6224                                         },
6225                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6226                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6227                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6228                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6229                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6230                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6231                                         },
6232                                 }
6233                         } else {
6234                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6235                         }
6236                 }
6237                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6238                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6239                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6240                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6241                 }
6242                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6243                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6244                 }
6245
6246                 Ok(())
6247         }
6248
6249         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6250                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6251                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6252                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6253                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6254                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6255                                 debug_assert!(false);
6256                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6257                         })?;
6258                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6259                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6260                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6261                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6262                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6263                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6264                                                 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6265                                                 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6266                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6267                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6268                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6269                                                                 msg,
6270                                                         });
6271                                                 }
6272                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6273                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6274                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6275                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6276                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6277                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6278                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6279                                                 } else { (tx, None) }
6280                                         } else {
6281                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6282                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6283                                         }
6284                                 },
6285                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6286                         }
6287                 };
6288                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6289                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6290                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6291                 }
6292                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6293                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6294                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6295                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6296                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6297                                         msg: update
6298                                 });
6299                         }
6300                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6301                         shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6302                 }
6303                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6304                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6305                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6306                 }
6307                 Ok(())
6308         }
6309
6310         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6311                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6312                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6313                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6314                 //
6315                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6316                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6317                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6318                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6319
6320                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6321                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6322
6323                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6324                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6325                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6326                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6327                                 debug_assert!(false);
6328                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6329                         })?;
6330                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6331                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6332                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6333                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6334                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6335                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6336                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6337                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6338                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6339                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6340                                         };
6341                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6342                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6343                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6344                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6345                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6346                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6347                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6348                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6349                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6350                                                                 } else {
6351                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6352                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6353                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6354                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6355                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6356                                                                         reason
6357                                                                 };
6358                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6359                                                         },
6360                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6361                                                 }
6362                                         };
6363                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6364                                 } else {
6365                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6366                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6367                                 }
6368                         },
6369                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6370                 }
6371                 Ok(())
6372         }
6373
6374         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6375                 let funding_txo;
6376                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6377                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6378                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6379                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6380                                         debug_assert!(false);
6381                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6382                                 })?;
6383                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6384                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6385                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6386                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6387                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6388                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6389                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6390                                                         log_trace!(self.logger,
6391                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6392                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6393                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6394                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6395                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6396                                                 }
6397                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6398                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6399                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6400                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6401                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6402                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6403                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6404                                                 res
6405                                         } else {
6406                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6407                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6408                                         }
6409                                 },
6410                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6411                         }
6412                 };
6413                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6414                 Ok(())
6415         }
6416
6417         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6418                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6419                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6420                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6421                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6422                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6423                                 debug_assert!(false);
6424                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6425                         })?;
6426                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6427                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6428                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6429                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6430                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6431                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6432                                 } else {
6433                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6434                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6435                                 }
6436                         },
6437                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6438                 }
6439                 Ok(())
6440         }
6441
6442         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6443                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6444                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6445                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6446                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6447                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6448                                 debug_assert!(false);
6449                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6450                         })?;
6451                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6452                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6453                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6454                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6455                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6456                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6457                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6458                                 }
6459                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6460                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6461                                 } else {
6462                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6463                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6464                                 }
6465                                 Ok(())
6466                         },
6467                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6468                 }
6469         }
6470
6471         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6472                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6473                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6474                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6475                                 debug_assert!(false);
6476                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6477                         })?;
6478                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6479                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6480                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6481                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6482                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6483                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6484                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6485                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6486                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6487                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6488                                         }
6489                                         Ok(())
6490                                 } else {
6491                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6492                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6493                                 }
6494                         },
6495                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6496                 }
6497         }
6498
6499         #[inline]
6500         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6501                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6502                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6503                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6504                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6505                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6506                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6507                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6508                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6509                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6510                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6511                                         };
6512                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6513                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6514
6515                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6516                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6517                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6518                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6519                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6520                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6521                                                 },
6522                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6523                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6524                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6525                                                         {
6526                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6527                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6528                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6529                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6530                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6531                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6532                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6533                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6534                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6535                                                                                         intercept_id
6536                                                                                 }, None));
6537                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6538                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6539                                                                         },
6540                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6541                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6542                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6543                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6544                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6545                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6546                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6547                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6548                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6549                                                                                 });
6550
6551                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6552                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6553                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6554                                                                                 ));
6555                                                                         }
6556                                                                 }
6557                                                         } else {
6558                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6559                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6560                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6561                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6562                                                                 }
6563                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6564                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6565                                                         }
6566                                                 }
6567                                         }
6568                                 }
6569                         }
6570
6571                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6572                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6573                         }
6574
6575                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6576                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6577                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6578                         }
6579                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6580                 }
6581         }
6582
6583         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6584                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6585                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6586                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6587                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6588                 ).count();
6589                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6590                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6591                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6592                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6593                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6594                 // real by taking more time.
6595                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6596                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6597                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6598                         }, None));
6599                 }
6600         }
6601
6602         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6603         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6604         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6605         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6606         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6607                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6608                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6609         ) -> bool {
6610                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6611                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6612                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6613                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6614                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6615                                 counterparty_node_id,
6616                         })
6617                 })
6618         }
6619
6620         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6621         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6622                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6623         ) -> bool {
6624                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6625                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6626                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6627                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6628
6629                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6630                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6631                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6632                         }
6633                 }
6634                 false
6635         }
6636
6637         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6638                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6639                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6640                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6641                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6642                                         debug_assert!(false);
6643                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6644                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6645                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6646                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6647                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6648                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6649                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6650                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6651                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6652                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6653                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6654                                                 } else { false };
6655                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6656                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6657                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6658                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6659                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6660                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6661                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6662                                                 }
6663                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6664                                         } else {
6665                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6666                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6667                                         }
6668                                 },
6669                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6670                         }
6671                 };
6672                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6673                 Ok(())
6674         }
6675
6676         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6677                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6678                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6679                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6680                                 debug_assert!(false);
6681                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6682                         })?;
6683                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6684                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6685                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6686                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6687                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6688                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6689                                 } else {
6690                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6691                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6692                                 }
6693                         },
6694                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6695                 }
6696                 Ok(())
6697         }
6698
6699         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6700                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6701                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6702                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6703                                 debug_assert!(false);
6704                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6705                         })?;
6706                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6707                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6708                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6709                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6710                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6711                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6712                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6713                                         }
6714
6715                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6716                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6717                                                         &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6718                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6719                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6720                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6721                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6722                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6723                                         });
6724                                 } else {
6725                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6726                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6727                                 }
6728                         },
6729                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6730                 }
6731                 Ok(())
6732         }
6733
6734         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6735         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6736                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6737                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6738                         None => {
6739                                 // It's not a local channel
6740                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6741                         }
6742                 };
6743                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6744                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6745                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6746                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6747                 }
6748                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6749                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6750                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6751                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6752                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6753                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6754                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6755                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6756                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6757                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6758                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6759                                                 }
6760                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6761                                         }
6762                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6763                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6764                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6765                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6766                                         } else {
6767                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6768                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6769                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6770                                                 // persisting.
6771                                                 if !did_change {
6772                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6773                                                 }
6774                                         }
6775                                 } else {
6776                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6777                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6778                                 }
6779                         },
6780                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6781                 }
6782                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6783         }
6784
6785         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6786                 let htlc_forwards;
6787                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6788                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6789
6790                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6791                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6792                                         debug_assert!(false);
6793                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6794                                 })?;
6795                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6796                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6797                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6798                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6799                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6800                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6801                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6802                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6803                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6804                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6805                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6806                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6807                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
6808                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6809                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6810                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6811                                                                 msg,
6812                                                         });
6813                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6814                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6815                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6816                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
6817                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6818                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6819                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6820                                                                         msg,
6821                                                                 });
6822                                                         }
6823                                                 }
6824                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6825                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6826                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6827                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6828                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6829                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6830                                                 }
6831                                                 need_lnd_workaround
6832                                         } else {
6833                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6834                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6835                                         }
6836                                 },
6837                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6838                         }
6839                 };
6840
6841                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6842                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6843                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6844                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6845                 }
6846
6847                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6848                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6849                 }
6850                 Ok(persist)
6851         }
6852
6853         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6854         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6855                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6856
6857                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6858                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6859                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6860                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6861                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6862                                 match monitor_event {
6863                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6864                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6865                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6866                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6867                                                 } else {
6868                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6869                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6870                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6871                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6872                                                 }
6873                                         },
6874                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6875                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6876                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6877                                                         None => {
6878                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6879                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6880                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6881                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6882                                                         }
6883                                                 };
6884                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6885                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6886                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6887                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6888                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6889                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6890                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6891                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6892                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6893                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6894                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6895                                                                                                 msg: update
6896                                                                                         });
6897                                                                                 }
6898                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6899                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6900                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6901                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6902                                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6903                                                                                         },
6904                                                                                 });
6905                                                                         }
6906                                                                 }
6907                                                         }
6908                                                 }
6909                                         },
6910                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6911                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6912                                         },
6913                                 }
6914                         }
6915                 }
6916
6917                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6918                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
6919                 }
6920
6921                 has_pending_monitor_events
6922         }
6923
6924         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6925         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6926         /// update events as a separate process method here.
6927         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
6928         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6929                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6930                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6931         }
6932
6933         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6934         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6935         /// update was applied.
6936         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6937                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6938                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6939
6940                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6941                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6942                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6943                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6944                 'peer_loop: loop {
6945                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6946                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6947                                 'chan_loop: loop {
6948                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6949                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6950                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6951                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6952                                         ) {
6953                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6954                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6955                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6956                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6957                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6958                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6959                                                 }
6960                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6961                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
6962
6963                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6964                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6965                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
6966                                                 }
6967                                         }
6968                                         break 'chan_loop;
6969                                 }
6970                         }
6971                         break 'peer_loop;
6972                 }
6973
6974                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
6975                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6976                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6977                 }
6978
6979                 has_update
6980         }
6981
6982         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6983         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6984         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6985         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6986                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6987                 let mut has_update = false;
6988                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
6989                 {
6990                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6991
6992                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6993                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6994                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6995                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6996                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6997                                         match phase {
6998                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6999                                                         let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7000                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7001                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7002                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7003                                                                                 has_update = true;
7004                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7005                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7006                                                                                 });
7007                                                                         }
7008                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7009                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7010                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7011                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7012                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7013                                                                                                 msg: update
7014                                                                                         });
7015                                                                                 }
7016
7017                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7018
7019                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7020                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7021                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7022                                                                                 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7023                                                                                 false
7024                                                                         } else { true }
7025                                                                 },
7026                                                                 Err(e) => {
7027                                                                         has_update = true;
7028                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7029                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7030                                                                         !close_channel
7031                                                                 }
7032                                                         }
7033                                                 },
7034                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7035                                         }
7036                                 });
7037                         }
7038                 }
7039
7040                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7041                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7042                 }
7043
7044                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7045                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7046                 }
7047
7048                 has_update
7049         }
7050
7051         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7052         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7053         /// Channel object.
7054         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7055                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7056                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7057                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7058                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7059                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7060                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7061                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7062                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7063                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7064                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7065                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7066                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7067                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7068                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7069                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7070                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7071                                         });
7072                         }
7073                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7074                 }
7075         }
7076
7077         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7078         /// to pay us.
7079         ///
7080         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7081         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7082         ///
7083         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7084         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7085         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7086         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7087         ///
7088         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7089         ///
7090         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7091         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7092         ///
7093         /// # Note
7094         ///
7095         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7096         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7097         ///
7098         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7099         ///
7100         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7101         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7102         ///
7103         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7104         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7105         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7106         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7107         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7108         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7109         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7110                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7111                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7112                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7113                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7114         }
7115
7116         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7117         /// stored external to LDK.
7118         ///
7119         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7120         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7121         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7122         ///
7123         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7124         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7125         /// payments.
7126         ///
7127         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7128         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7129         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7130         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7131         ///
7132         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7133         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7134         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7135         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7136         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7137         ///
7138         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7139         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7140         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7141         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7142         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7143         ///
7144         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7145         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7146         ///
7147         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7148         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7149         ///
7150         /// # Note
7151         ///
7152         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7153         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7154         ///
7155         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7156         ///
7157         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7158         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7159         ///
7160         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7161         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7162         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7163                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7164                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7165                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7166                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7167         }
7168
7169         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7170         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7171         ///
7172         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7173         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7174                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7175         }
7176
7177         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7178         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7179         ///
7180         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7181         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7182                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7183                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7184                 loop {
7185                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7186                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7187                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7188                                 Some(_) => continue,
7189                                 None => return scid_candidate
7190                         }
7191                 }
7192         }
7193
7194         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7195         ///
7196         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7197         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7198                 PhantomRouteHints {
7199                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7200                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7201                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7202                 }
7203         }
7204
7205         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7206         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7207         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7208         ///
7209         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7210         /// times to get a unique scid.
7211         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7212                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7213                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7214                 loop {
7215                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7216                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7217                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7218                         return scid_candidate
7219                 }
7220         }
7221
7222         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7223         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7224         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7225                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7226
7227                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7228                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7229                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7230                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7231                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7232                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7233                         ) {
7234                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7235                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7236                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7237                                         }
7238                                 }
7239                         }
7240                 }
7241
7242                 inflight_htlcs
7243         }
7244
7245         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7246         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7247                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7248                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7249                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7250                 events.into_inner()
7251         }
7252
7253         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7254         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7255                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7256                 events.push_back((event, None));
7257         }
7258
7259         #[cfg(test)]
7260         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7261                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7262                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7263         }
7264
7265         #[cfg(test)]
7266         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7267                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7268         }
7269
7270         #[cfg(test)]
7271         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7272                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7273         }
7274
7275         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7276         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7277         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7278         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7279         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7280                 loop {
7281                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7282                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7283                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7284                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7285
7286                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7287                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7288                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7289                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7290                                         {
7291                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7292                                         }
7293                                 }
7294
7295                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7296                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7297                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7298                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7299                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7300                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7301                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7302                                         break;
7303                                 }
7304
7305                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7306                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7307                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7308                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7309                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7310                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7311                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7312                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7313                                                         if further_update_exists {
7314                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7315                                                                 // top of the loop.
7316                                                                 continue;
7317                                                         }
7318                                                 } else {
7319                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7320                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7321                                                 }
7322                                         }
7323                                 }
7324                         } else {
7325                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7326                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7327                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7328                         }
7329                         break;
7330                 }
7331         }
7332
7333         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7334                 for action in actions {
7335                         match action {
7336                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7337                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7338                                 } => {
7339                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7340                                 }
7341                         }
7342                 }
7343         }
7344
7345         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7346         /// using the given event handler.
7347         ///
7348         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7349         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7350                 &self, handler: H
7351         ) {
7352                 let mut ev;
7353                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7354         }
7355 }
7356
7357 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7358 where
7359         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7360         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7361         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7362         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7363         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7364         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7365         R::Target: Router,
7366         L::Target: Logger,
7367 {
7368         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7369         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7370         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7371         /// is always placed next to each other.
7372         ///
7373         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7374         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7375         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7376         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7377         ///
7378         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7379         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7380         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7381         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7382                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7383                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7384                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7385
7386                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7387                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7388                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7389                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7390                         }
7391
7392                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7393                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7394                         }
7395                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7396                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7397                         }
7398
7399                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7400                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7401                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7402                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7403                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7404                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7405                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7406                                 }
7407                         }
7408
7409                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7410                                 events.replace(pending_events);
7411                         }
7412
7413                         result
7414                 });
7415                 events.into_inner()
7416         }
7417 }
7418
7419 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7420 where
7421         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7422         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7423         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7424         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7425         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7426         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7427         R::Target: Router,
7428         L::Target: Logger,
7429 {
7430         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7431         ///
7432         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7433         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7434         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7435                 let mut ev;
7436                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7437         }
7438 }
7439
7440 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7441 where
7442         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7443         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7444         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7445         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7446         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7447         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7448         R::Target: Router,
7449         L::Target: Logger,
7450 {
7451         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7452                 {
7453                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7454                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7455                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7456                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7457                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7458                 }
7459
7460                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7461                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7462         }
7463
7464         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7465                 let _persistence_guard =
7466                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7467                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7468                 let new_height = height - 1;
7469                 {
7470                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7471                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7472                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7473                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7474                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7475                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7476                 }
7477
7478                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7479         }
7480 }
7481
7482 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7483 where
7484         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7485         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7486         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7487         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7488         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7489         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7490         R::Target: Router,
7491         L::Target: Logger,
7492 {
7493         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7494                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7495                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7496                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7497
7498                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7499                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7500
7501                 let _persistence_guard =
7502                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7503                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7504                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7505                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7506
7507                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7508                 if height < last_best_block_height {
7509                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7510                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7511                 }
7512         }
7513
7514         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7515                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7516                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7517                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7518
7519                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7520                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7521
7522                 let _persistence_guard =
7523                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7524                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7525                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7526
7527                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7528
7529                 macro_rules! max_time {
7530                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
7531                                 loop {
7532                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7533                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7534                                         // having an explicit local time source.
7535                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7536                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7537                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7538                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7539                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7540                                                 break;
7541                                         }
7542                                 }
7543                         }
7544                 }
7545                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7546                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7547                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7548                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7549                 });
7550         }
7551
7552         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7553                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7554                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7555                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7556                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7557                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7558                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7559                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7560                                 }
7561                         }
7562                 }
7563                 res
7564         }
7565
7566         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7567                 let _persistence_guard =
7568                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7569                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7570                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7571                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7572                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7573                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7574                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7575                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7576                 });
7577         }
7578 }
7579
7580 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7581 where
7582         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7583         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7584         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7585         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7586         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7587         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7588         R::Target: Router,
7589         L::Target: Logger,
7590 {
7591         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7592         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7593         /// the function.
7594         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7595                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7596                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7597                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7598                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7599
7600                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7601                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7602                 {
7603                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7604                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7605                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7606                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7607                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7608                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7609                                         match phase {
7610                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
7611                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7612                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7613                                                         let res = f(channel);
7614                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7615                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7616                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7617                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7618                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7619                                                                 }
7620                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7621                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7622                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
7623                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7624                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7625                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7626                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7627                                                                                                 msg,
7628                                                                                         });
7629                                                                                 }
7630                                                                         } else {
7631                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7632                                                                         }
7633                                                                 }
7634
7635                                                                 {
7636                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7637                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7638                                                                 }
7639
7640                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7641                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7642                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7643                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7644                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
7645                                                                         });
7646                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7647                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7648                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7649                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
7650                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7651                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7652                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7653                                                                                         });
7654                                                                                 }
7655                                                                         }
7656                                                                 }
7657                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7658                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7659                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7660                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7661                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7662                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7663                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7664                                                                                 // is always consistent.
7665                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7666                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7667                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7668                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7669                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7670                                                                         }
7671                                                                 }
7672                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7673                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7674                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7675                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7676                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7677                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7678                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7679                                                                                 msg: update
7680                                                                         });
7681                                                                 }
7682                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7683                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7684                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7685                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7686                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7687                                                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7688                                                                                 data: reason_message,
7689                                                                         } },
7690                                                                 });
7691                                                                 return false;
7692                                                         }
7693                                                         true
7694                                                 }
7695                                         }
7696                                 });
7697                         }
7698                 }
7699
7700                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7701                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7702                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7703                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7704                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7705                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7706                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7707                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7708                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7709                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7710
7711                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7712                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7713                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7714                                                 false
7715                                         } else { true }
7716                                 });
7717                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7718                         });
7719
7720                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7721                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7722                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7723                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7724                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7725                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7726                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7727                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7728                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7729                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7730                                         });
7731
7732                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7733                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7734                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
7735                                         };
7736                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7737                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7738                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7739                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7740                                         false
7741                                 } else { true }
7742                         });
7743                 }
7744
7745                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7746
7747                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7748                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7749                 }
7750         }
7751
7752         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7753         /// may have events that need processing.
7754         ///
7755         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7756         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7757         ///
7758         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7759         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7760         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7761                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7762         }
7763
7764         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7765         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7766                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7767         }
7768
7769         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7770         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7771                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7772         }
7773
7774         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7775         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7776         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7777                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7778         }
7779
7780         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7781         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7782         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7783                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7784         }
7785
7786         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7787         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7788         ///
7789         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7790         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7791         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7792         pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7793                 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7794         }
7795
7796         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7797         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7798         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7799                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7800         }
7801
7802         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7803         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7804         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7805                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7806         }
7807
7808         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7809         /// [`ChannelManager`].
7810         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7811                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7812         }
7813 }
7814
7815 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7816         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7817 where
7818         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7819         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7820         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7821         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7822         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7823         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7824         R::Target: Router,
7825         L::Target: Logger,
7826 {
7827         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7828                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7829                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7830                 // change to the contents.
7831                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7832                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7833                         let persist = match &res {
7834                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7835                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7836                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
7837                                 },
7838                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7839                         };
7840                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7841                         persist
7842                 });
7843         }
7844
7845         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7846                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7847                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7848                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7849         }
7850
7851         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7852                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7853                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7854                 // change to the contents.
7855                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7856                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7857                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7858                 });
7859         }
7860
7861         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7862                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7863                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7864                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7865         }
7866
7867         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7868                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7869                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7870         }
7871
7872         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7873                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7874                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7875         }
7876
7877         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7878                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7879                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7880                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7881                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7882                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7883                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7884                         let persist = match &res {
7885                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7886                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7887                         };
7888                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7889                         persist
7890                 });
7891         }
7892
7893         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7894                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7895                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7896         }
7897
7898         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7899                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7900                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7901         }
7902
7903         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7904                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7905                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7906                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7907                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7908                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7909                         let persist = match &res {
7910                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7911                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7912                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7913                         };
7914                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7915                         persist
7916                 });
7917         }
7918
7919         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7920                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7921                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7922         }
7923
7924         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7925                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7926                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7927                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7928                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7929                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7930                         let persist = match &res {
7931                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7932                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7933                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7934                         };
7935                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7936                         persist
7937                 });
7938         }
7939
7940         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7941                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7942                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7943                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7944                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7945                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7946                         let persist = match &res {
7947                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7948                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7949                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7950                         };
7951                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7952                         persist
7953                 });
7954         }
7955
7956         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7957                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7958                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7959         }
7960
7961         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7962                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7963                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7964         }
7965
7966         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7967                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7968                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7969                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7970                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7971                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7972                         let persist = match &res {
7973                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7974                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7975                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7976                         };
7977                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7978                         persist
7979                 });
7980         }
7981
7982         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7983                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7984                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7985         }
7986
7987         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7988                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7989                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7990                                 persist
7991                         } else {
7992                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7993                         }
7994                 });
7995         }
7996
7997         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7998                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7999                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8000                         let persist = match &res {
8001                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8002                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8003                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8004                         };
8005                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8006                         persist
8007                 });
8008         }
8009
8010         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8011                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8012                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8013                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8014                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8015                 let remove_peer = {
8016                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8017                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8018                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8019                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8020                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8021                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8022                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8023                                         let context = match phase {
8024                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8025                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8026                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8027                                                                 return true;
8028                                                         }
8029                                                         &mut chan.context
8030                                                 },
8031                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8032                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8033                                                         &mut chan.context
8034                                                 },
8035                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8036                                                         &mut chan.context
8037                                                 },
8038                                         };
8039                                         // Clean up for removal.
8040                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8041                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8042                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8043                                         false
8044                                 });
8045                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8046                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8047                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8048                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8049                                         match msg {
8050                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8051                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8052                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8053                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8054                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8055                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8056                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8057                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8058                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8059                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8060                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8061                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8062                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8063                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8064                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8065                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8066                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8067                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8068                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8069                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8070                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8071                                                 // Channel Operations
8072                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8073                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8074                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8075                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8076                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8077                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8078                                                 // Gossip
8079                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8080                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8081                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8082                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8083                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8084                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8085                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8086                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8087                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8088                                         }
8089                                 });
8090                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8091                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8092                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8093                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8094                 };
8095                 if remove_peer {
8096                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8097                 }
8098                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8099
8100                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8101                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8102                 }
8103         }
8104
8105         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8106                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8107                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8108                         return Err(());
8109                 }
8110
8111                 let mut res = Ok(());
8112
8113                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8114                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8115                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8116                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8117                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8118                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8119                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8120
8121                         {
8122                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8123                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8124                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8125                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8126                                                         res = Err(());
8127                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8128                                                 }
8129                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8130                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8131                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8132                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8133                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8134                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8135                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8136                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8137                                                         is_connected: true,
8138                                                 }));
8139                                         },
8140                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8141                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8142                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8143
8144                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8145                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8146                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8147                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8148                                                 {
8149                                                         res = Err(());
8150                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8151                                                 }
8152
8153                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8154                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8155                                         },
8156                                 }
8157                         }
8158
8159                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8160
8161                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8162                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8163                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8164                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8165                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8166
8167                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8168                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8169                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8170                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8171                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
8172                                                 debug_assert!(false);
8173                                                 None
8174                                         }
8175                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
8176                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8177                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8178                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8179                                         });
8180                                 });
8181                         }
8182
8183                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8184                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8185                 });
8186                 res
8187         }
8188
8189         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8190                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8191
8192                 match &msg.data as &str {
8193                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8194                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8195                         {
8196                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8197                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8198                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8199                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8200                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8201                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8202                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8203                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8204                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8205                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8206                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8207                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8208                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8209                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8210                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8211                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8212                                                                 msg,
8213                                                         });
8214                                                 }
8215                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8216                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8217                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8218                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8219                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8220                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8221                                                                 },
8222                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8223                                                         }
8224                                                 });
8225                                         }
8226                                 }
8227                                 return;
8228                         }
8229                         _ => {}
8230                 }
8231
8232                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8233                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8234                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8235                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8236                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8237                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8238                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8239                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8240                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8241                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8242                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8243                         };
8244                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8245                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8246                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8247                         }
8248                 } else {
8249                         {
8250                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8251                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8252                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8253                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8254                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8255                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8256                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8257                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8258                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8259                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8260                                                         msg,
8261                                                 });
8262                                                 return;
8263                                         }
8264                                 }
8265                         }
8266
8267                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8268                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8269                 }
8270         }
8271
8272         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8273                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8274         }
8275
8276         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8277                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8278         }
8279
8280         fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8281                 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8282         }
8283
8284         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8285                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8286                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8287                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8288         }
8289
8290         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8291                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8292                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8293                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8294         }
8295
8296         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8297                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8298                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8299                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8300         }
8301
8302         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8303                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8304                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8305                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8306         }
8307
8308         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8309                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8310                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8311                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8312         }
8313
8314         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8315                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8316                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8317                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8318         }
8319
8320         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8321                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8322                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8323                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8324         }
8325
8326         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8327                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8328                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8329                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8330         }
8331
8332         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8333                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8334                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8335                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8336         }
8337 }
8338
8339 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8340 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8341 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8342         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8343         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8344         node_features
8345 }
8346
8347 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8348 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8349 ///
8350 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8351 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8352 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8353 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8354         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8355 }
8356
8357 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8358 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8359 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8360         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8361 }
8362
8363 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8364 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8365 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8366         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8367 }
8368
8369 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8370 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8371 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8372         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8373         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8374         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8375         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8376         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8377         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8378         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8379         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8380         features.set_payment_secret_required();
8381         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8382         features.set_wumbo_optional();
8383         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8384         features.set_channel_type_optional();
8385         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8386         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8387         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8388                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8389         }
8390         features
8391 }
8392
8393 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8394 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8395
8396 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8397         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8398         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8399         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8400 });
8401
8402 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8403         (2, node_id, required),
8404         (4, features, required),
8405         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8406         (8, forwarding_info, option),
8407         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8408         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8409 });
8410
8411 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8412         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8413                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8414                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8415                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8416                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8417                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8418                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8419                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
8420                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
8421                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
8422                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8423                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8424                         (7, self.config, option),
8425                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8426                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
8427                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8428                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8429                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8430                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8431                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8432                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8433                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8434                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8435                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8436                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8437                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8438                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8439                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
8440                         (32, self.is_public, required),
8441                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8442                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8443                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8444                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8445                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8446                 });
8447                 Ok(())
8448         }
8449 }
8450
8451 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8452         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8453                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8454                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8455                         (2, channel_id, required),
8456                         (3, channel_type, option),
8457                         (4, counterparty, required),
8458                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8459                         (6, funding_txo, option),
8460                         (7, config, option),
8461                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
8462                         (9, confirmations, option),
8463                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8464                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8465                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8466                         (16, balance_msat, required),
8467                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8468                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8469                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8470                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8471                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8472                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8473                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
8474                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8475                         (26, is_outbound, required),
8476                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8477                         (30, is_usable, required),
8478                         (32, is_public, required),
8479                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8480                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8481                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8482                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8483                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8484                 });
8485
8486                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8487                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8488                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8489                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8490                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8491
8492                 Ok(Self {
8493                         inbound_scid_alias,
8494                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8495                         channel_type,
8496                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8497                         outbound_scid_alias,
8498                         funding_txo,
8499                         config,
8500                         short_channel_id,
8501                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8502                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8503                         user_channel_id,
8504                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8505                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8506                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8507                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8508                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8509                         confirmations_required,
8510                         confirmations,
8511                         force_close_spend_delay,
8512                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8513                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8514                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8515                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8516                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8517                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8518                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8519                         channel_shutdown_state,
8520                 })
8521         }
8522 }
8523
8524 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8525         (2, channels, required_vec),
8526         (4, phantom_scid, required),
8527         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8528 });
8529
8530 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8531         (0, Forward) => {
8532                 (0, onion_packet, required),
8533                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8534         },
8535         (1, Receive) => {
8536                 (0, payment_data, required),
8537                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8538                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8539                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8540                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8541         },
8542         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8543                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8544                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8545                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8546                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8547                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8548         },
8549 ;);
8550
8551 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8552         (0, routing, required),
8553         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8554         (4, payment_hash, required),
8555         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8556         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8557         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8558         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8559 });
8560
8561
8562 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8563         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8564                 match self {
8565                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8566                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8567                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8568                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8569                                 reason.write(writer)?;
8570                         },
8571                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8572                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8573                         }) => {
8574                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8575                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8576                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8577                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8578                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8579                         },
8580                 }
8581                 Ok(())
8582         }
8583 }
8584
8585 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8586         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8587                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8588                 match id {
8589                         0 => {
8590                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8591                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8592                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8593                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8594                                 }))
8595                         },
8596                         1 => {
8597                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8598                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8599                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8600                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8601                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8602                                 }))
8603                         },
8604                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8605                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8606                         // messages contained in the variants.
8607                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8608                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8609                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8610                         2 => {
8611                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8612                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8613                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8614                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8615                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8616                         },
8617                         3 => {
8618                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8619                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8620                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8621                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8622                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8623                         },
8624                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8625                 }
8626         }
8627 }
8628
8629 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8630         (0, Forward),
8631         (1, Fail),
8632 );
8633
8634 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8635         (0, short_channel_id, required),
8636         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8637         (2, outpoint, required),
8638         (4, htlc_id, required),
8639         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8640         (7, user_channel_id, option),
8641 });
8642
8643 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8644         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8645                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8646                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8647                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8648                 };
8649                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8650                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8651                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
8652                         (2, self.value, required),
8653                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8654                         (4, payment_data, option),
8655                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8656                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8657                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8658                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8659                 });
8660                 Ok(())
8661         }
8662 }
8663
8664 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8665         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8666                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8667                         (0, prev_hop, required),
8668                         (1, total_msat, option),
8669                         (2, value_ser, required),
8670                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8671                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8672                         (5, total_value_received, option),
8673                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8674                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8675                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8676                 });
8677                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8678                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8679                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8680                         Some(p) => {
8681                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
8682                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8683                                 }
8684                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8685                                         total_msat = Some(value);
8686                                 }
8687                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8688                         },
8689                         None => {
8690                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
8691                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
8692                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8693                                         }
8694                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8695                                 }
8696                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8697                         },
8698                 };
8699                 Ok(Self {
8700                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8701                         timer_ticks: 0,
8702                         value,
8703                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8704                         total_value_received,
8705                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8706                         onion_payload,
8707                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8708                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8709                 })
8710         }
8711 }
8712
8713 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8714         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8715                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8716                 match id {
8717                         0 => {
8718                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8719                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8720                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8721                                 let mut payment_id = None;
8722                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8723                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8724                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8725                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8726                                         (1, payment_id, option),
8727                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8728                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8729                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8730                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
8731                                 });
8732                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
8733                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8734                                         // instead.
8735                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8736                                 }
8737                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8738                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8739                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8740                                 }
8741                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8742                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8743                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8744                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8745                                                 }
8746                                         }
8747                                 }
8748                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8749                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8750                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
8751                                         path,
8752                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8753                                 })
8754                         }
8755                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8756                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8757                 }
8758         }
8759 }
8760
8761 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8762         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8763                 match self {
8764                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8765                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8766                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8767                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8768                                         (0, session_priv, required),
8769                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8770                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8771                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8772                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8773                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8774                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8775                                  });
8776                         }
8777                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8778                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8779                                 field.write(writer)?;
8780                         }
8781                 }
8782                 Ok(())
8783         }
8784 }
8785
8786 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8787         (0, forward_info, required),
8788         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8789         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8790         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8791         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8792 });
8793
8794 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8795         (1, FailHTLC) => {
8796                 (0, htlc_id, required),
8797                 (2, err_packet, required),
8798         };
8799         (0, AddHTLC)
8800 );
8801
8802 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8803         (0, payment_secret, required),
8804         (2, expiry_time, required),
8805         (4, user_payment_id, required),
8806         (6, payment_preimage, required),
8807         (8, min_value_msat, required),
8808 });
8809
8810 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8811 where
8812         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8813         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8814         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8815         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8816         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8817         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8818         R::Target: Router,
8819         L::Target: Logger,
8820 {
8821         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8822                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8823
8824                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8825
8826                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8827                 {
8828                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8829                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8830                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8831                 }
8832
8833                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8834                 {
8835                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8836                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8837                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8838                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8839                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8840                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8841                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
8842                                 }
8843
8844                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8845                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
8846                                 ).count();
8847                         }
8848
8849                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8850
8851                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8852                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8853                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8854                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8855                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8856                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8857                                         } else { None }
8858                                 ) {
8859                                         channel.write(writer)?;
8860                                 }
8861                         }
8862                 }
8863
8864                 {
8865                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8866                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8867                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8868                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8869                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8870                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
8871                                         forward.write(writer)?;
8872                                 }
8873                         }
8874                 }
8875
8876                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8877
8878                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8879                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8880                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8881
8882                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8883                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8884                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8885                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8886                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8887                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8888                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8889                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
8890                         }
8891                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8892                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8893                 }
8894
8895                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8896                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8897                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8898                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8899                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8900                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
8901                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8902                 }
8903
8904                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8905                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8906                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8907                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8908                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8909                         // no channels.
8910                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8911                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8912                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8913                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8914                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8915                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8916                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8917                                 }
8918                         }
8919                 }
8920
8921                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8922                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8923                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8924                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8925                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8926                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8927                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8928                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
8929                         0u64.write(writer)?;
8930                 } else {
8931                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8932                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8933                                 event.write(writer)?;
8934                         }
8935                 }
8936
8937                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8938                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8939                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8940                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8941                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8942                 0u64.write(writer)?;
8943
8944                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8945                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8946                 // likely to be identical.
8947                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8948                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8949
8950                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8951                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8952                         hash.write(writer)?;
8953                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8954                 }
8955
8956                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8957                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8958                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8959                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8960                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8961                         }
8962                 }
8963                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8964                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8965                         match outbound {
8966                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8967                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8968                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8969                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8970                                         }
8971                                 }
8972                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8973                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8974                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8975                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8976                         }
8977                 }
8978
8979                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8980                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8981                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8982                         match outbound {
8983                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8984                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8985                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8986                                 },
8987                                 _ => {},
8988                         }
8989                 }
8990
8991                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8992                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8993                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8994                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8995                 }
8996
8997                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8998                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8999                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9000                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9001                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9002                 }
9003
9004                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9005                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9006                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9007                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9008                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9009                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9010                                 }
9011                         }
9012                 }
9013
9014                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9015                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9016                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9017                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9018                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9019                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9020                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9021                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9022                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9023                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9024                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9025                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9026                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9027                 });
9028
9029                 Ok(())
9030         }
9031 }
9032
9033 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9034         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9035                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9036                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9037                         event.write(w)?;
9038                         action.write(w)?;
9039                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9040                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9041                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9042                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9043                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9044                                 // check that the event is sane here.
9045                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9046                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9047                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9048                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9049                         }
9050                 }
9051                 Ok(())
9052         }
9053 }
9054 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9055         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9056                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9057                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9058                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9059                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9060                         len) as usize);
9061                 for _ in 0..len {
9062                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9063                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9064                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9065                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
9066                         } else if action.is_some() {
9067                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9068                         }
9069                 }
9070                 Ok(events)
9071         }
9072 }
9073
9074 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9075         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9076         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9077         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9078         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9079         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9080 );
9081
9082 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9083 ///
9084 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9085 /// is:
9086 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9087 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9088 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9089 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9090 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9091 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9092 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9093 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9094 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9095 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9096 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9097 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9098 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9099 ///    the next step.
9100 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9101 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9102 ///
9103 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9104 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9105 ///
9106 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9107 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9108 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9109 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9110 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9111 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9112 ///
9113 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9114 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9115 where
9116         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9117         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9118         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9119         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9120         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9121         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9122         R::Target: Router,
9123         L::Target: Logger,
9124 {
9125         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9126         pub entropy_source: ES,
9127
9128         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9129         pub node_signer: NS,
9130
9131         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9132         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9133         /// signing data.
9134         pub signer_provider: SP,
9135
9136         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9137         ///
9138         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9139         pub fee_estimator: F,
9140         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9141         ///
9142         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9143         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9144         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9145         pub chain_monitor: M,
9146
9147         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9148         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9149         /// force-closed during deserialization.
9150         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9151         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9152         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9153         ///
9154         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9155         pub router: R,
9156         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9157         /// deserialization.
9158         pub logger: L,
9159         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9160         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9161         pub default_config: UserConfig,
9162
9163         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9164         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9165         ///
9166         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9167         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9168         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9169         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9170         ///
9171         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9172         /// this struct.
9173         ///
9174         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9175         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9176 }
9177
9178 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9179                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9180 where
9181         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9182         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9183         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9184         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9185         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9186         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9187         R::Target: Router,
9188         L::Target: Logger,
9189 {
9190         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9191         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9192         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9193         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9194                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9195                 Self {
9196                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9197                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9198                 }
9199         }
9200 }
9201
9202 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9203 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9204 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9205         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9206 where
9207         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9208         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9209         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9210         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9211         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9212         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9213         R::Target: Router,
9214         L::Target: Logger,
9215 {
9216         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9217                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9218                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9219         }
9220 }
9221
9222 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9223         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9224 where
9225         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9226         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9227         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9228         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9229         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9230         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9231         R::Target: Router,
9232         L::Target: Logger,
9233 {
9234         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9235                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9236
9237                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9238                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9239                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9240
9241                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9242
9243                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9244                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9245                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9246                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9247                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9248                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9249                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9250                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9251                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9252                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9253                         ))?;
9254                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9255                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9256                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9257                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9258                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9259                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9260                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9261                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9262                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9263                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9264                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9265                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9266                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9267                                         }
9268                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9269                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9270                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9271                                         }
9272                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9273                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9274                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9275                                         }
9276                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9277                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9278                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9279                                         }
9280                                         let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9281                                         if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9282                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9283                                         }
9284                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9285                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9286                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9287                                                 });
9288                                         }
9289                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9290                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9291                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9292                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9293                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9294                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9295                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9296                                         }, None));
9297                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9298                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
9299                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9300                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9301                                                 }
9302                                                 if !found_htlc {
9303                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9304                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9305                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9306                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9307                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9308                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9309                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9310                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
9311                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9312                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9313                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9314                                                 }
9315                                         }
9316                                 } else {
9317                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9318                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9319                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9320                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9321                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9322                                         }
9323                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9324                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9325                                         }
9326                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9327                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9328                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9329                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9330                                                 },
9331                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9332                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9333                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9334                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
9335                                                 }
9336                                         }
9337                                 }
9338                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9339                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9340                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9341                                 // safely discard the channel.
9342                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9343                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9344                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9345                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9346                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9347                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9348                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9349                                 }, None));
9350                         } else {
9351                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9352                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9353                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9354                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9355                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9356                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9357                         }
9358                 }
9359
9360                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9361                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9362                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9363                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9364                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9365                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9366                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9367                                 };
9368                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9369                         }
9370                 }
9371
9372                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9373                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9374                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9375                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9376                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9377                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9378                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9379                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9380                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9381                         }
9382                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9383                 }
9384
9385                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9386                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9387                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9388                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9389                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9390                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9391                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9392                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9393                         }
9394                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9395                 }
9396
9397                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9398                         PeerState {
9399                                 channel_by_id,
9400                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9401                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9402                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9403                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9404                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9405                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9406                                 is_connected: false,
9407                         }
9408                 };
9409
9410                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9411                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9412                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9413                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9414                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9415                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9416                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9417                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9418                 }
9419
9420                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9421                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9422                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9423                 for _ in 0..event_count {
9424                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9425                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9426                                 None => continue,
9427                         }
9428                 }
9429
9430                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9431                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9432                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9433                                 0 => {
9434                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9435                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9436                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
9437                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9438                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9439                                 }
9440                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9441                         }
9442                 }
9443
9444                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9445                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9446
9447                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9448                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9449                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9450                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9451                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9452                         }
9453                 }
9454
9455                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9456                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9457                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9458                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9459                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9460                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9461                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9462                         };
9463                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9464                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9465                         };
9466                 }
9467
9468                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9469                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9470                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9471                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9472                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9473                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9474                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9475                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9476                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9477                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9478                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9479                 let mut events_override = None;
9480                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9481                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9482                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9483                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9484                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9485                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9486                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9487                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9488                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9489                         (8, events_override, option),
9490                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9491                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9492                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9493                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9494                 });
9495                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9496                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9497                 }
9498
9499                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9500                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9501                 }
9502
9503                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9504                         pending_events_read = events;
9505                 }
9506
9507                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9508                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9509                 }
9510
9511                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9512                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9513                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9514                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9515                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9516                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9517                         }
9518                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9519                 }
9520                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9521                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9522                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9523                 };
9524
9525                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9526                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9527                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9528                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9529                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9530                 //
9531                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9532                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9533                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9534                 //
9535                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9536                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9537                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9538                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9539                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9540                         ) => { {
9541                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9542                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9543                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9544                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9545                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9546                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9547                                         pending_background_events.push(
9548                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9549                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9550                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9551                                                         update: update.clone(),
9552                                                 });
9553                                 }
9554                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9555                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9556                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9557                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9558                                         pending_background_events.push(
9559                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9560                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9561                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9562                                                 });
9563                                 }
9564                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9565                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9566                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9567                                 }
9568                                 max_in_flight_update_id
9569                         } }
9570                 }
9571
9572                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9573                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9574                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9575                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9576                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9577                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9578                                         // discarded.
9579                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9580                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9581                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9582                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9583                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9584                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9585                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9586                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9587                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9588                                                 }
9589                                         }
9590                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9591                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9592                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9593                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9594                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9595                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9596                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9597                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9598                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9599                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9600                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9601                                         }
9602                                 } else {
9603                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9604                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9605                                         debug_assert!(false);
9606                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9607                                 }
9608                         }
9609                 }
9610
9611                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9612                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9613                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9614                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9615                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9616                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9617                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9618                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9619                                         });
9620                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9621                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9622                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9623                                 } else {
9624                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9625                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9626                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9627                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9628                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9629                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9630                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9631                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9632                                 }
9633                         }
9634                 }
9635
9636                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9637                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9638
9639                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9640                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9641                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9642                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9643
9644                 {
9645                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9646                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9647                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9648                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9649                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9650                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9651                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9652                         // 0.0.102+
9653                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9654                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9655                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9656                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9657                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9658                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
9659                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9660                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9661                                                         }
9662
9663                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9664                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9665                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9666                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9667                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9668                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9669                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9670                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9671                                                                 },
9672                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9673                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9674                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9675                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
9676                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9677                                                                                 payment_params: None,
9678                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9679                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9680                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9681                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9682                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9683                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9684                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9685                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9686                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
9687                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9688                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9689                                                                         });
9690                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9691                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9692                                                                 }
9693                                                         }
9694                                                 }
9695                                         }
9696                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9697                                                 match htlc_source {
9698                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9699                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9700                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9701                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9702                                                                 };
9703                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9704                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9705                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9706                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9707                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9708                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9709                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
9710                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9711                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9712                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9713                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9714                                                                                                 false
9715                                                                                         } else { true }
9716                                                                                 } else { true }
9717                                                                         });
9718                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
9719                                                                 });
9720                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9721                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9722                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9723                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9724                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9725                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9726                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
9727                                                                                         } else { true }
9728                                                                                 });
9729                                                                                 false
9730                                                                         } else { true }
9731                                                                 });
9732                                                         },
9733                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9734                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9735                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9736                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9737                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9738                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9739                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9740                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9741                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9742                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9743                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9744                                                                         let compl_action =
9745                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9746                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9747                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9748                                                                                 };
9749                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9750                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9751                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9752                                                                 }
9753                                                         },
9754                                                 }
9755                                         }
9756                                 }
9757
9758                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9759                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9760                                 // payments.
9761                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9762                                         .into_iter()
9763                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9764                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9765                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9766                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9767                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9768                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9769                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9770                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9771                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9772                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9773                                                         } else { None }
9774                                                 } else {
9775                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9776                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9777                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9778                                                         // channel still live case here.
9779                                                         None
9780                                                 }
9781                                         });
9782                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9783                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9784                                 }
9785                         }
9786                 }
9787
9788                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9789                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9790                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9791                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9792                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9793                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9794                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9795                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9796                         }, None));
9797                 }
9798
9799                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9800                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9801
9802                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9803                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9804                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9805                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9806                         }
9807                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9808                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9809                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9810                                 }
9811                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9812                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9813                                 {
9814                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9815                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9816                                         });
9817                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9818                                 }
9819                         } else {
9820                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9821                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9822                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9823                                         });
9824                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9825                                 }
9826                         }
9827                 } else {
9828                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9829                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9830                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9831                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9832                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9833                                 }
9834                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9835                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9836                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9837                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9838                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9839                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9840                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9841                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9842                                                                                 Err(()) => {
9843                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9844                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9845                                                                                 }
9846                                                                         }
9847                                                                 },
9848                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9849                                                         }
9850                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9851                                         },
9852                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9853                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9854                                 };
9855                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9856                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9857                                 });
9858                         }
9859                 }
9860
9861                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9862                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9863
9864                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9865                         Ok(key) => key,
9866                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9867                 };
9868                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9869                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9870                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9871                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9872                         }
9873                 }
9874
9875                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9876                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9877                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9878                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9879                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9880                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9881                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9882                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9883                                                 loop {
9884                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9885                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9886                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9887                                                 }
9888                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9889                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9890                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9891                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9892                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9893                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9894                                         }
9895                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
9896                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9897                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9898                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9899                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9900                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9901                                                 }
9902                                         }
9903                                 } else {
9904                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9905                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9906                                         debug_assert!(false);
9907                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9908                                 }
9909                         }
9910                 }
9911
9912                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9913
9914                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9915                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9916                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9917                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9918                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9919                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9920                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9921                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9922                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9923                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9924                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9925                                         }
9926                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9927                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9928
9929                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9930                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9931                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9932                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9933                                                 //
9934                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9935                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9936                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9937                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9938                                                 // reason to.
9939                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9940                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9941                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9942                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9943                                                 // restart.
9944                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9945                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9946                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9947                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9948                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9949                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9950                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9951                                                         }
9952                                                 }
9953                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9954                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9955                                                 }
9956                                         }
9957                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9958                                                 receiver_node_id,
9959                                                 payment_hash,
9960                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
9961                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9962                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9963                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9964                                         }, None));
9965                                 }
9966                         }
9967                 }
9968
9969                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9970                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9971                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9972                                         for action in actions.iter() {
9973                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9974                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9975                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9976                                                 } = action {
9977                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9978                                                                 log_trace!(args.logger,
9979                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
9980                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
9981                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9982                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9983                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9984                                                         } else {
9985                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9986                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9987                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9988                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9989                                                                 // anymore.
9990                                                         }
9991                                                 }
9992                                         }
9993                                 }
9994                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9995                         } else {
9996                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9997                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9998                         }
9999                 }
10000
10001                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10002                         genesis_hash,
10003                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10004                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10005                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10006                         router: args.router,
10007
10008                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10009
10010                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10011                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10012                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10013                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10014
10015                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10016                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10017                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10018                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10019                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10020                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10021
10022                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10023
10024                         our_network_pubkey,
10025                         secp_ctx,
10026
10027                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10028
10029                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10030
10031                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10032                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10033                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10034                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10035                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10036
10037                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10038                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10039
10040                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10041
10042                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10043                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
10044                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10045
10046                         logger: args.logger,
10047                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
10048                 };
10049
10050                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10051                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10052                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10053                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10054                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10055                 }
10056
10057                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10058                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10059                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10060                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10061                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10062                                 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10063                 }
10064
10065                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10066                 //connection or two.
10067
10068                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10069         }
10070 }
10071
10072 #[cfg(test)]
10073 mod tests {
10074         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10075         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10076         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10077         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10078         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10079         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10080         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10081         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10082         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10083         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10084         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10085         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10086         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10087         use crate::util::test_utils;
10088         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10089         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10090
10091         #[test]
10092         fn test_notify_limits() {
10093                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10094                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10095                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10096                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10097                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10098                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10099
10100                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10101                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10102                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10103                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10104                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10105
10106                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10107
10108                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10109                 // to connect messages with new values
10110                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10111                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10112                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10113                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10114                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10115                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10116
10117                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10118                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10119                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10120                 // ... but the last node should not.
10121                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10122                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10123                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10124                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10125
10126                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10127                 // about the channel.
10128                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10129                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10130                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10131
10132                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10133                 // parties.
10134                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10135                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10136                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10137                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10138                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10139                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10140
10141                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10142                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10143                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10144
10145                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10146                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10147                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10148                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10149                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10150                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10151
10152                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10153                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10154                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10155                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10156                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10157                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10158                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10159                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10160
10161                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10162                 // the channel info has updated.
10163                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10164                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10165                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10166                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10167                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10168                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10169         }
10170
10171         #[test]
10172         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10173                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10174                 // expected.
10175                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10176                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10177                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10178                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10179                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10180
10181                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10182                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10183                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10184                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10185
10186                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10187                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10188                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10189                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10190                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10191                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10192                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10193                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10194                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10195                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10196                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10197                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10198
10199                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10200                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10201                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10202                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10203                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10204                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10205                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10206                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10207                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10208                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10209                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10210                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10211                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10212                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10213                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10214                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10215                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10216                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10217                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10218                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10219                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10220                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10221                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10222
10223                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10224                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10225                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10226                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10227                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10228                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10229                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10230
10231                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10232                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10233                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10234                 // lightning messages manually.
10235                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10236                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10238
10239                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10240                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10241                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10242                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10243                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10244                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10245                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10246                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10247                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10248                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10249                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10250                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10251                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10252                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10253                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10254                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10255                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10256                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10257                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10258                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10259                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10260                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10261                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10262                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10263                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10264                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10265
10266                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10267                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10268                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10269                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10270                 match events[0] {
10271                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10272                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10273                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10274                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10275                         },
10276                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10277                 }
10278                 match events[1] {
10279                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10280                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10281                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10282                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10283                         },
10284                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10285                 }
10286         }
10287
10288         #[test]
10289         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10290                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10291                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10292         }
10293
10294         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10295                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10296                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10297                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10298                 //      fails as expected.
10299                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10300                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10301                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10302                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10303                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10304                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10305                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10306                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10307                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10308                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10309                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10310                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10311                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10312                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10313                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10314
10315                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10316                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10317                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10318
10319                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10320                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10321                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10322                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10323                 let route = find_route(
10324                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10325                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10326                 ).unwrap();
10327                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10328                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10329                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10330                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10331                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10332                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10333                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10334                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10335                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10336                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10337                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10338                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10339                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10340                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10341                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10342                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10343                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10344                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10345                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10346                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10347                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10348                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10349                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10350                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10351
10352                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10353                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10354
10355                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10356                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10357                 let route = find_route(
10358                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10359                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10360                 ).unwrap();
10361                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10362                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10363                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10364                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10365                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10366                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10367                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10368                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10369
10370                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10371                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10372                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10373                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10374                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10375                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10376                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10377                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10378                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10379                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10380                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10381                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10382                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10383                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10384                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10385                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10386                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10387                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10388                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10389                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10390                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10391                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10392                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10393                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10394
10395                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10396                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10397
10398                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10399                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10400                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10401                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10402                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10403                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10404                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10405                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10406                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10407                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10408
10409                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10410                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10411                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10412                         100_000
10413                 );
10414                 let route = find_route(
10415                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10416                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10417                 ).unwrap();
10418                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10419                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10420                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10421                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10422                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10423                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10424                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10425                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10426                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10427                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10428                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10429                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10430                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10431                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10432                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10433                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10434                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10435                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10436                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10437                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10438                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10439                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10440                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10441
10442                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10443                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10444         }
10445
10446         #[test]
10447         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10448                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10449                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10450                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10451                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10452                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10453                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10454
10455                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10456                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10457
10458                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10459                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10460                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10461                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10462                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10463                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10464                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10465                 let route = find_route(
10466                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10467                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10468                 ).unwrap();
10469
10470                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10471                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10472                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10473                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10474                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10475                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10476                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10477
10478                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10479                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10480                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10481                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10482                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10483                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10484                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10485
10486                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10487         }
10488
10489         #[test]
10490         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10491                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10492                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10493                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10494                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10495                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10496                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10497                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10498                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10499
10500                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10501                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10502
10503                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10504                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10505                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10506                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10507                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10508                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10509                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10510                 let route = find_route(
10511                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10512                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10513                 ).unwrap();
10514
10515                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10516                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10517                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10518                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10519                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10520                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10521                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10522                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10523                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10524
10525                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10526                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10527                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10528                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10529                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10530                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10531                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10532
10533                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10534         }
10535
10536         #[test]
10537         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10538                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10539                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10540                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10541                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10542
10543                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10544                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10545                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10546                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10547
10548                 // Marshall an MPP route.
10549                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10550                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10551                 route.paths.push(path);
10552                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10553                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10554                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10555                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10556                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10557                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10558
10559                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10560                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10561                 .unwrap_err() {
10562                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10563                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10564                         },
10565                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10566                 }
10567         }
10568
10569         #[test]
10570         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10571                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10572                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10573                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10574                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10575
10576                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10577
10578                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10579                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10580
10581                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10582                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10583                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10584                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10585
10586                 {
10587                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10588                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10589                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10590                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10591                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10592                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10593                 }
10594
10595                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10596
10597                 {
10598                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10599                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10600                 }
10601         }
10602
10603         #[test]
10604         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10605                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10606                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10607                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10608                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10609                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10610
10611                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10612                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10613                         payment_secret,
10614                         total_msat: 100_000,
10615                 };
10616
10617                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10618                 // payment verification fails as expected.
10619                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10620                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10621                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10622                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10623                         Err(()) => {
10624                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10625                         }
10626                 }
10627
10628                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10629                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10630         }
10631
10632         #[test]
10633         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10634                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10635                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10636                 // the channel is successfully closed.
10637                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10638                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10639                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10640                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10641
10642                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10643                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10644                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10645                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10646                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10647
10648                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10649                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10650                 {
10651                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10652                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10653                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10654                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10655                 }
10656
10657                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10658                 {
10659                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10660                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10661                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10662                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10663                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10664                 }
10665
10666                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10667
10668                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10669
10670                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10671                 {
10672                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10673                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10674                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10675                 }
10676                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10677
10678                 {
10679                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10680                         // as it has the funding transaction.
10681                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10682                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10683                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10684                 }
10685                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10686                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10687                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10689                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10690                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10691                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10692                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10693
10694                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10695                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10696                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10697                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10698
10699                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10700                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10701                 {
10702                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10703                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10704                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10705                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10706                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10707                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10708                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10709                 }
10710
10711                 {
10712                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10713                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10714                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10715                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10716                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10717                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10718                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10719                 }
10720
10721                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10722                 {
10723                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10724                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10725                         // closing transaction).
10726                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10727                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10728                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10729
10730                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10731                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10732                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10733                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10734                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10735                 }
10736
10737                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10738
10739                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10740                 {
10741                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10742                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10743                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10744                 }
10745                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10746
10747                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10748                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10749         }
10750
10751         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10752                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10753                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10754         }
10755
10756         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10757                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10758                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10759         }
10760
10761         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
10762                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
10763                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10764         }
10765
10766         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10767                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
10768                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10769         }
10770
10771         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10772                 match res_err {
10773                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10774                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10775                         },
10776                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10777                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10778                         },
10779                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10780                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10781                 }
10782         }
10783
10784         #[test]
10785         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10786                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10787                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10788                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10789                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10790                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10791                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10792                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10793
10794                 // Dummy values
10795                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10796                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10797                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10798
10799                 // Test the API functions.
10800                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10801
10802                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10803
10804                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10805
10806                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10807
10808                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10809
10810                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10811
10812                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10813         }
10814
10815         #[test]
10816         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
10817                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
10818                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
10819                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
10820                 // the given `channel_id`.
10821                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10822                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10823                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10824                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10825
10826                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10827
10828                 // Dummy values
10829                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10830
10831                 // Test the API functions.
10832                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
10833
10834                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10835
10836                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10837
10838                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10839
10840                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10841
10842                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
10843         }
10844
10845         #[test]
10846         fn test_connection_limiting() {
10847                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10848                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10849                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10850                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10851                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10852
10853                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10854
10855                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10856                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10857
10858                 let mut funding_tx = None;
10859                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10860                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10861                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10862
10863                         if idx == 0 {
10864                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10865                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10866                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10867                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10868                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10869
10870                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10871                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10872                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10873
10874                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10875
10876                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10877                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10878                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10879                         }
10880                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10881                 }
10882
10883                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10884                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10885                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10886                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10887                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10888
10889                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10890                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10891                 // limit.
10892                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10893                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10894                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10895                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10896                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10897                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10898                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10899                         }, true).unwrap();
10900                 }
10901                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10902                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10903                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10904                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10905                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10906
10907                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10908                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10909                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10910                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10911                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10912                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10913                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10914                 }
10915                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10916                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10917                 }, true).unwrap();
10918                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10919                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10920                 }, true).unwrap_err();
10921
10922                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10923                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10924                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10925                 }, false).unwrap();
10926                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10927
10928                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10929                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10930                 // open channels.
10931                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10932                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10933                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10934                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10935                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10936                 }
10937                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10938                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10939                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10940
10941                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10942                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10943                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10944
10945                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10946                 // "protected" and can connect again.
10947                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10948                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10949                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10950                 }, true).unwrap();
10951                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10952
10953                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10954                 // last_random_pk.
10955                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10956                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10957         }
10958
10959         #[test]
10960         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10961                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10962                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10963                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10964                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10965                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10966
10967                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10968
10969                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10970                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10971
10972                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10973                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10974                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10975                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10976                 }
10977
10978                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10979                 // rejected.
10980                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10981                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10982                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10983
10984                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10985                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10986                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10987
10988                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10989                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10990                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10991                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10992         }
10993
10994         #[test]
10995         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10996                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10997                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10998                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10999                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11000                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11001                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11002                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11003                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11004
11005                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11006
11007                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11008                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11009
11010                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11011                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11012                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11013                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11014                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11015                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11016                         }, true).unwrap();
11017
11018                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11019                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11020                         match events[0] {
11021                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11022                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11023                                 }
11024                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11025                         }
11026                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11027                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11028                 }
11029
11030                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11031                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11032                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11033                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11034                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11035                 }, true).unwrap();
11036                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11037                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11038                 match events[0] {
11039                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11040                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11041                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11042                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11043                                         _ => panic!(),
11044                                 }
11045                         }
11046                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11047                 }
11048                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11049                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11050
11051                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11052                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11053                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11054                 match events[0] {
11055                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11056                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11057                         }
11058                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11059                 }
11060                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11061         }
11062
11063         #[test]
11064         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11065                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11066                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11067                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11068                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11069                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11070                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11071                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11072                         amt_msat: 100,
11073                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11074                         payment_metadata: None,
11075                         keysend_preimage: None,
11076                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11077                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11078                         }),
11079                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11080                 };
11081                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11082                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11083                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11084                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11085                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11086                 {
11087                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11088                 } else { panic!(); }
11089
11090                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11091                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11092                         amt_msat: 100,
11093                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11094                         payment_metadata: None,
11095                         keysend_preimage: None,
11096                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11097                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11098                         }),
11099                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11100                 };
11101                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11102                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11103         }
11104
11105         #[test]
11106         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11107                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11108                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11109                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11110                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11111
11112                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11113                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11114
11115                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11116                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11117                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11118                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11119                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11120
11121                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11122                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11123
11124                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11125                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11126                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11127                 match &msg_events[0] {
11128                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11129                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11130                                 match action {
11131                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11132                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11133                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11134                                 }
11135                         }
11136                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11137                 }
11138
11139                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11140                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11141                 match events[0] {
11142                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11143                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11144                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11145                 }
11146                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11147         }
11148
11149         #[test]
11150         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11151                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11152                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11153                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11154                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11155                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11156                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11157                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11158                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11159                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11160                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11161
11162                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11163                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11164                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11165
11166                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11167                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11168                 match events[0] {
11169                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11170                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11171                         }
11172                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11173                 }
11174
11175                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11176                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11177
11178                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11179                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11180
11181                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11182                 // not have generated any events.
11183                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11184         }
11185
11186         #[test]
11187         fn test_update_channel_config() {
11188                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11189                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11190                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11191                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11192                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11193                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11194                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11195
11196                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11197                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11198                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11199
11200                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11201                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11202                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11203                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11204                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11205                 match &events[0] {
11206                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11207                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11208                 }
11209
11210                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11211                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11212                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11213
11214                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11215                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11216                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11217                         ..Default::default()
11218                 }).unwrap();
11219                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11220                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11221                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11222                 match &events[0] {
11223                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11224                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11225                 }
11226
11227                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11228                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11229                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11230                         ..Default::default()
11231                 }).unwrap();
11232                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11233                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11234                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11235                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11236                 match &events[0] {
11237                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11238                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11239                 }
11240
11241                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11242                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11243                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11244                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11245                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11246                 assert!(
11247                         matches!(
11248                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11249                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11250                                         ..Default::default()
11251                                 }),
11252                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11253                         )
11254                 );
11255                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11256                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11257                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11258                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11259         }
11260
11261         #[test]
11262         fn test_payment_display() {
11263                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11264                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11265                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11266                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11267                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11268                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11269         }
11270 }
11271
11272 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
11273 pub mod bench {
11274         use crate::chain::Listen;
11275         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11276         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11277         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11278         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11279         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11280         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11281         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11282         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11283         use crate::util::test_utils;
11284         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11285
11286         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11287         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11288         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11289
11290         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11291
11292         use criterion::Criterion;
11293
11294         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11295                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11296                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11297                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11298                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11299                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11300                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11301
11302         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11303                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11304         }
11305         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11306                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11307                 #[inline]
11308                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11309                 #[inline]
11310                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11311         }
11312
11313         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11314                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11315         }
11316
11317         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11318                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11319                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11320                 // calls per node.
11321                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11322                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11323
11324                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11325                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11326                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11327                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11328                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11329
11330                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11331                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11332                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11333
11334                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11335                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11336                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11337                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11338                         network,
11339                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11340                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11341                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11342
11343                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11344                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11345                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11346                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11347                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11348                         network,
11349                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11350                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11351                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11352
11353                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11354                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11355                 }, true).unwrap();
11356                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11357                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11358                 }, false).unwrap();
11359                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11360                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11361                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11362
11363                 let tx;
11364                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11365                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11366                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11367                         }]};
11368                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11369                 } else { panic!(); }
11370
11371                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11372                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11373                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11374                 match events_b[0] {
11375                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11376                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11377                         },
11378                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11379                 }
11380
11381                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11382                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11383                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11384                 match events_a[0] {
11385                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11386                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11387                         },
11388                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11389                 }
11390
11391                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11392
11393                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11394                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11395                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11396
11397                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11398                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11399                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11400                 match msg_events[0] {
11401                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11402                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11403                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11404                         },
11405                         _ => panic!(),
11406                 }
11407                 match msg_events[1] {
11408                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11409                         _ => panic!(),
11410                 }
11411
11412                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11413                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11414                 match events_a[0] {
11415                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11416                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11417                         },
11418                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11419                 }
11420
11421                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11422                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11423                 match events_b[0] {
11424                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11425                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11426                         },
11427                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11428                 }
11429
11430                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11431                 macro_rules! send_payment {
11432                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11433                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11434                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11435                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11436                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11437                                 payment_count += 1;
11438                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11439                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11440
11441                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11442                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11443                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11444                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11445                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11446                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11447                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11448                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11449                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11450                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11451                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11452
11453                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11454                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11455                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11456                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11457
11458                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11459                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11460                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11461                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11462                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11463                                         },
11464                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11465                                 }
11466
11467                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11468                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11469                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11470                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11471
11472                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11473                         }
11474                 }
11475
11476                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11477                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11478                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
11479                 }));
11480         }
11481 }