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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
24
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
28
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
32
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
35 use crate::chain;
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::events;
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
52 use crate::ln::msgs;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
56 #[cfg(test)]
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
75
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
77
78 use crate::io;
79 use crate::prelude::*;
80 use core::{cmp, mem};
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
82 use crate::io::Read;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
86 use core::ops::Deref;
87
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
91
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
93 //
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
97 //
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
102 //
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
108
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
111         Forward {
112                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113                 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114                 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
116         },
117         Receive {
118                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
124         },
125         ReceiveKeysend {
126                 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131                 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
133         },
134 }
135
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138         pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139         pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
141         /// Amount received
142         pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143         /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144         /// may overshoot this in either case)
145         pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147         /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148         /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149         pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
150 }
151
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
156 }
157
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
163 }
164
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
167
168         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
171         // HTLCs.
172         //
173         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
175         prev_htlc_id: u64,
176         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
178 }
179
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
182         FailHTLC {
183                 htlc_id: u64,
184                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
185         },
186 }
187
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192         short_channel_id: u64,
193         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
194         htlc_id: u64,
195         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
197
198         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
200         outpoint: OutPoint,
201 }
202
203 enum OnionPayload {
204         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
205         Invoice {
206                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
209         },
210         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
212 }
213
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
217         cltv_expiry: u32,
218         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
219         value: u64,
220         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222         sender_intended_value: u64,
223         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
224         timer_ticks: u8,
225         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
229         total_msat: u64,
230         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 }
233
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240                         value_msat: val.value,
241                 }
242         }
243 }
244
245 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
246 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
247 ///
248 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
249 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
250 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
251
252 impl PaymentId {
253         /// Number of bytes in the id.
254         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
255 }
256
257 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
258         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
259                 self.0.write(w)
260         }
261 }
262
263 impl Readable for PaymentId {
264         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
265                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
266                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
267         }
268 }
269
270 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
271         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
272                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
273         }
274 }
275
276 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
277 ///
278 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
279 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
280 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
281
282 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
283         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
284                 self.0.write(w)
285         }
286 }
287
288 impl Readable for InterceptId {
289         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
290                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
291                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
292         }
293 }
294
295 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
296 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
297 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
298         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
299         OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
300 }
301 impl SentHTLCId {
302         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
303                 match source {
304                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
305                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
306                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
307                         },
308                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
309                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
310                 }
311         }
312 }
313 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
314         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
315                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
316                 (2, htlc_id, required),
317         },
318         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
319                 (0, session_priv, required),
320         };
321 );
322
323
324 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
325 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
327 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
328         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
329         OutboundRoute {
330                 path: Path,
331                 session_priv: SecretKey,
332                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
333                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
334                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
335                 payment_id: PaymentId,
336         },
337 }
338 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
339 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
340         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
341                 match self {
342                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
343                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
344                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
345                         },
346                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
347                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
348                                 path.hash(hasher);
349                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
350                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
351                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
352                         },
353                 }
354         }
355 }
356 impl HTLCSource {
357         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
358         #[cfg(test)]
359         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
360                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
361                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
362                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
363                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
364                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
365                 }
366         }
367
368         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
369         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
370         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
371         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
372                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
373                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
374                 } else {
375                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
376                         true
377                 }
378         }
379 }
380
381 struct InboundOnionErr {
382         err_code: u16,
383         err_data: Vec<u8>,
384         msg: &'static str,
385 }
386
387 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
388 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
389 ///
390 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
392 pub enum FailureCode {
393         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
394         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
395         TemporaryNodeFailure,
396         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
397         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
398         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
399         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
400         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
401         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
402         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
403         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
404         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
405         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
406         ///
407         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
408         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
409         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
410 }
411
412 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
413     fn into(self) -> u16 {
414                 match self {
415                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
416                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
417                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
418                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
419                 }
420         }
421 }
422
423 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
424 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
425 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
426 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
427 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
428
429 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
430         err: msgs::LightningError,
431         chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
432         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
433         channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
434 }
435 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
436         #[inline]
437         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
438                 Self {
439                         err: LightningError {
440                                 err: err.clone(),
441                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
443                                                 channel_id,
444                                                 data: err
445                                         },
446                                 },
447                         },
448                         chan_id: None,
449                         shutdown_finish: None,
450                         channel_capacity: None,
451                 }
452         }
453         #[inline]
454         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
455                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
456         }
457         #[inline]
458         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
459                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
460                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
461                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
462                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
463                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
464                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
465                 } else {
466                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
467                 };
468                 Self {
469                         err: LightningError { err, action },
470                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
471                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
472                         channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
473                 }
474         }
475         #[inline]
476         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
477                 Self {
478                         err: match err {
479                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
480                                         err: msg.clone(),
481                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
482                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
483                                                         channel_id,
484                                                         data: msg
485                                                 },
486                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
487                                         },
488                                 },
489                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
490                                         err: msg,
491                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
492                                 },
493                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
494                                         err: msg.clone(),
495                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
496                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
497                                                         channel_id,
498                                                         data: msg
499                                                 },
500                                         },
501                                 },
502                         },
503                         chan_id: None,
504                         shutdown_finish: None,
505                         channel_capacity: None,
506                 }
507         }
508
509         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
510                 self.chan_id.is_some()
511         }
512 }
513
514 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
515 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
516 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
517 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
518 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
519
520 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
521 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
522 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
523 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
524 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
525 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
526         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
527         CommitmentFirst,
528         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
529         RevokeAndACKFirst,
530 }
531
532 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
533 struct ClaimingPayment {
534         amount_msat: u64,
535         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
537         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
538         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
539 }
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
541         (0, amount_msat, required),
542         (2, payment_purpose, required),
543         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
544         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
545         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
546 });
547
548 struct ClaimablePayment {
549         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
550         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
551         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
552 }
553
554 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
555 struct ClaimablePayments {
556         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
557         /// failed/claimed by the user.
558         ///
559         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
560         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
561         ///
562         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
563         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
564         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
565
566         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
567         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
568         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
569         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
570 }
571
572 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
573 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
574 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
575 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
576 #[derive(Debug)]
577 enum BackgroundEvent {
578         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
579         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
580         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
581         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
582         ///
583         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584         /// are regenerated on startup.
585         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
586         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
587         /// channel to continue normal operation.
588         ///
589         /// In general this should be used rather than
590         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
591         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
592         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
593         ///
594         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
595         /// are regenerated on startup.
596         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
597                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
598                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
599                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
600         },
601         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
602         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
603         /// on a channel.
604         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
605                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
606                 channel_id: ChannelId,
607         },
608 }
609
610 #[derive(Debug)]
611 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
612         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
613         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
614         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
615         /// event can be generated.
616         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
617         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
618         /// operation of another channel.
619         ///
620         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
621         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
622         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
623         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
624         /// outbound edge.
625         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
626                 event: events::Event,
627                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
628         },
629         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
630         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
631         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
632         ///
633         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
634         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
635         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
636         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
637         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
638         ///
639         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
640         /// stored for later processing.
641         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
642                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
643                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
644                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
645         },
646 }
647
648 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
649         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
650         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
651         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
652         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
653                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
654                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
655                 (4, blocking_action, required),
656         },
657         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
658                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
659                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
660                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
661                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
662                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
663                 // downgrades to prior versions.
664                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
665         },
666 );
667
668 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
669 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
670         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
671                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
672                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
673         },
674 }
675 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
676         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
677                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
678                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
679         };
680 );
681
682 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
683 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
684 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
685 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
686         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
687         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
688         /// durably to disk.
689         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
690                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
691                 channel_id: ChannelId,
692                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
693                 htlc_id: u64,
694         },
695 }
696
697 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
698         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
699                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
700                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
701                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
702                 }
703         }
704 }
705
706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
707         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
708 ;);
709
710
711 /// State we hold per-peer.
712 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
713         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
714         ///
715         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
716         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
717         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
718         ///
719         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
720         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
721         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
722         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
723         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
724         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
725         latest_features: InitFeatures,
726         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
727         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
728         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
729         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
730         /// user but which have not yet completed.
731         ///
732         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
733         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
734         /// for a missing channel.
735         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
736         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
737         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
738         ///
739         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
740         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
741         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
742         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
743         ///
744         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
745         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
746         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
747         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
748         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
749         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
750         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
751         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
752         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
753         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
754         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
755         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
756         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
757         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
758         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
759         is_connected: bool,
760 }
761
762 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
763         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
764         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
765         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
766         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
767                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
768                         return false
769                 }
770                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
771                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
772                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
773         }
774
775         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
776         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
777                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
778         }
779
780         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
781         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
782                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
783                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
784         }
785 }
786
787 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
788 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
789 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
790         /// The original OpenChannel message.
791         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
792         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
793         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
794 }
795
796 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
797 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
798 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
799
800 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
801 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
802 ///
803 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
804 /// here.
805 ///
806 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
807 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
808 struct PendingInboundPayment {
809         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
810         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
811         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
812         /// this payment being removed.
813         expiry_time: u64,
814         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
815         user_payment_id: u64,
816         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
817         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
818         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
819 }
820
821 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
822 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
823 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
824 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
825 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
826 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
827 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
828 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
829 ///
830 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
831 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
832 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
833         Arc<M>,
834         Arc<T>,
835         Arc<KeysManager>,
836         Arc<KeysManager>,
837         Arc<KeysManager>,
838         Arc<F>,
839         Arc<DefaultRouter<
840                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
841                 Arc<L>,
842                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
843                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
844                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
845         >>,
846         Arc<L>
847 >;
848
849 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
850 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
851 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
852 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
853 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
854 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
855 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
856 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
857 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
858 ///
859 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
860 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
861 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
862         ChannelManager<
863                 &'a M,
864                 &'b T,
865                 &'c KeysManager,
866                 &'c KeysManager,
867                 &'c KeysManager,
868                 &'d F,
869                 &'e DefaultRouter<
870                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
871                         &'g L,
872                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
873                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
874                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
875                 >,
876                 &'g L
877         >;
878
879 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
880 ///
881 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
882 /// languages.
883 pub trait AChannelManager {
884         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
885         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
886         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
887         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
888         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
889         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
890         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
891         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
892         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
893         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
894         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
895         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
896         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
897         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
898         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
899         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
900         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
901         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
902         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
903         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
904         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
905         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
906         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
907         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
908         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
909         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
910         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
911         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
912         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
913         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
914         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
915         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
916         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
917         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
918         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
919         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
920 }
921
922 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
923 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
924 where
925         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
926         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
927         ES::Target: EntropySource,
928         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
929         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
930         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
931         R::Target: Router,
932         L::Target: Logger,
933 {
934         type Watch = M::Target;
935         type M = M;
936         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
937         type T = T;
938         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
939         type ES = ES;
940         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
941         type NS = NS;
942         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
943         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
944         type SP = SP;
945         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
946         type F = F;
947         type Router = R::Target;
948         type R = R;
949         type Logger = L::Target;
950         type L = L;
951         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
952 }
953
954 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
955 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
956 ///
957 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
958 /// to individual Channels.
959 ///
960 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
961 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
962 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
963 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
964 ///
965 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
966 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
967 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
968 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
969 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
970 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
971 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
972 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
973 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
974 ///
975 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
976 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
977 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
978 ///
979 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
980 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
981 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
982 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
983 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
984 ///
985 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
986 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
987 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
988 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
989 ///
990 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
991 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
992 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
993 ///
994 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
995 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
996 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
997 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
998 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
999 ///
1000 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1001 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1002 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1003 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1004 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1005 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1006 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1007 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1008 //
1009 // Lock order:
1010 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1011 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1012 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1013 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1014 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1015 //
1016 // Lock order tree:
1017 //
1018 // `pending_offers_messages`
1019 //
1020 // `total_consistency_lock`
1021 //  |
1022 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1023 //  |   |
1024 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1025 //  |
1026 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1027 //      |
1028 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1029 //          |
1030 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1031 //          |
1032 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1033 //              |
1034 //              |__`peer_state`
1035 //                  |
1036 //                  |__`id_to_peer`
1037 //                  |
1038 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1039 //                  |
1040 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1041 //                  |
1042 //                  |__`best_block`
1043 //                  |
1044 //                  |__`pending_events`
1045 //                      |
1046 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1047 //
1048 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1049 where
1050         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1051         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1052         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1053         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1054         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1055         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1056         R::Target: Router,
1057         L::Target: Logger,
1058 {
1059         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1060         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1061         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1062         chain_monitor: M,
1063         tx_broadcaster: T,
1064         #[allow(unused)]
1065         router: R,
1066
1067         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1068         #[cfg(test)]
1069         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1070         #[cfg(not(test))]
1071         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1072         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1073
1074         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1075         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1076         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1077         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1078         ///
1079         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1080         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1081
1082         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1083         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1084         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1085         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1086         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1087         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1088         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1089         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1090         ///
1091         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1092         ///
1093         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1094         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1095
1096         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1097         ///
1098         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1099         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1100         /// and via the classic SCID.
1101         ///
1102         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1103         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1104         ///
1105         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1106         #[cfg(test)]
1107         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1108         #[cfg(not(test))]
1109         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1110         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1111         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1112         ///
1113         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1114         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1115
1116         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1117         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1118         ///
1119         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1120         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1121
1122         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1123         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1124         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1125         /// active channel list on load.
1126         ///
1127         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1128         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1129
1130         /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1131         ///
1132         /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1133         /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1134         /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1135         ///
1136         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1137         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1138         /// the handling of the events.
1139         ///
1140         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1141         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1142         ///
1143         /// TODO:
1144         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1145         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1146         /// would break backwards compatability.
1147         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1148         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1149         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1150         ///
1151         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1152         id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1153
1154         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1155         ///
1156         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1157         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1158         /// confirmation depth.
1159         ///
1160         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1161         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1162         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1163         ///
1164         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1165         #[cfg(test)]
1166         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1167         #[cfg(not(test))]
1168         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1169
1170         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1171
1172         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1173
1174         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1175         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1176         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1177         ///
1178         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1179         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1180
1181         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1182         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1183         /// keeping additional state.
1184         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1185
1186         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1187         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1188         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1189         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1190
1191         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1192         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1193         ///
1194         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1195         /// are currently open with that peer.
1196         ///
1197         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1198         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1199         /// channels.
1200         ///
1201         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1202         ///
1203         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1204         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1205         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1206         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1207         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1208
1209         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1210         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1211         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1212         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1213         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1214         ///
1215         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1216         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1217         ///
1218         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1219         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1220         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1221         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1222         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1223
1224         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1225         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1226
1227         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1228         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1229         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1230         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1231         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1232         ///
1233         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1234         ///
1235         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1236         ///
1237         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1238         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1239         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1240         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1241         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1242         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1243         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1244         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1245         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1246         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1247         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1248         ///
1249         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1250         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1251         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1252
1253         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1254
1255         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1256         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1257
1258         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1259
1260         entropy_source: ES,
1261         node_signer: NS,
1262         signer_provider: SP,
1263
1264         logger: L,
1265 }
1266
1267 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1268 ///
1269 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1270 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1271 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1272 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1273 pub struct ChainParameters {
1274         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1275         pub network: Network,
1276
1277         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1278         ///
1279         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1280         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1281 }
1282
1283 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1284 #[must_use]
1285 enum NotifyOption {
1286         DoPersist,
1287         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1288         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1289 }
1290
1291 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1292 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1293 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1294 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1295 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1296 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1297 ///
1298 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1299 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1300 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1301 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1302         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1303         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1304         should_persist: F,
1305         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1306         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1307 }
1308
1309 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1310         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1311         /// events to handle.
1312         ///
1313         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1314         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1315         /// isn't ideal.
1316         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1317                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1318         }
1319
1320         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1321         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1322                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1323                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1324
1325                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1326                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1327                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1328                         should_persist: move || {
1329                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1330                                 // processing and return that.
1331                                 let notify = persist_check();
1332                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1333                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1334                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1335                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1336                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1337                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1338                                 }
1339                         },
1340                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1341                 }
1342         }
1343
1344         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1345         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1346         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1347         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1348         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1349                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1350
1351                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1352                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1353                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1354                         should_persist: persist_check,
1355                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1356                 }
1357         }
1358 }
1359
1360 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1361         fn drop(&mut self) {
1362                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1363                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1364                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1365                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1366                         },
1367                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1368                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1369                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1370                 }
1371         }
1372 }
1373
1374 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1375 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1376 ///
1377 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1378 ///
1379 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1380 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1381 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1382 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1383 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1384
1385 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1386 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1387 ///
1388 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1389 ///
1390 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1391 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1392 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1393 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1394 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1395 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1396 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1397 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1398 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1399 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1400 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1401 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1402 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1403
1404 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1405 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1406 /// this value.
1407 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1408 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1409 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1410 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1411
1412 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1413 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1414 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1415 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1416 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1417 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1418 #[deny(const_err)]
1419 #[allow(dead_code)]
1420 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1421
1422 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1423 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1424 #[deny(const_err)]
1425 #[allow(dead_code)]
1426 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1427
1428 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1429 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1430
1431 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1432 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1433 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1434
1435 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1436 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1437 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1438
1439 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1440 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1441 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1442 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1443
1444 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1445 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1446 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1447
1448 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1449 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1450 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1451
1452 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1453 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1454 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1455         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1456         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1457         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1458         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1459         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1460         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1461         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1462         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1463 }
1464
1465 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1466 /// to better separate parameters.
1467 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1468 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1469         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1470         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1471         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1472         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1473         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1474         pub features: InitFeatures,
1475         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1476         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1477         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1478         ///
1479         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1480         ///
1481         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1482         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1483         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1484         /// payments to us through this channel.
1485         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1486         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1487         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1488         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1489         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1490         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1491         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1492 }
1493
1494 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1495 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1496 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1497         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1498         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1499         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1500         /// lifetime of the channel.
1501         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1502         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1503         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1504         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1505         /// our counterparty already.
1506         ///
1507         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1508         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1509         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1510         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1511         ///
1512         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1513         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1514         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1515         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1516         ///
1517         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1518         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1519         ///
1520         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1521         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1522         ///
1523         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1524         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1525         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1526         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1527         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1528         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1529         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1530         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1531         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1532         /// `Some(0)`).
1533         ///
1534         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1535         ///
1536         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1537         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1538         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1539         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1540         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1541         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1542         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1543         ///
1544         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1545         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1546         ///
1547         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1548         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1549         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1550         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1551         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1552         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1553         /// this value on chain.
1554         ///
1555         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1556         ///
1557         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1558         ///
1559         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1560         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1561         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1562         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1563         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1564         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1565         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1566         ///
1567         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1568         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1569         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1570         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1571         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1572         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1573         ///
1574         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1575         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1576         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1577         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1578         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1579         ///
1580         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1581         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1582         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1583         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1584         ///
1585         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1586         pub balance_msat: u64,
1587         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1588         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1589         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1590         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1591         ///
1592         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1593         ///
1594         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1595         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1596         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1597         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1598         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1599         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1600         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1601         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1602         ///
1603         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1604         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1605         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1606         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1607         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1608         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1609         /// route which is valid.
1610         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1611         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1612         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1613         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1614         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1615         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1616         ///
1617         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1618         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1619         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1620         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1621         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1622         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1623         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1624         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1625         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1626         ///
1627         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1628         ///
1629         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1630         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1631         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1632         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1633         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1634         ///
1635         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1636         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1637         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1638         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1639         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1640         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1641         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1642         ///
1643         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1644         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1645         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1646         pub is_outbound: bool,
1647         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1648         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1649         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1650         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1651         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1652         ///
1653         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1654         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1655         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1656         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1657         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1658         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1659         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1660         ///
1661         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1662         pub is_usable: bool,
1663         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1664         pub is_public: bool,
1665         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1666         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1667         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1668         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1669         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1670         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1671         ///
1672         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1673         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1674 }
1675
1676 impl ChannelDetails {
1677         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1678         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1679         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1680         ///
1681         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1682         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1683         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1684                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1685         }
1686
1687         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1688         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1689         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1690         ///
1691         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1692         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1693         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1694                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1695         }
1696
1697         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1698                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1699                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1700         ) -> Self
1701         where
1702                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1703                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1704         {
1705                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1706                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1707                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1708                 ChannelDetails {
1709                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1710                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1711                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1712                                 features: latest_features,
1713                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1714                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1715                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1716                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1717                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1718                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1719                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1720                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1721                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1722                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1723                         },
1724                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1725                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1726                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1727                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1728                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1729                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1730                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1731                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1732                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1733                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1734                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1735                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1736                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1737                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1738                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1739                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1740                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1741                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1742                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1743                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1744                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1745                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1746                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1747                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1748                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1749                         config: Some(context.config()),
1750                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1751                 }
1752         }
1753 }
1754
1755 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1756 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1757 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1758 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1759 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1760 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1761 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1762 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1763         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1764         NotShuttingDown,
1765         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1766         ShutdownInitiated,
1767         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1768         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1769         ResolvingHTLCs,
1770         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1771         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1772         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1773         /// to drop the channel.
1774         ShutdownComplete,
1775 }
1776
1777 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1778 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1779 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1780 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1781         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1782         AwaitingInvoice {
1783                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1784                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1785                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1786         },
1787         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1788         Pending {
1789                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1790                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1791                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1792                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1793                 /// abandoned.
1794                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1795                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1796                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1797                 total_msat: u64,
1798         },
1799         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1800         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1801         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1802         Fulfilled {
1803                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1804                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1805                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1806                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1807                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1808                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1809         },
1810         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1811         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1812         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1813         Abandoned {
1814                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1815                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1816                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1817                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1818                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1819         },
1820 }
1821
1822 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1823 ///
1824 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1825 #[derive(Clone)]
1826 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1827         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1828         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1829         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1830         /// route hints.
1831         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1832         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1833         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1834 }
1835
1836 macro_rules! handle_error {
1837         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1838                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1839                 // entering the macro.
1840                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1841                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1842
1843                 match $internal {
1844                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1845                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1846                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1847
1848                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1849                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1850                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1851                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1852                                                         msg: update
1853                                                 });
1854                                         }
1855                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1856                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1857                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
1858                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1859                                                         counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1860                                                         channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1861                                                 }, None));
1862                                         }
1863                                 }
1864
1865                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1866                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1867                                 } else {
1868                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1869                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1870                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1871                                         });
1872                                 }
1873
1874                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1875                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1876                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1877                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1878                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1879                                         }
1880                                 }
1881
1882                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1883                                 Err(err)
1884                         },
1885                 }
1886         } };
1887         ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1888                 match $internal {
1889                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
1890                         Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1891                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1892                                 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1893                         },
1894                 }
1895         };
1896 }
1897
1898 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1899         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1900                 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1901                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1902                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1903                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1904                 } else {
1905                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1906                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1907                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1908                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1909                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1910                         // stage.
1911                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1912                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1913                 }
1914                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1915         }}
1916 }
1917
1918 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1919 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1920         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1921                 match $err {
1922                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1923                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1924                         },
1925                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1926                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1927                         },
1928                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1929                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1930                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1931                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1932                                 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1933                                 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1934
1935                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1936                                         shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1937                         },
1938                 }
1939         };
1940         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1941                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1942         };
1943         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1944                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1945         };
1946         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1947                 match $channel_phase {
1948                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1949                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1950                         },
1951                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1952                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1953                         },
1954                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1955                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1956                         },
1957                 }
1958         };
1959 }
1960
1961 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1962         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1963                 match $res {
1964                         Ok(res) => res,
1965                         Err(e) => {
1966                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1967                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1968                                 if drop {
1969                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1970                                 }
1971                                 break Err(res);
1972                         }
1973                 }
1974         }
1975 }
1976
1977 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1978         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1979                 match $res {
1980                         Ok(res) => res,
1981                         Err(e) => {
1982                                 let key = *$entry.key();
1983                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1984                                 if drop {
1985                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1986                                 }
1987                                 return Err(res);
1988                         }
1989                 }
1990         }
1991 }
1992
1993 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1994         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1995                 {
1996                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1997                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1998                         channel
1999                 }
2000         }
2001 }
2002
2003 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2004         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2005                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2006                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2007                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2008                 });
2009                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2010                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2011                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2012                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2013                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2014                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2015                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2016                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2017                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2018                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2019                 }
2020         }}
2021 }
2022
2023 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2024         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2025                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2026                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2027                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2028                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2029                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2030                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2031                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2032                         }, None));
2033                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2034                 }
2035         }
2036 }
2037
2038 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2039         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2040                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2041                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2042                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2043                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2044                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2045                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2046                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2047                         }, None));
2048                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2049                 }
2050         }
2051 }
2052
2053 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2054         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2055                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2056                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2057                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2058                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2059                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2060                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2061                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2062                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2063                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2064                         // now.
2065                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2066                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2067                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2068                                         msg,
2069                                 })
2070                         } else { None }
2071                 } else { None };
2072
2073                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2074                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2075
2076                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2077                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2078                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2079                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2080                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2081                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2082                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2083                 }
2084
2085                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2086                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2087                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2088                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2089
2090                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2091                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2092                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2093                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2094                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2095                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2096                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2097                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2098                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2099                                 ));
2100                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2101                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2102                                 } else {
2103                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2104                                 }
2105                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2106                         } else {
2107                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2108                         }
2109
2110                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2111                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2112                         if batch_completed {
2113                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2114                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2115                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2116                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2117                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2118                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2119                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2120                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2121                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2122                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2123                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2124                                                 }
2125                                         }
2126                                 }
2127                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2128                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2129                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2130                                 }
2131                         }
2132                 }
2133
2134                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2135
2136                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2137                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2138                 }
2139                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2140                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2141                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2142                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2143                 }
2144         } }
2145 }
2146
2147 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2148         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2149                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2150                 match $update_res {
2151                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2152                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2153                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2154                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2155                         },
2156                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2157                                 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2158                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2159                                 false
2160                         },
2161                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2162                                 $completed;
2163                                 true
2164                         },
2165                 }
2166         } };
2167         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2168                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2169                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2170         };
2171         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2172                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2173                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2174                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2175                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2176                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2177                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2178                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2179                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2180                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2181                         });
2182                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2183                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2184                         {
2185                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2186                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2187                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2188                                 }
2189                         })
2190         } };
2191 }
2192
2193 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2194         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2195                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2196                 while !processed_all_events {
2197                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2198                                 return;
2199                         }
2200
2201                         let mut result;
2202
2203                         {
2204                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2205                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2206                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2207
2208                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2209                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2210                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2211
2212                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2213                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2214                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2215                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2216                                 }
2217                         }
2218
2219                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2220                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2221                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2222                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2223                         }
2224
2225                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2226
2227                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2228                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2229                                 $handle_event;
2230                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2231                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2232                                 }
2233                         }
2234
2235                         {
2236                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2237                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2238                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2239                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2240                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2241                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2242                         }
2243
2244                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2245                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2246                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2247                                 processed_all_events = false;
2248                         }
2249
2250                         match result {
2251                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2252                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2253                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2254                                 },
2255                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2256                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2257                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2258                         }
2259                 }
2260         }
2261 }
2262
2263 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2264 where
2265         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2266         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2267         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2268         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2269         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2270         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2271         R::Target: Router,
2272         L::Target: Logger,
2273 {
2274         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2275         ///
2276         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2277         ///
2278         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2279         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2280         ///
2281         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2282         ///
2283         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2284         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2285         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2286         /// more details.
2287         ///
2288         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2289         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2290         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2291         pub fn new(
2292                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2293                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2294                 current_timestamp: u32,
2295         ) -> Self {
2296                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2297                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2298                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2299                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2300                 ChannelManager {
2301                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2302                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2303                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2304                         chain_monitor,
2305                         tx_broadcaster,
2306                         router,
2307
2308                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2309
2310                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2311                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2312                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2313                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2314                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2315                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2316                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2317                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2318
2319                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2320                         secp_ctx,
2321
2322                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2323                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2324
2325                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2326
2327                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2328
2329                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2330
2331                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2332                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2333                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2334                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2335                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2336                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2337                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2338                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2339
2340                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2341
2342                         entropy_source,
2343                         node_signer,
2344                         signer_provider,
2345
2346                         logger,
2347                 }
2348         }
2349
2350         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2351         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2352                 &self.default_configuration
2353         }
2354
2355         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2356                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2357                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2358                 let mut i = 0;
2359                 loop {
2360                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2361                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2362                         } else {
2363                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2364                         }
2365                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2366                                 break;
2367                         }
2368                         i += 1;
2369                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2370                 }
2371                 outbound_scid_alias
2372         }
2373
2374         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2375         ///
2376         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2377         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2378         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2379         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2380         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2381         ///
2382         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2383         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2384         ///
2385         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2386         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2387         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2388         ///
2389         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2390         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2391         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2392         ///
2393         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2394         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2395         ///
2396         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2397         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2398         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2399         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2400         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2401         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2402         ///
2403         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2404         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2405         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2406         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2407                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2408                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2409                 }
2410
2411                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2412                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2413                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2414
2415                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2416
2417                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2418                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2419
2420                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2421
2422                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2423                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2424                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2425                         }
2426                 }
2427
2428                 let channel = {
2429                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2430                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2431                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2432                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2433                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2434                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2435                         {
2436                                 Ok(res) => res,
2437                                 Err(e) => {
2438                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2439                                         return Err(e);
2440                                 },
2441                         }
2442                 };
2443                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2444
2445                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2446                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2447                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2448                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2449                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2450                                 } else {
2451                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2452                                 }
2453                         },
2454                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2455                 }
2456
2457                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2458                         node_id: their_network_key,
2459                         msg: res,
2460                 });
2461                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2462         }
2463
2464         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2465                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2466                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2467                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2468                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2469                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2470                 // the same channel.
2471                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2472                 {
2473                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2474                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2475                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2476                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2477                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2478                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2479                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2480                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2481                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2482                                                 _ => None,
2483                                         })
2484                                         .filter(f)
2485                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2486                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2487                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2488                                         })
2489                                 );
2490                         }
2491                 }
2492                 res
2493         }
2494
2495         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2496         /// more information.
2497         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2498                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2499                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2500                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2501                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2502                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2503                 // the same channel.
2504                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2505                 {
2506                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2507                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2508                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2509                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2510                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2511                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2512                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2513                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2514                                         res.push(details);
2515                                 }
2516                         }
2517                 }
2518                 res
2519         }
2520
2521         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2522         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2523         ///
2524         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2525         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2526         /// are.
2527         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2528                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2529                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2530                 // really wanted anyway.
2531                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2532         }
2533
2534         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2535         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2536                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2537                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2538
2539                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2540                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2541                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2542                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2543                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2544                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2545                         };
2546                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2547                                 .iter()
2548                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2549                                 .map(context_to_details)
2550                                 .collect();
2551                 }
2552                 vec![]
2553         }
2554
2555         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2556         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2557         ///
2558         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2559         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2560         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2561         ///
2562         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2563         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2564                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2565                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2566                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2567                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2568                                 },
2569                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2570                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2571                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2572                                 },
2573                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2574                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2575                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2576                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2577                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2578                                         })
2579                                 },
2580                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2581                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2582                                 },
2583                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2584                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2585                                 },
2586                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2587                         })
2588                         .collect()
2589         }
2590
2591         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2592         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2593                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2594                 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2595                         Some(transaction) => {
2596                                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2597                                         channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2598                                 }, None));
2599                         },
2600                         None => {},
2601                 }
2602                 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2603                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2604                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2605                         reason: closure_reason,
2606                         counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2607                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2608                 }, None));
2609         }
2610
2611         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2612                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2613
2614                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2615                 let shutdown_result;
2616                 loop {
2617                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2618
2619                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2620                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2621
2622                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2623                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2624
2625                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2626                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2627                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2628                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2629                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2630                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2631                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2632                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2633                                                 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2634                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2635
2636                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2637                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2638                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2639                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2640                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2641                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2642                                                 });
2643
2644                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2645                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2646
2647                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2648                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2649                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2650                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2651                                                         break;
2652                                                 }
2653
2654                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2655                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2656                                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2657                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2658                                                                                 msg: channel_update
2659                                                                         });
2660                                                                 }
2661                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2662                                                         }
2663                                                 }
2664                                                 break;
2665                                         }
2666                                 },
2667                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2668                                         // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2669                                         // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2670                                         //
2671                                         // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2672                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2673                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2674                                         return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2675                                 },
2676                         }
2677                 }
2678
2679                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2680                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2681                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2682                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2683                 }
2684
2685                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2686                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2687                 }
2688
2689                 Ok(())
2690         }
2691
2692         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2693         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2694         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2695         ///
2696         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2697         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2698         ///    fee estimate.
2699         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2700         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2701         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2702         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2703         ///
2704         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2705         ///
2706         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2707         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2708         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2709         /// channel.
2710         ///
2711         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2712         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2713         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2714         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2715         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2716                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2717         }
2718
2719         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2720         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2721         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2722         ///
2723         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2724         /// the channel being closed or not:
2725         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2726         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2727         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2728         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2729         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2730         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2731         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2732         ///
2733         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2734         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2735         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2736         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2737         ///
2738         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2739         ///
2740         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2741         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2742         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2743         /// channel.
2744         ///
2745         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2746         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2747         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2748         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2749                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2750         }
2751
2752         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2753                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2754                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2755                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2756                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2757                 }
2758
2759                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2760                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2761                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2762                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2763                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2764                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2765                 }
2766                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2767                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2768                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2769                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2770                         // ignore the result here.
2771                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2772                 }
2773                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2774                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2775                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2776                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2777                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2778                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2779                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2780                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2781                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2782                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2783                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2784                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2785                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2786                                         }
2787                                 }
2788                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2789                         }
2790                         debug_assert!(
2791                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2792                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2793                         );
2794                 }
2795                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2796                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2797                 }
2798         }
2799
2800         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2801         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2802         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2803         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2804                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2805                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2806                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2807                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2808                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2809                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2810                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2811                         } else {
2812                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2813                         };
2814                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2815                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2816                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2817                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2818                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2819                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2820                                 match chan_phase {
2821                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2822                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2823                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2824                                         },
2825                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2826                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2827                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2828                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2829                                         },
2830                                 }
2831                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2832                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2833                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2834                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2835                                 // events anyway.
2836                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2837                         } else {
2838                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2839                         }
2840                 };
2841                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2842                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2843                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2844                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2845                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2846                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2847                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2848                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2849                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2850                                         msg: update
2851                                 });
2852                         }
2853                 }
2854
2855                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2856         }
2857
2858         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2859                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2860                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2861                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2862                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2863                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2864                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2865                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2866                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2867                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2868                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2869                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2870                                                         },
2871                                                 }
2872                                         );
2873                                 }
2874                                 Ok(())
2875                         },
2876                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2877                 }
2878         }
2879
2880         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2881         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2882         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2883         /// channel.
2884         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2885         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2886                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2887         }
2888
2889         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2890         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2891         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2892         ///
2893         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2894         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2895         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2896         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2897                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2898         }
2899
2900         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2901         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2902         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2903                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2904                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2905                 }
2906         }
2907
2908         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2909         /// local transaction(s).
2910         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2911                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2912                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2913                 }
2914         }
2915
2916         fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2917                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2918                 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2919                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2920         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2921                 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2922                 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2923                         version: 0,
2924                         public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2925                         hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2926                         hmac: hop_hmac,
2927                 };
2928
2929                 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2930                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2931                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2932                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2933                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2934                                         msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2935                                         err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2936                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2937                                 }),
2938                 };
2939
2940                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2941                         routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2942                                 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2943                                 short_channel_id,
2944                         },
2945                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2946                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2947                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2948                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2949                         outgoing_cltv_value,
2950                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2951                 })
2952         }
2953
2954         fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2955                 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2956                 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2957                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2958         ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2959                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2960                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2961                                 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2962                         } =>
2963                                 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2964                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2965                                 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2966                         } => {
2967                                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2968                                 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2969                         }
2970                         msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2971                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2972                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
2973                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
2974                                         msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2975                                 })
2976                         },
2977                 };
2978                 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2979                 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2980                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2981                                 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2982                                 err_code: 18,
2983                                 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2984                         })
2985                 }
2986                 // final_expiry_too_soon
2987                 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2988                 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2989                 //
2990                 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2991                 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2992                 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2993                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2994                 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2995                         let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2996                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2997                         err_data.extend_from_slice(&current_height.to_be_bytes());
2998                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2999                                 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
3000                                 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
3001                         });
3002                 }
3003                 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
3004                         (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
3005                          amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
3006                 {
3007                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3008                                 err_code: 19,
3009                                 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
3010                                 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3011                         });
3012                 }
3013
3014                 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3015                         // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3016                         // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3017                         // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3018                         // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3019                         // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3020                         let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3021                         if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3022                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3023                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
3024                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
3025                                         msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3026                                 });
3027                         }
3028                         if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3029                                 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3030                                         err_code: 0x4000|22,
3031                                         err_data: Vec::new(),
3032                                         msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3033                                 });
3034                         }
3035                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3036                                 payment_data,
3037                                 payment_preimage,
3038                                 payment_metadata,
3039                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3040                                 custom_tlvs,
3041                         }
3042                 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3043                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3044                                 payment_data: data,
3045                                 payment_metadata,
3046                                 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3047                                 phantom_shared_secret,
3048                                 custom_tlvs,
3049                         }
3050                 } else {
3051                         return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3052                                 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3053                                 err_data: Vec::new(),
3054                                 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3055                         });
3056                 };
3057                 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3058                         routing,
3059                         payment_hash,
3060                         incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3061                         incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3062                         outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3063                         outgoing_cltv_value,
3064                         skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3065                 })
3066         }
3067
3068         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3069                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3070         ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3071                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3072                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3073                                 {
3074                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3075                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3076                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3077                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3078                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3079                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
3080                                         }));
3081                                 }
3082                         }
3083                 }
3084
3085                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3086                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3087                 }
3088
3089                 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3090                         Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3091                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3092
3093                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3094                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3095                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3096                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3097                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3098                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3099                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3100                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3101                 }
3102                 macro_rules! return_err {
3103                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3104                                 {
3105                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3106                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3107                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3108                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3109                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3110                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3111                                         }));
3112                                 }
3113                         }
3114                 }
3115
3116                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3117                         shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3118                         msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3119                 ) {
3120                         Ok(res) => res,
3121                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3122                                 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3123                         },
3124                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3125                                 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3126                         },
3127                 };
3128                 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3129                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3130                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3131                                         short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3132                                 }, ..
3133                         } => {
3134                                 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3135                                         msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3136                                 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3137                         },
3138                         // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3139                         // inbound channel's state.
3140                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3141                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3142                                 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3143                         {
3144                                 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3145                         }
3146                 };
3147
3148                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3149                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3150                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3151                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3152                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3153                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3154                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3155                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3156                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3157                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3158                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3159                                         {
3160                                                 None
3161                                         } else {
3162                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3163                                         }
3164                                 },
3165                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3166                         };
3167                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3168                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3169                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3170                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3171                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3172                                 }
3173                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3174                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3175                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3176                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3177                                 ).flatten() {
3178                                         None => {
3179                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3180                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3181                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3182                                         },
3183                                         Some(chan) => chan
3184                                 };
3185                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3186                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3187                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3188                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3189                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3190                                 }
3191                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3192                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3193                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3194                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3195                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3196                                 }
3197                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3198
3199                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3200                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3201                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3202                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3203                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3204                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3205                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3206                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3207                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3208                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3209                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3210                                         } else {
3211                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3212                                         }
3213                                 }
3214                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3215                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3216                                 }
3217                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3218                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3219                                 }
3220                                 chan_update_opt
3221                         } else {
3222                                 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3223                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3224                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3225                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3226                                         break Some((
3227                                                         "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3228                                                         0x2000 | 2, None,
3229                                         ));
3230                                 }
3231                                 None
3232                         };
3233
3234                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3235                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3236                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3237                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3238                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3239                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3240                         }
3241                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3242                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3243                         }
3244                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3245                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3246                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3247                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3248                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3249                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3250                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3251                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3252                         if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3253                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3254                         }
3255
3256                         break None;
3257                 }
3258                 {
3259                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3260                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3261                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3262                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3263                                 }
3264                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3265                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3266                                 }
3267                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3268                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3269                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3270                                 }
3271                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3272                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3273                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3274                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3275                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3276                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3277                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3278                                 // instead.
3279                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3280                         }
3281                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3282                 }
3283                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3284         }
3285
3286         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3287                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3288                 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3289         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3290                 macro_rules! return_err {
3291                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3292                                 {
3293                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3294                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3295                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3296                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3297                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3298                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3299                                         }));
3300                                 }
3301                         }
3302                 }
3303                 match decoded_hop {
3304                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3305                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3306                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3307                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3308                                 {
3309                                         Ok(info) => {
3310                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3311                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3312                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3313                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3314                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3315                                         },
3316                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3317                                 }
3318                         },
3319                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3320                                 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3321                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3322                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3323                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3324                                 }
3325                         }
3326                 }
3327         }
3328
3329         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3330         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3331         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3332         ///
3333         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3334         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3335         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3336         ///
3337         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3338         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3339         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3340                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3341                         return Err(LightningError {
3342                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3343                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3344                         });
3345                 }
3346                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3347                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3348                 }
3349                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3350                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3351         }
3352
3353         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3354         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3355         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3356         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3357         ///
3358         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3359         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3360         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3361         ///
3362         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3363         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3364         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3365                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3366                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3367                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3368                         Some(id) => id,
3369                 };
3370
3371                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3372         }
3373
3374         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3375                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3376                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3377
3378                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3379                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3380                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3381                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3382                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3383                 };
3384
3385                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3386                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3387                         short_channel_id,
3388                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3389                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3390                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3391                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3392                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3393                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3394                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3395                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3396                 };
3397                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3398                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3399                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3400                 // channel.
3401                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3402
3403                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3404                         signature: sig,
3405                         contents: unsigned
3406                 })
3407         }
3408
3409         #[cfg(test)]
3410         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3411                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3412                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3413                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3414                         session_priv_bytes
3415                 })
3416         }
3417
3418         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3419                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3420                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3421                         session_priv_bytes
3422                 } = args;
3423                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3424                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3425
3426                 log_trace!(self.logger,
3427                         "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3428                         payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3429                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3430                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3431
3432                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3433                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3434                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3435                 )?;
3436
3437                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3438                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3439                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3440                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3441                         };
3442
3443                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3444                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3445                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3446                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3447                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3448                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3449                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3450                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3451                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3452                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3453                                                 }
3454                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3455                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3456                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3457                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3458                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3459                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3460                                                                 payment_id,
3461                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3462                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3463                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3464                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3465                                                                         false => {
3466                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3467                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3468                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3469                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3470                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3471                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3472                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3473                                                                         },
3474                                                                         true => {},
3475                                                                 }
3476                                                         },
3477                                                         None => {},
3478                                                 }
3479                                         },
3480                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3481                                 };
3482                         } else {
3483                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3484                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3485                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3486                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3487                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3488                         }
3489                         return Ok(());
3490                 };
3491
3492                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3493                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3494                         Err(e) => {
3495                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3496                         },
3497                 }
3498         }
3499
3500         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3501         ///
3502         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3503         /// fields for more info.
3504         ///
3505         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3506         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3507         ///
3508         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3509         ///
3510         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3511         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3512         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3513         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3514         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3515         ///
3516         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3517         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3518         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3519         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3520         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3521         ///
3522         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3523         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3524         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3525         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3526         ///
3527         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3528         ///
3529         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3530         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3531         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3532         ///
3533         /// In general, a path may raise:
3534         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3535         ///    node public key) is specified.
3536         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3537         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3538         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3539         ///    relevant updates.
3540         ///
3541         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3542         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3543         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3544         ///
3545         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3546         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3547         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3548         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3549         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3550         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3551         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3552                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3553                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3554                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3555                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3556                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3557                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3558         }
3559
3560         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3561         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3562         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3563                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3564                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3565                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3566                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3567                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3568                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3569                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3570         }
3571
3572         #[cfg(test)]
3573         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3574                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3575                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3576                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3577                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3578                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3579         }
3580
3581         #[cfg(test)]
3582         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3583                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3584                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3585         }
3586
3587         #[cfg(test)]
3588         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3589                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3590         }
3591
3592         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3593                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3594                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3595                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3596                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3597                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3598                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3599                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3600                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3601                         )
3602         }
3603
3604         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3605         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3606         /// retries are exhausted.
3607         ///
3608         /// # Event Generation
3609         ///
3610         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3611         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3612         ///
3613         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3614         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3615         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3616         ///
3617         /// # Requested Invoices
3618         ///
3619         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3620         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3621         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3622         /// once the invoice has been received.
3623         ///
3624         /// # Restart Behavior
3625         ///
3626         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3627         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3628         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3629         ///
3630         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3631         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3632                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3633                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3634         }
3635
3636         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3637         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3638         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3639         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3640         /// never reach the recipient.
3641         ///
3642         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3643         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3644         ///
3645         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3646         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3647         ///
3648         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3649         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3650                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3651                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3652                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3653                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3654                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3655         }
3656
3657         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3658         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3659         ///
3660         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3661         /// payments.
3662         ///
3663         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3664         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3665                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3666                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3667                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3668                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3669                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3670                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3671         }
3672
3673         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3674         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3675         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3676         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3677                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3678                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3679                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3680                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3681                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3682         }
3683
3684         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3685         /// payment probe.
3686         #[cfg(test)]
3687         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3688                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3689         }
3690
3691         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3692         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3693         ///
3694         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3695         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3696                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3697                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3698         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3699                 let payment_params =
3700                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3701
3702                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3703
3704                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3705         }
3706
3707         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3708         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3709         ///
3710         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3711         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3712         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3713         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3714         ///
3715         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3716         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3717         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3718         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3719         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3720         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3721         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3722                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3723         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3724                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3725
3726                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3727                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3728                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3729                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3730
3731                 let route = self
3732                         .router
3733                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3734                         .map_err(|e| {
3735                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3736                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3737                         })?;
3738
3739                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3740
3741                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3742
3743                 for mut path in route.paths {
3744                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3745                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3746                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3747                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3748                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3749                                         break;
3750                                 } else {
3751                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3752                                         log_debug!(
3753                                                 self.logger,
3754                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3755                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3756                                         );
3757                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3758                                         path.hops.pop();
3759                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3760                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3761                                         }
3762                                 }
3763                         }
3764
3765                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3766                                 log_debug!(
3767                                         self.logger,
3768                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3769                                 );
3770                                 continue;
3771                         }
3772
3773                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3774                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3775                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3776                                 }) {
3777                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3778                                         let used_liquidity =
3779                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3780
3781                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3782                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3783                                         {
3784                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3785                                                 continue;
3786                                         } else {
3787                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3788                                         }
3789                                 }
3790                         }
3791
3792                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3793                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3794                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3795                         })?);
3796                 }
3797
3798                 Ok(res)
3799         }
3800
3801         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3802         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3803         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3804                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3805                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3806         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3807                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3808                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3809                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3810
3811                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3812                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3813                 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3814                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3815                                 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3816
3817                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3818                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3819                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3820                                                 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3821                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3822                                                 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3823                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3824                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3825                                 match funding_res {
3826                                         Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3827                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3828                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3829                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3830
3831                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3832                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3833                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3834                                                 });
3835                                         },
3836                                 }
3837                         },
3838                         Some(phase) => {
3839                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3840                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3841                                         err: format!(
3842                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3843                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3844                                 })
3845                         },
3846                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3847                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3848                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3849                                 }),
3850                 };
3851
3852                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3853                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3854                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3855                                 msg,
3856                         });
3857                 }
3858                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3859                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3860                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3861                         },
3862                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3863                                 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3864                                 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3865                                         panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3866                                 }
3867                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3868                         }
3869                 }
3870                 Ok(())
3871         }
3872
3873         #[cfg(test)]
3874         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3875                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3876                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3877                 })
3878         }
3879
3880         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3881         ///
3882         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3883         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3884         ///
3885         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3886         /// across the p2p network.
3887         ///
3888         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3889         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3890         ///
3891         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3892         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3893         /// keys per-channel).
3894         ///
3895         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3896         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3897         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3898         ///
3899         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3900         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3901         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3902         ///
3903         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3904         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3905         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3906         /// for more details.
3907         ///
3908         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3909         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3910         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3911                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3912         }
3913
3914         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3915         ///
3916         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3917         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3918         ///
3919         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3920         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3921         /// signature for each channel.
3922         ///
3923         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3924         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3925                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3926                 let mut result = Ok(());
3927
3928                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3929                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3930                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3931                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3932                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3933                                         }));
3934                                 }
3935                         }
3936                 }
3937                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3938                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3939                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3940                         }));
3941                 }
3942                 {
3943                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3944                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3945                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3946                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3947                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3948                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3949                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3950                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3951                                 }));
3952                         }
3953                 }
3954
3955                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3956                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3957                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3958                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3959                 } else {
3960                         None
3961                 };
3962                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3963                         match states.entry(txid) {
3964                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3965                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3966                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3967                                         }));
3968                                         None
3969                                 },
3970                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3971                         }
3972                 });
3973                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3974                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3975                                 temporary_channel_id,
3976                                 counterparty_node_id,
3977                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3978                                 is_batch_funding,
3979                                 |chan, tx| {
3980                                         let mut output_index = None;
3981                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3982                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3983                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3984                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3985                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3986                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3987                                                                 });
3988                                                         }
3989                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3990                                                 }
3991                                         }
3992                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3993                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3994                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3995                                                 });
3996                                         }
3997                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3998                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3999                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4000                                         }
4001                                         Ok(outpoint)
4002                                 })
4003                         );
4004                 }
4005                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4006                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4007                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4008                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4009                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4010                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4011                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4012                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4013                         );
4014                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4015                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4016                         );
4017                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4018                         {
4019                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4020                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4021                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4022                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4023                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4024                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
4025                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4026                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4027                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4028                                                 });
4029                                 }
4030                         }
4031                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4032                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4033                         }
4034                 }
4035                 result
4036         }
4037
4038         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4039         ///
4040         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4041         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4042         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4043         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4044         ///
4045         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4046         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4047         ///
4048         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4049         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4050         ///
4051         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4052         ///
4053         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4054         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4055         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4056         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4057         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4058         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4059         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4060         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4061                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4062         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4063                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4064                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4065                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4066                         });
4067                 }
4068
4069                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4070                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4071                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4072                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4073                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4074                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4075                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4076                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4077                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4078                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4079                                 });
4080                         };
4081                 }
4082                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4083                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4084                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4085                                 config.apply(config_update);
4086                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4087                                         continue;
4088                                 }
4089                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4090                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4091                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4092                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4093                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4094                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4095                                                         msg,
4096                                                 });
4097                                         }
4098                                 }
4099                                 continue;
4100                         } else {
4101                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4102                                 debug_assert!(false);
4103                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4104                                         err: format!(
4105                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4106                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4107                                 });
4108                         };
4109                 }
4110                 Ok(())
4111         }
4112
4113         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4114         ///
4115         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4116         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4117         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4118         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4119         ///
4120         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4121         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4122         ///
4123         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4124         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4125         ///
4126         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4127         ///
4128         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4129         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4130         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4131         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4132         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4133         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4134         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4135         pub fn update_channel_config(
4136                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4137         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4138                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4139         }
4140
4141         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4142         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4143         ///
4144         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4145         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4146         ///
4147         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4148         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4149         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4150         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4151         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4152         ///
4153         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4154         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4155         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4156         /// than expected.
4157         ///
4158         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4159         /// backwards.
4160         ///
4161         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4162         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4163         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4164         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4165         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4166         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4167                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4168
4169                 let next_hop_scid = {
4170                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4171                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4172                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4173                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4174                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4175                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4176                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4177                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4178                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4179                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4180                                                 })
4181                                         }
4182                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4183                                 },
4184                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4185                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4186                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4187                                 }),
4188                                 None => {
4189                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4190                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4191                                         log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4192                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4193                                                 err: error
4194                                         })
4195                                 }
4196                         }
4197                 };
4198
4199                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4200                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4201                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4202                         })?;
4203
4204                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4205                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4206                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4207                         },
4208                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4209                 };
4210                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4211                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4212                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4213                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4214                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4215                 };
4216
4217                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4218                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4219                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4220                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4221                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4222                 )];
4223                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4224                 Ok(())
4225         }
4226
4227         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4228         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4229         ///
4230         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4231         /// backwards.
4232         ///
4233         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4234         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4235                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4236
4237                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4238                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4239                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4240                         })?;
4241
4242                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4243                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4244                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4245                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4246                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4247                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4248                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4249                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4250                         });
4251
4252                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4253                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4254                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4255                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4256
4257                 Ok(())
4258         }
4259
4260         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4261         ///
4262         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4263         /// Will likely generate further events.
4264         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4265                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4266
4267                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4268                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4269                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4270                 {
4271                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4272                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4273
4274                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4275                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4276                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4277                                                 () => {
4278                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4279                                                                 match forward_info {
4280                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4281                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4282                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4283                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4284                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4285                                                                                 }
4286                                                                         }) => {
4287                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4288                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4289                                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4290
4291                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4292                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4293                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4294                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4295                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4296                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4297                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4298                                                                                                 });
4299
4300                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4301                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4302                                                                                                 } else {
4303                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4304                                                                                                 };
4305
4306                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4307                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4308                                                                                                         reason
4309                                                                                                 ));
4310                                                                                                 continue;
4311                                                                                         }
4312                                                                                 }
4313                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4314                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4315                                                                                                 {
4316                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4317                                                                                                 }
4318                                                                                         }
4319                                                                                 }
4320                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4321                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4322                                                                                                 {
4323                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4324                                                                                                 }
4325                                                                                         }
4326                                                                                 }
4327                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4328                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4329                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4330                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4331                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4332                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4333                                                                                                         payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4334                                                                                                 ) {
4335                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4336                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4337                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4338                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4339                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4340                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4341                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4342                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4343                                                                                                         },
4344                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4345                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4346                                                                                                         },
4347                                                                                                 };
4348                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4349                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4350                                                                                                                 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4351                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4352                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4353                                                                                                                 {
4354                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4355                                                                                                                         Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4356                                                                                                                 }
4357                                                                                                         },
4358                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4359                                                                                                 }
4360                                                                                         } else {
4361                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4362                                                                                         }
4363                                                                                 } else {
4364                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4365                                                                                 }
4366                                                                         },
4367                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4368                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4369                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4370                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4371                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4372                                                                         }
4373                                                                 }
4374                                                         }
4375                                                 }
4376                                         }
4377                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4378                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4379                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4380                                                 None => {
4381                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4382                                                         continue;
4383                                                 }
4384                                         };
4385                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4386                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4387                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4388                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4389                                                 continue;
4390                                         }
4391                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4392                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4393                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4394                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4395                                                         match forward_info {
4396                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4397                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4398                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4399                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4400                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4401                                                                         },
4402                                                                 }) => {
4403                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4404                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4405                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4406                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4407                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4408                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4409                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4410                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4411                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4412                                                                         });
4413                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4414                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4415                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4416                                                                                 &self.logger)
4417                                                                         {
4418                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4419                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4420                                                                                 } else {
4421                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4422                                                                                 }
4423                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4424                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4425                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4426                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4427                                                                                 ));
4428                                                                                 continue;
4429                                                                         }
4430                                                                 },
4431                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4432                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4433                                                                 },
4434                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4435                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4436                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4437                                                                                 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4438                                                                         ) {
4439                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4440                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4441                                                                                 } else {
4442                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4443                                                                                 }
4444                                                                                 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4445                                                                                 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4446                                                                                 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4447                                                                                 continue;
4448                                                                         }
4449                                                                 },
4450                                                         }
4451                                                 }
4452                                         } else {
4453                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4454                                                 continue;
4455                                         }
4456                                 } else {
4457                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4458                                                 match forward_info {
4459                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4460                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4461                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4462                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4463                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4464                                                                 }
4465                                                         }) => {
4466                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4467                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4468                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4469                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4470                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4471                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4472                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4473                                                                         },
4474                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4475                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4476                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4477                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4478                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4479                                                                                 };
4480                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4481                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4482                                                                         },
4483                                                                         _ => {
4484                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4485                                                                         }
4486                                                                 };
4487                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4488                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4489                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4490                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4491                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4492                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4493                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4494                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4495                                                                         },
4496                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4497                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4498                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4499                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4500                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4501                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4502                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4503                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4504                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4505                                                                         onion_payload,
4506                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4507                                                                 };
4508
4509                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4510
4511                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4512                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4513                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4514                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4515                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4516                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4517                                                                                 );
4518                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4519                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4520                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4521                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4522                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4523                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4524                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4525                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4526                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4527                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4528                                                                                 ));
4529                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4530                                                                         }
4531                                                                 }
4532                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4533                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4534                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4535                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4536                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4537                                                                 }
4538
4539                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4540                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4541                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4542                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4543                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4544                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4545                                                                                 };
4546                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4547                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4548                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4549                                                                                 }
4550                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4551                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4552                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4553                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4554                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4555                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4556                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4557                                                                                                 }
4558                                                                                         });
4559                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4560                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4561                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4562                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4563                                                                                 }
4564                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4565                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4566                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4567                                                                                 }
4568                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4569                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4570                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4571                                                                                         }
4572                                                                                 } else {
4573                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4574                                                                                 }
4575                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4576                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4577                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4578                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4579                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4580                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4581                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4582                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4583                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4584                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4585                                                                                         }
4586                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4587                                                                                 }
4588                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4589                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4590                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4591                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4592                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4593                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4594                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4595                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4596                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4597                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4598                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4599                                                                                         }
4600                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4601                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4602                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4603                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4604                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4605                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4606                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4607                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4608                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4609                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4610                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4611                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4612                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4613                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4614                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4615                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4616                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4617                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4618                                                                                         }, None));
4619                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4620                                                                                 } else {
4621                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4622                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4623                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4624                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4625                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4626                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4627                                                                                         }
4628                                                                                 }
4629                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4630                                                                         }}
4631                                                                 }
4632
4633                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4634                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4635                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4636                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4637                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4638                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4639                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4640                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4641                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4642                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4643                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4644                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4645                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4646                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4647                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4648                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4649                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4650                                                                                                         }
4651                                                                                                 };
4652                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4653                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4654                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4655                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4656                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4657                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4658                                                                                                         }
4659                                                                                                 }
4660                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4661                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4662                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4663                                                                                                 };
4664                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4665                                                                                         },
4666                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4667                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4668                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4669                                                                                         }
4670                                                                                 }
4671                                                                         },
4672                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4673                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4674                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4675                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4676                                                                                 }
4677                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4678                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4679                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4680                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4681                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4682                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4683                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4684                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4685                                                                                 } else {
4686                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4687                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4688                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4689                                                                                         };
4690                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4691                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4692                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4693                                                                                         }
4694                                                                                 }
4695                                                                         },
4696                                                                 };
4697                                                         },
4698                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4699                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4700                                                         }
4701                                                 }
4702                                         }
4703                                 }
4704                         }
4705                 }
4706
4707                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4708                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4709                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4710                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4711
4712                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4713                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4714                 }
4715                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4716
4717                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4718                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4719                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4720                 // network stack.
4721                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4722
4723                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4724                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4725                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4726         }
4727
4728         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4729         ///
4730         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4731         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4732                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4733
4734                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4735
4736                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4737                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4738                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4739                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4740                 }
4741
4742                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4743                         match event {
4744                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4745                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4746                                         // monitor updating completing.
4747                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4748                                 },
4749                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4750                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4751                                         {
4752                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4753                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4754                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4755                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4756                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4757                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4758                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4759                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4760                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4761                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4762                                                                         } else {
4763                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4764                                                                         }
4765                                                                 },
4766                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4767                                                         }
4768                                                 }
4769                                         }
4770                                         if !updated_chan {
4771                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4772                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4773                                         }
4774                                 },
4775                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4776                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4777                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4778                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4779                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4780                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4781                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4782                                                 } else {
4783                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4784                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4785                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4786                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4787                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4788                                                 }
4789                                         }
4790                                 },
4791                         }
4792                 }
4793                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4794         }
4795
4796         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4797         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4798         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4799                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4800                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4801         }
4802
4803         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4804                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4805                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4806                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4807                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4808                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4809                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4810                         }
4811                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4812                 }
4813                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4814                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4815                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4816                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4817                 }
4818                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4819                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4820
4821                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4822                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4823         }
4824
4825         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4826         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4827         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4828         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4829         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4830         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4831                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4832                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4833
4834                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4835                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4836
4837                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4838                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4839                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4840                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4841                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4842                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4843                                 ) {
4844                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4845                                                 anchor_feerate
4846                                         } else {
4847                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4848                                         };
4849                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4850                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4851                                 }
4852                         }
4853
4854                         should_persist
4855                 });
4856         }
4857
4858         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4859         ///
4860         /// This currently includes:
4861         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4862         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4863         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4864         ///    the channel.
4865         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4866         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4867         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4868         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4869         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4870         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4871         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4872         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4873         ///
4874         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4875         /// estimate fetches.
4876         ///
4877         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4878         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4879         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4880                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4881                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4882
4883                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4884                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4885
4886                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4887                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4888                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4889                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4890
4891                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4892                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4893                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4894                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4895                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4896                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4897                         | {
4898                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4899                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4900                                         log_error!(self.logger,
4901                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4902                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4903                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4904                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4905                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4906                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4907                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4908                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4909                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4910                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4911                                                         },
4912                                                 },
4913                                         });
4914                                         false
4915                                 } else {
4916                                         true
4917                                 }
4918                         };
4919
4920                         {
4921                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4922                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4923                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4924                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4925                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4926                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4927                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4928                                                 match phase {
4929                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4930                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4931                                                                         anchor_feerate
4932                                                                 } else {
4933                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4934                                                                 };
4935                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4936                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4937
4938                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4939                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4940                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4941                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4942                                                                 }
4943
4944                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4945                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4946                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4947                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4948                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4949                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4950                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4951                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4952                                                                                 n += 1;
4953                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4954                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4955                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4956                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4957                                                                                                         msg: update
4958                                                                                                 });
4959                                                                                         }
4960                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4961                                                                                 } else {
4962                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4963                                                                                 }
4964                                                                         },
4965                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4966                                                                                 n += 1;
4967                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4968                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4969                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4970                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4971                                                                                                         msg: update
4972                                                                                                 });
4973                                                                                         }
4974                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4975                                                                                 } else {
4976                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4977                                                                                 }
4978                                                                         },
4979                                                                         _ => {},
4980                                                                 }
4981
4982                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4983
4984                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4985                                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4986                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4987                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4988                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4989                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4990                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4991                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4992                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4993                                                                                         },
4994                                                                                 },
4995                                                                         });
4996                                                                 }
4997
4998                                                                 true
4999                                                         },
5000                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5001                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5002                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5003                                                         },
5004                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5005                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5006                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5007                                                         },
5008                                                 }
5009                                         });
5010
5011                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5012                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5013                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5014                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5015                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5016                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5017                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5018                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5019                                                                         },
5020                                                                 }
5021                                                         );
5022                                                 }
5023                                         }
5024                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5025
5026                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5027                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5028                                         }
5029                                 }
5030                         }
5031
5032                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5033                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5034                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5035                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5036                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5037                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5038                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5039                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5040                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5041                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5042                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5043                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5044                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5045                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5046                                                         let remove_entry = {
5047                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5048                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5049                                                         };
5050                                                         if remove_entry {
5051                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5052                                                         }
5053                                                 },
5054                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5055                                         }
5056                                 }
5057                         }
5058
5059                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5060                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5061                                         // This should be unreachable
5062                                         debug_assert!(false);
5063                                         return false;
5064                                 }
5065                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5066                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5067                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5068                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5069                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5070                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5071                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5072                                         {
5073                                                 return true;
5074                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5075                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5076                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5077                                         }) {
5078                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5079                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5080                                                 return false;
5081                                         }
5082                                 }
5083                                 true
5084                         });
5085
5086                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5087                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5088                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5089                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5090                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5091                         }
5092
5093                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5094                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5095                         }
5096
5097                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5098                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5099                         }
5100
5101                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5102                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5103                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5104                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5105                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5106                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5107                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5108                         );
5109
5110                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5111                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5112                         );
5113
5114                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5115                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5116                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5117                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5118                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5119                         }
5120
5121                         should_persist
5122                 });
5123         }
5124
5125         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5126         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5127         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5128         ///
5129         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5130         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5131         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5132         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5133         ///
5134         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5135         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5136         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5137         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5138         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5139                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5140         }
5141
5142         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5143         /// reason for the failure.
5144         ///
5145         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5146         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5147                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5148
5149                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5150                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5151                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5152                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5153                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5154                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5155                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5156                         }
5157                 }
5158         }
5159
5160         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5161         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5162                 match failure_code {
5163                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5164                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5165                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5166                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5167                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5168                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5169                         },
5170                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5171                                 let fail_data = match data {
5172                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5173                                         None => Vec::new(),
5174                                 };
5175                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5176                         }
5177                 }
5178         }
5179
5180         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5181         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5182         ///
5183         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5184         /// forwarding
5185         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5186                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5187                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5188                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5189                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5190                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5191                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5192                 } else {
5193                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5194                 };
5195                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5196                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5197                 } else {
5198                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5199                 }
5200         }
5201
5202
5203         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5204         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5205         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5206                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5207                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5208                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5209                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5210                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5211                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5212                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5213                         }
5214                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5215                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5216                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5217                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5218                 } else {
5219                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5220                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5221                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5222                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5223                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5224                 }
5225         }
5226
5227         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5228         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5229         // be surfaced to the user.
5230         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5231                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5232                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5233         ) {
5234                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5235                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5236                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5237                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5238                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5239                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5240                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5241                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5242                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5243                                                 } else {
5244                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5245                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5246                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5247                                                 }
5248                                         },
5249                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5250                                 }
5251                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5252                 };
5253
5254                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5255                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5256                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5257                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5258                 }
5259         }
5260
5261         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5262         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5263         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5264                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5265                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5266                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5267                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5268                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5269                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5270                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5271                 }
5272
5273                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5274                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5275                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5276                 //timer handling.
5277
5278                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5279                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5280                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5281                 match source {
5282                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5283                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5284                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5285                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5286                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5287                         },
5288                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5289                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5290                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5291
5292                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5293                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5294                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5295                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5296                                 }
5297                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5298                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5299                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5300                                         },
5301                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5302                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5303                                         }
5304                                 }
5305                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5306                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5307                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5308                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5309                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5310                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5311                                 }, None));
5312                         },
5313                 }
5314         }
5315
5316         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5317         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5318         ///
5319         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5320         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5321         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5322         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5323         ///
5324         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5325         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5326         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5327         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5328         ///
5329         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5330         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5331         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5332         ///
5333         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5334         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5335         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5336         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5337         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5338         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5339         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5340         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5341                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5342         }
5343
5344         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5345         /// even type numbers.
5346         ///
5347         /// # Note
5348         ///
5349         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5350         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5351         ///
5352         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5353         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5354                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5355         }
5356
5357         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5358                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5359
5360                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5361
5362                 let mut sources = {
5363                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5364                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5365                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5366                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5367                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5368                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5369                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5370                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5371                                                 break;
5372                                         }
5373                                 }
5374
5375                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5376                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5377                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5378                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5379                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5380                                 });
5381                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5382                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5383                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5384                                                 &payment_hash);
5385                                 }
5386
5387                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5388                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5389                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5390                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5391                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5392                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5393                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5394                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5395                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5396                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5397                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5398                                                 }
5399                                                 return;
5400                                         }
5401                                 }
5402
5403                                 payment.htlcs
5404                         } else { return; }
5405                 };
5406                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5407
5408                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5409                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5410                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5411                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5412                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5413                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5414                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5415                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5416                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5417                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5418                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5419                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5420                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5421                                 debug_assert!(false);
5422                                 valid_mpp = false;
5423                                 break;
5424                         }
5425                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5426
5427                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5428                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5429                                 debug_assert!(false);
5430                                 valid_mpp = false;
5431                                 break;
5432                         }
5433                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5434                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5435                 }
5436                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5437                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5438                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5439                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5440                         return;
5441                 }
5442                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5443                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5444                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5445                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5446                         return;
5447                 }
5448                 if valid_mpp {
5449                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5450                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5451                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5452                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5453                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5454                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5455                                         }
5456                                 ) {
5457                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5458                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5459                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5460                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5461                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5462                                 }
5463                         }
5464                 }
5465                 if !valid_mpp {
5466                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5467                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5468                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5469                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5470                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5471                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5472                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5473                         }
5474                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5475                 }
5476
5477                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5478                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5479                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5480                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5481                 }
5482         }
5483
5484         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5485                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5486         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5487                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5488
5489                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5490                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5491                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5492                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5493
5494                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5495                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5496                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5497                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5498
5499                 {
5500                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5501                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5502                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5503                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5504                                 None => None
5505                         };
5506
5507                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5508                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5509                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5510                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5511
5512                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5513                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5514                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5515                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5516                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5517                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5518                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5519
5520                                                 match fulfill_res {
5521                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5522                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5523                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5524                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5525                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5526                                                                 }
5527                                                                 if !during_init {
5528                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5529                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5530                                                                 } else {
5531                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5532                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5533                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5534                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5535                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5536                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5537                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5538                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5539                                                                                 });
5540                                                                 }
5541                                                         }
5542                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5543                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5544                                                                         action
5545                                                                 } else {
5546                                                                         return Ok(());
5547                                                                 };
5548                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5549
5550                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5551                                                                         chan_id, action);
5552                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5553                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5554                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5555                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5556                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5557                                                                 } = action {
5558                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5559                                                                 } else {
5560                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5561                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5562                                                                         return Ok(());
5563                                                                 };
5564                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5565                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5566                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5567                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5568                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5569                                                                         {
5570                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5571                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5572                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5573                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5574                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5575                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5576                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5577                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5578                                                                                 });
5579                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5580                                                                         }
5581                                                                 } else {
5582                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5583                                                                 }
5584                                                         }
5585                                                 }
5586                                         }
5587                                         return Ok(());
5588                                 }
5589                         }
5590                 }
5591                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5592                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5593                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5594                                 payment_preimage,
5595                         }],
5596                 };
5597
5598                 if !during_init {
5599                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5600                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5601                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5602                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5603                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5604                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5605                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5606                                 // again on restart.
5607                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5608                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5609                         }
5610                 } else {
5611                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5612                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5613                         // event.
5614                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5615                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5616                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5617                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5618                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5619                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5620                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5621                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5622                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5623                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5624                                 )));
5625                 }
5626                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5627                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5628                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5629                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5630                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5631                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5632                 Ok(())
5633         }
5634
5635         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5636                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5637         }
5638
5639         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5640                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5641                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5642         ) {
5643                 match source {
5644                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5645                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5646                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5647                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5648                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5649                                 }
5650                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5651                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5652                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5653                                 };
5654                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5655                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5656                                         &self.logger);
5657                         },
5658                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5659                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5660                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5661                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5662                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5663                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5664                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5665                                                 let chan_to_release =
5666                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5667                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5668                                                         } else {
5669                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5670                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5671                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5672                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5673                                                                 // closed.
5674                                                                 None
5675                                                         };
5676
5677                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5678                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5679                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5680                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5681                                                         // in the background.
5682                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5683                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5684                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5685                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5686                                                                         match ev {
5687                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5688                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5689                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5690                                                                                 } => {
5691                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5692                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5693                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5694                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5695                                                                                                         } = upd {
5696                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5697                                                                                                         } else { false }
5698                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5699                                                                                                 true
5700                                                                                         } else { false }
5701                                                                                 },
5702                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5703                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5704                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5705                                                                                 ) => {
5706                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5707                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5708                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5709                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5710                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5711                                                                                                 ));
5712                                                                                                 true
5713                                                                                         } else { false }
5714                                                                                 },
5715                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5716                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5717                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5718                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5719                                                                                 } =>
5720                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5721                                                                         }
5722                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5723                                                         }
5724                                                         None
5725                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5726                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5727                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5728                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5729                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5730                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5731                                                                 })
5732                                                         } else { None }
5733                                                 } else {
5734                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5735                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5736                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5737                                                                 } else { None }
5738                                                         } else { None };
5739                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5740                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5741                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5742                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5743                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5744                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5745                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5746                                                                 },
5747                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5748                                                         })
5749                                                 }
5750                                         });
5751                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5752                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5753                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5754                                 }
5755                         },
5756                 }
5757         }
5758
5759         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5760         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5761                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5762         }
5763
5764         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5765                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5766                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5767                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5768
5769                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5770                         match action {
5771                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5772                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5773                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5774                                                 amount_msat,
5775                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5776                                                 receiver_node_id,
5777                                                 htlcs,
5778                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5779                                         }) = payment {
5780                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5781                                                         payment_hash,
5782                                                         purpose,
5783                                                         amount_msat,
5784                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5785                                                         htlcs,
5786                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5787                                                 }, None));
5788                                         }
5789                                 },
5790                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5791                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5792                                 } => {
5793                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5794                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5795                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5796                                         }
5797                                 },
5798                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5799                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5800                                 } => {
5801                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5802                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5803                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5804                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5805                                         );
5806                                 },
5807                         }
5808                 }
5809         }
5810
5811         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5812         /// update completion.
5813         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5814                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5815                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5816                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5817                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5818         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5819                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5820                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5821                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5822                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5823                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5824                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5825                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5826
5827                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5828
5829                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5830                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5831                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5832                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5833                 }
5834
5835                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5836                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5837                 }
5838                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5839                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5840                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5841                                 msg,
5842                         });
5843                 }
5844
5845                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5846                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5847                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5848                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5849                                         updates: update,
5850                                 });
5851                         }
5852                 } }
5853                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5854                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5855                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5856                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5857                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5858                                 });
5859                         }
5860                 } }
5861                 match order {
5862                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5863                                 handle_cs!();
5864                                 handle_raa!();
5865                         },
5866                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5867                                 handle_raa!();
5868                                 handle_cs!();
5869                         },
5870                 }
5871
5872                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5873                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5874                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5875                 }
5876
5877                 {
5878                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5879                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5880                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5881                 }
5882
5883                 htlc_forwards
5884         }
5885
5886         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5887                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5888
5889                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5890                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5891                         None => {
5892                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5893                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5894                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5895                                 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5896                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5897                                         None => return,
5898                                 }
5899                         }
5900                 };
5901                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5902                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5903                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5904                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5905                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5906                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5907                 let channel =
5908                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5909                                 chan
5910                         } else {
5911                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5912                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5913                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5914                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5915                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5916                                 return;
5917                         };
5918                 let remaining_in_flight =
5919                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5920                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5921                                 pending.len()
5922                         } else { 0 };
5923                 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5924                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5925                         remaining_in_flight);
5926                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5927                         return;
5928                 }
5929                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5930         }
5931
5932         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5933         ///
5934         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5935         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5936         /// the channel.
5937         ///
5938         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5939         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5940         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5941         ///
5942         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5943         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5944         /// used to accept such channels.
5945         ///
5946         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5947         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5948         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5949                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5950         }
5951
5952         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5953         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5954         ///
5955         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5956         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5957         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5958         ///
5959         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5960         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5961         ///
5962         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5963         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5964         ///
5965         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5966         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5967         ///
5968         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5969         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5970         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5971                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5972         }
5973
5974         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5975                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5976
5977                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5978                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5979                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5980                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5981                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5982                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5983                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5984                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5985
5986                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5987                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5988                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5989                 // succeed.
5990                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5991                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5992                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5993                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5994                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5995                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5996                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5997                         }
5998                         _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5999                 }?;
6000
6001                 if accept_0conf {
6002                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6003                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6004                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6005                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6006                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6007                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6008                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6009                                 }
6010                         };
6011                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6012                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6013                 } else {
6014                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6015                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6016                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6017                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6018                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6019                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6020                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6021                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6022                                         }
6023                                 };
6024                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6025                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6026                         }
6027                 }
6028
6029                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6030                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6031                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6032
6033                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6034                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6035                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6036                 });
6037
6038                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6039
6040                 Ok(())
6041         }
6042
6043         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6044         /// or 0-conf channels.
6045         ///
6046         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6047         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6048         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6049         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6050                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6051                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6052                 {
6053                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6054                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6055                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6056                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6057                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6058                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6059                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6060                                 }
6061                         }
6062                 }
6063                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6064         }
6065
6066         fn unfunded_channel_count(
6067                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6068         ) -> usize {
6069                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6070                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6071                         match phase {
6072                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6073                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6074                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6075                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6076                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6077                                         {
6078                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6079                                         }
6080                                 },
6081                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6082                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6083                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6084                                         }
6085                                 },
6086                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6087                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6088                                         continue;
6089                                 }
6090                         }
6091                 }
6092                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6093         }
6094
6095         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6096                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6097                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6098                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6099                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6100                 }
6101
6102                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6103                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6104                 }
6105
6106                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6107                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6108                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6109                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6110                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6111
6112                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6113                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6114                     .ok_or_else(|| {
6115                                 debug_assert!(false);
6116                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6117                         })?;
6118                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6119                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6120
6121                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6122                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6123                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6124                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6125                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6126                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6127                 {
6128                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6129                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6130                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6131                 }
6132
6133                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6134                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6135                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6136                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6137                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6138                 }
6139
6140                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6141                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6142                 if channel_exists {
6143                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6144                 }
6145
6146                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6147                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6148                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6149                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6150                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6151                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6152                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6153                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6154                                 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6155                         }, None));
6156                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6157                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6158                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6159                         });
6160                         return Ok(());
6161                 }
6162
6163                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6164                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6165                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6166                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6167                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6168                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6169                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6170                 {
6171                         Err(e) => {
6172                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6173                         },
6174                         Ok(res) => res
6175                 };
6176
6177                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6178                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6179                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6180                 }
6181                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6182                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6183                 }
6184
6185                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6186                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6187
6188                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6189                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6190                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6191                 });
6192                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6193                 Ok(())
6194         }
6195
6196         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6197                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6198                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6199                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6200                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6201                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6202                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6203                                         debug_assert!(false);
6204                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6205                                 })?;
6206                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6207                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6208                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6209                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6210                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6211                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6212                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6213                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6214                                                 },
6215                                                 _ => {
6216                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6217                                                 }
6218                                         }
6219                                 },
6220                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6221                         }
6222                 };
6223                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6224                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6225                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6226                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6227                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6228                         output_script,
6229                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6230                 }, None));
6231                 Ok(())
6232         }
6233
6234         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6235                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6236
6237                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6238                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6239                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6240                                 debug_assert!(false);
6241                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6242                         })?;
6243
6244                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6245                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6246                 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6247                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6248                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6249                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6250                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6251                                                 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6252                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6253                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6254                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6255                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6256                                                         let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6257                                                         let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6258                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6259                                                                 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6260                                                 },
6261                                         }
6262                                 },
6263                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6264                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6265                                 },
6266                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6267                         };
6268
6269                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6270                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6271                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6272                                         "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6273                                         chan.context.channel_id()
6274                                 ))
6275                         },
6276                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6277                                 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6278                                 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6279                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6280                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6281                                                         "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6282                                                         chan.context.channel_id()))
6283                                         },
6284                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6285                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6286                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6287                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6288                                                         mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6289
6290                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6291                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6292                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6293                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6294                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6295                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6296                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6297                                                                         msg,
6298                                                                 });
6299                                                         }
6300
6301                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6302                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6303                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6304                                                         } else {
6305                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6306                                                         }
6307                                                         Ok(())
6308                                                 } else {
6309                                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6310                                                         let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6311                                                                 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6312                                                                 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6313                                                         };
6314                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6315                                                                 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6316                                                                 channel_id));
6317                                                 }
6318                                         }
6319                                 }
6320                         }
6321                 }
6322         }
6323
6324         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6325                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6326                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6327                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6328                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6329                                 debug_assert!(false);
6330                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6331                         })?;
6332
6333                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6334                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6335                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6336                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6337                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6338                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6339                                                 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6340                                                         chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6341                                                 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6342                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6343                                                         Ok(())
6344                                                 } else {
6345                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6346                                                 }
6347                                         },
6348                                         _ => {
6349                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6350                                         },
6351                                 }
6352                         },
6353                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6354                 }
6355         }
6356
6357         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6358                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6359                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6360                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6361                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6362                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6363                                 debug_assert!(false);
6364                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6365                         })?;
6366                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6367                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6368                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6369                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6370                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6371                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6372                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6373                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6374                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6375                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6376                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6377                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6378                                                 });
6379                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6380                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6381                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6382                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6383                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6384                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6385                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6386                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6387                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6388                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6389                                                                 msg,
6390                                                         });
6391                                                 }
6392                                         }
6393
6394                                         {
6395                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6396                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6397                                         }
6398
6399                                         Ok(())
6400                                 } else {
6401                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6402                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6403                                 }
6404                         },
6405                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6406                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6407                         }
6408                 }
6409         }
6410
6411         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6412                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6413                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6414                 {
6415                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6416                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6417                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6418                                         debug_assert!(false);
6419                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6420                                 })?;
6421                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6422                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6423                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6424                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6425                                 match phase {
6426                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6427                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6428                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6429                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6430                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6431                                                 }
6432
6433                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6434                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6435                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6436                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6437
6438                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6439                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6440                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6441                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6442                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6443                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6444                                                                 msg,
6445                                                         });
6446                                                 }
6447                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6448                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6449                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6450                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6451                                                 }
6452                                         },
6453                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6454                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6455                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6456                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6457                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6458                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6459                                         },
6460                                 }
6461                         } else {
6462                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6463                         }
6464                 }
6465                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6466                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6467                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6468                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6469                 }
6470                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6471                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6472                 }
6473
6474                 Ok(())
6475         }
6476
6477         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6478                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6479                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6480                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6481                                 debug_assert!(false);
6482                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6483                         })?;
6484                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6485                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6486                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6487                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6488                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6489                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6490                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6491                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6492                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6493                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6494                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6495                                                                 msg,
6496                                                         });
6497                                                 }
6498                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6499                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6500                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6501                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6502                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6503                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6504                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6505                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6506                                         } else {
6507                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6508                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6509                                         }
6510                                 },
6511                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6512                         }
6513                 };
6514                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6515                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6516                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6517                 }
6518                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6519                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6520                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6521                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6522                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6523                                         msg: update
6524                                 });
6525                         }
6526                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6527                 }
6528                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6529                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6530                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6531                 }
6532                 Ok(())
6533         }
6534
6535         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6536                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6537                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6538                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6539                 //
6540                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6541                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6542                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6543                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6544
6545                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6546                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6547
6548                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6549                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6550                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6551                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6552                                 debug_assert!(false);
6553                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6554                         })?;
6555                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6556                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6557                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6558                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6559                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6560                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6561                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6562                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6563                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6564                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6565                                         };
6566                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6567                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6568                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6569                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6570                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6571                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6572                                                                 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6573                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6574                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6575                                                                 } else {
6576                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6577                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6578                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6579                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6580                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6581                                                                         reason
6582                                                                 };
6583                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6584                                                         },
6585                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6586                                                 }
6587                                         };
6588                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6589                                 } else {
6590                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6591                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6592                                 }
6593                         },
6594                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6595                 }
6596                 Ok(())
6597         }
6598
6599         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6600                 let funding_txo;
6601                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6602                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6603                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6604                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6605                                         debug_assert!(false);
6606                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6607                                 })?;
6608                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6609                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6610                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6611                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6612                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6613                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6614                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6615                                                         log_trace!(self.logger,
6616                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6617                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6618                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6619                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6620                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6621                                                 }
6622                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6623                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6624                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6625                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6626                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6627                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6628                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6629                                                 res
6630                                         } else {
6631                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6632                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6633                                         }
6634                                 },
6635                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6636                         }
6637                 };
6638                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6639                 Ok(())
6640         }
6641
6642         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6643                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6644                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6645                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6646                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6647                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6648                                 debug_assert!(false);
6649                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6650                         })?;
6651                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6652                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6653                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6654                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6655                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6656                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6657                                 } else {
6658                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6659                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6660                                 }
6661                         },
6662                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6663                 }
6664                 Ok(())
6665         }
6666
6667         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6668                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6669                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6670                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6671                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6672                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6673                                 debug_assert!(false);
6674                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6675                         })?;
6676                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6677                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6678                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6679                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6680                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6681                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6682                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6683                                 }
6684                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6685                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6686                                 } else {
6687                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6688                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6689                                 }
6690                                 Ok(())
6691                         },
6692                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6693                 }
6694         }
6695
6696         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6697                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6698                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6699                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6700                                 debug_assert!(false);
6701                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6702                         })?;
6703                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6704                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6705                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6706                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6707                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6708                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6709                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6710                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6711                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6712                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6713                                         }
6714                                         Ok(())
6715                                 } else {
6716                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6717                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6718                                 }
6719                         },
6720                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6721                 }
6722         }
6723
6724         #[inline]
6725         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6726                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6727                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6728                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6729                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6730                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6731                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6732                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6733                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6734                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6735                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6736                                         };
6737                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6738                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6739
6740                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6741                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6742                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6743                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6744                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6745                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6746                                                 },
6747                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6748                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6749                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6750                                                         {
6751                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6752                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6753                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6754                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6755                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6756                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6757                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6758                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6759                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6760                                                                                         intercept_id
6761                                                                                 }, None));
6762                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6763                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6764                                                                         },
6765                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6766                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6767                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6768                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6769                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6770                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6771                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6772                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6773                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6774                                                                                 });
6775
6776                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6777                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6778                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6779                                                                                 ));
6780                                                                         }
6781                                                                 }
6782                                                         } else {
6783                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6784                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6785                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6786                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6787                                                                 }
6788                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6789                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6790                                                         }
6791                                                 }
6792                                         }
6793                                 }
6794                         }
6795
6796                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6797                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6798                         }
6799
6800                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6801                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6802                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6803                         }
6804                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6805                 }
6806         }
6807
6808         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6809                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6810                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6811                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6812                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6813                 ).count();
6814                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6815                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6816                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6817                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6818                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6819                 // real by taking more time.
6820                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6821                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6822                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6823                         }, None));
6824                 }
6825         }
6826
6827         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6828         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6829         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6830         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6831         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6832                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6833                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6834         ) -> bool {
6835                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6836                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6837                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6838                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6839                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6840                                 counterparty_node_id,
6841                         })
6842                 })
6843         }
6844
6845         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6846         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6847                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6848         ) -> bool {
6849                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6850                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6851                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6852                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6853
6854                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6855                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6856                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6857                         }
6858                 }
6859                 false
6860         }
6861
6862         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6863                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6864                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6865                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6866                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6867                                         debug_assert!(false);
6868                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6869                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6870                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6871                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6872                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6873                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6874                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6875                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6876                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6877                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6878                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6879                                                 } else { false };
6880                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6881                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6882                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6883                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6884                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6885                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6886                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6887                                                 }
6888                                                 htlcs_to_fail
6889                                         } else {
6890                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6891                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6892                                         }
6893                                 },
6894                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6895                         }
6896                 };
6897                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6898                 Ok(())
6899         }
6900
6901         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6902                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6903                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6904                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6905                                 debug_assert!(false);
6906                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6907                         })?;
6908                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6909                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6910                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6911                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6912                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6913                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6914                                 } else {
6915                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6916                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6917                                 }
6918                         },
6919                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6920                 }
6921                 Ok(())
6922         }
6923
6924         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6925                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6926                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6927                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6928                                 debug_assert!(false);
6929                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6930                         })?;
6931                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6932                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6933                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6934                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6935                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6936                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6937                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6938                                         }
6939
6940                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6941                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6942                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6943                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
6944                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
6945                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6946                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6947                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6948                                         });
6949                                 } else {
6950                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6951                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6952                                 }
6953                         },
6954                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6955                 }
6956                 Ok(())
6957         }
6958
6959         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6960         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6961                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6962                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6963                         None => {
6964                                 // It's not a local channel
6965                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6966                         }
6967                 };
6968                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6969                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6970                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6971                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6972                 }
6973                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6974                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6975                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6976                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6977                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6978                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6979                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6980                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6981                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6982                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6983                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6984                                                 }
6985                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6986                                         }
6987                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6988                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6989                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6990                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6991                                         } else {
6992                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6993                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6994                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6995                                                 // persisting.
6996                                                 if !did_change {
6997                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6998                                                 }
6999                                         }
7000                                 } else {
7001                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7002                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7003                                 }
7004                         },
7005                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7006                 }
7007                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7008         }
7009
7010         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7011                 let htlc_forwards;
7012                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7013                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7014
7015                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7016                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7017                                         debug_assert!(false);
7018                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7019                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7020                                                 msg.channel_id
7021                                         )
7022                                 })?;
7023                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7024                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7025                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7026                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7027                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7028                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7029                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7030                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7031                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7032                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7033                                                         msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7034                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7035                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
7036                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7037                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7038                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7039                                                                 msg,
7040                                                         });
7041                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7042                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7043                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7044                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
7045                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7046                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7047                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7048                                                                         msg,
7049                                                                 });
7050                                                         }
7051                                                 }
7052                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7053                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7054                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7055                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7056                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7057                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7058                                                 }
7059                                                 need_lnd_workaround
7060                                         } else {
7061                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7062                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7063                                         }
7064                                 },
7065                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7066                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7067                                                 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7068                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7069                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7070                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7071                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7072                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7073                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7074                                         //
7075                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7076                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7077                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7078                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7079                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7080                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7081                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7082                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7083                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7084                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7085                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7086                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7087                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7088                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7089                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7090                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
7091                                                 },
7092                                         });
7093                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7094                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7095                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7096                                         )
7097                                 }
7098                         }
7099                 };
7100
7101                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7102                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7103                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7104                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7105                 }
7106
7107                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7108                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7109                 }
7110                 Ok(persist)
7111         }
7112
7113         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7114         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7115                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7116
7117                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7118                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7119                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7120                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7121                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7122                                 match monitor_event {
7123                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7124                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7125                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7126                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7127                                                 } else {
7128                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7129                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7130                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7131                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7132                                                 }
7133                                         },
7134                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7135                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7136                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7137                                                         None => {
7138                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7139                                                                 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7140                                                                 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7141                                                                 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7142                                                         }
7143                                                 };
7144                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7145                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7146                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7147                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7148                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7149                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7150                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7151                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7152                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7153                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7154                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7155                                                                                                 msg: update
7156                                                                                         });
7157                                                                                 }
7158                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7159                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7160                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7161                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7162                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7163                                                                                         },
7164                                                                                 });
7165                                                                         }
7166                                                                 }
7167                                                         }
7168                                                 }
7169                                         },
7170                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7171                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7172                                         },
7173                                 }
7174                         }
7175                 }
7176
7177                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7178                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7179                 }
7180
7181                 has_pending_monitor_events
7182         }
7183
7184         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7185         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7186         /// update events as a separate process method here.
7187         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7188         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7189                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7190                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7191         }
7192
7193         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7194         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7195         /// update was applied.
7196         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7197                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7198                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7199
7200                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7201                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7202                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7203                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7204                 'peer_loop: loop {
7205                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7206                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7207                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7208                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7209                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7210                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7211                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7212                                         ) {
7213                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7214                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7215                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7216                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7217                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7218                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7219                                                 }
7220                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7221                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7222
7223                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7224                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7225                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7226                                                 }
7227                                         }
7228                                         break 'chan_loop;
7229                                 }
7230                         }
7231                         break 'peer_loop;
7232                 }
7233
7234                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7235                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7236                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7237                 }
7238
7239                 has_update
7240         }
7241
7242         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7243         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7244         ///
7245         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7246         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7247         ///
7248         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7249         #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7250                      // actually finish implementing it fully.
7251         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7252                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7253
7254                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7255                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7256                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7257                                 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7258                                 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7259                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7260                                                 node_id,
7261                                                 updates,
7262                                         });
7263                                 }
7264                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7265                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7266                                                 node_id,
7267                                                 msg,
7268                                         });
7269                                 }
7270                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7271                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7272                                                 node_id,
7273                                                 msg,
7274                                         });
7275                                 }
7276                                 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7277                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7278                                 }
7279                         }
7280                 };
7281
7282                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7283                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7284                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7285                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7286                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7287                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7288                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7289                                 }
7290                         }
7291                 } else {
7292                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7293                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7294                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7295                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7296                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7297                                 }
7298                         }
7299                 }
7300         }
7301
7302         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7303         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7304         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7305         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7306                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7307                 let mut has_update = false;
7308                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7309                 {
7310                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7311
7312                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7313                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7314                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7315                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7316                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7317                                         match phase {
7318                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7319                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7320                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7321                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7322                                                                                 has_update = true;
7323                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7324                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7325                                                                                 });
7326                                                                         }
7327                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7328                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7329                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7330                                                                         }
7331                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7332                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7333                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7334                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7335                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7336                                                                                                 msg: update
7337                                                                                         });
7338                                                                                 }
7339
7340                                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7341
7342                                                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7343                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7344                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7345                                                                                 false
7346                                                                         } else { true }
7347                                                                 },
7348                                                                 Err(e) => {
7349                                                                         has_update = true;
7350                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7351                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7352                                                                         !close_channel
7353                                                                 }
7354                                                         }
7355                                                 },
7356                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7357                                         }
7358                                 });
7359                         }
7360                 }
7361
7362                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7363                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7364                 }
7365
7366                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7367                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7368                 }
7369
7370                 has_update
7371         }
7372
7373         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7374         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7375         /// Channel object.
7376         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7377                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7378                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7379                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7380                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7381                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7382                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7383                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7384                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7385                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7386                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7387                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7388                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7389                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7390                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7391                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7392                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7393                                         });
7394                         }
7395                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7396                 }
7397         }
7398
7399         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7400         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7401         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7402         ///
7403         /// # Privacy
7404         ///
7405         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7406         /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7407         /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7408         /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7409         ///
7410         /// # Limitations
7411         ///
7412         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7413         /// reply path.
7414         ///
7415         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7416         ///
7417         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7418         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7419         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7420                 &self, description: String
7421         ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7422                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7423                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7424                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7425                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7426                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7427
7428                 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7429                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7430                         .path(path)
7431         }
7432
7433         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7434         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7435         ///
7436         /// # Payment
7437         ///
7438         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7439         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7440         ///
7441         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7442         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7443         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7444         /// expired.
7445         ///
7446         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7447         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7448         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7449         ///
7450         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7451         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7452         ///
7453         /// # Privacy
7454         ///
7455         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7456         /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7457         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7458         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7459         ///
7460         /// # Limitations
7461         ///
7462         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7463         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7464         ///
7465         /// # Errors
7466         ///
7467         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7468         /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7469         ///
7470         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7471         ///
7472         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7473         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7474         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7475         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7476                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7477                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7478         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7479                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7480                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7481                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7482                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7483                 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7484
7485                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7486                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7487                 )?
7488                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7489                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7490                         .path(path);
7491
7492                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7493                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7494                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7495                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7496                         )
7497                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7498
7499                 Ok(builder)
7500         }
7501
7502         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7503         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7504         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7505         ///
7506         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7507         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7508         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7509         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7510         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7511         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7512         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7513         ///
7514         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7515         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7516         ///
7517         /// # Payment
7518         ///
7519         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7520         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7521         /// been sent.
7522         ///
7523         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7524         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7525         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7526         ///
7527         /// # Privacy
7528         ///
7529         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7530         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7531         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7532         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7533         ///
7534         /// # Limitations
7535         ///
7536         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7537         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7538         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7539         ///
7540         /// # Errors
7541         ///
7542         /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7543         /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7544         ///
7545         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7546         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7547         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7548         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7549         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7550         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7551         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7552         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7553                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7554                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7555                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7556         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7557                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7558                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7559                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7560
7561                 let builder = offer
7562                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7563                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7564                 let builder = match quantity {
7565                         None => builder,
7566                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7567                 };
7568                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7569                         None => builder,
7570                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7571                 };
7572                 let builder = match payer_note {
7573                         None => builder,
7574                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7575                 };
7576
7577                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7578                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7579
7580                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7581                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7582                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7583                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7584                         )
7585                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7586
7587                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7588                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7589                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7590                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7591                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7592                                 Some(reply_path),
7593                         );
7594                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7595                 } else {
7596                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7597                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7598                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7599                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7600                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7601                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7602                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7603                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7604                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7605                                 );
7606                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7607                         }
7608                 }
7609
7610                 Ok(())
7611         }
7612
7613         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7614         /// message.
7615         ///
7616         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7617         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7618         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7619         ///
7620         /// # Limitations
7621         ///
7622         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7623         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7624         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7625         /// received and no retries will be made.
7626         ///
7627         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7628         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7629                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7630                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7631                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7632
7633                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7634                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7635
7636                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7637                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7638                                 let payment_paths = vec![
7639                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7640                                 ];
7641                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7642                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7643                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7644                                 )?;
7645                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7646                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7647                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7648                                 );
7649                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7650                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7651                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7652                                 )?;
7653                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7654                                 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7655
7656                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7657                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7658                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7659                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7660                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7661                                                 Some(reply_path),
7662                                         );
7663                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7664                                 } else {
7665                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7666                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7667                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7668                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7669                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7670                                                 );
7671                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7672                                         }
7673                                 }
7674
7675                                 Ok(())
7676                         },
7677                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7678                 }
7679         }
7680
7681         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7682         /// to pay us.
7683         ///
7684         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7685         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7686         ///
7687         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7688         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7689         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7690         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7691         ///
7692         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7693         ///
7694         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7695         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7696         ///
7697         /// # Note
7698         ///
7699         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7700         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7701         ///
7702         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7703         ///
7704         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7705         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7706         ///
7707         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7708         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7709         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7710         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7711         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7712         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7713         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7714                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7715                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7716                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7717                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7718         }
7719
7720         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7721         /// stored external to LDK.
7722         ///
7723         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7724         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7725         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7726         ///
7727         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7728         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7729         /// payments.
7730         ///
7731         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7732         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7733         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7734         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7735         ///
7736         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7737         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7738         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7739         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7740         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7741         ///
7742         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7743         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7744         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7745         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7746         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7747         ///
7748         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7749         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7750         ///
7751         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7752         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7753         ///
7754         /// # Note
7755         ///
7756         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7757         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7758         ///
7759         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7760         ///
7761         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7762         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7763         ///
7764         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7765         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7766         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7767                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7768                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7769                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7770                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7771         }
7772
7773         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7774         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7775         ///
7776         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7777         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7778                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7779         }
7780
7781         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7782         /// node.
7783         fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7784                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7785                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7786                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7787         }
7788
7789         /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7790         /// node.
7791         fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7792                 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7793         ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7794                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7795                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7796
7797                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7798                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7799                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7800                         payment_secret,
7801                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7802                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7803                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7804                         },
7805                 };
7806                 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7807                 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7808                         payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7809                 ).unwrap()
7810         }
7811
7812         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7813         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7814         ///
7815         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7816         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7817                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7818                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7819                 loop {
7820                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7821                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7822                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7823                                 Some(_) => continue,
7824                                 None => return scid_candidate
7825                         }
7826                 }
7827         }
7828
7829         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7830         ///
7831         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7832         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7833                 PhantomRouteHints {
7834                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7835                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7836                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7837                 }
7838         }
7839
7840         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7841         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7842         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7843         ///
7844         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7845         /// times to get a unique scid.
7846         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7847                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7848                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7849                 loop {
7850                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7851                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7852                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7853                         return scid_candidate
7854                 }
7855         }
7856
7857         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7858         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7859         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7860                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7861
7862                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7863                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7864                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7865                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7866                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7867                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7868                         ) {
7869                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7870                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7871                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7872                                         }
7873                                 }
7874                         }
7875                 }
7876
7877                 inflight_htlcs
7878         }
7879
7880         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7881         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7882                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7883                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7884                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7885                 events.into_inner()
7886         }
7887
7888         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7889         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7890                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7891                 events.push_back((event, None));
7892         }
7893
7894         #[cfg(test)]
7895         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7896                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7897                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7898         }
7899
7900         #[cfg(test)]
7901         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7902                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7903         }
7904
7905         #[cfg(test)]
7906         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7907                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7908         }
7909
7910         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7911         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7912         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7913         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7914         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7915                 loop {
7916                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7917                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7918                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7919                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7920
7921                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7922                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7923                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7924                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7925                                         {
7926                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7927                                         }
7928                                 }
7929
7930                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7931                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7932                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7933                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7934                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7935                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7936                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7937                                         break;
7938                                 }
7939
7940                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7941                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7942                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7943                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7944                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7945                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7946                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7947                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7948                                                         if further_update_exists {
7949                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7950                                                                 // top of the loop.
7951                                                                 continue;
7952                                                         }
7953                                                 } else {
7954                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7955                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7956                                                 }
7957                                         }
7958                                 }
7959                         } else {
7960                                 log_debug!(self.logger,
7961                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7962                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7963                         }
7964                         break;
7965                 }
7966         }
7967
7968         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7969                 for action in actions {
7970                         match action {
7971                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7972                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7973                                 } => {
7974                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7975                                 }
7976                         }
7977                 }
7978         }
7979
7980         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7981         /// using the given event handler.
7982         ///
7983         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7984         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7985                 &self, handler: H
7986         ) {
7987                 let mut ev;
7988                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7989         }
7990 }
7991
7992 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7993 where
7994         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7995         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7996         ES::Target: EntropySource,
7997         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7998         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7999         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8000         R::Target: Router,
8001         L::Target: Logger,
8002 {
8003         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8004         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8005         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8006         /// is always placed next to each other.
8007         ///
8008         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8009         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8010         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8011         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8012         ///
8013         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8014         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8015         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8016         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8017                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8018                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8019                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8020
8021                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8022                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8023                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8024                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8025                         }
8026
8027                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8028                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8029                         }
8030                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8031                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8032                         }
8033
8034                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8035                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8036                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8037                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8038                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8039                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8040                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8041                                 }
8042                         }
8043
8044                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8045                                 events.replace(pending_events);
8046                         }
8047
8048                         result
8049                 });
8050                 events.into_inner()
8051         }
8052 }
8053
8054 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8055 where
8056         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8057         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8058         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8059         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8060         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8061         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8062         R::Target: Router,
8063         L::Target: Logger,
8064 {
8065         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8066         ///
8067         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8068         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8069         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8070                 let mut ev;
8071                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8072         }
8073 }
8074
8075 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8076 where
8077         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8078         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8079         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8080         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8081         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8082         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8083         R::Target: Router,
8084         L::Target: Logger,
8085 {
8086         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8087                 {
8088                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8089                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8090                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8091                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8092                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8093                 }
8094
8095                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8096                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8097         }
8098
8099         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8100                 let _persistence_guard =
8101                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8102                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8103                 let new_height = height - 1;
8104                 {
8105                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8106                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8107                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8108                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8109                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8110                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8111                 }
8112
8113                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8114         }
8115 }
8116
8117 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8118 where
8119         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8120         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8121         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8122         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8123         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8124         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8125         R::Target: Router,
8126         L::Target: Logger,
8127 {
8128         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8129                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8130                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8131                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8132
8133                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8134                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8135
8136                 let _persistence_guard =
8137                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8138                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8139                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8140                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8141
8142                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8143                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8144                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8145                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8146                 }
8147         }
8148
8149         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8150                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8151                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8152                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8153
8154                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8155                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8156
8157                 let _persistence_guard =
8158                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8159                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8160                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8161
8162                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8163
8164                 macro_rules! max_time {
8165                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8166                                 loop {
8167                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8168                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8169                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8170                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8171                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8172                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8173                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8174                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8175                                                 break;
8176                                         }
8177                                 }
8178                         }
8179                 }
8180                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8181                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8182                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8183                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8184                 });
8185         }
8186
8187         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8188                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8189                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8190                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8191                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8192                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8193                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8194                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8195                                 }
8196                         }
8197                 }
8198                 res
8199         }
8200
8201         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8202                 let _persistence_guard =
8203                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8204                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8205                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8206                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8207                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8208                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8209                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8210                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8211                 });
8212         }
8213 }
8214
8215 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8216 where
8217         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8218         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8219         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8220         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8221         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8222         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8223         R::Target: Router,
8224         L::Target: Logger,
8225 {
8226         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8227         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8228         /// the function.
8229         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8230                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8231                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8232                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8233                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8234
8235                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8236                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8237                 {
8238                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8239                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8240                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8241                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8242                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8243                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8244                                         match phase {
8245                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8246                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8247                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8248                                                         let res = f(channel);
8249                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8250                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8251                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8252                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8253                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8254                                                                 }
8255                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8256                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8257                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8258                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8259                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8260                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8261                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8262                                                                                                 msg,
8263                                                                                         });
8264                                                                                 }
8265                                                                         } else {
8266                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8267                                                                         }
8268                                                                 }
8269
8270                                                                 {
8271                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8272                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8273                                                                 }
8274
8275                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8276                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8277                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8278                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8279                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8280                                                                         });
8281                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8282                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8283                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8284                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8285                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8286                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8287                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8288                                                                                         });
8289                                                                                 }
8290                                                                         }
8291                                                                 }
8292                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8293                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8294                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8295                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8296                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8297                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8298                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8299                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8300                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8301                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8302                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8303                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8304                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8305                                                                         }
8306                                                                 }
8307                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8308                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8309                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8310                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8311                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8312                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8313                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8314                                                                                 msg: update
8315                                                                         });
8316                                                                 }
8317                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8318                                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8319                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8320                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8321                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8322                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8323                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8324                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8325                                                                                 })
8326                                                                         },
8327                                                                 });
8328                                                                 return false;
8329                                                         }
8330                                                         true
8331                                                 }
8332                                         }
8333                                 });
8334                         }
8335                 }
8336
8337                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8338                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8339                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8340                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8341                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8342                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8343                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8344                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8345                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8346                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8347
8348                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8349                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8350                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8351                                                 false
8352                                         } else { true }
8353                                 });
8354                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8355                         });
8356
8357                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8358                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8359                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8360                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8361                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8362                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8363                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8364                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8365                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8366                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8367                                         });
8368
8369                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8370                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8371                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8372                                         };
8373                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8374                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8375                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8376                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8377                                         false
8378                                 } else { true }
8379                         });
8380                 }
8381
8382                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8383
8384                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8385                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8386                 }
8387         }
8388
8389         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8390         /// may have events that need processing.
8391         ///
8392         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8393         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8394         ///
8395         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8396         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8397         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8398                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8399         }
8400
8401         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8402         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8403                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8404         }
8405
8406         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8407         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8408                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8409         }
8410
8411         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8412         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8413         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8414                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8415         }
8416
8417         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8418         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8419         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8420                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8421         }
8422
8423         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8424         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8425         ///
8426         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8427         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8428         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8429         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8430                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8431         }
8432
8433         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8434         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8435         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8436                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8437         }
8438
8439         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8440         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8441         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8442                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8443         }
8444
8445         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8446         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8447         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8448                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8449         }
8450
8451         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8452         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8453         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8454                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8455         }
8456 }
8457
8458 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8459         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8460 where
8461         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8462         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8463         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8464         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8465         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8466         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8467         R::Target: Router,
8468         L::Target: Logger,
8469 {
8470         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8471                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8472                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8473                 // change to the contents.
8474                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8475                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8476                         let persist = match &res {
8477                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8478                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8479                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8480                                 },
8481                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8482                         };
8483                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8484                         persist
8485                 });
8486         }
8487
8488         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8489                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8490                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8491                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8492         }
8493
8494         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8495                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8496                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8497                 // change to the contents.
8498                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8499                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8500                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8501                 });
8502         }
8503
8504         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8505                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8506                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8507                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8508         }
8509
8510         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8511                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8512                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8513         }
8514
8515         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8516                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8517                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8518         }
8519
8520         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8521                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8522                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8523                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8524                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8525                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8526                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8527                         let persist = match &res {
8528                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8529                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8530                         };
8531                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8532                         persist
8533                 });
8534         }
8535
8536         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8537                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8538                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8539         }
8540
8541         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8542                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8543                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8544         }
8545
8546         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8547                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8548                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8549                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8550                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8551                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8552                         let persist = match &res {
8553                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8554                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8555                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8556                         };
8557                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8558                         persist
8559                 });
8560         }
8561
8562         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8563                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8564                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8565         }
8566
8567         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8568                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8569                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8570                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8571                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8572                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8573                         let persist = match &res {
8574                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8575                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8576                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8577                         };
8578                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8579                         persist
8580                 });
8581         }
8582
8583         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8584                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8585                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8586                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8587                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8588                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8589                         let persist = match &res {
8590                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8591                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8592                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8593                         };
8594                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8595                         persist
8596                 });
8597         }
8598
8599         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8600                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8601                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8602         }
8603
8604         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8605                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8606                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8607         }
8608
8609         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8610                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8611                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8612                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8613                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8614                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8615                         let persist = match &res {
8616                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8617                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8618                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8619                         };
8620                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8621                         persist
8622                 });
8623         }
8624
8625         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8626                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8627                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8628         }
8629
8630         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8631                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8632                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8633                                 persist
8634                         } else {
8635                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8636                         }
8637                 });
8638         }
8639
8640         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8641                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8642                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8643                         let persist = match &res {
8644                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8645                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8646                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8647                         };
8648                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8649                         persist
8650                 });
8651         }
8652
8653         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8654                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8655                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8656                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8657                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8658                 let remove_peer = {
8659                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8660                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8661                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8662                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8663                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8664                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8665                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8666                                         let context = match phase {
8667                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8668                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8669                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8670                                                                 return true;
8671                                                         }
8672                                                         &mut chan.context
8673                                                 },
8674                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8675                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8676                                                         &mut chan.context
8677                                                 },
8678                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8679                                                         &mut chan.context
8680                                                 },
8681                                         };
8682                                         // Clean up for removal.
8683                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8684                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8685                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8686                                         false
8687                                 });
8688                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8689                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8690                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8691                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8692                                         match msg {
8693                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8694                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8695                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8696                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8697                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8698                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8699                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8700                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8701                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8702                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8703                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8704                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8705                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8706                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8707                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8708                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8709                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8710                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8711                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8712                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8713                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8714                                                 // Channel Operations
8715                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8716                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8717                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8718                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8719                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8720                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8721                                                 // Gossip
8722                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8723                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8724                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8725                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8726                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8727                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8728                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8729                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8730                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8731                                         }
8732                                 });
8733                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8734                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8735                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8736                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8737                 };
8738                 if remove_peer {
8739                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8740                 }
8741                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8742
8743                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8744                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8745                 }
8746         }
8747
8748         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8749                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8750                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8751                         return Err(());
8752                 }
8753
8754                 let mut res = Ok(());
8755
8756                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8757                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8758                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8759                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8760                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8761                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8762                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8763
8764                         {
8765                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8766                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8767                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8768                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8769                                                         res = Err(());
8770                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8771                                                 }
8772                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8773                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8774                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8775                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8776                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8777                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8778                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8779                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8780                                                         is_connected: true,
8781                                                 }));
8782                                         },
8783                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8784                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8785                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8786
8787                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8788                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8789                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8790                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8791                                                 {
8792                                                         res = Err(());
8793                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8794                                                 }
8795
8796                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8797                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8798                                         },
8799                                 }
8800                         }
8801
8802                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8803
8804                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8805                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8806                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8807                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8808                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8809
8810                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8811                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8812                                                 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8813                                                 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8814                                                 // worry about closing and removing them.
8815                                                 debug_assert!(false);
8816                                                 None
8817                                         }
8818                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
8819                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8820                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8821                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8822                                         });
8823                                 });
8824                         }
8825
8826                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8827                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8828                 });
8829                 res
8830         }
8831
8832         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8833                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8834
8835                 match &msg.data as &str {
8836                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8837                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
8838                         {
8839                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8840                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8841                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8842                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8843                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8844                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8845                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8846                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8847                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8848                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8849                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8850                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8851                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8852                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8853                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8854                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8855                                                                 msg,
8856                                                         });
8857                                                 }
8858                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8859                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8860                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8861                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8862                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8863                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8864                                                                 },
8865                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
8866                                                         }
8867                                                 });
8868                                         }
8869                                 }
8870                                 return;
8871                         }
8872                         _ => {}
8873                 }
8874
8875                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8876                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8877                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8878                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8879                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8880                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8881                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8882                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8883                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8884                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8885                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8886                         };
8887                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
8888                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8889                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8890                         }
8891                 } else {
8892                         {
8893                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8894                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8895                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8896                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8897                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8898                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8899                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8900                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8901                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8902                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8903                                                         msg,
8904                                                 });
8905                                                 return;
8906                                         }
8907                                 }
8908                         }
8909
8910                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8911                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8912                 }
8913         }
8914
8915         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8916                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8917         }
8918
8919         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8920                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8921         }
8922
8923         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8924                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8925         }
8926
8927         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8928                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8929                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8930                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8931         }
8932
8933         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8934                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8935                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8936                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8937         }
8938
8939         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8940                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8941                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8942                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8943         }
8944
8945         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8946                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8947                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8948                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8949         }
8950
8951         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8952                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8953                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8954                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8955         }
8956
8957         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8958                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8959                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8960                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8961         }
8962
8963         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8964                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8965                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8966                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8967         }
8968
8969         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8970                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8971                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8972                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8973         }
8974
8975         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8976                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8977                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8978                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8979         }
8980 }
8981
8982 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8983 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8984 where
8985         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8986         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8987         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8988         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8989         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8990         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8991         R::Target: Router,
8992         L::Target: Logger,
8993 {
8994         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8995                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8996                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8997
8998                 match message {
8999                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9000                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9001                                         &invoice_request
9002                                 ) {
9003                                         Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
9004                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9005                                 };
9006                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9007                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9008                                         Err(()) => {
9009                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9010                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9011                                         },
9012                                 };
9013                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9014
9015                                 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
9016                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
9017                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9018                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9019                                                 ];
9020                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9021                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9022                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash
9023                                                 );
9024                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9025                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9026                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9027                                                 );
9028                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9029                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9030                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9031                                                 );
9032                                                 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9033                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9034                                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9035                                                 }
9036                                         },
9037                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
9038                                                 let payment_paths = vec![
9039                                                         self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
9040                                                 ];
9041                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9042                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9043                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9044                                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9045                                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9046                                                 );
9047                                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9048                                                 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9049                                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9050                                                 );
9051                                                 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9052                                                         .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9053                                                         .and_then(|invoice|
9054                                                                 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9055                                                                         Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9056                                                                         Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9057                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9058                                                                         )),
9059                                                                         Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9060                                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9061                                                                         )),
9062                                                                 });
9063                                                 match response {
9064                                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9065                                                         Err(error) => Some(error),
9066                                                 }
9067                                         },
9068                                         Err(()) => {
9069                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9070                                         },
9071                                 }
9072                         },
9073                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9074                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9075                                         Err(()) => {
9076                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9077                                         },
9078                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9079                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9080                                         },
9081                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9082                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9083                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9084                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9085                                                 } else {
9086                                                         None
9087                                                 }
9088                                         },
9089                                 }
9090                         },
9091                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9092                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9093                                 None
9094                         },
9095                 }
9096         }
9097
9098         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9099                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9100         }
9101 }
9102
9103 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9104 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9105 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9106         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9107         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9108         node_features
9109 }
9110
9111 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9112 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9113 ///
9114 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9115 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9116 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9117 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9118         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9119 }
9120
9121 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9122 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9123 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9124         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9125 }
9126
9127 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9128 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9129 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9130         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9131 }
9132
9133 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9134 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9135 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9136         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9137 }
9138
9139 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9140 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9141 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9142         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9143         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9144         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9145         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9146         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9147         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9148         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9149         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9150         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9151         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9152         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9153         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9154         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9155         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9156         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9157         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9158                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9159         }
9160         features
9161 }
9162
9163 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9164 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9165
9166 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9167         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9168         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9169         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9170 });
9171
9172 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9173         (2, node_id, required),
9174         (4, features, required),
9175         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9176         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9177         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9178         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9179 });
9180
9181 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9182         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9183                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9184                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9185                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9186                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9187                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9188                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9189                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9190                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9191                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9192                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9193                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9194                         (7, self.config, option),
9195                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9196                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9197                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9198                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9199                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9200                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9201                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9202                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9203                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9204                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9205                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9206                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9207                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9208                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9209                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9210                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9211                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9212                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9213                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9214                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9215                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9216                 });
9217                 Ok(())
9218         }
9219 }
9220
9221 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9222         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9223                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9224                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9225                         (2, channel_id, required),
9226                         (3, channel_type, option),
9227                         (4, counterparty, required),
9228                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9229                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9230                         (7, config, option),
9231                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9232                         (9, confirmations, option),
9233                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9234                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9235                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9236                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9237                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9238                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9239                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9240                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9241                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9242                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9243                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9244                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9245                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9246                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9247                         (30, is_usable, required),
9248                         (32, is_public, required),
9249                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9250                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9251                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9252                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9253                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9254                 });
9255
9256                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9257                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9258                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9259                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9260                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9261
9262                 Ok(Self {
9263                         inbound_scid_alias,
9264                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9265                         channel_type,
9266                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9267                         outbound_scid_alias,
9268                         funding_txo,
9269                         config,
9270                         short_channel_id,
9271                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9272                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9273                         user_channel_id,
9274                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9275                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9276                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9277                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9278                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9279                         confirmations_required,
9280                         confirmations,
9281                         force_close_spend_delay,
9282                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9283                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9284                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9285                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9286                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9287                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9288                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9289                         channel_shutdown_state,
9290                 })
9291         }
9292 }
9293
9294 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9295         (2, channels, required_vec),
9296         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9297         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9298 });
9299
9300 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9301         (0, Forward) => {
9302                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9303                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9304         },
9305         (1, Receive) => {
9306                 (0, payment_data, required),
9307                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9308                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9309                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9310                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9311         },
9312         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9313                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9314                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9315                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9316                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9317                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9318         },
9319 ;);
9320
9321 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9322         (0, routing, required),
9323         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9324         (4, payment_hash, required),
9325         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9326         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9327         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9328         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9329 });
9330
9331
9332 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9333         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9334                 match self {
9335                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9336                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9337                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9338                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9339                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9340                         },
9341                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9342                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9343                         }) => {
9344                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9345                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9346                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9347                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9348                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9349                         },
9350                 }
9351                 Ok(())
9352         }
9353 }
9354
9355 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9356         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9357                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9358                 match id {
9359                         0 => {
9360                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9361                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9362                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9363                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9364                                 }))
9365                         },
9366                         1 => {
9367                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9368                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9369                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9370                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9371                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9372                                 }))
9373                         },
9374                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9375                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9376                         // messages contained in the variants.
9377                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9378                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9379                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9380                         2 => {
9381                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9382                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9383                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9384                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9385                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9386                         },
9387                         3 => {
9388                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9389                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9390                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9391                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9392                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9393                         },
9394                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9395                 }
9396         }
9397 }
9398
9399 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9400         (0, Forward),
9401         (1, Fail),
9402 );
9403
9404 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9405         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9406         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9407         (2, outpoint, required),
9408         (4, htlc_id, required),
9409         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9410         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9411 });
9412
9413 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9414         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9415                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9416                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9417                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9418                 };
9419                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9420                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9421                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9422                         (2, self.value, required),
9423                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9424                         (4, payment_data, option),
9425                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9426                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9427                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9428                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9429                 });
9430                 Ok(())
9431         }
9432 }
9433
9434 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9435         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9436                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9437                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9438                         (1, total_msat, option),
9439                         (2, value_ser, required),
9440                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9441                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9442                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9443                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9444                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9445                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9446                 });
9447                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9448                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9449                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9450                         Some(p) => {
9451                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9452                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9453                                 }
9454                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9455                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9456                                 }
9457                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9458                         },
9459                         None => {
9460                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9461                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9462                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9463                                         }
9464                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9465                                 }
9466                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9467                         },
9468                 };
9469                 Ok(Self {
9470                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9471                         timer_ticks: 0,
9472                         value,
9473                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9474                         total_value_received,
9475                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9476                         onion_payload,
9477                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9478                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9479                 })
9480         }
9481 }
9482
9483 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9484         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9485                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9486                 match id {
9487                         0 => {
9488                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9489                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9490                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9491                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9492                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9493                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9494                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9495                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9496                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9497                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9498                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9499                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9500                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9501                                 });
9502                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9503                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9504                                         // instead.
9505                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9506                                 }
9507                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9508                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9509                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9510                                 }
9511                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9512                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9513                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9514                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9515                                                 }
9516                                         }
9517                                 }
9518                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9519                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9520                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9521                                         path,
9522                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9523                                 })
9524                         }
9525                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9526                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9527                 }
9528         }
9529 }
9530
9531 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9532         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9533                 match self {
9534                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9535                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9536                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9537                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9538                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9539                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9540                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9541                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9542                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9543                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9544                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9545                                  });
9546                         }
9547                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9548                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9549                                 field.write(writer)?;
9550                         }
9551                 }
9552                 Ok(())
9553         }
9554 }
9555
9556 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9557         (0, forward_info, required),
9558         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9559         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9560         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9561         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9562 });
9563
9564 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9565         (1, FailHTLC) => {
9566                 (0, htlc_id, required),
9567                 (2, err_packet, required),
9568         };
9569         (0, AddHTLC)
9570 );
9571
9572 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9573         (0, payment_secret, required),
9574         (2, expiry_time, required),
9575         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9576         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9577         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9578 });
9579
9580 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9581 where
9582         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9583         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9584         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9585         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9586         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9587         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9588         R::Target: Router,
9589         L::Target: Logger,
9590 {
9591         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9592                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9593
9594                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9595
9596                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9597                 {
9598                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9599                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9600                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9601                 }
9602
9603                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9604                 {
9605                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9606                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9607                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9608                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9609                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9610                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9611                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9612                                 }
9613
9614                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9615                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9616                                 ).count();
9617                         }
9618
9619                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9620
9621                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9622                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9623                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9624                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9625                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9626                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9627                                         } else { None }
9628                                 ) {
9629                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9630                                 }
9631                         }
9632                 }
9633
9634                 {
9635                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9636                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9637                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9638                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9639                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9640                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9641                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9642                                 }
9643                         }
9644                 }
9645
9646                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9647
9648                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9649                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9650                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9651
9652                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9653                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9654                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9655                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9656                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9657                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9658                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9659                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9660                         }
9661                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9662                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9663                 }
9664
9665                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9666                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9667                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9668                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9669                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9670                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9671                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9672                 }
9673
9674                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9675                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9676                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9677                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9678                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9679                         // no channels.
9680                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9681                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9682                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9683                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9684                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9685                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9686                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9687                                 }
9688                         }
9689                 }
9690
9691                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9692                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9693                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9694                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9695                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9696                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9697                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9698                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9699                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9700                 } else {
9701                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9702                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9703                                 event.write(writer)?;
9704                         }
9705                 }
9706
9707                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9708                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9709                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9710                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9711                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9712                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9713
9714                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9715                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9716                 // likely to be identical.
9717                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9718                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9719
9720                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9721                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9722                         hash.write(writer)?;
9723                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9724                 }
9725
9726                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9727                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9728                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9729                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9730                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9731                         }
9732                 }
9733                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9734                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9735                         match outbound {
9736                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9737                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9738                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9739                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9740                                         }
9741                                 }
9742                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9743                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9744                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9745                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9746                         }
9747                 }
9748
9749                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9750                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9751                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9752                         match outbound {
9753                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9754                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9755                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9756                                 },
9757                                 _ => {},
9758                         }
9759                 }
9760
9761                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9762                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9763                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9764                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9765                 }
9766
9767                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9768                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9769                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9770                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9771                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
9772                 }
9773
9774                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9775                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9776                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9777                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
9778                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9779                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9780                                 }
9781                         }
9782                 }
9783
9784                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9785                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9786                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9787                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9788                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9789                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9790                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9791                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9792                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9793                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9794                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9795                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9796                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9797                 });
9798
9799                 Ok(())
9800         }
9801 }
9802
9803 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9804         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9805                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9806                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9807                         event.write(w)?;
9808                         action.write(w)?;
9809                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9810                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9811                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9812                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9813                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9814                                 // check that the event is sane here.
9815                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9816                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9817                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9818                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9819                         }
9820                 }
9821                 Ok(())
9822         }
9823 }
9824 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9825         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9826                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9827                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9828                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9829                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9830                         len) as usize);
9831                 for _ in 0..len {
9832                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9833                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9834                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9835                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
9836                         } else if action.is_some() {
9837                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9838                         }
9839                 }
9840                 Ok(events)
9841         }
9842 }
9843
9844 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9845         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9846         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9847         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9848         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9849         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9850 );
9851
9852 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9853 ///
9854 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9855 /// is:
9856 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9857 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9858 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9859 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9860 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9861 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9862 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9863 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9864 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9865 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9866 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9867 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9868 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9869 ///    the next step.
9870 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9871 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9872 ///
9873 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9874 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9875 ///
9876 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9877 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9878 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9879 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9880 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9881 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9882 ///
9883 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9884 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9885 where
9886         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9887         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9888         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9889         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9890         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9891         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9892         R::Target: Router,
9893         L::Target: Logger,
9894 {
9895         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9896         pub entropy_source: ES,
9897
9898         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9899         pub node_signer: NS,
9900
9901         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9902         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9903         /// signing data.
9904         pub signer_provider: SP,
9905
9906         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9907         ///
9908         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9909         pub fee_estimator: F,
9910         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9911         ///
9912         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9913         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9914         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9915         pub chain_monitor: M,
9916
9917         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9918         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9919         /// force-closed during deserialization.
9920         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9921         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9922         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9923         ///
9924         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9925         pub router: R,
9926         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9927         /// deserialization.
9928         pub logger: L,
9929         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9930         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9931         pub default_config: UserConfig,
9932
9933         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9934         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9935         ///
9936         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9937         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9938         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9939         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9940         ///
9941         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9942         /// this struct.
9943         ///
9944         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9945         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9946 }
9947
9948 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9949                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9950 where
9951         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9952         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9953         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9954         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9955         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9956         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9957         R::Target: Router,
9958         L::Target: Logger,
9959 {
9960         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9961         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9962         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9963         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9964                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9965                 Self {
9966                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9967                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9968                 }
9969         }
9970 }
9971
9972 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9973 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9974 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9975         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9976 where
9977         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9978         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9979         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9980         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9981         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9982         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9983         R::Target: Router,
9984         L::Target: Logger,
9985 {
9986         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9987                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9988                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9989         }
9990 }
9991
9992 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9993         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9994 where
9995         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9996         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9997         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9998         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9999         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10000         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10001         R::Target: Router,
10002         L::Target: Logger,
10003 {
10004         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10005                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10006
10007                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10008                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10009                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10010
10011                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10012
10013                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10014                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10015                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10016                 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10017                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10018                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10019                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10020                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10021                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10022                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10023                         ))?;
10024                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10025                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10026                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10027                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10028                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10029                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10030                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10031                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10032                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10033                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10034                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10035                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10036                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10037                                         }
10038                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10039                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10040                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10041                                         }
10042                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10043                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10044                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10045                                         }
10046                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10047                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10048                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10049                                         }
10050                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
10051                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10052                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10053                                         }
10054                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10055                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10056                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10057                                                 });
10058                                         }
10059                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10060                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10061                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10062                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10063                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10064                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10065                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10066                                         }, None));
10067                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10068                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10069                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10070                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10071                                                 }
10072                                                 if !found_htlc {
10073                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10074                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10075                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10076                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10077                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10078                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10079                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10080                                                         log_info!(args.logger,
10081                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10082                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10083                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10084                                                 }
10085                                         }
10086                                 } else {
10087                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10088                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10089                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10090                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10091                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10092                                         }
10093                                         if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10094                                                 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10095                                         }
10096                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10097                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10098                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10099                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10100                                                 },
10101                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10102                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10103                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10104                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10105                                                 }
10106                                         }
10107                                 }
10108                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10109                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10110                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10111                                 // safely discard the channel.
10112                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10113                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10114                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10115                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10116                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10117                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10118                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10119                                 }, None));
10120                         } else {
10121                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10122                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10123                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10124                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10125                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10126                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10127                         }
10128                 }
10129
10130                 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10131                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10132                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10133                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10134                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10135                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10136                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10137                                 };
10138                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10139                         }
10140                 }
10141
10142                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10143                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10144                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10145                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10146                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10147                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10148                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10149                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10150                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10151                         }
10152                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10153                 }
10154
10155                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10156                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10157                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10158                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10159                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10160                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10161                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10162                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10163                         }
10164                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10165                 }
10166
10167                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10168                         PeerState {
10169                                 channel_by_id,
10170                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10171                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10172                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10173                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10174                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10175                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10176                                 is_connected: false,
10177                         }
10178                 };
10179
10180                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10181                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10182                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10183                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10184                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10185                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10186                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10187                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10188                 }
10189
10190                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10191                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10192                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10193                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10194                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10195                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10196                                 None => continue,
10197                         }
10198                 }
10199
10200                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10201                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10202                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10203                                 0 => {
10204                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10205                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10206                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10207                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10208                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10209                                 }
10210                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10211                         }
10212                 }
10213
10214                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10215                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10216
10217                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10218                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10219                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10220                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10221                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10222                         }
10223                 }
10224
10225                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10226                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10227                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10228                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10229                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10230                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10231                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10232                         };
10233                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10234                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10235                         };
10236                 }
10237
10238                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10239                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10240                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10241                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10242                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10243                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10244                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10245                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10246                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10247                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10248                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10249                 let mut events_override = None;
10250                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10251                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10252                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10253                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10254                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10255                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10256                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10257                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10258                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10259                         (8, events_override, option),
10260                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10261                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10262                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10263                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10264                 });
10265                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10266                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10267                 }
10268
10269                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10270                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10271                 }
10272
10273                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10274                         pending_events_read = events;
10275                 }
10276
10277                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10278                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10279                 }
10280
10281                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10282                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10283                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10284                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10285                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10286                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10287                         }
10288                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10289                 }
10290                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10291                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10292                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10293                 };
10294
10295                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10296                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10297                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10298                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10299                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10300                 //
10301                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10302                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10303                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10304                 //
10305                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10306                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10307                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10308                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10309                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10310                         ) => { {
10311                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10312                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10313                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10314                                         log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10315                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10316                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10317                                         pending_background_events.push(
10318                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10319                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10320                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10321                                                         update: update.clone(),
10322                                                 });
10323                                 }
10324                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10325                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10326                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10327                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10328                                         pending_background_events.push(
10329                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10330                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10331                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10332                                                 });
10333                                 }
10334                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10335                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10336                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10337                                 }
10338                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10339                         } }
10340                 }
10341
10342                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10343                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10344                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10345                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10346                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10347                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10348                                         // discarded.
10349                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10350                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10351                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10352                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10353                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10354                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10355                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10356                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10357                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10358                                                 }
10359                                         }
10360                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10361                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10362                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10363                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10364                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10365                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10366                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10367                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10368                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10369                                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10370                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10371                                         }
10372                                 } else {
10373                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10374                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10375                                         debug_assert!(false);
10376                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10377                                 }
10378                         }
10379                 }
10380
10381                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10382                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10383                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10384                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10385                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10386                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10387                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10388                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10389                                         });
10390                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10391                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10392                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10393                                 } else {
10394                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10395                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10396                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10397                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10398                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10399                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10400                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10401                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10402                                 }
10403                         }
10404                 }
10405
10406                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10407                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10408
10409                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10410                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10411                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10412                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10413
10414                 {
10415                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10416                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10417                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10418                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10419                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10420                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10421                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10422                         // 0.0.102+
10423                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10424                                 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10425                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10426                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10427                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10428                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10429                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10430                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10431                                                         }
10432
10433                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10434                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10435                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10436                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10437                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10438                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10439                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10440                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10441                                                                 },
10442                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10443                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10444                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10445                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10446                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10447                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10448                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10449                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10450                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10451                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10452                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10453                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10454                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10455                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10456                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10457                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10458                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10459                                                                         });
10460                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10461                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10462                                                                 }
10463                                                         }
10464                                                 }
10465                                         }
10466                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10467                                                 match htlc_source {
10468                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10469                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10470                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10471                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10472                                                                 };
10473                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10474                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10475                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10476                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10477                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10478                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10479                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10480                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10481                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10482                                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10483                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10484                                                                                                 false
10485                                                                                         } else { true }
10486                                                                                 } else { true }
10487                                                                         });
10488                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10489                                                                 });
10490                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10491                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10492                                                                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10493                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10494                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10495                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10496                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10497                                                                                         } else { true }
10498                                                                                 });
10499                                                                                 false
10500                                                                         } else { true }
10501                                                                 });
10502                                                         },
10503                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10504                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10505                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10506                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10507                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10508                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10509                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10510                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10511                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10512                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10513                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10514                                                                         let compl_action =
10515                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10516                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10517                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10518                                                                                 };
10519                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10520                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10521                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10522                                                                 }
10523                                                         },
10524                                                 }
10525                                         }
10526                                 }
10527
10528                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10529                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10530                                 // payments.
10531                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10532                                         .into_iter()
10533                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10534                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10535                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10536                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10537                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10538                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10539                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10540                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10541                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10542                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10543                                                         } else { None }
10544                                                 } else {
10545                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10546                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10547                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10548                                                         // channel still live case here.
10549                                                         None
10550                                                 }
10551                                         });
10552                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10553                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10554                                 }
10555                         }
10556                 }
10557
10558                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10559                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10560                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10561                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10562                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10563                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10564                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10565                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10566                         }, None));
10567                 }
10568
10569                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10570                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10571
10572                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10573                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10574                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10575                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10576                         }
10577                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10578                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10579                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10580                                 }
10581                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10582                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10583                                 {
10584                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10585                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10586                                         });
10587                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10588                                 }
10589                         } else {
10590                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10591                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10592                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10593                                         });
10594                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10595                                 }
10596                         }
10597                 } else {
10598                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10599                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10600                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10601                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10602                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10603                                 }
10604                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10605                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10606                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10607                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10608                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10609                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10610                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10611                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10612                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10613                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10614                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10615                                                                                 }
10616                                                                         }
10617                                                                 },
10618                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10619                                                         }
10620                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10621                                         },
10622                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10623                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10624                                 };
10625                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10626                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10627                                 });
10628                         }
10629                 }
10630
10631                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10632                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10633
10634                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10635                         Ok(key) => key,
10636                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10637                 };
10638                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10639                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10640                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10641                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10642                         }
10643                 }
10644
10645                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10646                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10647                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10648                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10649                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10650                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10651                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10652                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10653                                                 loop {
10654                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10655                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10656                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10657                                                 }
10658                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10659                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10660                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10661                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10662                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10663                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10664                                         }
10665                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10666                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10667                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10668                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10669                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10670                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10671                                                 }
10672                                         }
10673                                 } else {
10674                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10675                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10676                                         debug_assert!(false);
10677                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10678                                 }
10679                         }
10680                 }
10681
10682                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10683
10684                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10685                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10686                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10687                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10688                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10689                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10690                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10691                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10692                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10693                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10694                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10695                                         }
10696                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10697                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10698
10699                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10700                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10701                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10702                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10703                                                 //
10704                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10705                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10706                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10707                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10708                                                 // reason to.
10709                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10710                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10711                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10712                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10713                                                 // restart.
10714                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10715                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10716                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10717                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10718                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10719                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10720                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10721                                                         }
10722                                                 }
10723                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10724                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10725                                                 }
10726                                         }
10727                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10728                                                 receiver_node_id,
10729                                                 payment_hash,
10730                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
10731                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10732                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10733                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10734                                         }, None));
10735                                 }
10736                         }
10737                 }
10738
10739                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10740                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10741                                 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10742                                         for action in actions.iter() {
10743                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10744                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10745                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10746                                                 } = action {
10747                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10748                                                                 log_trace!(args.logger,
10749                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10750                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10751                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10752                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10753                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10754                                                         } else {
10755                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10756                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10757                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10758                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10759                                                                 // anymore.
10760                                                         }
10761                                                 }
10762                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10763                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10764                                                 }
10765                                         }
10766                                 }
10767                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10768                         } else {
10769                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10770                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10771                         }
10772                 }
10773
10774                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10775                         chain_hash,
10776                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10777                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10778                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10779                         router: args.router,
10780
10781                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10782
10783                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10784                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10785                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10786                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10787
10788                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10789                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10790                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10791                         id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10792                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10793                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10794
10795                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10796
10797                         our_network_pubkey,
10798                         secp_ctx,
10799
10800                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10801
10802                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10803
10804                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10805                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10806                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10807                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10808                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10809
10810                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10811                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10812
10813                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10814
10815                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10816
10817                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10818                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
10819                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10820
10821                         logger: args.logger,
10822                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
10823                 };
10824
10825                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10826                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10827                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10828                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10829                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10830                 }
10831
10832                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10833                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10834                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10835                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10836                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10837                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10838                 }
10839
10840                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10841                 //connection or two.
10842
10843                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10844         }
10845 }
10846
10847 #[cfg(test)]
10848 mod tests {
10849         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10850         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10851         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10852         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10853         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10854         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10855         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10856         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10857         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10858         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10859         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10860         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10861         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10862         use crate::util::test_utils;
10863         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10864         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10865
10866         #[test]
10867         fn test_notify_limits() {
10868                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10869                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10870                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10871                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10872                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10873                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10874
10875                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10876                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10878                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10879                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10880
10881                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10882
10883                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10884                 // to connect messages with new values
10885                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10886                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10887                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10888                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10889                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10890                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10891
10892                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10893                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10894                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10895                 // ... but the last node should not.
10896                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10897                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10898                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10899                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10900
10901                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10902                 // about the channel.
10903                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10904                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10905                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10906
10907                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10908                 // parties.
10909                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10910                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10911                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10912                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10913                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10914                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10915
10916                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10917                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10918                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10919
10920                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10921                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10922                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10923                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10924                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10925                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10926
10927                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10928                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10929                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10930                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10931                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10932                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10933                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10934                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10935
10936                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10937                 // the channel info has updated.
10938                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10939                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10940                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10941                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10942                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10943                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10944         }
10945
10946         #[test]
10947         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10948                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10949                 // expected.
10950                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10951                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10952                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10953                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10954                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10955
10956                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10957                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10958                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10959                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10960
10961                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10962                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10963                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10964                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10965                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10966                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10967                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10968                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10969                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10970                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10971                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10972                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10973
10974                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10975                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10976                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10977                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10978                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10979                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10980                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10981                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10982                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10983                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10984                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10985                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10986                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10987                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10988                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10989                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10990                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10991                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10992                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10993                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10994                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10995                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10996                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10997
10998                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10999                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11000                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11001                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11002                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11003                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11004                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11005
11006                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11007                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11008                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11009                 // lightning messages manually.
11010                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11011                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11012                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11013
11014                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11015                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11016                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11017                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11018                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11019                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11020                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11021                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11022                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11023                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11024                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11025                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11026                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11027                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11028                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11029                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11030                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11031                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11032                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11033                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11034                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11035                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11036                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11037                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11038                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11039                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11040
11041                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11042                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11043                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11044                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11045                 match events[0] {
11046                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11047                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11048                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11049                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11050                         },
11051                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11052                 }
11053                 match events[1] {
11054                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11055                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11056                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11057                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11058                         },
11059                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11060                 }
11061         }
11062
11063         #[test]
11064         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11065                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11066                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11067         }
11068
11069         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11070                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11071                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11072                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11073                 //      fails as expected.
11074                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11075                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11076                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11077                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11078                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11079                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11080                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11081                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11082                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11083                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11084                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11085                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11086                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11087                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11088                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11089
11090                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11091                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11092                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11093
11094                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11095                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11096                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11097                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11098                 let route = find_route(
11099                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11100                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11101                 ).unwrap();
11102                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11103                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11104                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11105                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11106                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11107                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11108                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11109                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11110                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11111                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11112                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11113                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11114                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11115                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11116                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11117                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11118                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11119                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11120                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11121                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11122                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11123                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11124                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11125                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11126
11127                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11128                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11129
11130                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11131                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11132                 let route = find_route(
11133                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11134                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11135                 ).unwrap();
11136                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11137                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11138                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11139                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11140                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11141                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11142                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11143                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11144
11145                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11146                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11147                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11148                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11149                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11150                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11151                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11152                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11153                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11154                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11155                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11156                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11157                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11158                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11159                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11160                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11161                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11162                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11163                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11164                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11165                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11166                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11167                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11168                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11169
11170                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11171                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11172
11173                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11174                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11175                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11176                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11177                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11178                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11179                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11180                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11181                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11182                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11183
11184                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11185                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11186                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11187                         100_000
11188                 );
11189                 let route = find_route(
11190                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11191                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11192                 ).unwrap();
11193                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11194                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11195                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11196                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11197                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11198                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11199                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11200                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11201                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11202                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11203                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11204                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11205                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11206                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11207                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11208                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11209                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11210                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11211                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11212                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11213                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11214                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11215                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11216
11217                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11218                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11219         }
11220
11221         #[test]
11222         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11223                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11224                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11225                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11226                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11227                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11228                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11229
11230                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11231                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11232
11233                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11234                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11235                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11236                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11237                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11238                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11239                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11240                 let route = find_route(
11241                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11242                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11243                 ).unwrap();
11244
11245                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11246                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11247                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11248                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11249                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11250                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11251                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11252
11253                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11254                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11255                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11256                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11257                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11258                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11259                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11260
11261                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11262         }
11263
11264         #[test]
11265         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11266                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11267                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11268                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11269                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11270                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11271                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11272                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11273                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11274
11275                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11276                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11277
11278                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11279                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11280                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11281                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11282                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11283                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11284                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11285                 let route = find_route(
11286                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11287                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11288                 ).unwrap();
11289
11290                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11291                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11292                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11293                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11294                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11295                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11296                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11297                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11298                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11299
11300                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11301                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11302                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11303                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11304                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11305                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11306                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11307
11308                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11309         }
11310
11311         #[test]
11312         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11313                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11314                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11315                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11316                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11317
11318                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11319                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11320                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11321                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11322
11323                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11324                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11325                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11326                 route.paths.push(path);
11327                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11328                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11329                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11330                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11331                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11332                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11333
11334                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11335                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11336                 .unwrap_err() {
11337                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11338                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11339                         },
11340                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11341                 }
11342         }
11343
11344         #[test]
11345         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11346                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11347                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11348                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11349                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11350
11351                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11352
11353                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11354                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11355
11356                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11357                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11358                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11359                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11360
11361                 {
11362                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11363                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11364                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11365                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11366                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11367                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11368                 }
11369
11370                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11371
11372                 {
11373                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11374                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11375                 }
11376         }
11377
11378         #[test]
11379         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11380                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11381                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11382                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11383                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11384                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11385
11386                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11387                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11388                         payment_secret,
11389                         total_msat: 100_000,
11390                 };
11391
11392                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11393                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11394                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11395                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11396                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11397                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11398                         Err(()) => {
11399                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11400                         }
11401                 }
11402
11403                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11404                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11405         }
11406
11407         #[test]
11408         fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11409                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11410                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11411                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11412                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11413                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11414                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11415                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11416
11417                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11418                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11419                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11420                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11421                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11422
11423                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11424                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11425                 {
11426                         // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11427                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11428                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11429                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11430                 }
11431
11432                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11433                 {
11434                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11435                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11436                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11437                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11438                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11439                 }
11440
11441                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11442
11443                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11444
11445                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11446                 {
11447                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11448                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11449                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11450                 }
11451                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11452
11453                 {
11454                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11455                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11456                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11457                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11458                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11459                 }
11460                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11461                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11462                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11463                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11464                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11465                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11466                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11467                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11468
11469                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11470                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11471                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11472                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11473
11474                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11475                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11476                 {
11477                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11478                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11479                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11480                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11481                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11482                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11483                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11484                 }
11485
11486                 {
11487                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11488                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11489                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11490                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11491                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11492                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11493                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11494                 }
11495
11496                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11497                 {
11498                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11499                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11500                         // closing transaction).
11501                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11502                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11503                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11504
11505                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11506                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11507                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11508                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11509                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11510                 }
11511
11512                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11513
11514                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11515                 {
11516                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11517                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11518                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11519                 }
11520                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11521
11522                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11523                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11524         }
11525
11526         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11527                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11528                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11529         }
11530
11531         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11532                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11533                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11534         }
11535
11536         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11537                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11538                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11539         }
11540
11541         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11542                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11543                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11544         }
11545
11546         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11547                 match res_err {
11548                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11549                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11550                         },
11551                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11552                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11553                         },
11554                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11555                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11556                 }
11557         }
11558
11559         #[test]
11560         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11561                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11562                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11563                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11564                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11565                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11566                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11567                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11568
11569                 // Dummy values
11570                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11571                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11572                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11573
11574                 // Test the API functions.
11575                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11576
11577                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11578
11579                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11580
11581                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11582
11583                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11584
11585                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11586
11587                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11588         }
11589
11590         #[test]
11591         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11592                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11593                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11594                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11595                 // the given `channel_id`.
11596                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11597                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11598                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11599                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11600
11601                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11602
11603                 // Dummy values
11604                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11605
11606                 // Test the API functions.
11607                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11608
11609                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11610
11611                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11612
11613                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11614
11615                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11616
11617                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11618         }
11619
11620         #[test]
11621         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11622                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11623                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11624                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11625                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11626                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11627
11628                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11629
11630                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11631                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11632
11633                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11634                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11635                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11636                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11637
11638                         if idx == 0 {
11639                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11640                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11641                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11642                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11643                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11644
11645                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11646                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11647                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11648
11649                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11650
11651                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11652                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11653                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11654                         }
11655                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11656                 }
11657
11658                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11659                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11660                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11661                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11662                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11663
11664                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11665                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11666                 // limit.
11667                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11668                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11669                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11670                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11671                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11672                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11673                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11674                         }, true).unwrap();
11675                 }
11676                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11677                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11678                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11679                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11680                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11681
11682                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11683                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11684                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11685                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11686                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11687                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11688                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11689                 }
11690                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11691                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11692                 }, true).unwrap();
11693                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11694                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11695                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11696
11697                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11698                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11699                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11700                 }, false).unwrap();
11701                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11702
11703                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11704                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11705                 // open channels.
11706                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11707                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11708                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11709                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11710                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11711                 }
11712                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11713                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11714                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11715
11716                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11717                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11718                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11719
11720                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11721                 // "protected" and can connect again.
11722                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11723                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11724                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11725                 }, true).unwrap();
11726                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11727
11728                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11729                 // last_random_pk.
11730                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11731                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11732         }
11733
11734         #[test]
11735         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11736                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11737                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11738                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11739                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11740                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11741
11742                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11743
11744                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11745                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11746
11747                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11748                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11749                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11750                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11751                 }
11752
11753                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11754                 // rejected.
11755                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11756                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11757                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11758
11759                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11760                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11761                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11762
11763                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11764                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11765                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11766                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11767         }
11768
11769         #[test]
11770         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11771                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11772                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11773                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11774                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11775                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11776                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11777                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11778                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11779
11780                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11781
11782                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11783                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11784
11785                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11786                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11787                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11788                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11789                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11790                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11791                         }, true).unwrap();
11792
11793                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11794                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11795                         match events[0] {
11796                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11797                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11798                                 }
11799                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11800                         }
11801                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11802                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11803                 }
11804
11805                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11806                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11807                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11808                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11809                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11810                 }, true).unwrap();
11811                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11812                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11813                 match events[0] {
11814                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11815                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11816                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11817                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11818                                         _ => panic!(),
11819                                 }
11820                         }
11821                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11822                 }
11823                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11824                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11825
11826                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11827                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11828                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11829                 match events[0] {
11830                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11831                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11832                         }
11833                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11834                 }
11835                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11836         }
11837
11838         #[test]
11839         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11840                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11841                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11842                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11843                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11844                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11845                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11846                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11847                         amt_msat: 100,
11848                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11849                         payment_metadata: None,
11850                         keysend_preimage: None,
11851                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11852                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11853                         }),
11854                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11855                 };
11856                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11857                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11858                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11859                         node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11860                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11861                 {
11862                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11863                 } else { panic!(); }
11864
11865                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11866                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11867                         amt_msat: 100,
11868                         outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11869                         payment_metadata: None,
11870                         keysend_preimage: None,
11871                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11872                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11873                         }),
11874                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11875                 };
11876                 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11877                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11878         }
11879
11880         #[test]
11881         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11882                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11883                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11884                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11885                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11886
11887                 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11888                         amt_msat: 100,
11889                         outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11890                         payment_metadata: None,
11891                         keysend_preimage: None,
11892                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11893                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11894                         }),
11895                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11896                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11897
11898                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11899                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11900                 // is not satisfied.
11901                 assert!(result.is_ok());
11902         }
11903
11904         #[test]
11905         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11906                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11907                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11908                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11909                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11910
11911                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11912                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11913
11914                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11915                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11916                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11917                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11918                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11919
11920                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11921                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11922
11923                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11924                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11925                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11926                 match &msg_events[0] {
11927                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11928                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11929                                 match action {
11930                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11931                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11932                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11933                                 }
11934                         }
11935                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11936                 }
11937
11938                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11939                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11940                 match events[0] {
11941                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11942                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11943                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11944                 }
11945                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11946         }
11947
11948         #[test]
11949         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11950                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11951                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11952                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11953                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11954                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11955                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11956                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11957                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11958                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11959                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11960
11961                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11962                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11963                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11964
11965                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11966                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11967                 match events[0] {
11968                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11969                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11970                         }
11971                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11972                 }
11973
11974                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11975                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11976
11977                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11978                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11979
11980                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11981                 // not have generated any events.
11982                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11983         }
11984
11985         #[test]
11986         fn test_update_channel_config() {
11987                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11988                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11989                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11990                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11991                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11992                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11993                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11994
11995                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11996                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11997                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11998
11999                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12000                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12001                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12002                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12003                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12004                 match &events[0] {
12005                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12006                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12007                 }
12008
12009                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12010                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12011                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12012
12013                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12014                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12015                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12016                         ..Default::default()
12017                 }).unwrap();
12018                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12019                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12020                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12021                 match &events[0] {
12022                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12023                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12024                 }
12025
12026                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12027                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12028                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12029                         ..Default::default()
12030                 }).unwrap();
12031                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12032                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12033                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12034                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12035                 match &events[0] {
12036                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12037                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12038                 }
12039
12040                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12041                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12042                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12043                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12044                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12045                 assert!(
12046                         matches!(
12047                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12048                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12049                                         ..Default::default()
12050                                 }),
12051                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12052                         )
12053                 );
12054                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12055                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12056                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12057                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12058         }
12059
12060         #[test]
12061         fn test_payment_display() {
12062                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12063                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12064                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12065                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12066                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12067                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12068         }
12069
12070         #[test]
12071         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12072                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12073                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12074                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12075                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12076                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12077
12078                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12079                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12080                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12081                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12082                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12083                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12084                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12085                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12086                 {
12087                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12088                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12089                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12090                 }
12091
12092                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12093                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12094                 // their side.
12095                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12096                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12097                 }, true).unwrap();
12098                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12099                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12100                 }, false).unwrap();
12101                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12102                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12103                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12104                 );
12105                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12106
12107                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12108                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12109                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12110                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12111                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12112                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12113                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12114                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12115                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12116                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12117                 } else { panic!() };
12118                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12119                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12120                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12121                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12122                 };
12123                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12124                 {
12125                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12126                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12127                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12128                 }
12129         }
12130 }
12131
12132 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12133 pub mod bench {
12134         use crate::chain::Listen;
12135         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12136         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12137         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12138         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12139         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12140         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12141         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12142         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12143         use crate::util::test_utils;
12144         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12145
12146         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12147         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12148         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12149
12150         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12151
12152         use criterion::Criterion;
12153
12154         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12155                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12156                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12157                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12158                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12159                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12160                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12161
12162         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12163                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12164         }
12165         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12166                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12167                 #[inline]
12168                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12169                 #[inline]
12170                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12171         }
12172
12173         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12174                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12175         }
12176
12177         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12178                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12179                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12180                 // calls per node.
12181                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12182                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12183
12184                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12185                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12186                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12187                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12188                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12189
12190                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12191                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12192                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12193
12194                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12195                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12196                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12197                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12198                         network,
12199                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12200                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12201                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12202
12203                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12204                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12205                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12206                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12207                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12208                         network,
12209                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12210                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12211                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12212
12213                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12214                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12215                 }, true).unwrap();
12216                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12217                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12218                 }, false).unwrap();
12219                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12220                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12221                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12222
12223                 let tx;
12224                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12225                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12226                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12227                         }]};
12228                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12229                 } else { panic!(); }
12230
12231                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12232                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12233                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12234                 match events_b[0] {
12235                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12236                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12237                         },
12238                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12239                 }
12240
12241                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12242                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12243                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12244                 match events_a[0] {
12245                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12246                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12247                         },
12248                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12249                 }
12250
12251                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12252
12253                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12254                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12255                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12256
12257                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12258                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12259                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12260                 match msg_events[0] {
12261                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12262                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12263                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12264                         },
12265                         _ => panic!(),
12266                 }
12267                 match msg_events[1] {
12268                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12269                         _ => panic!(),
12270                 }
12271
12272                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12273                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12274                 match events_a[0] {
12275                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12276                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12277                         },
12278                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12279                 }
12280
12281                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12282                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12283                 match events_b[0] {
12284                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12285                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12286                         },
12287                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12288                 }
12289
12290                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12291                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12292                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12293                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12294                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12295                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12296                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12297                                 payment_count += 1;
12298                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12299                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12300
12301                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12302                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12303                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12304                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12305                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12306                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12307                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12308                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12309                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12310                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12311                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12312
12313                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12314                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12315                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12316                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12317
12318                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12319                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12320                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12321                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12322                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12323                                         },
12324                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12325                                 }
12326
12327                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12328                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12329                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12330                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12331
12332                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12333                         }
12334                 }
12335
12336                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12337                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12338                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12339                 }));
12340         }
12341 }