1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
116 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
122 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
123 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
126 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
127 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
128 /// may overshoot this in either case)
129 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
130 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
133 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
134 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
135 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
136 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
139 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
140 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
141 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
142 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
143 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
146 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
147 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
149 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
150 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
151 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
154 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
155 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
157 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
158 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
161 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
162 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
165 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
169 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
170 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
171 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
172 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
173 short_channel_id: u64,
175 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
176 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
178 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
179 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
184 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
186 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
187 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
188 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
190 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
191 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
194 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
195 struct ClaimableHTLC {
196 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
198 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
200 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
201 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
202 sender_intended_value: u64,
203 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
205 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
206 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
207 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
208 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
212 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
214 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
215 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
216 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
218 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
219 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
224 impl Readable for PaymentId {
225 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
226 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
231 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
233 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
234 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
235 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
237 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
238 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
243 impl Readable for InterceptId {
244 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
245 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
250 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
251 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
252 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
253 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
254 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
257 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
260 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
261 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
264 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
268 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
269 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
270 (0, short_channel_id, required),
271 (2, htlc_id, required),
273 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
274 (0, session_priv, required),
279 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
282 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
283 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
286 session_priv: SecretKey,
287 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
288 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
289 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
290 payment_id: PaymentId,
293 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
294 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
295 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
297 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
299 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
301 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
304 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
305 payment_id.hash(hasher);
306 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
312 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
314 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
323 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
324 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
325 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
326 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
327 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
328 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
330 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
336 struct ReceiveError {
342 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
343 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
345 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
346 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
347 pub enum FailureCode {
348 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
349 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
350 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
351 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
352 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
353 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
354 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
355 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
356 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
357 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
358 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
361 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
363 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
364 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
365 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
366 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
367 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
369 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
370 err: msgs::LightningError,
371 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
372 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
374 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
378 err: LightningError {
380 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
381 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
388 shutdown_finish: None,
392 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
393 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
396 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
398 err: LightningError {
400 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
401 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
408 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
412 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
415 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
418 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
422 log_level: Level::Warn,
425 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
427 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
429 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
445 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
446 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
447 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
448 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
449 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
451 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
452 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
453 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
454 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
455 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
456 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
457 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
459 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
463 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
464 struct ClaimingPayment {
466 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
467 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
470 (0, amount_msat, required),
471 (2, payment_purpose, required),
472 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
475 struct ClaimablePayment {
476 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
477 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
478 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
481 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
482 struct ClaimablePayments {
483 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
484 /// failed/claimed by the user.
486 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
487 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
489 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
490 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
491 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
493 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
494 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
495 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
496 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
499 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
500 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
501 /// quite some time lag.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
504 /// commitment transaction.
505 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
509 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
510 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
511 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
512 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
513 /// event can be generated.
514 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
515 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
516 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
519 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
520 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
521 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
524 /// State we hold per-peer.
525 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
526 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
528 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
529 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
531 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
532 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
533 latest_features: InitFeatures,
534 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
535 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
536 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
537 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
538 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
540 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
541 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
542 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
543 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
545 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
546 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
547 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
548 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
549 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
550 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
551 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
552 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
553 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
554 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
558 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
559 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
560 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
561 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
562 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
563 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
566 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
570 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
571 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
573 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
576 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
577 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
578 struct PendingInboundPayment {
579 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
580 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
581 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
582 /// this payment being removed.
584 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
585 user_payment_id: u64,
586 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
587 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
588 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
591 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
592 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
593 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
594 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
596 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
597 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
598 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
600 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
601 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
609 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
611 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
616 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
617 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
618 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
619 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
620 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
621 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
622 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
623 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
624 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
626 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
627 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
629 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
630 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
632 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
633 /// to individual Channels.
635 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
636 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
637 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
638 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
640 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
641 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
642 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
643 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
644 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
645 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
646 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
648 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
649 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
650 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
652 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
653 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
654 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
655 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
656 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
658 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
659 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
660 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
661 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
663 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
664 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
665 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
667 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
668 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
669 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
670 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
671 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
673 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
674 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
675 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
676 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
677 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
678 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
679 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
680 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
683 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
684 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
685 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
686 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
687 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
691 // `total_consistency_lock`
693 // |__`forward_htlcs`
695 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
697 // |__`per_peer_state`
699 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
701 // | |__`claimable_payments`
703 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
709 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
711 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
715 // | |__`pending_events`
717 // | |__`pending_background_events`
719 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
721 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
723 ES::Target: EntropySource,
724 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
725 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
730 default_configuration: UserConfig,
731 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
732 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
738 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
740 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
742 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
743 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
745 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
746 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
747 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
748 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
750 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
751 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
753 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
754 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
755 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
756 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
757 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
758 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
759 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
760 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
762 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
767 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
769 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
770 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
771 /// and via the classic SCID.
773 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
774 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
776 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
778 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
780 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
781 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
782 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
784 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
785 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
787 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
788 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
790 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
791 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
793 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
794 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
795 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
796 /// active channel list on load.
798 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
799 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
801 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
803 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
804 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
805 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
807 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
808 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
809 /// the handling of the events.
811 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
812 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
815 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
816 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
817 /// would break backwards compatability.
818 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
819 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
820 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
822 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
823 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
825 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
827 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
828 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
829 /// confirmation depth.
831 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
832 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
833 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
835 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
837 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
839 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
841 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
843 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
845 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
846 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
847 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
849 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
850 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
852 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
853 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
854 /// keeping additional state.
855 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
857 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
858 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
859 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
860 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
862 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
863 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
865 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
866 /// are currently open with that peer.
868 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
869 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
872 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
874 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
875 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
876 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
877 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
878 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
880 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
881 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
882 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
883 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
884 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
885 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
886 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
887 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
888 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
889 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
890 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
892 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
901 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
903 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
904 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
905 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
906 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
907 pub struct ChainParameters {
908 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
909 pub network: Network,
911 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
913 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
914 pub best_block: BestBlock,
917 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
923 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
924 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
925 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
926 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
927 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
928 /// updates are ready for persistence).
930 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
931 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
932 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
933 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
934 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
936 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
937 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
940 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
941 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
942 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
945 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
946 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
948 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
949 persistence_notifier: notifier,
950 should_persist: persist_check,
951 _read_guard: read_guard,
956 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
958 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
959 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
964 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
965 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
967 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
969 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
970 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
971 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
972 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
973 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
975 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
976 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
978 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
980 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
981 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
982 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
983 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
984 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
985 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
986 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
987 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
988 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
989 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
990 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
991 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
992 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
994 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
995 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
997 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
998 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
999 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1000 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1002 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1003 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1004 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1005 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1006 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1007 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1010 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1012 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1013 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1016 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1018 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1019 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1021 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1022 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1023 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1024 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1026 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1027 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1028 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1029 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1031 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1032 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1033 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1035 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1036 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1037 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1039 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1040 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1041 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1042 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1043 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1044 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1045 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1046 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1047 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1048 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1049 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1052 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1053 /// to better separate parameters.
1054 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1055 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1056 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1057 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1058 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1059 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1060 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1061 pub features: InitFeatures,
1062 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1063 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1064 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1066 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1068 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1069 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1070 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1071 /// payments to us through this channel.
1072 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1073 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1074 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1075 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1076 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1078 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1081 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1082 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1083 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1084 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1085 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1086 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1087 /// lifetime of the channel.
1088 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1089 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1090 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1091 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1092 /// our counterparty already.
1094 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1095 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1096 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1097 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1099 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1100 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1101 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1102 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1104 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1105 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1107 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1108 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1110 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1111 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1112 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1113 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1114 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1115 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1116 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1117 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1118 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1121 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1123 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1124 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1125 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1126 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1127 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1128 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1129 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1131 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1132 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1134 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1135 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1136 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1137 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1138 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1139 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1140 /// this value on chain.
1142 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1144 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1146 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1147 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1148 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1149 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1151 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1152 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1153 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1155 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1156 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1157 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1158 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1159 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1161 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1162 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1163 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1164 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1166 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1167 pub balance_msat: u64,
1168 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1169 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1170 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1171 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1173 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1175 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1176 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1177 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1178 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1179 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1180 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1181 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1182 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1184 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1185 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1186 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1187 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1188 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1189 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1190 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1192 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1193 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1194 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1195 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1196 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1197 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1198 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1199 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1200 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1202 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1204 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1205 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1206 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1207 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1208 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1210 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1211 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1212 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1213 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1214 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1215 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1216 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1218 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1219 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1220 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1221 pub is_outbound: bool,
1222 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1223 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1224 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1225 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1226 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1228 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1229 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1230 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1231 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1233 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1234 pub is_usable: bool,
1235 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1236 pub is_public: bool,
1237 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1238 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1239 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1240 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1241 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1242 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1244 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1245 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1248 impl ChannelDetails {
1249 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1250 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1251 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1253 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1254 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1255 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1256 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1259 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1260 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1261 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1263 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1264 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1265 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1266 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1269 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1270 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1272 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1273 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1274 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1276 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1277 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1278 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1279 features: latest_features,
1280 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1281 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1282 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1283 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1284 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1285 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1286 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1287 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1288 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1289 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1291 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1292 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1293 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1294 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1295 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1296 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1297 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1298 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1299 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1300 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1301 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1302 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1303 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1304 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1305 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1306 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1307 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1308 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1309 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1310 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1311 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1312 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1313 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1314 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1315 config: Some(channel.config()),
1320 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1321 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1322 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1323 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1324 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1326 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1328 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1329 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1330 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1333 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1334 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1335 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1337 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1338 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1339 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1341 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1342 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1343 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1345 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1346 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1350 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1352 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1354 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1355 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1356 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1357 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1359 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1360 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1361 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1364 macro_rules! handle_error {
1365 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1368 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1369 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1370 // entering the macro.
1371 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1372 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1374 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1376 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1377 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1378 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1379 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1383 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1384 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1385 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1386 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1391 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1392 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1394 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1395 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1396 action: err.action.clone()
1400 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1401 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1402 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1403 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1404 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1408 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1415 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1416 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1417 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1418 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1419 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1420 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1422 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1423 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1424 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1425 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1426 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1428 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1429 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1431 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1435 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1436 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1437 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1439 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1440 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1442 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1443 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1445 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1446 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1447 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1448 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1449 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1450 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1456 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1457 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1461 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1463 $entry.remove_entry();
1471 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1472 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1476 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1478 $entry.remove_entry();
1486 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1487 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1489 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1490 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1496 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1497 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1498 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1499 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1500 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1502 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1503 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1504 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1505 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1506 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1507 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1508 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1509 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1510 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1511 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1516 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1517 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1518 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1519 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1520 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1521 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1522 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1523 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1524 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1526 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1531 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1532 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1533 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1534 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1535 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1536 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1537 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1538 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1539 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1541 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1546 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1547 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1548 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1549 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1550 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1551 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1552 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1553 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1554 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1555 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1556 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1558 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1559 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1560 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1566 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1567 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1569 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1570 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1571 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1572 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1573 updates.announcement_sigs);
1574 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1575 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1578 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1579 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1580 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1582 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1584 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1585 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1587 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1588 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1589 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1590 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1595 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1596 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1597 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1598 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1599 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1601 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1602 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1603 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1606 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1607 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1608 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1609 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1610 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1611 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1612 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1613 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1617 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1618 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1619 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1620 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1621 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1623 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1629 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1630 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1634 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1636 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1637 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1638 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1639 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1640 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1641 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1645 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1647 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1648 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1650 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1652 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1653 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1654 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1657 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1658 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1659 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1660 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1661 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1662 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1663 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1664 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1666 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1667 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1668 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1673 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1675 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1676 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1677 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1678 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1679 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1680 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1681 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1682 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1684 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1687 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1688 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1690 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1692 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1694 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1696 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1697 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1698 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1699 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1709 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1710 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1711 &self.default_configuration
1714 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1715 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1716 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1719 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1720 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1722 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1724 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1728 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1733 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1735 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1736 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1737 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1738 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1739 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1741 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1742 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1744 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1745 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1746 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1748 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1749 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1750 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1751 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1752 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1753 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1755 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1756 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1757 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1758 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1759 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1763 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1764 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1765 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1769 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1770 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1772 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1774 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1775 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1776 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1777 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1778 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1779 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1783 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1788 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1790 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1794 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1796 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1799 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1803 node_id: their_network_key,
1806 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1809 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1810 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1811 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1812 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1813 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1814 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1815 // the same channel.
1816 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1818 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1820 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1821 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1822 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1823 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1824 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1825 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1833 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1834 /// more information.
1835 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1836 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1839 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1840 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1842 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1843 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1845 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1846 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1847 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1848 // really wanted anyway.
1849 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1852 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1853 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1854 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1857 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1858 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1859 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1860 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1861 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1864 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1870 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1871 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1873 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1874 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1875 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1877 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1878 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1879 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1880 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1881 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1882 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1883 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1884 total_msat: *total_msat,
1887 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1888 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1890 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1891 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1893 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1898 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1899 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1900 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1901 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1902 Some(transaction) => {
1903 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1907 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1908 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1909 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1910 reason: closure_reason
1914 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1917 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1918 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1921 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1922 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1924 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1925 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1926 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1927 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1928 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1929 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1930 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1931 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1932 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1934 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1935 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1936 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1937 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1938 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1942 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1943 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1944 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1945 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1946 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1949 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1950 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1951 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1952 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1956 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1964 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1965 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1966 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1967 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1970 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1974 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1975 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1976 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1978 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1979 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1981 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1982 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1983 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1984 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1986 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1988 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1989 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1990 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1991 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1992 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1993 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1996 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1997 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1998 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2000 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2001 /// the channel being closed or not:
2002 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2003 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2004 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2005 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2006 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2007 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2008 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2010 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2012 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2013 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2014 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2015 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2016 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2017 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2021 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2022 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2023 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2024 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2025 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2026 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2027 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2028 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2030 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2031 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2032 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2033 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2034 // ignore the result here.
2035 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2039 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2040 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2041 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2042 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2044 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2045 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2047 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2049 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2050 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2051 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2053 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2055 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2057 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2060 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2061 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2062 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2063 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2064 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2069 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2072 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2074 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2075 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2077 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2078 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2079 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2080 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2081 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2082 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2083 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2094 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2095 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2096 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2098 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2099 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2100 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2103 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2104 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2105 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2107 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2108 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2109 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2110 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2111 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2114 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2115 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2116 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2117 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2118 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2122 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2123 /// local transaction(s).
2124 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2125 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2126 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2130 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2131 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2133 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2134 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2135 return Err(ReceiveError {
2136 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2138 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2141 // final_expiry_too_soon
2142 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2143 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2145 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2146 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2147 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2148 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2149 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2150 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2151 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2152 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2153 return Err(ReceiveError {
2154 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2155 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2158 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2159 return Err(ReceiveError {
2161 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2162 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2166 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2167 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2168 return Err(ReceiveError {
2169 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2170 err_data: Vec::new(),
2171 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2174 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2175 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2176 return Err(ReceiveError {
2177 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2178 err_data: Vec::new(),
2179 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2181 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2182 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2185 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2186 phantom_shared_secret,
2188 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2189 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2190 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2191 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2192 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2193 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2194 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2195 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2196 return Err(ReceiveError {
2197 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2198 err_data: Vec::new(),
2199 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2203 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2206 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2209 return Err(ReceiveError {
2210 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2211 err_data: Vec::new(),
2212 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2217 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2220 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2221 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2222 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2223 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2227 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2228 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2229 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2231 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2232 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2233 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2234 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2235 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2236 failure_code: $err_code,
2242 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2243 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2246 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2247 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2248 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2250 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2251 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2252 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2253 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2254 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2255 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2256 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2257 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2259 macro_rules! return_err {
2260 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2262 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2263 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2264 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2265 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2266 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2267 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2273 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2275 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2276 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2278 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2279 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2283 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2284 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2286 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2288 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2289 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2290 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2291 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2292 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2294 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2297 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2298 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2299 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2301 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2302 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2303 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2306 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2307 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2308 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2309 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2313 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2314 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2315 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2318 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2319 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2320 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2321 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2322 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2327 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2328 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2329 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2330 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2331 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2332 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2333 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2334 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2335 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2336 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2337 // phantom or an intercept.
2338 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2339 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2340 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2344 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2347 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2349 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2351 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2352 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2353 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2355 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2356 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2357 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2359 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2360 // have no consistency guarantees.
2361 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2365 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2366 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2367 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2368 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2369 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2371 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2372 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2373 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2374 // we don't have the channel here.
2375 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2377 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2379 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2380 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2381 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2382 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2383 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2384 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2385 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2387 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2388 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2390 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2391 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2395 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2396 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2397 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2398 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2400 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2407 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2408 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2409 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2410 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2411 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2412 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2414 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2415 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2417 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2418 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2419 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2420 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2421 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2422 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2423 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2424 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2425 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2426 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2432 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2433 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2434 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2435 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2437 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2438 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2440 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2441 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2442 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2444 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2445 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2446 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2447 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2448 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2449 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2450 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2454 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2459 pending_forward_info
2462 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2463 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2464 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2466 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2467 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2468 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2470 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2471 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2472 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2473 if !chan.should_announce() {
2474 return Err(LightningError {
2475 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2476 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2479 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2480 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2483 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2486 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2487 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2488 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2489 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2491 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2492 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2493 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2495 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2496 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2497 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2499 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2500 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2504 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2506 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2507 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2508 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2510 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2511 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2513 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2514 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2515 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2516 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2517 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2518 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2519 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2520 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2522 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2523 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2524 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2526 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2528 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2535 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2536 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2537 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2540 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2541 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2542 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2545 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2546 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2548 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2549 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2550 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2551 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2552 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2554 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2556 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2557 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2558 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2559 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2562 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2563 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2564 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2565 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2566 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2567 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2568 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2569 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2571 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2572 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2573 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2575 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2576 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2578 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2579 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2580 Some(monitor_update) => {
2581 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2582 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2583 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2586 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2587 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2588 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2589 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2590 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2591 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2592 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2593 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2599 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2600 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2601 // `channel_by_id` map.
2602 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2603 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2608 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2609 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2611 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2616 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2618 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2619 /// fields for more info.
2621 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2622 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2624 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2626 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2627 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2628 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2629 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2630 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2632 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2633 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2634 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2635 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2636 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2638 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2639 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2640 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2641 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2643 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2645 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2646 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2647 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2649 /// In general, a path may raise:
2650 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2651 /// node public key) is specified.
2652 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2653 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2655 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2656 /// relevant updates.
2658 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2659 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2660 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2662 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2663 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2664 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2665 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2666 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2667 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2668 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2670 self.pending_outbound_payments
2671 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2672 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2673 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2676 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2677 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2678 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2679 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2681 self.pending_outbound_payments
2682 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2683 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2684 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2685 &self.pending_events,
2686 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2687 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2691 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2692 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2694 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2695 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2696 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2700 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2701 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2702 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2706 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2707 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2708 /// retries are exhausted.
2710 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2711 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2713 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2714 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2715 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2717 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2718 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2720 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2721 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2722 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2724 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2727 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2728 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2729 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2730 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2731 /// never reach the recipient.
2733 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2734 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2736 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2737 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2739 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2741 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2742 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2743 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2744 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2745 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2746 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2747 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2748 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2749 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2752 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2753 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2755 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2758 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2759 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2760 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2761 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2762 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2763 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2764 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2765 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2766 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2767 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2770 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2771 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2772 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2773 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2774 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2776 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2777 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2778 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2781 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2784 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2785 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2788 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2789 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2790 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2791 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2792 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2793 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2794 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2795 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2801 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2803 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2805 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2806 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2807 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2808 } else { unreachable!(); })
2811 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2814 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2815 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2818 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2819 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2824 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2825 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2828 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2830 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2833 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2834 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2835 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2844 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2845 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2846 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2850 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2852 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2853 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2855 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2856 /// across the p2p network.
2858 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2859 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2861 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2862 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2863 /// keys per-channel).
2865 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2866 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2867 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2869 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2870 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2871 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2873 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2874 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2875 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2876 /// for more details.
2878 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2879 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2880 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2883 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2884 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2885 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2886 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2891 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2892 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2893 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2894 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2895 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2896 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2897 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2901 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2902 let mut output_index = None;
2903 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2904 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2905 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2906 if output_index.is_some() {
2907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2908 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2911 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2913 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2916 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2919 if output_index.is_none() {
2920 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2921 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2924 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2928 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2930 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2931 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2932 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2933 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2935 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2936 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2938 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2939 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2941 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2943 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2944 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2945 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2946 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2947 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2948 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2949 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2950 pub fn update_channel_config(
2951 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2952 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2953 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2955 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2960 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2963 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2964 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2967 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2968 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2969 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2970 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2974 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2975 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2976 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2979 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2980 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2981 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2982 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2983 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2991 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2992 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2994 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2995 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2997 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2998 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2999 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3000 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3001 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3003 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3004 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3006 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3009 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3010 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3011 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3012 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3013 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3016 let next_hop_scid = {
3017 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3018 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3019 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3024 if !chan.is_usable() {
3025 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3026 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3029 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3031 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3032 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3037 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3038 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3039 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3042 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3043 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3044 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3046 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3048 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3049 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3052 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3053 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3054 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3055 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3056 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3058 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3062 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3063 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3065 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3068 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3069 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3072 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3073 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3074 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3077 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3078 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3079 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3080 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3081 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3082 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3083 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3086 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3087 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3089 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3094 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3096 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3097 /// Will likely generate further events.
3098 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3101 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3102 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3103 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3105 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3106 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3108 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3109 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3110 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3112 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3113 match forward_info {
3114 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3115 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3116 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3117 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3118 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3121 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3122 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3123 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3125 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3126 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3127 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3128 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3129 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3130 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3133 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3134 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3136 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3139 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3140 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3146 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3147 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3149 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3153 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3154 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3156 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3160 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3161 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3162 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3163 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3164 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3166 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3167 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3168 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3169 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3170 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3172 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3174 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3175 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3179 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3180 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3181 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3182 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3188 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3191 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3194 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3195 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3196 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3197 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3198 // problem, not ours.
3204 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3205 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3207 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3212 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3213 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3214 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3219 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3221 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3225 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3226 match forward_info {
3227 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3228 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3229 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3230 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3231 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3235 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3236 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3237 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3238 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3239 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3240 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3241 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3243 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3244 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3245 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3247 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3250 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3252 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3253 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3254 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3255 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3260 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3261 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3263 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3265 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3266 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3268 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3269 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3271 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3273 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3274 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3275 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3284 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3285 match forward_info {
3286 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3287 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3288 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3289 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3292 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3293 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3294 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3296 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3297 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3298 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3300 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3301 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3302 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3303 None, None, onion_fields)
3306 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3309 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3310 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3311 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3312 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3313 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3314 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3315 phantom_shared_secret,
3317 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3318 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3319 // if routing nodes overpay
3320 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3321 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3323 total_value_received: None,
3324 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3329 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3331 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3332 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3333 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3334 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3335 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3336 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3338 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3339 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3340 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3341 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3342 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3343 phantom_shared_secret,
3345 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3346 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3348 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3351 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3352 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3353 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3354 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3355 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3358 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3359 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3360 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3362 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3363 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3364 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3367 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3368 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3369 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3371 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3372 .entry(payment_hash)
3373 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3374 .or_insert_with(|| {
3375 committed_to_claimable = true;
3377 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3380 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3381 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3382 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3385 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3387 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3388 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3389 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3391 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3394 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3395 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3396 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3397 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3398 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3399 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3400 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3401 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3403 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3404 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3406 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3408 _ => unreachable!(),
3411 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3412 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3413 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3414 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3415 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3417 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3418 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3419 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3420 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3421 committed_to_claimable = true;
3423 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3424 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3425 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3426 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3427 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3428 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3432 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3433 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3434 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3435 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3437 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3439 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3440 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3442 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3443 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3444 committed_to_claimable = true;
3447 payment_claimable_generated
3451 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3452 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3453 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3454 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3455 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3456 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3457 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3458 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3460 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3461 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3462 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3463 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3464 Ok(result) => result,
3466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3467 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3470 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3471 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3472 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3473 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3474 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3475 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3478 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3480 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3481 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3482 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3483 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3485 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3486 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3487 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3488 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3489 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3490 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3491 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3492 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3493 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3494 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3496 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3497 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3498 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3502 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3503 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3505 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3510 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3517 if payment_data.is_none() {
3518 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3519 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3521 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3522 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3523 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3524 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3525 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3526 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3527 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3528 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3530 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3531 if payment_claimable_generated {
3532 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3538 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3539 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3547 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3548 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3549 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3550 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3551 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3552 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3554 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3555 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3557 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3559 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3560 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3561 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3563 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3565 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3566 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3567 events.append(&mut new_events);
3570 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3572 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3573 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3575 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3576 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3577 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3578 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3579 if background_events.is_empty() {
3583 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3585 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3586 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3587 // monitor updating completing.
3588 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3595 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3596 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3597 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3598 self.process_background_events();
3601 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3602 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3603 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3604 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3605 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3606 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3607 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3609 if !chan.is_live() {
3610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3611 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3612 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3614 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3615 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3617 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3618 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3622 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3623 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3624 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3625 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3626 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3627 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3628 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3630 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3633 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3634 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3635 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3636 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3637 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3638 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3646 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3648 /// This currently includes:
3649 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3650 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3651 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3653 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3654 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3655 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3657 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3658 /// estimate fetches.
3660 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3661 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3662 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3663 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3664 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3665 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3667 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3669 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3670 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3671 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3674 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3676 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3677 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3678 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3679 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3680 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3681 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3683 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3684 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3685 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3686 if needs_close { return false; }
3689 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3690 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3691 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3692 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3693 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3694 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3695 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3696 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3700 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3701 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3703 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3704 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3705 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3709 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3710 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3715 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3719 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3720 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3725 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3726 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3727 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3728 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3729 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3730 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3731 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3732 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3733 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3734 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3735 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3737 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3738 // have no channels to the peer.
3739 let remove_entry = {
3740 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3741 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3744 entry.remove_entry();
3747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3752 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3753 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3754 // This should be unreachable
3755 debug_assert!(false);
3758 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3759 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3760 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3761 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3762 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3763 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3764 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3767 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3768 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3769 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3771 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3772 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3779 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3780 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3781 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3782 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3783 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3786 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3787 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3790 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3792 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3793 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3794 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3795 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3796 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3803 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3804 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3805 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3807 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3808 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3809 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3810 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3812 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3813 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3814 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3815 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3816 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3817 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3820 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3821 /// reason for the failure.
3823 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3824 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3825 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3827 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3828 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3829 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
3830 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3831 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3832 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3833 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3838 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3839 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3840 match failure_code {
3841 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3842 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3843 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3844 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3845 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3846 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3851 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3852 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3854 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3856 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3857 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3858 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3859 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3860 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3861 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3862 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3864 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3866 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3867 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3869 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3874 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3875 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3876 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3877 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3878 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3879 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3880 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3881 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3882 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3883 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3885 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3886 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3887 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3888 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3890 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3891 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3892 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3893 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3894 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3898 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3899 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3900 // be surfaced to the user.
3901 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3902 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3903 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3905 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3907 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3910 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3912 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3916 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3919 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3920 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3921 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3922 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3926 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3927 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3928 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3929 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3930 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3931 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3932 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3933 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3934 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3937 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3938 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3939 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3942 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3943 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3944 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3946 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3947 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3948 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3949 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3950 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3952 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3953 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3954 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3956 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3957 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3958 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3959 push_forward_ev = true;
3961 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3962 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3963 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3965 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3966 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3969 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3970 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3971 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3972 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3973 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3974 failed_next_destination: destination,
3980 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3981 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3983 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
3984 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
3985 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
3986 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
3988 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3989 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3990 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3991 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3993 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3994 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
3995 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3996 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3997 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3998 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3999 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4000 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4005 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4006 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4007 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4008 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4009 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4010 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4011 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4012 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4017 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4018 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4019 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4021 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4022 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4023 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4024 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4029 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4031 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4032 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4033 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4034 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4035 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4036 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4037 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4038 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4039 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4041 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4042 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4043 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4044 debug_assert!(false);
4048 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4050 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4051 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4052 debug_assert!(false);
4056 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4058 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4059 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4060 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4061 if sources.len() != 1 {
4062 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4063 debug_assert!(false);
4069 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4071 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4072 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4073 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4074 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4077 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4078 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4079 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4080 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4084 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4085 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4086 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4087 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4089 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4090 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4091 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4092 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4093 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4098 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4099 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4100 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4101 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4102 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4103 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4104 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4106 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4109 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4110 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4111 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4112 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4116 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4117 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4118 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4119 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4123 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4124 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4125 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4129 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4130 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4131 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4134 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4137 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4138 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4139 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4141 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4142 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4143 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4144 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4145 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4147 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4148 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4149 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4150 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4151 if let Err(e) = res {
4152 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4153 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4154 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4155 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4156 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4163 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4164 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4165 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4169 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4170 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4171 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4172 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4173 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4174 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4175 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4176 // again on restart.
4177 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4178 payment_preimage, update_res);
4180 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4181 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4182 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4183 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4184 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4185 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4189 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4190 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4193 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4195 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4196 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4198 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4199 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4200 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4201 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4202 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4203 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4204 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4207 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4208 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4210 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4212 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4215 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4219 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4220 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4221 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4227 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4228 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4229 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4232 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4233 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4235 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4236 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4237 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4238 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4239 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4243 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4244 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4250 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4251 /// update completion.
4252 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4253 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4254 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4255 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4256 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4257 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4259 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4260 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4261 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4262 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4263 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4264 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4266 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4268 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4269 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4270 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4271 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4274 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4275 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4277 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4278 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4279 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4284 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4285 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4286 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4287 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4292 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4293 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4294 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4295 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4296 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4301 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4305 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4311 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4312 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4313 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4317 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4318 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4319 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4325 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4326 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4328 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4329 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4331 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4332 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4333 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4334 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4335 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4341 let mut peer_state_lock;
4342 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4343 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4344 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4347 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4352 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4353 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4354 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4357 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4360 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4362 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4363 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4366 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4367 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4368 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4370 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4371 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4372 /// used to accept such channels.
4374 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4375 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4376 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4377 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4380 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4381 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4383 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4384 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4385 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4387 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4388 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4390 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4391 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4393 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4394 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4396 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4397 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4398 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4399 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4402 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4405 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4407 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4408 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4411 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4412 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4414 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4415 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4418 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4419 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4420 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4421 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4422 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4423 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4426 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4427 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4428 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4430 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4431 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4432 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4433 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4434 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4435 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4436 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4437 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4440 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4441 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4442 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4446 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4447 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4448 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4452 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4458 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4459 /// or 0-conf channels.
4461 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4462 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4463 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4464 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4465 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4466 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4468 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4469 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4470 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4471 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4472 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4473 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4474 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4478 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4481 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4482 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4484 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4485 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4486 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4487 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4489 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4492 num_unfunded_channels
4495 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4496 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4497 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4500 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4501 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4504 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4505 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4506 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4507 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4509 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4510 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4511 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4512 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4514 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4515 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4517 debug_assert!(false);
4518 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4523 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4524 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4525 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4526 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4527 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4528 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4530 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4531 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4532 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4535 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4536 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4538 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4539 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4542 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4543 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4544 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4547 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4552 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4554 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4555 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4558 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4559 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4560 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4562 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4563 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4564 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4567 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4568 pending_events.push(
4569 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4570 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4571 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4572 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4573 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4574 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4579 entry.insert(channel);
4585 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4586 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4587 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4588 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4590 debug_assert!(false);
4591 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4593 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4594 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4595 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4596 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4597 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4598 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4603 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4604 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4605 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4606 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4607 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4609 user_channel_id: user_id,
4614 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4615 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4617 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4618 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4620 debug_assert!(false);
4621 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4626 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4627 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4629 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4634 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4636 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4639 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4641 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4642 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4643 funding_msg.channel_id))
4645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4646 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4650 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4651 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4652 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4653 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4654 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4655 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4656 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4660 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4662 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4663 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4664 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4666 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4667 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4668 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4669 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4670 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4671 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4672 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4673 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4681 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4682 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4683 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4684 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4686 debug_assert!(false);
4687 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4690 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4691 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4692 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4694 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4695 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4696 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4697 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4698 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4699 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4700 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4701 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4702 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4703 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4712 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4713 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4714 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4716 debug_assert!(false);
4717 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4719 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4720 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4721 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4723 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4724 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4725 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4726 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4727 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4728 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4729 msg: announcement_sigs,
4731 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4732 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4733 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4734 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4735 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4736 // announcement_signatures.
4737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4738 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4739 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4740 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4747 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4748 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4757 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4758 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4759 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4760 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4761 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4763 debug_assert!(false);
4764 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4768 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4771 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4772 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4773 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4774 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4777 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4778 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4779 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4780 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4782 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4783 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4784 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4785 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4786 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4787 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4792 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4793 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4794 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4795 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4796 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4803 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4804 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4805 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4806 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4812 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4814 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4816 debug_assert!(false);
4817 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4819 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4820 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4821 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4822 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4824 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4825 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4826 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4827 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4832 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4833 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4834 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4835 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4836 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4837 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4838 } else { (tx, None) }
4840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4843 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4844 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4845 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4847 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4848 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4849 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4850 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4851 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4855 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4860 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4861 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4862 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4863 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4865 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4866 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4867 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4868 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4870 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4872 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4874 debug_assert!(false);
4875 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4879 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4882 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4883 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4884 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4885 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4886 match pending_forward_info {
4887 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4888 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4889 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4890 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4892 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4893 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4894 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4895 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4896 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4899 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4901 _ => pending_forward_info
4904 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4911 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4912 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4914 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4916 debug_assert!(false);
4917 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4921 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4923 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4928 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4932 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4933 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4934 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4936 debug_assert!(false);
4937 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4939 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4941 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4943 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4950 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4951 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4952 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4954 debug_assert!(false);
4955 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4957 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4958 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4959 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4960 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4961 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4962 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4963 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4965 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4972 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4974 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4976 debug_assert!(false);
4977 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4981 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4983 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4984 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4985 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4986 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4987 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4988 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4990 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4995 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4996 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4997 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4998 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4999 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5000 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5001 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5002 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5003 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5004 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5005 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5007 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5008 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5010 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5011 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5012 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5014 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5015 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5018 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5019 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5021 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5022 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5023 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5024 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5025 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5026 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5027 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5028 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5029 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5032 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5033 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5036 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5037 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5038 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5039 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5040 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5041 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5042 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5045 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5046 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5047 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5052 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5053 // payments are being processed.
5054 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5055 push_forward_event = true;
5057 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5058 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5065 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5066 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5069 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5070 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5071 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5073 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5077 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5078 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5079 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5080 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5081 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5083 if !forward_ev_exists {
5084 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5086 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5091 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5092 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5093 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5094 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5096 debug_assert!(false);
5097 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5098 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5100 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5102 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5103 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5104 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5105 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5106 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5107 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5108 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5113 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5117 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5118 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5119 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5121 debug_assert!(false);
5122 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5124 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5125 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5126 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5128 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5135 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5136 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5137 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5139 debug_assert!(false);
5140 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5142 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5143 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5144 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5145 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5146 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5147 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5150 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5151 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5152 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5153 msg, &self.default_configuration
5155 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5156 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5157 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5165 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5166 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5167 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5168 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5170 // It's not a local channel
5171 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5175 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5176 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5177 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5181 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5183 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5184 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5185 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5186 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5187 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5188 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5192 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5193 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5194 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5195 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5197 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5198 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5201 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5203 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5206 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5208 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5211 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5213 debug_assert!(false);
5214 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5216 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5217 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5218 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5219 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5220 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5221 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5222 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5223 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5224 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5225 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5226 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5227 let mut channel_update = None;
5228 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5229 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5230 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5233 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5234 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5235 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5236 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5237 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5238 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5239 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5244 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5245 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5246 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5247 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5248 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5249 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5257 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5258 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5261 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5262 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5267 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5268 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5269 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5271 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5272 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5273 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5274 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5275 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5276 match monitor_event {
5277 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5278 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5279 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5280 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5282 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5283 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5284 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5285 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5288 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5289 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5290 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5291 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5293 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5294 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5295 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5296 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5299 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5301 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5304 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5305 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5306 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5307 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5308 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5309 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5313 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5314 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5316 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5318 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5319 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5320 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5322 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5329 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5330 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5336 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5337 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5340 has_pending_monitor_events
5343 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5344 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5345 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5347 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5348 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5349 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5350 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5352 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5357 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5358 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5359 /// update was applied.
5360 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5361 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5362 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5363 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5365 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5366 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5367 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5368 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5370 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5371 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5374 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5375 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5376 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5377 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5378 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5379 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5380 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5381 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5383 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5384 has_monitor_update = true;
5386 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5387 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5388 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5389 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5390 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5391 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5392 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5394 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5396 continue 'peer_loop;
5405 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5406 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5407 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5410 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5411 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5417 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5418 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5419 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5420 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5421 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5422 let mut has_update = false;
5424 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5426 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5427 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5428 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5429 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5430 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5431 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5432 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5433 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5436 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5439 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5440 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5441 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5442 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5443 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5448 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5450 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5451 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5452 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5458 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5459 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5467 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5468 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5474 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5475 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5477 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5478 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5479 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5480 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5481 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5482 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5483 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5484 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5485 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5486 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5487 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5488 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5489 assert!(should_broadcast);
5490 } else { unreachable!(); }
5491 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5493 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5497 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5498 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5500 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5501 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5504 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5507 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5508 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5510 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5511 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5512 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5513 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5514 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5515 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5516 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5517 // never fail a payment too early.
5518 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5520 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5528 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5531 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5532 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5534 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5535 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5536 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5537 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5539 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5541 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5542 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5546 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5547 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5549 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5551 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5552 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5554 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5555 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5556 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5557 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5558 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5559 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5560 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5561 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5562 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5563 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5564 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5567 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5568 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5570 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5573 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5575 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5577 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5578 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5579 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5580 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5581 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5584 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5585 /// stored external to LDK.
5587 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5588 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5589 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5591 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5592 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5595 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5596 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5597 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5598 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5600 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5601 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5602 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5603 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5604 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5606 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5607 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5608 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5609 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5610 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5612 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5613 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5615 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5616 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5620 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5621 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5623 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5625 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5626 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5628 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5629 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5630 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5631 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5632 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5633 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5634 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5637 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5638 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5640 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5643 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5645 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5647 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5648 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5651 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5652 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5654 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5655 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5656 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5659 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5660 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5662 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5663 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5664 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5665 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5667 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5668 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5669 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5670 Some(_) => continue,
5671 None => return scid_candidate
5676 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5678 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5679 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5681 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5682 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5683 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5687 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5688 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5689 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5691 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5692 /// times to get a unique scid.
5693 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5694 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5695 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5697 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5698 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5699 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5700 return scid_candidate
5704 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5705 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5706 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5707 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5709 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5710 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5711 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5713 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5714 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5715 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5716 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5725 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5726 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5727 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5728 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5729 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5733 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5734 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5735 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5740 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5741 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5742 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5746 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5747 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5751 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5752 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5755 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5756 /// using the given event handler.
5758 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5759 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5762 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5763 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5764 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5766 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5768 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5769 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5770 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5771 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5774 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5775 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5776 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5779 for event in pending_events {
5780 handler(event).await;
5783 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5784 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5789 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5791 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5792 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5793 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5794 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5795 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5796 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5800 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5801 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5802 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5803 /// is always placed next to each other.
5805 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5806 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5807 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5808 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5810 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5811 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5812 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5813 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5814 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5815 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5816 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5818 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5819 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5820 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5821 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5824 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5825 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5827 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5828 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5831 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5833 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5834 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5835 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5836 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5837 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5841 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5842 events.replace(pending_events);
5851 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5853 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5854 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5855 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5856 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5857 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5858 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5862 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5864 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5865 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5866 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5867 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5868 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5870 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5871 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5872 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5873 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5876 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5877 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5878 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5881 for event in pending_events {
5882 handler.handle_event(event);
5890 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5892 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5893 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5894 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5895 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5896 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5897 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5901 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5903 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5904 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5905 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5906 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5907 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5910 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5911 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5914 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5915 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5916 let new_height = height - 1;
5918 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5919 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5920 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5921 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5922 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5923 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5926 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5930 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5932 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5933 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5934 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5935 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5936 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5937 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5941 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5942 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5943 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5944 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5946 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5947 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5950 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5951 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5953 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5954 if height < last_best_block_height {
5955 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5956 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5960 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5961 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5962 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5963 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5965 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5966 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5970 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5972 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5974 macro_rules! max_time {
5975 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5977 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5978 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5979 // having an explicit local time source.
5980 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5981 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5982 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5983 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5984 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5990 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5991 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5992 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5993 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5997 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5998 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5999 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6002 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6003 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6004 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6011 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6013 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6014 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6015 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6016 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6017 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6018 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6023 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6025 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6026 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6027 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6028 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6029 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6030 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6034 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6035 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6037 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6038 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6039 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6040 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6041 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6043 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6044 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6046 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6047 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6050 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6051 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6052 let res = f(channel);
6053 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6054 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6055 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6056 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6057 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6059 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6060 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6061 if channel.is_usable() {
6062 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6063 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6064 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6065 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6075 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6076 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6079 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6080 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6081 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6082 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6083 msg: announcement_sigs,
6085 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6086 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6087 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6089 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6090 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6091 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6096 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6097 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6098 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6099 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6100 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6101 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6102 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6103 // is always consistent.
6104 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6105 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6106 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6107 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6108 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6111 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6112 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6113 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6114 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6115 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6116 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6117 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6121 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6122 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6123 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6124 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6125 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6126 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6127 data: reason_message,
6137 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6138 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6139 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6140 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6141 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6142 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6143 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6144 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6145 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6146 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6148 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6149 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6150 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6154 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6157 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6158 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6159 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6160 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6161 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6162 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6163 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6164 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6165 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6168 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6169 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6170 _ => unreachable!(),
6172 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6173 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6174 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6181 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6183 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6184 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6188 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6190 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6191 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6193 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6194 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6197 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6198 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6199 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6202 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6203 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6204 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6205 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6208 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6209 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6210 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6211 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6214 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6215 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6217 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6218 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6219 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6220 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6221 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6224 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6225 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6226 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6227 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6230 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6231 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6232 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6233 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6236 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6237 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6238 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6239 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6243 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6244 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6246 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6247 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6248 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6249 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6250 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6251 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6255 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6256 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6257 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6260 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6262 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6265 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6266 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6267 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6270 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6271 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6272 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6275 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6276 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6277 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6280 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6281 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6282 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6285 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6287 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6290 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6295 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6296 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6297 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6300 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6302 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6305 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6307 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6310 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6312 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6315 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6317 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6320 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6322 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6325 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6327 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6330 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6331 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6332 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6335 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6340 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6342 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6345 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6347 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6348 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6350 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6351 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6352 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6353 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6355 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6356 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6357 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6358 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6359 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6360 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6365 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6367 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6369 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6370 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6371 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6372 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6373 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6374 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6375 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6376 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6377 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6378 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6379 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6380 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6381 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6382 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6383 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6384 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6385 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6386 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6387 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6390 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6391 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6392 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6393 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6396 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6398 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6400 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6401 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6405 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6406 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6407 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6413 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6414 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6415 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6416 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6417 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6418 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6421 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6422 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6423 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6424 if inbound_peer_limited {
6427 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6428 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6429 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6430 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6431 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6436 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6437 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6439 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6440 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6441 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6442 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6447 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6448 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6453 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6455 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6456 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6459 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6460 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6461 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6462 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6463 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6464 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6465 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6469 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6470 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6471 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6476 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6477 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6478 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6479 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6480 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6489 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6493 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6494 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6496 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6497 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6498 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6499 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6500 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6501 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6502 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6503 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6505 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6506 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6507 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6511 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6513 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6514 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6517 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6518 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6519 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6520 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6528 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6529 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6533 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6534 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6537 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6538 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6542 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6543 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6544 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6545 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6548 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6549 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6551 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6552 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6553 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6554 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6555 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6558 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6559 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6560 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6561 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6564 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6565 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6566 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6567 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6570 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6571 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6572 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6573 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6574 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6575 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6576 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6577 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6578 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6579 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6580 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6581 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6582 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6583 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6584 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6585 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6586 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6587 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6589 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6590 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6591 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6597 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6598 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6600 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6601 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6602 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6603 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6606 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6607 (2, node_id, required),
6608 (4, features, required),
6609 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6610 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6611 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6612 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6615 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6616 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6617 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6618 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6619 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6620 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6621 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6622 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6623 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6624 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6625 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6626 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6627 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6628 (7, self.config, option),
6629 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6630 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6631 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6632 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6633 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6634 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6635 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6636 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6637 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6638 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6639 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6640 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6641 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6642 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6643 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6644 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6645 (32, self.is_public, required),
6646 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6647 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6648 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6649 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6655 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6656 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6657 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6658 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6659 (2, channel_id, required),
6660 (3, channel_type, option),
6661 (4, counterparty, required),
6662 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6663 (6, funding_txo, option),
6664 (7, config, option),
6665 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6666 (9, confirmations, option),
6667 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6668 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6669 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6670 (16, balance_msat, required),
6671 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6672 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6673 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6674 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6675 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6676 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6677 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6678 (26, is_outbound, required),
6679 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6680 (30, is_usable, required),
6681 (32, is_public, required),
6682 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6683 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6684 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6685 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6688 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6689 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6690 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6691 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6692 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6696 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6698 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6699 outbound_scid_alias,
6703 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6704 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6706 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6707 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6708 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6709 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6710 confirmations_required,
6712 force_close_spend_delay,
6713 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6714 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6715 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6716 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6717 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6718 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6719 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6724 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6725 (2, channels, vec_type),
6726 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6727 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6730 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6732 (0, onion_packet, required),
6733 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6736 (0, payment_data, required),
6737 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6738 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6739 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6741 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6742 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6743 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6744 (3, payment_metadata, option),
6748 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6749 (0, routing, required),
6750 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6751 (4, payment_hash, required),
6752 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6753 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6754 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6758 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6759 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6761 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6763 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6764 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6765 reason.write(writer)?;
6767 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6768 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6771 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6772 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6773 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6774 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6781 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6782 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6783 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6786 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6787 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6788 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6789 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6793 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6794 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6795 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6796 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6797 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6800 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6801 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6802 // messages contained in the variants.
6803 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6804 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6805 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6807 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6809 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6810 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6811 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6814 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6815 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6816 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6817 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6818 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6820 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6825 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6830 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6831 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6832 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6833 (2, outpoint, required),
6834 (4, htlc_id, required),
6835 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6838 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6839 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6840 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6841 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6842 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6844 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6845 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6846 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6847 (2, self.value, required),
6848 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6849 (4, payment_data, option),
6850 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6851 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6852 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6858 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6859 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6860 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6862 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6863 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6864 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6865 let mut total_value_received = None;
6866 let mut total_msat = None;
6867 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6868 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6869 (0, prev_hop, required),
6870 (1, total_msat, option),
6871 (2, value, required),
6872 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6873 (4, payment_data, option),
6874 (5, total_value_received, option),
6875 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6876 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6878 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6880 if payment_data.is_some() {
6881 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6883 if total_msat.is_none() {
6884 total_msat = Some(value);
6886 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6889 if total_msat.is_none() {
6890 if payment_data.is_none() {
6891 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6893 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6895 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6899 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6902 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6903 total_value_received,
6904 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6911 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6912 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6913 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6916 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6917 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6918 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6919 let mut payment_id = None;
6920 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6921 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6922 (0, session_priv, required),
6923 (1, payment_id, option),
6924 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6925 (4, path, vec_type),
6926 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6928 if payment_id.is_none() {
6929 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6931 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6933 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6934 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6936 let path = path.unwrap();
6937 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6938 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6939 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6942 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6943 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6944 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6946 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6949 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6950 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6955 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6956 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6958 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6960 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6961 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6962 (0, session_priv, required),
6963 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6964 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6965 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6966 (4, *path, vec_type),
6967 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6970 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6972 field.write(writer)?;
6979 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6980 (0, forward_info, required),
6981 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6982 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6983 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6984 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6987 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6989 (0, htlc_id, required),
6990 (2, err_packet, required),
6995 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6996 (0, payment_secret, required),
6997 (2, expiry_time, required),
6998 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6999 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7000 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7003 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7005 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7006 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7007 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7008 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7009 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7010 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7014 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7015 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7017 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7019 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7021 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7022 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7023 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7026 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7029 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7030 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7031 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7034 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7035 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7037 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7038 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7039 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7040 unfunded_channels += 1;
7045 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7047 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7050 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7051 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7052 channel.write(writer)?;
7059 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7060 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7061 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7062 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7063 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7064 for forward in pending_forwards {
7065 forward.write(writer)?;
7070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7072 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7073 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7074 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7076 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7077 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7078 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7079 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7080 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7081 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7082 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7083 htlc.write(writer)?;
7085 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7086 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7089 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7090 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7091 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7092 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7093 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7094 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7095 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7098 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7099 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7100 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7101 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7102 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7104 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7105 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7106 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7107 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7108 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7109 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7110 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7115 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7116 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7117 for event in events.iter() {
7118 event.write(writer)?;
7121 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7122 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7123 for event in background_events.iter() {
7125 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7127 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7128 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7133 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7134 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7135 // likely to be identical.
7136 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7137 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7139 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7140 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7141 hash.write(writer)?;
7142 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7145 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7146 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7147 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7148 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7149 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7152 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7153 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7155 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7156 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7157 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7158 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7161 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7162 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7166 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7167 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7168 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7170 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7171 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7172 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7178 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7179 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7180 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7181 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7184 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7185 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7186 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7187 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7188 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7191 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7192 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7193 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7194 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7195 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7196 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7197 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7198 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7199 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7200 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7201 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7208 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7210 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7212 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7213 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7214 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7215 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7216 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7217 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7218 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7219 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7220 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7221 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7222 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7223 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7224 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7226 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7227 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7229 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7230 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7232 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7233 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7234 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7235 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7236 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7237 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7239 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7240 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7242 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7243 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7244 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7245 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7246 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7247 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7251 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7252 pub entropy_source: ES,
7254 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7255 pub node_signer: NS,
7257 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7258 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7260 pub signer_provider: SP,
7262 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7264 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7265 pub fee_estimator: F,
7266 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7268 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7269 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7270 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7271 pub chain_monitor: M,
7273 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7274 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7275 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7276 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7277 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7278 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7280 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7282 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7283 /// deserialization.
7285 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7286 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7287 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7289 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7290 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7292 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7293 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7294 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7295 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7297 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7300 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7301 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7304 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7305 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7307 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7309 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7310 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7311 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7312 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7316 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7317 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7318 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7319 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7320 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7322 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7323 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7328 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7329 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7330 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7331 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7333 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7334 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7335 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7336 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7337 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7338 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7342 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7343 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7344 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7348 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7349 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7351 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7352 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7353 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7354 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7355 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7356 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7360 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7361 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7363 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7364 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7369 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7371 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7372 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7373 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7374 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7375 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7376 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7377 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7378 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7380 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7381 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7382 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7383 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7384 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7385 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7386 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7387 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7388 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7389 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7390 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7391 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7392 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7393 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7394 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7395 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7396 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7397 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7398 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7399 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7400 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7401 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7402 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7403 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7404 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7405 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7406 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7407 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7409 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7410 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7411 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7412 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7413 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7415 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7416 let mut found_htlc = false;
7417 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7418 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7421 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7422 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7423 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7424 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7425 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7426 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7427 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7428 log_info!(args.logger,
7429 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7430 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7431 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7435 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7436 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7437 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7439 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7440 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7442 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7443 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7444 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7445 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7448 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7449 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7450 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7454 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7455 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7456 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7457 // safely discard the channel.
7458 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7459 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7460 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7461 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7462 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7465 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7466 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7467 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7468 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7469 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7470 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7474 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7475 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7476 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7477 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7478 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7480 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7484 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7485 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7487 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7488 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7491 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7492 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7494 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7497 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7498 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7499 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7500 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7501 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7503 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7504 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7506 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7509 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7510 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7511 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7512 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7513 let peer_state = PeerState {
7514 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7515 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7516 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7517 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7518 is_connected: false,
7520 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7523 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7524 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7525 for _ in 0..event_count {
7526 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7527 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7532 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7533 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7534 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7536 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7537 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7538 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7539 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7541 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7544 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7548 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7549 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7551 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7552 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7553 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7554 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7555 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7559 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7560 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7561 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7562 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7563 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7564 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7565 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7567 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7572 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7573 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7574 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7575 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7576 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7577 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7578 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7579 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7580 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7581 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7582 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7583 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7584 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7585 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7586 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7587 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7588 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7589 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7590 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7591 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7592 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7593 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7595 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7596 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7599 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7600 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7603 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7604 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7607 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7608 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7609 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7610 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7611 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7612 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7614 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7616 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7617 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7618 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7622 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7623 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7624 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7625 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7626 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7627 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7628 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7630 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7631 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7632 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7633 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7634 if path.is_empty() {
7635 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7636 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7639 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7640 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7641 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7642 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7644 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7645 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7646 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7648 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7649 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7650 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7651 retry_strategy: None,
7652 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7653 payment_params: None,
7654 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7655 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7656 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7657 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7658 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7659 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7660 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7661 total_msat: path_amt,
7662 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7664 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7665 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7670 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7672 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7673 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7674 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7675 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7677 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7678 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7679 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7680 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7681 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7682 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7683 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7684 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7685 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7686 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7687 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7692 !forwards.is_empty()
7694 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7695 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7696 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7697 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7698 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7699 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7700 intercepted_id != ev_id
7707 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7708 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7709 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7710 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7711 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7712 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7713 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7714 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7715 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7716 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7717 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7718 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7719 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7728 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7729 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7730 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7731 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7732 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7733 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7734 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7735 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7739 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7740 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7742 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7743 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7744 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7747 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
7748 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7749 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7751 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
7752 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
7754 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7755 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
7757 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7760 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
7761 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7762 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7764 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7768 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7769 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7770 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7771 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7772 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7774 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7775 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7776 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7777 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7778 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7779 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7780 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7781 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7783 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7784 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7788 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7790 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7792 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7793 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7795 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7796 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
7801 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7802 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7804 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7806 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7808 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7809 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7810 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7811 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7815 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7816 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7817 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7818 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7819 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7820 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7821 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7823 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7824 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7825 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7827 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7828 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7829 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7830 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7831 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7834 if chan.is_usable() {
7835 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7836 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7837 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7838 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7839 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7845 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7847 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7848 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7849 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7850 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7851 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7852 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7853 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7854 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7855 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7856 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7857 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7859 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7860 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7862 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7863 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7864 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7865 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7867 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7868 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7869 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7870 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7872 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7873 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7874 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7875 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7877 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7878 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7879 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7882 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7883 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7886 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7887 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7890 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7893 purpose: payment.purpose,
7894 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7900 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7901 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7902 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7904 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7909 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7911 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7912 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7913 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7914 router: args.router,
7916 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7918 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7919 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7920 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7921 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7923 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7924 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7925 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7926 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7927 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7928 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7930 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7935 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7937 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7939 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7940 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7941 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7942 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7944 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7945 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7946 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7948 logger: args.logger,
7949 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7952 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7953 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7954 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7955 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7956 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7959 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7960 //connection or two.
7962 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7968 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7969 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7970 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7971 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7972 use core::time::Duration;
7973 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7974 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7975 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7976 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7977 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7978 use crate::ln::msgs;
7979 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7980 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7981 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7982 use crate::util::test_utils;
7983 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7984 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7987 fn test_notify_limits() {
7988 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7989 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7990 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7991 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7992 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7993 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7995 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7996 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7997 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7998 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7999 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8001 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8003 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8004 // to connect messages with new values
8005 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8006 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8007 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8008 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8009 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8010 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8012 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8013 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8014 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8015 // ... but the last node should not.
8016 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8017 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8018 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8019 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8021 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8022 // about the channel.
8023 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8024 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8025 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8027 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8029 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8030 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8031 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8032 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8033 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8034 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8036 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8037 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8038 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8040 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8041 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8042 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8043 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8044 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8045 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8047 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8048 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8049 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8050 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8051 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8052 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8053 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8054 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8056 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8057 // the channel info has updated.
8058 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8059 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8060 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8061 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8062 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8063 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8067 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8068 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8073 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8074 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8076 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8077 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8078 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8079 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8081 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8082 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8083 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8084 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8085 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8086 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8087 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8088 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8090 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8092 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8094 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8095 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8096 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8098 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8100 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8101 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8102 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8104 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8108 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8109 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8110 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8111 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8112 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8113 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8114 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8115 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8116 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8118 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8119 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8120 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8122 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8124 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8126 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8127 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8128 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8129 // lightning messages manually.
8130 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8131 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8134 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8136 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8138 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8139 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8141 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8144 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8146 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8148 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8150 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8152 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8156 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8157 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8160 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8161 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8162 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8165 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8166 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8167 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8168 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8173 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8174 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8175 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8176 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8181 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8182 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8183 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8184 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8191 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8192 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8193 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8194 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8195 // fails as expected.
8196 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8197 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8198 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8199 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8200 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8201 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8202 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8204 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8205 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8206 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8208 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8209 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8210 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8211 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8213 let route = find_route(
8214 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8215 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8217 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8218 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8220 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8222 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8223 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8227 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8228 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8229 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8230 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8232 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8233 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8234 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8235 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8236 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8237 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8238 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8239 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8240 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8242 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8243 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8245 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8246 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8247 let route = find_route(
8248 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8249 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8251 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8252 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8254 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8255 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8256 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8257 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8258 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8260 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8261 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8262 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8263 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8265 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8266 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8267 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8268 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8269 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8271 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8272 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8273 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8275 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8276 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8277 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8278 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8279 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8280 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8281 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8282 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8283 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8285 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8286 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8290 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8291 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8292 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8298 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8299 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8301 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8302 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8303 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8304 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8306 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8307 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8308 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8309 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8310 let route = find_route(
8311 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8312 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8315 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8316 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8317 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8318 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8319 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8320 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8323 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8324 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8325 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8326 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8327 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8328 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8329 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8331 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8335 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8336 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8337 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8338 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8339 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8340 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8342 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8343 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8345 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8346 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8347 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8348 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8350 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8351 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8352 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8353 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8354 let route = find_route(
8355 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8356 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8359 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8360 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8361 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8362 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8363 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8364 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8365 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8366 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8369 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8370 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8371 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8372 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8373 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8374 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8375 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8377 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8381 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8385 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8387 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8388 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8389 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8390 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8392 // Marshall an MPP route.
8393 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8394 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8395 route.paths.push(path);
8396 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8397 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8398 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8399 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8400 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8401 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8403 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8404 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8406 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8407 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8409 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8414 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8418 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8420 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8422 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8423 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8425 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8426 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8428 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8431 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8432 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8433 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8434 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8435 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8436 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8439 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8442 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8443 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8448 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8449 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8453 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8455 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8456 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8458 total_msat: 100_000,
8461 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8462 // payment verification fails as expected.
8463 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8464 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8465 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8466 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8468 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8472 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8473 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8477 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8478 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8479 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8480 // the channel is successfully closed.
8481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8484 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8486 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8487 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8488 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8489 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8490 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8492 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8493 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8495 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8496 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8497 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8498 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8501 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8503 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8504 // as it has the funding transaction.
8505 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8506 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8507 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8510 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8512 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8514 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8516 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8517 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8518 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8520 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8523 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8524 // as it has the funding transaction.
8525 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8526 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8527 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8530 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8533 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8534 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8535 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8536 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8538 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8539 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8540 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8541 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8543 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8544 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8546 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8547 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8548 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8549 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8550 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8551 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8552 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8556 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8557 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8558 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8559 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8560 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8561 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8562 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8565 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8567 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8568 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8569 // closing transaction).
8570 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8571 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8572 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8574 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8575 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8576 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8577 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8578 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8581 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8583 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8585 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8586 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8587 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8589 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8591 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8592 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8595 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8596 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8597 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8600 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8601 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8602 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8605 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8607 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8608 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8610 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8611 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8613 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8614 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8619 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8620 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8621 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8622 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8623 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8624 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8625 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8626 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8629 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8630 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8631 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8633 // Test the API functions.
8634 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8636 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8638 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8640 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8642 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8644 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8646 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8650 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8651 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8655 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8657 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8659 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8660 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8662 let mut funding_tx = None;
8663 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8664 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8665 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8668 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8669 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8670 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8671 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8672 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8674 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8676 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8678 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8680 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8682 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8684 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8687 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8688 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8689 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8690 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8691 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8693 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8694 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8696 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8697 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8698 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8699 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8700 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8701 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8702 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8704 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8705 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8706 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8707 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8709 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8710 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8711 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8712 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8713 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8714 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8715 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8717 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8718 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8719 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8720 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8722 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8723 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8724 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8725 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8727 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8728 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8730 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8731 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8732 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8733 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8734 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8736 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8737 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8738 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8740 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8741 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8742 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8744 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8745 // "protected" and can connect again.
8746 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8747 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8748 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8749 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8751 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8753 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8754 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8758 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8759 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8760 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8761 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8762 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8763 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8765 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8767 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8768 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8770 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8771 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8772 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8773 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8776 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8778 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8779 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8780 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8782 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8783 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8784 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8786 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8787 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8788 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8789 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8793 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8794 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8795 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8798 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8799 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8801 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8803 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8805 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8806 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8808 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8809 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8810 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8811 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8812 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8813 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8815 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8816 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8818 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8819 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8821 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8823 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8824 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8827 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8828 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8829 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8830 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8831 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8832 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8833 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8835 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8836 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8837 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8838 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8842 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8844 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8845 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8847 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8848 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8849 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8851 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8852 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8854 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8856 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8861 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8862 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8863 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8864 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8867 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8868 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8869 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8871 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8873 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8874 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8875 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8877 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8878 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8880 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8881 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8886 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8887 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8889 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8890 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8892 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8896 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8898 use crate::chain::Listen;
8899 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8900 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8901 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8902 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8903 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8904 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8905 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8906 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8907 use crate::util::test_utils;
8908 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8910 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8911 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8912 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8914 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8918 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8919 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8920 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8921 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8922 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8923 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8924 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8925 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8930 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8931 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8934 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8935 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8936 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8938 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8940 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8941 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8942 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8943 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8944 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8946 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8947 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8949 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8950 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8951 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8952 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8954 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8956 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8958 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8959 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8960 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8961 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8962 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8964 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8966 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8968 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8969 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8970 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8971 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8972 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8975 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8976 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8977 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8979 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8980 } else { panic!(); }
8982 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8983 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8984 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8986 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8987 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8992 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8993 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8994 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8996 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8997 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8999 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9002 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9005 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9008 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9009 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9011 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9012 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9013 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9014 match msg_events[0] {
9015 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9016 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9017 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9021 match msg_events[1] {
9022 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9026 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9027 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9029 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9030 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9035 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9036 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9038 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9039 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9044 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9045 macro_rules! send_payment {
9046 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9047 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9048 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9049 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9050 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9052 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9053 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9055 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9056 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9057 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9058 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9059 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9060 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9061 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9062 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9063 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9064 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9065 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9067 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9068 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9069 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9070 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9072 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9073 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9074 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9075 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9076 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9078 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9081 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9082 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9083 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9084 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9086 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9091 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9092 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);