1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
68 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
251 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
252 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
254 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
257 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
258 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
259 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
261 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
263 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
265 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
268 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
269 payment_id.hash(hasher);
270 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
271 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
272 payment_params.hash(hasher);
277 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
280 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
283 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
284 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
285 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
286 payment_secret: None,
287 payment_params: None,
292 struct ReceiveError {
298 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
299 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
301 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
302 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
303 pub enum FailureCode {
304 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
305 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
306 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
307 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
308 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
309 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
310 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
311 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
312 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
313 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
314 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
317 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
319 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
320 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
321 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
322 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
323 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
325 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
326 err: msgs::LightningError,
327 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
328 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
330 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
332 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 shutdown_finish: None,
348 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
350 err: LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
355 shutdown_finish: None,
359 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
360 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
363 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
365 err: LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
375 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
379 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
382 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
385 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
389 log_level: Level::Warn,
392 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
394 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
396 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 shutdown_finish: None,
412 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
413 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
414 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
415 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
416 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
418 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
419 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
420 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
421 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
422 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
423 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
424 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
426 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
430 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
431 struct ClaimingPayment {
433 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
434 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
436 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
437 (0, amount_msat, required),
438 (2, payment_purpose, required),
439 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
442 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
443 struct ClaimablePayments {
444 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
445 /// failed/claimed by the user.
447 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
448 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
450 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
451 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
452 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
454 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
455 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
456 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
457 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
460 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
461 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
462 /// quite some time lag.
463 enum BackgroundEvent {
464 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
465 /// commitment transaction.
466 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
469 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
470 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
471 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
472 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
473 /// event can be generated.
474 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
475 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
476 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
479 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
480 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
481 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, ignorable) },
484 /// State we hold per-peer.
485 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
486 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
488 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
489 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
491 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
492 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
493 latest_features: InitFeatures,
494 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
495 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
496 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
497 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
498 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
500 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
501 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
502 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
503 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
505 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
506 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
507 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
508 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
509 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
510 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
511 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
512 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
513 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
514 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
518 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
519 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
520 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
521 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
522 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
523 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
526 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
530 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
531 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
533 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
536 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
537 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
538 struct PendingInboundPayment {
539 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
540 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
541 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
542 /// this payment being removed.
544 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
545 user_payment_id: u64,
546 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
547 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
548 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
551 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
552 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
553 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
554 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
555 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
556 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
557 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
559 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
560 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
568 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
570 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
575 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
576 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
577 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
578 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
579 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
580 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
581 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
582 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
584 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
585 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
587 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
588 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
590 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
591 /// to individual Channels.
593 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
594 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
595 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
596 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
598 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
599 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
600 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
601 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
602 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
603 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
604 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
606 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
607 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
608 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
609 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
612 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
613 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
614 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
615 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
616 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
618 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
619 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
620 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
622 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
625 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
626 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
627 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
628 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
629 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
633 // `total_consistency_lock`
635 // |__`forward_htlcs`
637 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
639 // |__`per_peer_state`
641 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
643 // | |__`claimable_payments`
645 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
651 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
653 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
657 // | |__`pending_events`
659 // | |__`pending_background_events`
661 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
663 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
664 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
665 ES::Target: EntropySource,
666 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
667 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
668 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
672 default_configuration: UserConfig,
673 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
674 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
680 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
682 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
684 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
685 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
687 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
688 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
689 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
690 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
692 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
693 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
695 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
696 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
697 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
698 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
699 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
700 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
701 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
702 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
704 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
706 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
707 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
709 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
711 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
712 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
713 /// and via the classic SCID.
715 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
716 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
718 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
720 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
722 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
723 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
724 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
726 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
727 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
729 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
730 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
732 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
733 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
735 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
736 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
737 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
738 /// active channel list on load.
740 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
741 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
743 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
745 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
746 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
747 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
749 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
750 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
751 /// the handling of the events.
753 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
754 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
757 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
758 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
759 /// would break backwards compatability.
760 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
761 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
762 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
767 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
769 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
770 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
771 /// confirmation depth.
773 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
774 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
775 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
777 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
779 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
781 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
783 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
785 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
787 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
788 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
789 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
791 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
792 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
794 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
795 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
796 /// keeping additional state.
797 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
799 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
800 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
801 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
802 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
804 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
805 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
807 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
808 /// are currently open with that peer.
810 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
811 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
814 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
816 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
817 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
818 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
819 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
820 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
822 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
823 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
824 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
825 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
826 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
827 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
828 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
829 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
830 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
831 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
832 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
834 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
843 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
845 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
846 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
847 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
848 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
849 pub struct ChainParameters {
850 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
851 pub network: Network,
853 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
855 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
856 pub best_block: BestBlock,
859 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
865 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
866 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
867 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
868 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
869 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
870 /// updates are ready for persistence).
872 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
873 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
874 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
875 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
876 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
878 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
879 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
882 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
883 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
884 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
887 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
888 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
890 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
891 persistence_notifier: notifier,
892 should_persist: persist_check,
893 _read_guard: read_guard,
898 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
900 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
901 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
906 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
907 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
909 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
911 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
912 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
913 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
914 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
915 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
917 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
918 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
920 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
922 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
923 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
924 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
925 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
926 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
927 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
928 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
929 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
930 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
931 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
932 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
933 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
934 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
936 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
937 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
939 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
940 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
941 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
942 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
944 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
945 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
946 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
947 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
948 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
949 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
952 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
954 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
955 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
958 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
960 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
961 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
963 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
964 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
965 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
966 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
968 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
969 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
970 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
971 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
972 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
973 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
974 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
975 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
976 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
977 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
978 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
981 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
982 /// to better separate parameters.
983 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
984 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
985 /// The node_id of our counterparty
986 pub node_id: PublicKey,
987 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
988 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
989 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
990 pub features: InitFeatures,
991 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
992 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
993 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
995 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
997 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
998 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
999 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1000 /// payments to us through this channel.
1001 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1002 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1003 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1004 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1005 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1006 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1007 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1010 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1011 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1012 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1013 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1014 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1015 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1016 /// lifetime of the channel.
1017 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1018 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1019 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1020 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1021 /// our counterparty already.
1023 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1024 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1025 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1026 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1028 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1029 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1030 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1031 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1033 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1034 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1036 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1037 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1039 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1040 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1041 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1042 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1043 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1044 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1045 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1046 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1047 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1050 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1052 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1053 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1054 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1055 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1056 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1057 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1058 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1060 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1061 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1063 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1064 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1065 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1066 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1067 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1068 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1069 /// this value on chain.
1071 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1073 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1075 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1076 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1077 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1078 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1080 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1081 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1082 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1083 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1085 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1086 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1087 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1088 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1090 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1091 pub balance_msat: u64,
1092 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1093 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1094 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1095 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1097 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1099 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1100 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1101 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1102 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1103 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1104 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1105 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1106 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1108 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1109 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1110 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1111 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1112 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1113 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1114 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1116 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1117 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1118 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1119 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1120 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1121 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1122 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1123 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1124 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1126 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1128 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1129 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1130 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1131 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1132 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1134 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1135 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1136 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1137 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1138 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1139 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1140 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1142 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1143 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1144 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1145 pub is_outbound: bool,
1146 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1147 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1148 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1149 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1150 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1152 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1153 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1154 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1155 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1157 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1158 pub is_usable: bool,
1159 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1160 pub is_public: bool,
1161 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1162 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1163 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1164 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1165 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1166 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1168 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1169 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1172 impl ChannelDetails {
1173 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1174 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1175 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1177 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1178 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1179 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1180 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1183 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1184 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1185 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1187 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1188 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1189 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1190 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1194 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1195 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1196 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1197 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1198 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1200 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1202 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1203 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1204 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1207 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1208 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1209 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1211 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1212 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1213 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1215 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1216 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1217 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1219 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1224 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1226 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1228 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1229 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1230 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1231 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1233 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1234 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1235 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1238 macro_rules! handle_error {
1239 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1242 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1243 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1244 // entering the macro.
1245 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1246 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1248 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1250 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1251 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1252 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1253 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1257 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1258 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1259 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1260 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1265 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1266 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1268 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1269 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1270 action: err.action.clone()
1274 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1275 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1276 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1277 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1278 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1282 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1289 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1290 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1291 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1292 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1293 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1294 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1296 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1297 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1298 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1299 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1300 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1302 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1303 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1305 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1309 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1310 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1311 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1313 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1314 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1316 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1317 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1319 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1320 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1321 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1322 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1323 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1324 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1330 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1331 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1335 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1337 $entry.remove_entry();
1345 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1346 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1350 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1352 $entry.remove_entry();
1360 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1361 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1363 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1364 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1370 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1371 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1373 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1374 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1375 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1376 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1377 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1378 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1379 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1380 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1381 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1382 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1383 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1384 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1385 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1386 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1389 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1390 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1391 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1392 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1393 match $action_type {
1394 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1395 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1397 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1398 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1400 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1401 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1402 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1403 if !$resend_commitment {
1404 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1407 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1409 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1410 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1412 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1417 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1418 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1420 $entry.remove_entry();
1424 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1425 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1426 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1428 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1429 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1431 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1432 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1434 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1435 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1437 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1438 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1442 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1443 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1444 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1445 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1446 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1448 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1449 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1450 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1451 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1452 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1453 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1454 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1455 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1456 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1457 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1462 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1463 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1464 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1466 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1467 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1468 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1469 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1470 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1471 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1474 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1479 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1480 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1481 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1482 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1483 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1485 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1486 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1487 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1490 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1491 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1492 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1493 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1494 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1495 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1496 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1497 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1501 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1502 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1503 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1504 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1505 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1507 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1508 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1509 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1510 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1511 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1512 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1513 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1514 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1515 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1517 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1518 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1519 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1524 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1525 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1526 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1527 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1528 updates.announcement_sigs);
1529 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1530 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1533 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1534 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1536 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1537 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1539 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1540 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1541 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1542 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1549 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1550 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1554 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1556 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1557 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1558 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1559 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1560 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1561 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1565 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1567 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1568 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1570 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1572 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1573 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1574 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1575 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1576 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1577 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1578 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1579 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1581 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1582 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1583 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1588 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1590 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1591 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1592 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1593 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1594 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1595 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1596 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1597 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1599 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1602 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1603 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1605 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1607 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1609 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1611 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1612 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1613 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1614 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1624 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1625 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1626 &self.default_configuration
1629 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1630 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1631 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1634 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1635 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1637 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1639 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1643 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1648 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1650 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1651 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1652 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1653 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1654 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1656 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1657 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1659 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1660 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1661 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1663 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1664 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1665 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1666 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1667 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1668 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1670 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1671 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1672 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1673 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1674 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1675 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1678 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1679 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1680 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1684 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1685 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1687 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1689 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1690 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1691 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1692 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1693 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1694 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1698 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1703 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1705 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1706 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1711 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1717 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1718 node_id: their_network_key,
1721 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1724 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1725 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1726 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1727 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1728 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1729 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1730 // the same channel.
1731 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1733 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1734 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1735 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1736 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1737 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1738 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1739 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1740 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1741 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1742 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1743 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1744 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1745 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1746 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1747 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1748 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1749 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1750 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1751 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1752 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1753 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1754 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1755 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1756 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1758 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1759 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1760 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1761 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1762 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1763 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1764 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1765 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1766 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1767 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1768 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1769 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1770 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1771 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1772 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1773 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1774 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1775 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1776 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1777 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1778 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1779 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1780 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1781 config: Some(channel.config()),
1789 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1790 /// more information.
1791 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1792 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1795 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1796 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1798 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1799 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1802 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1803 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1804 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1805 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1806 // really wanted anyway.
1807 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1810 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1811 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1813 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1814 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1815 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1817 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1818 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1819 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1820 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1821 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1822 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1823 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1824 total_msat: *total_msat,
1827 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1828 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1830 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1831 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1833 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1838 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1839 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1840 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1841 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1842 Some(transaction) => {
1843 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1847 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1848 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1849 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1850 reason: closure_reason
1854 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1857 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1858 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1859 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1861 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1862 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1864 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1865 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1866 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1868 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1869 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1871 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1872 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1873 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1874 let (result, is_permanent) =
1875 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1877 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1882 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1883 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1887 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1888 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1889 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1890 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1894 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1902 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1903 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1904 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1905 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1908 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1912 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1913 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1914 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1916 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1917 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1919 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1920 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1921 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1922 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1924 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1926 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1927 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1928 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1929 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1930 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1933 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1934 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1935 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1937 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1938 /// the channel being closed or not:
1939 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1940 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1941 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1942 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1943 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1944 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1945 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1947 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1949 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1950 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1951 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1952 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1953 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1957 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1958 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1959 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1960 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1961 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1962 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1963 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1964 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1966 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1967 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1968 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1969 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1970 // ignore the result here.
1971 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1975 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1976 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1977 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1978 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1979 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1980 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1981 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1983 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1984 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1985 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1986 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1987 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1989 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1991 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1993 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1996 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1997 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1998 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1999 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2000 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2005 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2008 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2009 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2010 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2011 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2013 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2014 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2016 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2017 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2018 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2019 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2030 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2031 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2032 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2034 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2035 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2036 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2039 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2040 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2041 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2043 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2044 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2045 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2046 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2047 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2050 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2051 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2052 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2053 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2054 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2058 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2059 /// local transaction(s).
2060 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2061 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2062 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2066 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2067 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2069 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2070 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2071 return Err(ReceiveError {
2072 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2074 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2077 // final_expiry_too_soon
2078 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2079 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2081 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2082 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2083 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2084 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2085 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2086 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2087 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2088 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2089 return Err(ReceiveError {
2090 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2091 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2094 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2095 return Err(ReceiveError {
2097 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2098 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2102 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2103 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2104 return Err(ReceiveError {
2105 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2106 err_data: Vec::new(),
2107 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2111 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2112 return Err(ReceiveError {
2113 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2114 err_data: Vec::new(),
2115 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2117 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2118 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2120 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2121 phantom_shared_secret,
2123 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2124 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2125 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2126 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2127 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2128 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2129 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2130 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2131 return Err(ReceiveError {
2132 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2133 err_data: Vec::new(),
2134 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2138 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2140 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2143 return Err(ReceiveError {
2144 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2145 err_data: Vec::new(),
2146 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2151 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2154 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2155 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2156 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2157 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2161 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2162 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2163 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2165 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2166 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2167 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2168 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2169 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2170 failure_code: $err_code,
2176 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2177 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2180 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2181 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2182 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2184 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2185 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2186 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2187 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2188 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2189 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2190 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2191 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2193 macro_rules! return_err {
2194 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2196 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2197 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2198 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2199 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2200 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2201 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2207 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2209 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2210 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2212 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2213 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2217 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2218 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2220 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2222 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2223 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2224 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2225 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2226 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2228 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2231 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2232 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2233 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2235 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2236 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2237 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2240 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2241 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2242 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2243 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2247 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2248 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2249 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2252 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2253 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2254 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2255 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2256 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2261 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2262 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2263 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2264 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2265 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2266 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2267 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2268 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2269 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2270 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2271 // phantom or an intercept.
2272 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2273 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2274 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2278 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2281 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2283 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2285 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2286 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2287 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2289 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2290 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2291 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2293 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2294 // have no consistency guarantees.
2295 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2299 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2300 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2301 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2302 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2303 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2305 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2306 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2307 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2308 // we don't have the channel here.
2309 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2311 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2313 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2314 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2315 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2316 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2317 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2318 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2319 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2321 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2322 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2324 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2325 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2329 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2330 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2331 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2332 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2334 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2341 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2342 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2343 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2344 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2345 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2346 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2348 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2349 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2351 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2352 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2353 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2354 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2355 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2356 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2357 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2358 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2359 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2360 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2366 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2367 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2368 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2369 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2371 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2372 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2374 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2375 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2376 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2378 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2379 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2380 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2381 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2382 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2383 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2384 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2388 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2393 pending_forward_info
2396 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2397 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2398 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2400 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2401 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2402 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2403 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2404 if !chan.should_announce() {
2405 return Err(LightningError {
2406 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2407 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2410 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2411 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2414 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2417 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2418 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2419 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2420 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2422 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2423 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2424 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2425 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2427 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2428 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2432 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2434 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2436 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2438 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2439 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2441 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2442 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2443 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2444 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2445 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2446 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2447 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2448 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2450 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2451 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2452 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2454 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2456 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2462 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2463 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2464 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2465 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2466 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2468 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2469 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2470 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2471 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2472 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2474 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2476 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2478 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2479 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2480 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2481 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2485 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2486 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2489 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2490 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2491 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2494 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2495 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2497 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2498 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2500 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2501 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2502 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2505 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2506 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2507 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2509 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2510 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2512 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2513 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2514 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2515 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2516 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2517 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2518 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2519 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2520 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2521 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2523 _ => unreachable!(),
2526 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2527 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2528 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2529 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2530 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2531 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2532 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2533 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2542 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2543 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2544 // `channel_by_id` map.
2545 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2546 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2551 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2552 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2554 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2559 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2561 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2562 /// fields for more info.
2564 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2565 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2567 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2569 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2570 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2571 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2572 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2573 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2575 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2576 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2577 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2578 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2579 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2581 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2582 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2583 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2584 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2586 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2588 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2589 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2590 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2592 /// In general, a path may raise:
2593 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2594 /// node public key) is specified.
2595 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2596 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2598 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2599 /// relevant updates.
2601 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2602 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2603 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2605 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2607 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2608 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2609 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2610 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2611 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2613 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2614 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2615 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2617 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2618 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2619 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2620 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2621 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2622 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2623 self.pending_outbound_payments
2624 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2625 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2626 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2629 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2630 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2631 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2632 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2633 self.pending_outbound_payments
2634 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2635 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2636 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2637 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2638 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2642 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2643 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2644 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2645 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2646 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2650 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2651 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2652 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2656 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2657 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2658 /// retries are exhausted.
2660 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2661 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2663 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2664 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2665 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2667 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2668 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2670 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2671 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2672 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2674 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2677 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2678 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2679 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2680 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2681 /// never reach the recipient.
2683 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2684 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2686 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2687 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2689 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2691 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2692 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2693 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2694 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2695 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2697 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2698 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2701 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2702 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2704 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2707 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2708 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2709 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2710 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2711 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2712 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2714 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2715 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2718 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2719 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2720 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2721 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2722 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2723 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2724 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2725 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2728 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2731 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2732 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2735 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2736 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2737 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2738 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2739 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2740 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2741 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2742 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2748 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2750 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2752 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2753 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2754 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2755 } else { unreachable!(); })
2758 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2761 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2762 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2765 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2766 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2771 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2772 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2777 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2780 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2781 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2782 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2791 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2792 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2793 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2797 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2799 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2800 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2802 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2803 /// across the p2p network.
2805 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2806 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2808 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2809 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2810 /// keys per-channel).
2812 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2813 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2814 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2816 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2817 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2818 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2820 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2821 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2822 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2823 /// for more details.
2825 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2826 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2827 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2830 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2831 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2833 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2838 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2839 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2840 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2841 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2842 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2843 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2844 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2848 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2849 let mut output_index = None;
2850 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2851 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2852 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2853 if output_index.is_some() {
2854 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2855 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2858 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2859 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2860 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2863 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2866 if output_index.is_none() {
2867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2868 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2871 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2875 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2877 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2878 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2879 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2880 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2882 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2883 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2885 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2886 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2888 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2890 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2891 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2892 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2893 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2894 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2895 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2896 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2897 pub fn update_channel_config(
2898 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2899 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2900 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2902 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2907 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2909 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2910 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2911 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2912 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2913 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2914 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2915 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2916 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2917 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2921 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2922 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2923 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2926 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2927 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2928 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2929 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2930 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2938 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2939 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2941 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2942 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2944 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2945 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2946 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2947 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2948 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2950 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2951 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2953 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2956 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2957 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2958 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2959 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2960 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2963 let next_hop_scid = {
2964 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2965 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2966 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2967 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2968 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2969 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2971 if !chan.is_usable() {
2972 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2973 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2976 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2978 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2979 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2984 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2985 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2986 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2989 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2990 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2991 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2993 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2995 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2996 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2999 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3000 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3001 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3002 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3003 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3005 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3009 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3010 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3012 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3015 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3016 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3019 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3020 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3021 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3024 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3025 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3026 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3027 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3028 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3029 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3030 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3033 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3034 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3035 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3036 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3041 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3043 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3044 /// Will likely generate further events.
3045 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3048 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3049 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3050 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3052 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3053 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3055 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3056 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3057 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3059 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3060 match forward_info {
3061 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3062 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3063 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3064 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3065 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3068 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3069 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3070 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3072 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3073 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3074 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3075 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3076 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3077 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3080 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3081 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3083 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3086 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3087 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3093 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3094 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3096 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3100 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3101 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3103 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3107 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3108 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3109 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3110 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3111 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3113 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3114 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3115 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3116 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3117 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3119 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3121 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3122 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3126 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3127 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3128 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3129 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3135 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3138 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3141 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3142 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3143 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3144 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3145 // problem, not ours.
3151 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3152 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3154 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3159 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3160 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3161 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3164 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3165 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3166 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3167 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3168 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3172 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3173 match forward_info {
3174 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3175 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3176 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3177 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3178 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3182 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3183 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3184 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3185 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3187 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3188 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3190 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3191 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3192 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3194 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3197 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3199 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3200 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3201 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3202 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3207 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3208 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3210 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3212 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3213 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3215 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3216 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3218 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3220 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3221 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3222 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3231 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3232 match forward_info {
3233 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3234 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3235 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3236 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3239 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3240 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3241 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3242 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3244 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3245 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3247 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3250 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3251 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3252 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3253 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3254 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3255 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3256 phantom_shared_secret,
3258 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3260 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3265 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3266 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3267 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3268 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3269 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3271 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3272 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3273 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3274 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3275 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3276 phantom_shared_secret,
3278 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3279 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3283 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3284 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3285 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3286 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3287 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3290 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3291 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3292 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3294 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3295 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3296 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3299 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3300 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3301 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3304 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3305 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3306 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3307 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3308 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3309 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3313 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3314 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3315 total_value += htlc.value;
3316 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3317 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3318 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3320 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3321 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3323 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3325 _ => unreachable!(),
3328 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3330 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3331 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3332 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3333 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3334 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3335 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3336 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3339 amount_msat: total_value,
3340 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3341 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3343 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3345 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3346 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3348 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3350 payment_claimable_generated
3354 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3355 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3356 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3357 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3358 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3359 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3360 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3361 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3363 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3364 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3365 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3366 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3367 Ok(result) => result,
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3370 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3374 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3375 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3376 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3378 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3379 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3383 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3385 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3386 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3387 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3391 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3393 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3394 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3395 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3396 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3397 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3399 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3401 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3402 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3406 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3407 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3414 if payment_data.is_none() {
3415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3416 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3419 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3420 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3422 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3423 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3425 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3426 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3428 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3429 if payment_claimable_generated {
3430 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3436 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3437 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3445 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3446 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3447 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3448 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3449 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3450 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3452 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3453 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3455 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3457 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3458 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3459 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3461 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3463 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3464 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3465 events.append(&mut new_events);
3468 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3470 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3471 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3473 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3474 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3475 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3476 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3477 if background_events.is_empty() {
3481 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3483 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3484 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3485 // monitor updating completing.
3486 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3493 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3494 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3495 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3496 self.process_background_events();
3499 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3500 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3501 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3502 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3504 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3505 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3507 if !chan.is_live() {
3508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3509 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3510 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3512 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3513 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3515 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3516 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3520 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3521 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3522 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3523 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3524 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3525 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3526 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3528 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3530 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3531 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3532 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3533 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3534 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3535 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3536 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3544 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3546 /// This currently includes:
3547 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3548 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3549 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3551 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3552 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3553 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3555 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3556 /// estimate fetches.
3557 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3558 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3559 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3560 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3562 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3564 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3565 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3566 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3569 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3572 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3573 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3574 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3575 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3576 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3578 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3579 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3580 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3581 if needs_close { return false; }
3584 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3585 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3586 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3587 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3588 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3589 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3590 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3591 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3595 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3596 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3598 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3599 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3600 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3604 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3605 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3610 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3614 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3615 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3620 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3621 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3622 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3623 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3624 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3625 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3626 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3627 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3628 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3629 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3630 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3632 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3633 // have no channels to the peer.
3634 let remove_entry = {
3635 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3636 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3639 entry.remove_entry();
3642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3647 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3648 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3649 // This should be unreachable
3650 debug_assert!(false);
3653 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3654 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3655 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3656 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3658 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3659 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3660 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3662 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3669 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3670 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3671 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3672 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3673 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3676 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3677 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3680 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3682 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3683 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3684 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3685 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3686 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3693 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3694 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3695 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3697 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3698 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3699 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3700 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3702 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3703 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3704 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3705 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3706 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3707 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3710 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3711 /// reason for the failure.
3713 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3714 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3717 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3718 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3719 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3720 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3721 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3722 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3723 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3728 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3729 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3730 match failure_code {
3731 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3732 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3733 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3734 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3735 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3736 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3741 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3742 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3744 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3746 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3747 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3748 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3749 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3750 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3751 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3752 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3754 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3756 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3757 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3759 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3764 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3765 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3766 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3767 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3768 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3769 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3770 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3771 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3772 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3773 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3775 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3776 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3777 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3778 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3780 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3781 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3782 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3783 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3784 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3788 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3789 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3790 // be surfaced to the user.
3791 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3792 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3793 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3795 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3796 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3797 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3802 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3806 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3809 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3810 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3811 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3812 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3816 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3817 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3818 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3819 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3820 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3821 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3822 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3823 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3824 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3827 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3828 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3829 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3832 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3833 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3834 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3836 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3837 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3839 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3840 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3841 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3843 let mut forward_event = None;
3844 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3845 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3846 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3848 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3850 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3853 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3856 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3857 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3858 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3859 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3860 time_forwardable: time
3863 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3864 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3865 failed_next_destination: destination,
3871 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3872 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3874 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3875 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3876 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3878 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3879 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3880 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3881 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3883 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3884 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3885 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3886 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3887 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3888 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3889 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3894 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3895 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3896 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3897 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3898 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3899 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3900 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3901 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3906 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3907 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3908 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3910 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3911 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3912 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3913 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3918 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3920 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3921 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3922 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3923 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3924 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3926 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3927 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3929 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3930 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3931 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3932 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3933 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3935 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3936 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3937 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3938 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3940 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3941 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3942 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3949 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3950 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3958 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3963 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3964 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3965 debug_assert!(false);
3970 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3971 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3972 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3973 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3974 if sources.len() != 1 {
3975 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3976 debug_assert!(false);
3982 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3984 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3985 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3986 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3987 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3990 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3991 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3992 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3993 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3997 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3998 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3999 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4000 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4002 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4003 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4004 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4005 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4006 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4011 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4012 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4013 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4014 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4015 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4016 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4017 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4019 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4022 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4023 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4024 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4025 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4029 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4030 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4031 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4032 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4035 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4037 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4038 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4042 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4043 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4044 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4048 if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id))
4050 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4051 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4052 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4053 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4054 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4055 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4057 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4058 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4059 payment_preimage, e);
4060 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
4061 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4062 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4063 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4064 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
4067 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4068 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4069 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4070 peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4071 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4072 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4073 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4074 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4075 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4076 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4082 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4083 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4084 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4090 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4091 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4092 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4094 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4095 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4096 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4097 // again on restart.
4098 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4099 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4100 payment_preimage, e);
4103 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4105 chan.remove_entry();
4107 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4108 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4109 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4110 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4114 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4115 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4116 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4120 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4121 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4122 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4123 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4124 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4125 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4126 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4127 // again on restart.
4128 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4129 payment_preimage, update_res);
4131 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4132 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4133 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4134 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4135 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4136 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4137 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4138 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4143 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4144 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4147 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4149 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4150 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4152 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4153 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4154 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4155 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4156 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4157 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4158 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4161 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4162 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4164 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4166 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4172 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4173 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4174 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4180 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4181 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4182 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4185 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4186 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4188 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4189 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4190 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4191 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4192 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4196 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4197 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4203 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4204 /// update completion.
4205 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4206 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4207 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4208 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4209 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4210 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4211 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4213 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4214 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4215 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4216 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4219 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4220 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4222 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4223 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4224 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4229 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4231 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4232 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4233 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4234 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4239 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4240 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4242 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4243 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4248 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4252 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4258 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4259 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4260 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4266 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4270 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4271 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4272 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4274 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4275 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4276 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4277 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4278 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4283 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4284 let mut peer_state_lock;
4285 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4286 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4287 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4288 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4290 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4295 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4299 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4300 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4301 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4302 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4303 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4304 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4306 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4307 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4308 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4313 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4314 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4315 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4318 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4320 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4321 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4323 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4324 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4325 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4326 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4330 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4332 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4333 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4336 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4337 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4338 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4340 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4341 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4342 /// used to accept such channels.
4344 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4345 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4346 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4347 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4350 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4351 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4353 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4354 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4355 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4357 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4358 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4360 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4361 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4363 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4364 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4366 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4367 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4368 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4369 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4372 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4376 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4377 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4380 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4382 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4383 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4386 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4387 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4388 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4389 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4390 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4391 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4394 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4395 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4396 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4399 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4400 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4401 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4405 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4411 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4412 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4413 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4416 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4417 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4420 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4421 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4422 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4424 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4426 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4428 debug_assert!(false);
4429 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4433 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4434 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4435 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4438 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4443 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4445 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4446 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4449 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4450 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4451 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4454 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4455 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4458 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4459 pending_events.push(
4460 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4461 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4462 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4463 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4464 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4465 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4470 entry.insert(channel);
4476 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4477 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4478 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4479 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4481 debug_assert!(false);
4482 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4484 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4485 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4486 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4488 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4489 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4494 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4495 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4496 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4497 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4498 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4500 user_channel_id: user_id,
4505 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4506 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4507 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4509 debug_assert!(false);
4510 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4512 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4513 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4514 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4515 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4516 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4517 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4518 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4520 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4523 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4524 // lock before watch_channel
4525 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4526 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4527 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4528 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4529 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4530 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4531 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4532 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4533 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4534 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4535 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4536 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4537 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4539 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4540 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4541 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4542 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4543 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4544 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4545 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4548 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4549 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4550 // the channel above.
4551 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4552 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4553 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4554 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4555 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4558 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4559 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4562 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4563 funding_msg.channel_id))
4565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4566 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4569 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4570 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4573 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4574 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4582 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4584 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4586 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4588 debug_assert!(false);
4589 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4592 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4593 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4594 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4595 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4596 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4597 Ok(update) => update,
4598 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4600 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4601 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4603 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4604 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4605 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4606 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4607 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4608 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4609 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4615 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4616 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4623 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4624 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4628 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4629 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4630 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4632 debug_assert!(false);
4633 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4635 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4636 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4637 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4639 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4640 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4641 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4642 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4643 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4644 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4645 msg: announcement_sigs,
4647 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4648 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4649 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4650 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4651 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4652 // announcement_signatures.
4653 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4654 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4655 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4656 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4662 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4666 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4670 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4671 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4672 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4674 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4676 debug_assert!(false);
4677 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4684 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4685 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4686 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4687 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4690 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4691 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4693 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4694 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4695 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4696 let (result, is_permanent) =
4697 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4699 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4704 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4705 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4706 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4716 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4717 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4718 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4719 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4722 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4726 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4727 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4728 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4730 debug_assert!(false);
4731 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4733 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4734 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4735 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4736 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4738 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4739 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4740 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4741 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4746 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4747 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4748 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4749 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4750 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4751 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4752 } else { (tx, None) }
4754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4757 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4758 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4759 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4761 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4762 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4765 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4769 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4774 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4775 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4776 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4777 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4779 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4780 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4781 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4782 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4784 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4785 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4786 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4788 debug_assert!(false);
4789 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4791 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4792 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4793 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4794 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4796 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4797 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4798 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4799 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4800 match pending_forward_info {
4801 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4802 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4803 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4804 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4806 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4807 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4808 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4809 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4810 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4813 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4815 _ => pending_forward_info
4818 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4825 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4826 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4828 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4830 debug_assert!(false);
4831 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4835 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4837 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4842 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4846 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4848 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4850 debug_assert!(false);
4851 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4853 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4854 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4855 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4857 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4859 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4864 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4866 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4868 debug_assert!(false);
4869 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4871 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4872 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4873 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4875 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4876 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4877 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4879 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4886 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4887 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4888 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4890 debug_assert!(false);
4891 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4893 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4894 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4895 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4897 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4898 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4899 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4900 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4901 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4902 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4903 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4908 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4909 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4913 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4914 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4915 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4917 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4918 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4919 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4920 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4921 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4922 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4923 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4924 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4926 commitment_signed: msg,
4932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4937 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4938 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4939 let mut forward_event = None;
4940 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4941 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4942 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4943 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4944 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4945 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4946 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4947 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4949 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4950 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4952 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4953 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4954 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4956 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4957 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4960 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4961 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4963 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4964 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4965 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4967 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4968 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4969 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4970 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4971 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4974 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4975 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4978 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4979 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4980 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4981 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4982 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4983 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4984 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4987 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4988 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4989 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4994 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4995 // payments are being processed.
4996 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4997 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4999 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5000 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5007 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5008 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5011 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5012 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5013 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5016 match forward_event {
5018 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5019 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5020 time_forwardable: time
5028 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5029 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5031 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5032 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5034 debug_assert!(false);
5035 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5037 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5038 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5039 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5041 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5042 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5043 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5044 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5045 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
5046 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5047 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5048 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5049 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5050 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5051 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5052 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5054 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5055 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5056 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5057 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5058 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5059 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5061 } else { unreachable!(); }
5063 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5064 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5065 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5069 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5070 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5071 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5072 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5073 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5074 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5079 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5081 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5082 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5084 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5085 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5086 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5088 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5089 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5096 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5100 debug_assert!(false);
5101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5105 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5107 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5114 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5115 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5116 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5118 debug_assert!(false);
5119 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5121 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5123 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5124 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5125 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5126 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5129 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5130 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5131 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5132 msg, &self.default_configuration
5134 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5135 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5136 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5144 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5145 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5146 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5147 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5149 // It's not a local channel
5150 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5154 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5155 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5156 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5158 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5159 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5160 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5162 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5163 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5164 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5165 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5166 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5167 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5169 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5171 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5172 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5173 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5174 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5176 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5182 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5185 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5187 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5190 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5192 debug_assert!(false);
5193 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5197 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5199 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5200 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5201 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5202 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5203 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5204 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5205 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5206 let mut channel_update = None;
5207 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5208 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5209 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5212 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5213 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5214 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5215 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5216 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5217 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5218 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5223 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5224 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5225 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5226 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5227 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5228 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5236 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5237 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5240 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5241 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5246 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5247 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5248 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5249 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5250 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5251 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5252 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5253 match monitor_event {
5254 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5255 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5256 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5257 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5260 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5261 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5262 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5265 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5266 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5267 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5268 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5270 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5271 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5272 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5273 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5276 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5277 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5278 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5279 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5280 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5281 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5282 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5283 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5284 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5285 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5286 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5290 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5291 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5293 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5295 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5296 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5297 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5298 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5299 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5306 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5307 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5313 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5314 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5317 has_pending_monitor_events
5320 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5321 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5322 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5324 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5325 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5328 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5329 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5330 /// update was applied.
5331 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5332 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5333 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5334 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5338 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5341 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5342 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5343 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5344 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5345 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5347 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5349 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5352 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5353 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5354 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5355 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5356 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5357 updates: commitment_update,
5361 has_monitor_update = true;
5362 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5363 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5364 if close_channel { return false; }
5371 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5372 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5373 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5381 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5382 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5383 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5386 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5387 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5393 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5394 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5395 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5396 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5397 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5398 let mut has_update = false;
5400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5402 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5405 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5406 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5407 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5408 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5409 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5411 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5412 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5415 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5416 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5417 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5418 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5419 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5424 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5426 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5427 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5428 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5434 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5435 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5443 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5444 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5450 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5451 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5453 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5454 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5455 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5456 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5457 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5458 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5459 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5460 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5461 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5462 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5463 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5464 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5465 assert!(should_broadcast);
5466 } else { unreachable!(); }
5467 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5469 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5473 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5474 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5476 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5477 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5480 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5482 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5483 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5484 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5486 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5487 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5488 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5489 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5490 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5491 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5492 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5493 // never fail a payment too early.
5494 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5496 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5504 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5507 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5508 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5510 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5511 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5512 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5513 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5515 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5517 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5518 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5522 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5523 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5525 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5527 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5528 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5530 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5531 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5532 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5533 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5534 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5535 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5536 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5537 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5538 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5539 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5540 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5543 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5544 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5546 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5549 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5551 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5553 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5554 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5555 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5556 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5557 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5560 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5561 /// stored external to LDK.
5563 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5564 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5565 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5567 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5568 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5571 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5572 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5573 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5574 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5576 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5577 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5578 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5579 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5580 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5582 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5583 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5584 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5585 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5586 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5588 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5589 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5591 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5592 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5596 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5597 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5599 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5601 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5602 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5604 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5605 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5606 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5607 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5608 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5609 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5610 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5613 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5614 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5616 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5619 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5621 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5623 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5624 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5627 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5628 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5630 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5631 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5632 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5635 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5636 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5638 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5639 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5640 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5641 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5643 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5644 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5645 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5646 Some(_) => continue,
5647 None => return scid_candidate
5652 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5654 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5655 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5657 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5658 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5659 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5663 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5664 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5665 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5667 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5668 /// times to get a unique scid.
5669 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5670 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5671 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5673 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5674 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5675 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5676 return scid_candidate
5680 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5681 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5682 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5683 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5685 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5686 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5687 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5688 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5689 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5690 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5691 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5692 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5702 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5703 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5704 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5705 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5709 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5710 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5711 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5716 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5717 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5718 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5722 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5723 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5727 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5728 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5731 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5732 /// using the given event handler.
5734 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5735 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5738 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5739 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5740 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5742 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5744 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5745 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5746 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5747 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5750 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5751 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5752 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5755 for event in pending_events {
5756 handler(event).await;
5759 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5760 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5765 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5767 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5768 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5769 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5770 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5771 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5772 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5776 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5777 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5778 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5779 /// is always placed next to each other.
5781 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5782 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5783 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5784 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5786 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5787 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5788 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5789 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5790 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5791 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5792 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5794 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5795 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5796 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5797 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5800 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5801 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5803 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5804 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5807 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5808 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5809 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5812 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5813 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5817 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5818 events.replace(pending_events);
5827 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5829 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5830 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5831 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5832 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5833 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5834 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5838 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5840 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5841 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5842 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5843 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5844 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5846 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5847 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5848 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5849 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5852 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5853 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5854 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5857 for event in pending_events {
5858 handler.handle_event(event);
5866 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5868 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5870 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5871 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5872 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5873 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5877 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5879 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5880 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5881 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5882 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5883 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5886 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5887 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5890 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5892 let new_height = height - 1;
5894 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5895 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5896 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5897 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5898 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5899 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5902 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5906 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5908 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5909 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5910 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5911 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5912 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5913 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5917 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5918 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5919 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5920 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5922 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5923 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5925 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5926 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5927 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5929 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5930 if height < last_best_block_height {
5931 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5932 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5936 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5937 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5938 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5939 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5941 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5942 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5946 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5948 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5950 macro_rules! max_time {
5951 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5953 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5954 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5955 // having an explicit local time source.
5956 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5957 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5958 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5959 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5960 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5966 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5967 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5968 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5969 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5973 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5974 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5975 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5976 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5978 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5979 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5980 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5987 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5989 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5990 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5991 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5992 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5993 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5994 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5999 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6001 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6002 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6003 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6004 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6005 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6006 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6010 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6011 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6013 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6014 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6015 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6016 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6017 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6019 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6020 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6023 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6025 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6026 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6027 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6028 let res = f(channel);
6029 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6030 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6031 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6032 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6033 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6035 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6036 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6037 if channel.is_usable() {
6038 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6039 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6040 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6041 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6046 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6050 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6052 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6054 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6055 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6056 msg: announcement_sigs,
6058 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6059 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6060 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6062 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6063 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6064 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6069 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6070 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6071 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6072 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6073 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6074 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6075 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6076 // is always consistent.
6077 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6078 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6079 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6080 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6081 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6084 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6085 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6086 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6087 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6088 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6089 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6094 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6095 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6096 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6097 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6098 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6099 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6100 data: reason_message,
6110 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6111 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6112 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6113 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6114 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6115 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6116 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6117 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6118 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6119 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6121 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6122 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6123 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6127 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6130 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6131 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6132 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6133 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6134 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6135 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6136 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6137 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6138 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6141 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6142 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6143 _ => unreachable!(),
6145 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6146 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6147 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6154 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6156 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6157 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6161 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6162 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6163 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6164 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6166 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6168 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6169 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6170 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6171 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6172 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6173 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6176 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6177 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6178 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6180 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6181 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6182 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6183 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6186 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6187 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6188 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6189 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6190 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6193 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6194 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6195 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6198 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6199 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6200 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6201 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6204 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6205 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6206 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6207 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6210 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6211 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6213 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6214 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6215 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6216 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6217 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6220 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6221 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6222 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6223 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6226 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6227 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6228 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6229 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6232 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6233 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6234 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6235 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6239 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6240 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6242 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6243 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6244 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6245 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6246 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6247 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6251 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6253 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6256 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6266 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6268 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6271 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6273 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6276 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6281 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6283 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6286 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6287 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6288 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6291 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6293 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6296 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6298 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6301 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6302 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6303 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6306 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6308 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6311 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6312 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6313 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6316 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6318 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6321 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6322 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6323 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6326 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6327 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6328 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6331 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6336 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6337 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6338 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6341 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6343 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6344 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6346 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6347 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6348 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6349 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6351 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6352 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6353 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6354 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6355 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6356 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6361 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6367 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6369 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6370 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6371 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6372 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6373 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6374 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6375 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6376 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6377 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6378 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6379 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6380 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6381 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6382 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6383 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6386 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6387 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6388 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6392 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6394 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6396 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6397 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6401 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6402 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6403 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6407 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6412 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6413 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6414 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6415 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6416 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6417 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6418 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6419 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6423 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6424 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6425 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6426 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6427 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6434 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6437 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6438 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6439 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6440 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6441 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6442 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6443 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6447 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6448 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6449 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6454 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6455 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6456 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6457 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6458 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6467 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6471 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6474 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6475 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6476 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6477 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6478 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6479 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6480 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6481 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6483 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6484 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6485 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6489 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6491 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6492 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6495 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6496 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6497 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6498 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6506 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6507 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6511 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6512 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6515 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6516 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6520 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6521 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6522 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6523 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6526 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6527 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6529 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6530 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6531 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6532 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6533 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6536 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6537 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6538 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6539 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6542 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6543 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6544 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6545 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6548 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6549 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6550 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6551 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6552 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6553 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6554 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6555 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6556 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6557 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6558 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6559 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6560 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6561 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6562 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6563 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6564 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6565 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6567 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6568 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6569 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6575 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6576 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6578 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6579 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6580 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6581 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6584 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6585 (2, node_id, required),
6586 (4, features, required),
6587 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6588 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6589 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6590 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6593 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6594 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6595 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6596 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6597 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6598 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6599 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6600 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6601 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6602 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6603 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6604 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6605 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6606 (7, self.config, option),
6607 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6608 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6609 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6610 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6611 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6612 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6613 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6614 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6615 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6616 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6617 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6618 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6619 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6620 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6621 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6622 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6623 (32, self.is_public, required),
6624 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6625 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6626 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6632 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6633 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6634 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6635 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6636 (2, channel_id, required),
6637 (3, channel_type, option),
6638 (4, counterparty, required),
6639 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6640 (6, funding_txo, option),
6641 (7, config, option),
6642 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6643 (9, confirmations, option),
6644 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6645 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6646 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6647 (16, balance_msat, required),
6648 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6649 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6650 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6651 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6652 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6653 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6654 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6655 (26, is_outbound, required),
6656 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6657 (30, is_usable, required),
6658 (32, is_public, required),
6659 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6660 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6661 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6664 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6665 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6666 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6667 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6668 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6672 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6674 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6675 outbound_scid_alias,
6679 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6680 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6682 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6683 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6684 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6685 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6686 confirmations_required,
6688 force_close_spend_delay,
6689 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6690 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6691 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6692 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6693 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6694 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6699 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6700 (2, channels, vec_type),
6701 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6702 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6705 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6707 (0, onion_packet, required),
6708 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6711 (0, payment_data, required),
6712 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6713 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6715 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6716 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6717 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6721 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6722 (0, routing, required),
6723 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6724 (4, payment_hash, required),
6725 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6726 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6727 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6731 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6732 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6734 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6736 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6737 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6738 reason.write(writer)?;
6740 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6741 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6744 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6745 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6746 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6747 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6754 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6755 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6756 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6759 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6760 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6761 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6762 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6766 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6767 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6768 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6769 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6770 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6773 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6774 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6775 // messages contained in the variants.
6776 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6777 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6778 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6780 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6781 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6782 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6783 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6784 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6787 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6788 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6789 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6790 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6791 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6793 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6798 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6803 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6804 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6805 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6806 (2, outpoint, required),
6807 (4, htlc_id, required),
6808 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6811 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6812 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6813 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6814 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6815 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6817 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6818 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6819 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6820 (2, self.value, required),
6821 (4, payment_data, option),
6822 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6823 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6829 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6830 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6831 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6833 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6834 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6835 let mut total_msat = None;
6836 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6837 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6838 (0, prev_hop, required),
6839 (1, total_msat, option),
6840 (2, value, required),
6841 (4, payment_data, option),
6842 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6843 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6845 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6847 if payment_data.is_some() {
6848 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6850 if total_msat.is_none() {
6851 total_msat = Some(value);
6853 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6856 if total_msat.is_none() {
6857 if payment_data.is_none() {
6858 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6860 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6862 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6866 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6869 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6876 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6877 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6878 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6881 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6882 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6883 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6884 let mut payment_id = None;
6885 let mut payment_secret = None;
6886 let mut payment_params = None;
6887 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6888 (0, session_priv, required),
6889 (1, payment_id, option),
6890 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6891 (3, payment_secret, option),
6892 (4, path, vec_type),
6893 (5, payment_params, option),
6895 if payment_id.is_none() {
6896 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6898 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6900 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6901 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6902 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6903 path: path.unwrap(),
6904 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6909 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6910 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6915 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6916 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6918 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6920 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6921 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6922 (0, session_priv, required),
6923 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6924 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6925 (3, payment_secret, option),
6926 (4, *path, vec_type),
6927 (5, payment_params, option),
6930 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6932 field.write(writer)?;
6939 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6940 (0, forward_info, required),
6941 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6942 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6943 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6944 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6947 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6949 (0, htlc_id, required),
6950 (2, err_packet, required),
6955 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6956 (0, payment_secret, required),
6957 (2, expiry_time, required),
6958 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6959 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6960 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6963 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6965 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6966 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6967 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6968 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6969 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6970 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6974 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6975 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6977 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6979 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6981 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6982 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6983 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6986 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6989 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6990 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6991 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6994 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6995 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6997 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6998 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6999 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7000 unfunded_channels += 1;
7005 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7007 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7008 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7009 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7010 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7011 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7012 channel.write(writer)?;
7019 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7020 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7021 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7022 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7023 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7024 for forward in pending_forwards {
7025 forward.write(writer)?;
7030 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7032 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7033 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7034 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7036 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7037 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7038 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7039 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7040 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7041 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7042 htlc.write(writer)?;
7044 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7047 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7048 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7049 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7050 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap());
7053 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7054 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7055 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7056 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7057 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7059 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7060 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7061 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7062 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7063 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7064 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7065 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7070 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7071 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7072 for event in events.iter() {
7073 event.write(writer)?;
7076 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7077 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7078 for event in background_events.iter() {
7080 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7082 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7083 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7088 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7089 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7090 // likely to be identical.
7091 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7092 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7094 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7095 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7096 hash.write(writer)?;
7097 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7100 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7101 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7102 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7103 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7104 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7107 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7108 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7110 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7111 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7112 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7113 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7116 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7117 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7121 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7122 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7123 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7125 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7126 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7127 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7133 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7134 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7135 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7136 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7139 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7140 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7141 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7142 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7143 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7145 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7148 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7149 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7150 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7151 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7152 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7153 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7154 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7155 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7156 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7157 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7164 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7166 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7168 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7169 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7170 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7171 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7172 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7173 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7174 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7175 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7176 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7177 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7178 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7179 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7180 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7182 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7183 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7185 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7186 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7188 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7189 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7190 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7191 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7192 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7193 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7195 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7196 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7198 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7199 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7200 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7201 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7202 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7203 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7207 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7208 pub entropy_source: ES,
7210 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7211 pub node_signer: NS,
7213 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7214 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7216 pub signer_provider: SP,
7218 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7220 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7221 pub fee_estimator: F,
7222 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7224 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7225 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7226 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7227 pub chain_monitor: M,
7229 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7230 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7231 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7232 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7233 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7234 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7236 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7238 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7239 /// deserialization.
7241 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7242 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7243 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7245 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7246 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7248 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7249 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7250 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7251 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7253 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7256 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7257 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7260 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7261 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7265 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7267 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7272 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7273 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7274 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7275 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7276 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7278 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7279 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7284 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7285 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7286 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7287 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7289 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7290 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7291 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7292 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7293 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7294 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7298 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7299 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7300 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7304 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7305 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7307 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7309 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7310 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7311 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7312 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7316 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7317 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7319 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7323 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7325 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7327 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7328 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7329 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7330 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7331 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7332 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7333 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7335 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7336 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7337 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7338 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7339 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7340 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7341 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7342 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7343 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7344 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7345 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7346 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7347 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7348 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7349 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7350 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7351 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7352 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7353 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7354 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7355 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7356 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7357 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7358 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7359 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7360 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7361 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7362 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7363 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7364 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7365 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7366 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7368 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7369 let mut found_htlc = false;
7370 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7371 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7374 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7375 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7376 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7377 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7378 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7379 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7380 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7381 log_info!(args.logger,
7382 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7383 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7384 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7388 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7389 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7390 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7392 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7393 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7395 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7397 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7398 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7400 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7401 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7402 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7403 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7407 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7408 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7409 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7410 // safely discard the channel.
7411 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7412 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7413 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7414 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7415 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7418 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7419 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7420 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7421 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7422 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7423 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7427 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7428 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7429 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7430 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7434 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7435 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7436 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7437 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7438 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7439 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7441 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7442 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7444 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7447 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7449 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7450 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7453 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7454 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7456 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7459 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7461 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7462 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let peer_state = PeerState {
7464 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7465 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7466 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7467 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7468 is_connected: false,
7470 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7473 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7475 for _ in 0..event_count {
7476 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7477 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7482 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7483 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7484 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7485 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7486 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7487 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7491 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7492 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7494 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7496 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7497 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7498 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7502 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7503 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7504 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7505 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7506 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7507 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7508 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7510 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7511 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7515 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7516 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7517 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7518 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7519 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7520 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7521 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7522 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7523 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7524 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7525 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7526 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7527 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7528 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7529 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7530 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7531 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7532 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7533 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7534 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7536 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7537 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7540 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7541 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7544 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7545 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7546 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7547 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7548 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7549 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7551 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7553 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7554 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7555 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7556 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7557 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7558 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7559 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7561 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7562 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7563 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7564 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7565 if path.is_empty() {
7566 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7567 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7569 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7570 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7571 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7572 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7574 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7575 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7576 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7579 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7580 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7581 retry_strategy: None,
7582 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7583 payment_params: None,
7584 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7585 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7587 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7588 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7589 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7590 total_msat: path_amt,
7591 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7593 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7594 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7599 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7600 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7601 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7602 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7603 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7605 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7606 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7607 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7608 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7609 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7610 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7611 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7612 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7613 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7614 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7615 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7620 !forwards.is_empty()
7622 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7623 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7624 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7625 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7626 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7627 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7628 intercepted_id != ev_id
7640 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7641 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7642 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7643 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7644 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7645 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7646 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7647 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7651 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7652 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7654 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7655 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7656 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7657 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7659 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7660 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7663 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7664 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7665 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7666 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7667 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7669 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7670 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7671 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7672 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7673 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7674 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7675 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7676 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7678 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7679 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7683 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7685 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7687 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7688 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7690 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7694 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7695 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7697 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7698 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7701 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7703 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7705 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7706 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7707 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7708 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7712 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7713 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7716 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7717 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7718 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7720 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7721 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7722 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7724 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7725 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7726 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7727 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7728 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7729 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7731 if chan.is_usable() {
7732 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7733 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7734 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7735 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7736 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7742 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7744 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7745 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7746 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7747 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7748 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7749 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7750 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7751 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7752 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7753 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7754 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7756 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7757 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7759 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7760 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7761 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7762 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7764 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7765 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7766 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7767 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7769 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7770 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7771 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7772 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7774 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7775 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7776 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7779 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7780 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7783 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7784 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7787 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7790 purpose: payment_purpose,
7791 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7797 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7798 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7799 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7801 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7802 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7806 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7808 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7809 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7810 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7811 router: args.router,
7813 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7815 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7816 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7817 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()), },
7818 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7820 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7821 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7822 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7823 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7824 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7825 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7827 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7832 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7834 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7836 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7837 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7838 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7839 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7841 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7842 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7843 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7845 logger: args.logger,
7846 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7849 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7850 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7851 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7852 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7853 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7856 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7857 //connection or two.
7859 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7865 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7866 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7867 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7868 use core::time::Duration;
7869 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7870 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7871 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7872 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7873 use crate::ln::msgs;
7874 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7875 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7876 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7877 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7878 use crate::util::test_utils;
7879 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7880 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7883 fn test_notify_limits() {
7884 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7885 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7889 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7891 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7892 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7893 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7894 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7895 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7897 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7899 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7900 // to connect messages with new values
7901 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7902 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7903 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7904 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7906 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7907 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7908 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7909 // ... but the last node should not.
7910 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7911 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7912 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7913 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7915 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7916 // about the channel.
7917 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7918 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7919 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7921 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7923 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7924 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7925 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7926 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7927 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7928 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7930 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7931 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7932 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7934 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7935 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7936 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7937 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7938 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7939 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7941 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7942 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7943 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7944 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7945 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7946 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7947 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7948 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7950 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7951 // the channel info has updated.
7952 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7953 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7954 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7955 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7956 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7957 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7961 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7962 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7967 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7968 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7970 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7971 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7972 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7973 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7975 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7976 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7977 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7978 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7979 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7980 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7982 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7984 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7986 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7987 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7989 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7991 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7992 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7993 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7995 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7999 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8000 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8001 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8002 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8003 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8004 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8005 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8006 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8007 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8009 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8010 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8012 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8013 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8014 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8016 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8017 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8018 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8019 // lightning messages manually.
8020 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8021 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8024 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8025 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8026 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8028 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8029 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8031 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8032 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8034 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8035 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8036 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8038 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8039 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8040 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8042 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8044 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8046 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8047 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8050 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8051 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8052 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8055 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8056 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8057 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8058 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8063 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8064 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8065 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8066 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8071 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8072 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8073 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8074 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8076 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8081 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8082 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8083 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8084 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8085 // fails as expected.
8086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8088 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8089 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8090 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8091 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8092 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8094 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8095 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8096 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8098 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8099 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8100 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8101 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8102 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8104 let route = find_route(
8105 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8106 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8108 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8110 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8111 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8112 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8113 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8114 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8116 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8117 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8118 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8122 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8123 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8124 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8125 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8126 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8127 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8128 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8129 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8130 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8132 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8133 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8135 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8136 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8137 let route = find_route(
8138 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8139 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8141 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8143 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8145 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8146 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8147 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8149 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8150 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8151 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8155 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8156 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8157 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8159 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8160 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8163 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8164 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8165 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8166 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8167 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8168 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8169 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8170 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8171 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8173 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8174 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8178 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8179 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8180 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8186 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8187 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8189 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8190 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8191 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8192 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8193 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8195 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8196 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8197 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8198 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8199 let route = find_route(
8200 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8201 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8204 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8205 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8206 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8207 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8210 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8211 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8212 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8213 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8214 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8215 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8216 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8218 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8222 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8223 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8227 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8229 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8230 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8232 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8233 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8234 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8235 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8236 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8238 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8239 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8240 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8241 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8242 let route = find_route(
8243 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8244 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8247 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8248 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8249 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8250 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8251 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8254 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8255 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8256 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8257 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8258 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8259 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8260 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8262 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8266 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8270 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8272 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8273 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8274 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8275 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8277 // Marshall an MPP route.
8278 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8279 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8280 route.paths.push(path);
8281 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8282 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8283 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8284 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8285 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8286 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8288 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8289 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8290 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8291 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8296 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8300 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8302 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8304 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8305 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8307 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8308 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8310 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8313 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8314 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8315 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8316 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8317 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8318 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8321 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8324 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8325 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8330 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8331 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8333 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8334 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8335 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8337 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8338 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8340 total_msat: 100_000,
8343 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8344 // payment verification fails as expected.
8345 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8346 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8347 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8348 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8350 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8354 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8355 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8359 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8360 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8361 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8362 // the channel is successfully closed.
8363 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8364 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8365 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8366 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8368 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8369 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8370 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8371 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8372 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8374 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8375 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8377 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8378 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8379 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8380 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8383 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8385 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8386 // as it has the funding transaction.
8387 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8388 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8389 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8391 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8394 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8396 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8398 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8399 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8400 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8402 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8403 // as it has the funding transaction.
8404 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8405 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8406 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8409 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8410 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8412 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8413 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8414 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8416 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8417 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8418 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8419 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8421 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8422 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8424 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8425 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8426 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8427 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8428 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8429 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8430 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8432 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8433 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8434 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8435 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8436 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8437 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8438 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8441 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8443 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8444 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8445 // closing transaction).
8446 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8447 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8448 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8450 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8451 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8452 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8453 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8454 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8457 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8459 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8461 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8462 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8463 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8465 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8467 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8468 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8471 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8472 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8473 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8476 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8477 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8478 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8481 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8483 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8484 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8486 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8487 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8489 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8490 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8495 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8496 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8497 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8498 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8499 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8500 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8501 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8502 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8505 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8506 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8507 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8509 // Test the API functions.
8510 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8512 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8514 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8516 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8518 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8520 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8522 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8527 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8528 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8529 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8530 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8531 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8532 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8533 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8534 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8535 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8536 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8537 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8539 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8540 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8541 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8543 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8544 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8546 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8547 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8549 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8552 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8553 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8555 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8556 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8558 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8562 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8564 use crate::chain::Listen;
8565 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8566 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8567 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8568 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8569 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8570 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8571 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8572 use crate::util::test_utils;
8573 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8574 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8576 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8577 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8578 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8580 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8584 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8585 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8586 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8587 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8588 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8589 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8590 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8591 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8596 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8597 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8600 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8601 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8602 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8604 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8605 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8607 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8608 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8609 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8610 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8611 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8613 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8614 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8616 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8617 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8618 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8619 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8621 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8623 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8625 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8626 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8627 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8628 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8629 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8631 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8633 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8635 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8636 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8637 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8638 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8639 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8642 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8643 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8644 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8646 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8647 } else { panic!(); }
8649 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8650 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8652 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8655 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8658 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8659 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8661 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8662 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8663 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8664 match msg_events[0] {
8665 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8666 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8667 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8671 match msg_events[1] {
8672 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8676 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8677 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8679 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8680 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8685 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8686 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8688 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8689 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8694 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8696 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8697 macro_rules! send_payment {
8698 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8699 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8700 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8701 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8702 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8703 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8704 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8705 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8706 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8707 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8709 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8710 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8712 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8713 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8715 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8716 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8717 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8718 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8719 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8720 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8721 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8722 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8724 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8725 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8726 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8727 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8729 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8730 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8731 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8732 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8733 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8735 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8738 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8739 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8740 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8741 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8743 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8748 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8749 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);