1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
82 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo,
83 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
84 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
85 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
86 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
89 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
90 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
91 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
92 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
95 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
96 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
97 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
98 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
102 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
104 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
106 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
110 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
114 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
115 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
116 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
117 short_channel_id: u64,
119 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
123 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
124 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
125 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
128 session_priv: SecretKey,
129 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
130 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
131 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
136 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
137 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
138 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
139 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
140 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
145 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
146 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
148 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
157 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
158 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
159 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
160 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
161 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
163 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
165 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
166 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
167 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
168 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
169 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
171 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
172 err: msgs::LightningError,
173 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
175 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
177 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
179 err: LightningError {
181 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
182 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
184 data: err.to_string()
188 shutdown_finish: None,
192 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
194 err: LightningError {
196 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
198 shutdown_finish: None,
202 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
203 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
206 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
208 err: LightningError {
210 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213 data: err.to_string()
217 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
221 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
224 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
226 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
228 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
231 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
233 data: msg.to_string()
237 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
239 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
240 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
242 data: msg.to_string()
247 shutdown_finish: None,
252 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
253 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
254 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
255 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
256 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
258 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
259 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
260 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
261 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
262 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
263 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
264 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
266 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
270 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
271 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
272 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
273 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
274 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
275 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
276 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
277 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
278 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
280 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
281 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
282 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
284 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
285 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
286 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
287 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
290 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
291 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
293 latest_features: InitFeatures,
296 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
297 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
299 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
300 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
301 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
302 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
303 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
304 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
306 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
307 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
308 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
309 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
310 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
311 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
312 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
314 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
315 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
317 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
318 /// to individual Channels.
320 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
321 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
322 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
323 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
325 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
326 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
327 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
328 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
329 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
330 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
331 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
333 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
334 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
335 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
336 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
339 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
340 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
341 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
342 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
343 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
345 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
346 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
347 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
348 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
349 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
350 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
351 default_configuration: UserConfig,
352 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
353 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
355 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
358 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
360 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
361 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
362 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
365 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
367 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
368 our_network_key: SecretKey,
370 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
372 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
373 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
374 /// are currently open with that peer.
375 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
376 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
378 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
380 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
381 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
382 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
383 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
384 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
386 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
391 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
392 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
393 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
394 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
395 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
397 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
398 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
399 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
400 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
401 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
402 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
403 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
405 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
406 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
407 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
408 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
409 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
410 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
413 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
415 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
416 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
419 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
421 macro_rules! secp_call {
422 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
425 Err(_) => return Err($err),
430 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
431 pub struct ChannelDetails {
432 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
433 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
434 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
435 /// lifetime of the channel.
436 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
437 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
438 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
439 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
440 /// The node_id of our counterparty
441 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
442 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
443 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
444 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
445 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
446 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
447 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
448 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
450 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
451 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
452 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
453 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
454 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
455 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
456 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
457 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
458 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
459 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
460 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
461 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
462 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
466 macro_rules! handle_error {
467 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
470 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
471 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
472 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
473 if let Some(update) = update_option {
474 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
479 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
480 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
481 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
482 // Return error in case higher-API need one
489 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
490 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
493 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
494 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
496 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
497 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
498 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
499 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
500 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
502 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
504 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
509 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
510 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
513 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
516 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
517 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
518 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
519 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
520 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
524 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
525 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
526 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
527 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
528 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
530 if let Some(update) = update {
531 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
533 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
534 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
535 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
536 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
537 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
538 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
542 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
543 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
544 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
546 shutdown_res.0.clear();
547 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
553 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
554 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
555 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
557 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
559 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
560 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
561 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
562 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
563 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
565 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
566 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
567 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
568 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
569 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
570 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
571 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
572 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
573 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
574 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
577 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
578 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
579 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
580 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
582 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
583 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
585 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
586 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
588 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
589 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
590 if !$resend_commitment {
591 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
594 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
596 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
597 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
603 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
604 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
605 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
607 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
608 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
612 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
613 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
614 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
615 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
616 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
619 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
624 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
625 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
627 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
628 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
630 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
632 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
634 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
635 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
637 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
638 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
639 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
640 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
641 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
643 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
644 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
646 let res = ChannelManager {
647 default_configuration: config.clone(),
648 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
649 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
653 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
654 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
657 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
658 by_id: HashMap::new(),
659 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
660 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
661 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
662 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
664 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
666 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
668 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
670 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
671 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
681 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
683 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
684 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
685 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
686 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
688 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
689 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
691 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
692 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
693 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
694 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
695 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
698 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
699 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
701 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
702 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
704 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
705 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
706 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
708 panic!("RNG is bad???");
711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
713 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
714 node_id: their_network_key,
720 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
721 let mut res = Vec::new();
723 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
724 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
725 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
726 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
727 res.push(ChannelDetails {
728 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
729 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
730 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
731 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
732 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
733 inbound_capacity_msat,
734 outbound_capacity_msat,
735 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
736 is_live: channel.is_live(),
740 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
741 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
742 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
743 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
749 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
750 /// more information.
751 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
752 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
755 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
756 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
758 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
759 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
760 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
761 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
762 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
763 // really wanted anyway.
764 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
767 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
768 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
769 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
771 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
772 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
773 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
775 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
776 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
777 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
778 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
779 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
780 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
781 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
782 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
785 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
786 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
787 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
789 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
790 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
795 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
796 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
798 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
799 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
804 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
805 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
806 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
815 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
816 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
817 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
818 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
819 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
821 for tx in local_txn {
822 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
823 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
827 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
828 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
829 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
830 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
833 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
834 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
835 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
836 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
837 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
844 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
845 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
846 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
847 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
848 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
854 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
855 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
856 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
857 for chan in self.list_channels() {
858 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
862 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
863 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
864 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
866 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
867 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
868 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
869 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
870 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
871 failure_code: $err_code,
872 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
877 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
878 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
881 let shared_secret = {
882 let mut arr = [0; 32];
883 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
886 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
888 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
889 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
890 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
891 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
892 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
893 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
894 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
895 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
898 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
899 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
900 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
901 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
902 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
905 let mut channel_state = None;
906 macro_rules! return_err {
907 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
909 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
910 if channel_state.is_none() {
911 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
913 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
914 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
915 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
916 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
917 })), channel_state.unwrap());
922 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
923 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
924 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
925 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
927 let error_code = match err {
928 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
929 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
930 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
931 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
932 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
934 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
937 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
938 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
939 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
946 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
949 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
950 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
951 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
952 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
953 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
954 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
955 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
956 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
957 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
958 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
959 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
960 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
964 // final_expiry_too_soon
965 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
966 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
968 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
969 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
970 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
972 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
973 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
974 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
977 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
978 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
979 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
980 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
982 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
983 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive {},
984 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
985 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
986 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
987 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
990 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
991 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
992 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
995 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
996 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
997 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
999 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1001 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1002 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1003 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1005 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1007 let blinding_factor = {
1008 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1009 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1010 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1011 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1014 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1016 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1018 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1021 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1022 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1025 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1026 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1027 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1028 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1029 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1033 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1034 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1035 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1036 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1038 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1039 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1040 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1041 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1045 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1046 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref type_data, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1047 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here (which is
1048 // important as various things later assume we are a ::Receive if short_channel_id is
1050 if let &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = type_data {
1051 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1052 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1053 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1054 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1056 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1058 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1059 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1061 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1062 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1063 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1064 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1065 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1066 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1067 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1069 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1070 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1072 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1073 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1074 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1076 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1077 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1079 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1080 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1081 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1082 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1084 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1085 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1090 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1091 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1092 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1093 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1095 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1096 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1098 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1099 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1101 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1103 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1108 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1111 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1112 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1113 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1114 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1115 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1119 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1121 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1122 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1123 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1124 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1125 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1126 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1127 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1128 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1129 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1130 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1133 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1134 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1136 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1142 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1144 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1145 /// fields for more info.
1147 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1148 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1149 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1150 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1151 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1152 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1154 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1156 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1157 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1158 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1159 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1160 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1161 /// relevant updates.
1163 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1164 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1165 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1166 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1167 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1168 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1169 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1170 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1172 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1173 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1174 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1175 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1179 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1181 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1183 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1184 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1185 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1186 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1187 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route had too large size once"});
1189 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1191 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1193 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1194 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1196 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1197 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1198 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1201 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1202 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1204 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1205 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1207 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1208 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1210 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1211 route: route.clone(),
1212 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1213 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1214 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1216 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1217 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1218 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1219 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1220 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1221 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1222 // something else in case we will resend later!
1223 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1226 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1227 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1228 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1229 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1230 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1231 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1232 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1240 } else { unreachable!(); }
1244 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1245 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1246 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1250 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1252 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1253 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1255 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1257 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1258 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1259 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1260 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1262 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1263 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1264 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1266 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1267 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1268 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1269 } else { unreachable!(); })
1274 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1275 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1276 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1278 Err(_) => { return; }
1281 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1282 // lock before add_update_monitor
1283 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1285 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1287 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1288 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1289 Err(_) => { return; },
1290 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1294 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1295 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1296 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1297 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1299 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1304 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1305 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1306 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1309 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1310 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1311 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1313 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1319 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1320 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1322 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1324 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1326 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1327 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1329 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1330 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1331 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1332 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1333 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1337 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1338 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event.
1340 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias a printable human-readable string to describe this node to
1341 /// humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1343 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1344 /// incoming connections.
1345 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: msgs::NetAddressSet) {
1346 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1348 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1349 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1350 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1351 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1353 addresses: addresses.to_vec(),
1354 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1355 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1357 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1359 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1360 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1361 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1362 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1363 contents: announcement
1368 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1370 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1371 /// Will likely generate further events.
1372 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1373 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1375 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1376 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1377 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1379 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1380 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1382 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1383 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1384 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1385 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1387 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1388 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1389 match forward_info {
1390 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1391 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1392 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1393 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1394 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1396 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1398 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1399 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1400 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1401 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1402 // problem, not ours.
1409 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1410 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1411 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1412 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1413 match forward_info {
1414 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1415 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
1417 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1418 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1419 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1420 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1421 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1424 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1426 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1427 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1429 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1431 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1432 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1437 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1439 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1440 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1441 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1442 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1443 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1444 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1445 // this channel currently :/.
1451 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1452 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1454 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1455 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1456 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1458 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1459 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1461 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1463 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1464 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1465 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1468 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1470 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1471 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1472 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1473 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1474 // messages when we can.
1475 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1476 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1477 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1484 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1485 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1488 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1489 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1490 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1491 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1492 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1493 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1495 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1496 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1497 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1498 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1499 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1501 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1503 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1505 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1506 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1507 Err(_) => { continue; },
1511 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1512 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1515 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1516 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1517 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1518 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1519 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1520 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1521 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1523 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1531 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1532 match forward_info {
1533 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1534 type_data: PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { },
1535 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1536 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1537 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1538 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1539 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1541 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
1542 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1543 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1545 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1546 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1547 amt: amt_to_forward,
1550 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1551 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1553 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1554 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1562 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1564 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1565 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1569 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1570 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1571 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1572 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1576 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1577 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1578 events.append(&mut new_events);
1581 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1582 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1583 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1585 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1586 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1587 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1588 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1589 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1590 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1591 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1592 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1593 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1598 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1600 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1601 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1606 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1607 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1608 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1609 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1610 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1611 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1612 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1614 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1615 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1616 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1617 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1618 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1619 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1620 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1621 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1627 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1628 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1629 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1630 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1631 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1632 /// still-available channels.
1633 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1634 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1635 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1636 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1639 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1640 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1641 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1642 match &onion_error {
1643 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1645 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1647 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1648 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1649 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1650 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1651 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1652 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1653 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1658 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1659 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1660 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1661 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1663 error_code: onion_error_code
1667 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1671 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1672 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1673 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1674 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1676 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1677 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1678 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1679 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1680 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1681 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1683 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1689 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1690 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1691 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1692 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1693 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1694 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1696 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1697 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1698 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1702 let mut forward_event = None;
1703 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1704 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1706 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1708 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1710 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1711 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1714 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1715 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1716 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1717 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1718 time_forwardable: time
1725 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1726 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1727 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1729 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1730 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1731 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1732 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1733 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1734 /// motivated attackers.
1736 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1737 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1738 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1740 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1742 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1743 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1744 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1745 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1746 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1747 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1748 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1749 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1750 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1751 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1752 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1753 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1755 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1761 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1762 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1764 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1765 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1766 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1767 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1771 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1772 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1773 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1775 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1776 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1778 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1779 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1780 // why it's missing.
1785 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1786 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1787 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1788 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1789 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1790 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1791 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1792 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1794 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1798 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1799 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1800 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1801 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1802 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1803 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1804 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1805 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1813 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1814 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1815 //TODO: Do something with e?
1819 } else { unreachable!(); }
1825 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1828 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1829 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1830 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1833 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1834 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1836 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1837 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1838 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1839 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1840 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1841 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1844 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1845 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1846 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1847 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1848 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1849 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1850 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1851 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1853 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1854 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1855 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1856 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1857 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1858 // on-chain confirmations.
1859 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1860 // should be written.
1861 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1862 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1864 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1865 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1866 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1872 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1875 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1876 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1877 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1879 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1881 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1882 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1883 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1884 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1889 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1890 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1891 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1892 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1893 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1898 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1902 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1907 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1908 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1909 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1910 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1913 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1914 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1915 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1918 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1919 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1920 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1921 msg: announcement_sigs,
1924 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1932 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1934 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1935 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1937 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1939 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1940 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1944 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1945 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1946 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1949 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1950 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1951 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1952 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1953 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1954 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1956 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1957 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1958 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1960 entry.insert(channel);
1966 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1967 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1968 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1969 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1970 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1972 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1973 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1975 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1976 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1981 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1982 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1983 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1984 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1985 output_script: output_script,
1986 user_channel_id: user_id,
1991 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1992 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1993 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1995 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1997 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1998 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2000 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2005 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2006 // lock before add_update_monitor
2007 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2009 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2010 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2011 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2012 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2013 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2014 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
2016 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2017 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2018 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2019 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2020 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2021 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2025 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2029 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2031 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2032 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2033 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2042 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2043 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2044 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2045 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2046 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2047 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2048 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2049 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2051 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2052 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2053 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2055 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2057 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2060 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2061 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2062 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2063 user_channel_id: user_id,
2068 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2069 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2070 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2071 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2073 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2074 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2076 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2077 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2078 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2079 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2080 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2081 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2082 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2083 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2084 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2085 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2086 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2087 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2088 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2089 msg: announcement_sigs,
2094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2098 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2099 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2100 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2101 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2103 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2105 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2108 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2109 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2110 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2111 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2115 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2116 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2117 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2121 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2122 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2123 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2125 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2126 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2128 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2131 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2132 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2134 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2135 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2136 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2137 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2145 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2146 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2147 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2148 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2149 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2151 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2152 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2154 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2155 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2156 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2157 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2162 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2163 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2164 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2165 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2166 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2167 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2168 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2170 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2171 } else { (tx, None) }
2173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2176 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2177 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2178 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2180 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2181 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2182 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2183 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2191 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2192 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2193 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2194 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2196 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2197 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2198 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2199 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2201 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2202 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2204 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2205 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2206 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2207 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2209 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2210 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2211 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2212 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2213 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2214 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2215 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2216 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2217 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2218 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2219 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2220 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2221 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2222 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2224 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2225 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2226 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2227 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2231 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2232 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2233 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2234 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2235 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2236 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2241 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2248 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2249 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2251 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2252 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2254 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2255 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2257 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2259 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2262 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2266 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2267 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2269 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2271 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2272 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2274 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2281 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2282 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2283 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2284 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2285 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2286 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2287 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2289 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2290 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2292 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2299 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2300 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2301 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2302 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2304 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2305 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2307 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2308 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2309 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2310 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2311 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2313 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2314 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2315 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2317 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2318 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2319 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2320 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2321 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2322 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2323 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2324 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2326 commitment_signed: msg,
2330 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2331 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2332 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2343 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2344 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2345 let mut forward_event = None;
2346 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2347 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2348 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2349 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2351 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2352 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.type_data {
2353 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2354 PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { .. } => 0,
2356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2357 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2360 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2365 match forward_event {
2367 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2368 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2369 time_forwardable: time
2377 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2378 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2379 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2380 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2381 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2383 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2384 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2386 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2387 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2388 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2389 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2390 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2391 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2392 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2394 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2397 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2398 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2399 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2403 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2405 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2409 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2414 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2415 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2417 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2422 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2423 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2424 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2425 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2427 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2430 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2437 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2438 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2439 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2443 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2446 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2447 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2450 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2451 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2452 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2454 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2455 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2456 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2457 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2458 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2461 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2463 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2464 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2465 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2466 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2467 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2468 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2469 contents: announcement,
2471 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2479 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2480 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2481 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2483 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2485 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2486 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2488 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2489 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2490 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2491 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2492 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2493 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2494 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2495 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2496 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2498 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2499 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2501 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2502 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2505 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2506 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2507 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2511 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2512 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2513 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2514 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2519 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2520 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2521 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2522 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2528 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2532 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2537 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2538 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2539 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2549 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2550 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2551 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2552 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2554 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2555 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2556 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2558 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2559 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2561 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2564 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2565 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2567 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2568 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2570 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2571 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2573 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2574 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2575 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2577 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2580 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2581 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2582 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2583 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2584 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2585 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2586 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2587 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2597 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2598 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2599 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2604 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2605 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2606 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2607 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2608 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2610 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2611 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2612 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2613 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2614 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2616 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2617 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2622 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2623 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2624 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2629 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2630 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2631 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2632 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2633 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2635 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2636 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2637 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2638 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2639 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2641 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2642 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2647 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2648 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2649 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2654 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2655 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2656 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2657 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2658 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2659 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2661 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2662 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2663 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2664 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2665 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2666 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2667 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2668 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2669 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2670 msg: funding_locked,
2672 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2673 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2674 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2675 msg: announcement_sigs,
2678 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2679 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2681 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2682 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2686 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2687 for tx in txn_matched {
2688 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2689 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2690 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2691 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2692 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2694 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2695 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2696 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2697 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2698 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2699 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2708 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2709 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2710 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2712 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2713 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2714 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2715 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2716 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2717 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2718 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2727 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2728 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2730 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2731 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2734 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2735 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2736 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2737 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2739 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2740 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2741 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2742 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2743 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2744 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2745 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2746 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2748 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2749 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2750 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2760 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2761 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2763 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2764 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2768 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2769 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2770 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2771 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2773 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2774 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2778 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2779 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2780 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2782 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2783 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2787 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2788 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2789 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2792 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2796 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2797 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2798 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2800 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2801 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2805 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2806 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2807 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2809 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2810 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2814 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2815 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2816 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2818 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2819 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2823 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2824 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2825 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2827 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2828 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2832 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2833 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2834 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2836 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2837 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2841 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2842 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2843 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2845 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2846 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2850 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2851 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2852 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2854 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2855 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2859 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2860 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2861 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2863 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2864 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2868 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2869 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2870 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2872 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2873 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2877 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2878 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2879 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2881 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2882 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2886 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2887 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2888 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2890 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2891 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2895 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2896 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2897 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2899 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2900 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2904 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2905 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2906 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2908 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2909 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2913 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2914 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2915 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2916 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2917 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2919 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2920 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2921 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2922 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2923 if no_connection_possible {
2924 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2925 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2926 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2927 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2928 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2930 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2931 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2932 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2942 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2943 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2944 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2945 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2946 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2947 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2948 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2949 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2951 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2952 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2953 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2957 no_channels_remain = false;
2963 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2965 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2967 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2968 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2969 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2970 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2971 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2972 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2973 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2974 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2975 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2976 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2977 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2978 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2979 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2980 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2984 if no_channels_remain {
2985 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2988 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2989 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2991 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2992 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2993 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2998 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2999 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3001 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3004 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3005 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3007 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3008 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3011 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3012 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3017 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3018 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3019 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3020 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3021 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3022 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3023 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3024 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3025 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3029 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3030 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3031 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3037 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3040 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3041 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3043 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3044 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3045 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3046 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3050 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3055 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3056 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3058 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3059 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3060 match &self.type_data {
3061 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3063 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3064 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3066 &PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { } => {
3070 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3071 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3072 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3073 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3078 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCInfo {
3079 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3080 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3081 type_data: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3082 0u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Forward {
3083 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3084 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3086 1u8 => PendingForwardReceiveHTLCInfo::Receive { },
3087 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3089 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3090 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3091 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3092 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3097 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3098 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3100 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3102 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3104 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3106 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3113 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3114 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3115 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3116 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3117 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3118 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3123 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3124 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3126 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3128 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3130 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3132 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3139 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3140 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3141 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3142 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3143 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3144 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3149 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3152 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3155 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3156 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3158 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3160 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3162 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3164 route.write(writer)?;
3165 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3166 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3173 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3174 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3175 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3176 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3177 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3178 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3179 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3180 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3182 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3187 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3188 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3190 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3194 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3196 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3197 data.write(writer)?;
3204 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3205 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3206 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3207 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3208 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3209 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3210 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3212 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3217 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3218 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3220 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3222 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3223 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3224 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3226 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3228 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3229 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3236 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3237 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3238 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3239 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3240 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3241 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3242 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3244 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3245 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3246 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3248 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3253 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3254 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3255 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3257 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3258 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3260 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3261 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3262 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3264 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3265 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3266 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3267 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3268 unfunded_channels += 1;
3271 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3272 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3273 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3274 channel.write(writer)?;
3278 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3279 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3280 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3281 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3282 for forward in pending_forwards {
3283 forward.write(writer)?;
3287 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3288 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3289 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3290 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3291 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3292 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3293 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3298 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3299 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3300 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3301 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3302 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3305 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3311 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3313 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3315 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3316 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3317 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3318 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3319 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3320 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3321 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3322 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3323 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3324 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3325 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3326 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3327 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3328 /// deserialization.
3329 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3331 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3333 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3334 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3335 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3337 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3338 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3339 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3342 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3343 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3344 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3345 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3346 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3347 /// deserialization.
3348 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3349 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3350 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3351 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3353 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3354 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3356 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3357 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3358 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3359 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3361 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3363 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3366 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3367 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3368 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3369 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3370 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3371 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3374 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3375 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3376 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3378 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3380 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3381 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3382 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3383 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3384 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3385 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3386 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3387 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3390 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3391 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3392 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3393 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3394 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3395 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3396 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3397 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3398 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3400 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3401 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3403 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3406 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3410 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3411 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3412 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3416 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3417 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3418 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3419 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3420 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3421 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3422 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3423 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3425 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3428 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3429 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3430 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3431 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3432 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3433 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3434 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3435 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3437 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3440 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3441 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3442 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3443 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3444 let peer_state = PeerState {
3445 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3447 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3450 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3452 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3454 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3455 monitor: args.monitor,
3456 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3458 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3459 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3460 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3462 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3467 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3469 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3471 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3473 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3475 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3476 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3477 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3478 logger: args.logger,
3479 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3482 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3483 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3484 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3485 //connection or two.
3488 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))