1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 use alloc::string::ToString;
75 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
76 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
79 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
80 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
81 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
83 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
84 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
85 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
86 use util::logger::Logger;
88 use core::convert::TryInto;
91 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
92 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
94 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
95 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
96 // retrieve said payment type bits.
97 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
99 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
100 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
102 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
103 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
104 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
105 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
106 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
107 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
108 /// registered with LDK.
109 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
110 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
111 /// registered with LDK.
112 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
116 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
117 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
118 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
133 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
135 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
136 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
137 unknown => Err(unknown),
142 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
143 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
145 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
147 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
148 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
149 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
151 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
152 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
153 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
154 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
156 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
157 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
158 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
161 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
162 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
164 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
165 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
166 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
167 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
169 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
170 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
172 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
175 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
176 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
180 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
181 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
182 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
184 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
186 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
187 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
188 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
189 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
190 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
191 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
193 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
194 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
195 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
200 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
201 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
202 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
203 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
205 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
206 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
207 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
209 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
212 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
214 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
215 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
218 /// The metadata is constructed as:
219 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
220 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
222 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
223 /// match what was constructed.
225 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
226 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
227 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
228 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
230 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
231 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
232 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
235 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
236 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
237 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
239 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
241 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
242 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
244 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
245 where L::Target: Logger
247 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
249 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
250 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
251 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
252 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
253 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
254 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
255 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
257 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
259 let mut payment_preimage = None;
260 match payment_type_res {
261 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
262 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
263 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
264 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
265 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
266 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
270 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
271 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
272 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
273 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
274 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
279 Err(unknown_bits) => {
280 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
285 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
290 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
291 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
298 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
299 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
301 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
302 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
303 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
304 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
305 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
308 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
309 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
311 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
315 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
316 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
317 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
318 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
320 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
321 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
322 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
323 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
326 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
329 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
331 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
332 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
333 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
334 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
335 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
336 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
337 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
339 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
343 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
345 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
346 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
347 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
349 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
350 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
351 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
352 // before we forward it.
354 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
355 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
356 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
357 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
358 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
360 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
361 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
363 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
364 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
367 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
368 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
369 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
372 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
373 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
377 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
378 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
379 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
380 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
381 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
382 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
383 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
386 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
387 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
388 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
389 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
392 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
393 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
394 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
395 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
396 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
399 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
401 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
403 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
404 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
405 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
407 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
409 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
413 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
417 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
418 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
419 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
420 short_channel_id: u64,
422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
423 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
425 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
426 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
431 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
432 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
433 /// are part of the same payment.
434 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
435 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
436 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
439 struct ClaimableHTLC {
440 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
443 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
446 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
447 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
448 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
449 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
451 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
452 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
457 impl Readable for PaymentId {
458 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
459 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
463 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
464 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
465 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
466 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
467 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
470 session_priv: SecretKey,
471 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
472 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
473 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
474 payment_id: PaymentId,
475 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
476 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
479 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
480 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
481 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
483 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
485 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
487 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
490 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
491 payment_id.hash(hasher);
492 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
493 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
494 payment_params.hash(hasher);
501 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
504 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
505 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
506 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
507 payment_secret: None,
508 payment_params: None,
513 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
514 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
516 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
524 struct ReceiveError {
530 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
531 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
533 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
538 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
540 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
541 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
542 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
543 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
544 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
546 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
547 err: msgs::LightningError,
548 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
549 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
551 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
553 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
555 err: LightningError {
557 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
558 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
565 shutdown_finish: None,
569 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
571 err: LightningError {
573 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
576 shutdown_finish: None,
580 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
581 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
584 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
586 err: LightningError {
588 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
589 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
595 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
596 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
600 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
603 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
605 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
606 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
610 log_level: Level::Warn,
613 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
617 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
620 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
626 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
629 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
637 shutdown_finish: None,
642 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
643 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
644 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
645 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
646 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
648 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
649 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
650 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
651 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
652 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
653 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
654 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
656 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
660 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
661 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
662 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
663 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
664 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
665 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
666 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
667 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
668 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
669 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
670 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
671 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
673 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
674 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
675 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
676 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
679 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
680 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
681 /// quite some time lag.
682 enum BackgroundEvent {
683 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
684 /// commitment transaction.
685 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
688 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
689 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
691 latest_features: InitFeatures,
694 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
695 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
697 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
700 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
701 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
702 struct PendingInboundPayment {
703 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
704 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
705 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
706 /// this payment being removed.
708 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
709 user_payment_id: u64,
710 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
711 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
712 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
715 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
716 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
717 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
719 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
722 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
723 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
724 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
725 pending_amt_msat: u64,
726 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
727 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
728 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
730 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
731 starting_block_height: u32,
733 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
734 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
735 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
737 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
738 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
740 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
741 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
742 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
743 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
744 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
746 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
748 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
749 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
753 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
754 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
756 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
760 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
762 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
766 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
768 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
772 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
774 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
779 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
781 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
782 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
783 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
784 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
788 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
789 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
790 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
797 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
798 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
801 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
802 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
803 let our_payment_hash;
804 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
805 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
806 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
808 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
809 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
810 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
814 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
818 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
819 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
820 let remove_res = match self {
821 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
822 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
823 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
824 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
825 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
829 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
830 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
831 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
832 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
833 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
834 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
841 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
842 let insert_res = match self {
843 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
844 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
845 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
847 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
848 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
851 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
852 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
853 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
854 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
855 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
862 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
864 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
865 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
866 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
867 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
874 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
875 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
876 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
877 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
878 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
879 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
880 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
881 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
883 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
884 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
885 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
886 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
887 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
888 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
889 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
890 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
891 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
893 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
894 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
896 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
897 /// to individual Channels.
899 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
900 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
901 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
902 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
904 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
905 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
906 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
907 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
908 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
909 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
910 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
912 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
913 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
914 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
915 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
918 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
919 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
920 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
921 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
922 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
924 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
925 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
926 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
927 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
928 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
929 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
930 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
931 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
932 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
933 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
936 default_configuration: UserConfig,
937 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
943 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
945 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
946 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
948 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
949 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
950 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
951 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
953 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
954 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
955 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
956 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
957 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
958 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
960 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
961 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
962 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
963 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
964 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
965 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
966 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
967 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
969 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
971 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
972 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
974 our_network_key: SecretKey,
975 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
977 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
979 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
980 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
981 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
983 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
984 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
986 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
987 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
988 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
990 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
991 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
992 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
993 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
995 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
996 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
997 /// are currently open with that peer.
998 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
999 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1002 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1003 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1005 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1006 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1007 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1008 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1009 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1010 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1011 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1012 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1013 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1015 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1022 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1024 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1025 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1026 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1027 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1028 pub struct ChainParameters {
1029 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1030 pub network: Network,
1032 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1034 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1035 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1038 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1044 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1045 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1046 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1047 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1048 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1049 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1051 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1052 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1053 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1054 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1055 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1057 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1058 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1061 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1062 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1063 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1066 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1067 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1069 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1070 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1071 should_persist: persist_check,
1072 _read_guard: read_guard,
1077 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1078 fn drop(&mut self) {
1079 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1080 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1085 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1086 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1088 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1090 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1091 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1092 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1093 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1094 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1096 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1097 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1099 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1101 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1102 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1103 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1104 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1105 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1106 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1107 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1109 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1110 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1112 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1113 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1114 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1115 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1117 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1118 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1119 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1120 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1121 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1122 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1125 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1127 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1128 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1131 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1133 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1134 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1135 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1137 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1138 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1139 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1140 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1141 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1142 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1143 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1144 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1145 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1146 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1147 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1150 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1151 /// to better separate parameters.
1152 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1153 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1154 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1155 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1156 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1157 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1158 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1159 pub features: InitFeatures,
1160 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1161 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1162 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1164 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1166 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1167 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1168 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1169 /// payments to us through this channel.
1170 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1173 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1175 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1176 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1177 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1178 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1179 /// lifetime of the channel.
1180 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1181 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1182 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1183 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1184 /// our counterparty already.
1186 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1187 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1188 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1189 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1190 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1191 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1192 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1193 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1194 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1195 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1196 /// this value on chain.
1198 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1200 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1202 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1203 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1204 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1205 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1206 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1207 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1208 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1210 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1211 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1212 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1213 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1215 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1216 pub balance_msat: u64,
1217 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1218 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1219 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1220 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1222 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1224 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1225 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1226 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1227 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1228 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1229 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1230 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1231 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1232 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1234 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1235 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1236 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1237 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1238 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1239 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1240 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1241 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1242 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1244 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1246 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1247 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1248 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1249 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1250 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1251 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1252 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1253 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1254 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1256 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1257 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1258 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1259 pub is_outbound: bool,
1260 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1261 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1262 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1263 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1264 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1266 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1267 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1268 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1269 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1271 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1272 pub is_usable: bool,
1273 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1274 pub is_public: bool,
1277 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1278 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1279 /// states for more.
1280 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1281 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1282 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1283 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1284 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1285 ParameterError(APIError),
1286 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1287 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1288 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1289 /// payment in full.
1291 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1293 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1294 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1295 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1296 /// paths than the ones selected).
1297 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1298 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1299 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1300 /// in over-/re-payment.
1302 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1303 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1304 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1306 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1307 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1308 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1309 /// with the latest update_id.
1311 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1312 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1313 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1314 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1315 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1316 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1317 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1318 payment_id: PaymentId,
1322 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1324 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1326 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1327 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1328 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1329 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1331 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1332 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1333 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1336 macro_rules! handle_error {
1337 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1340 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1341 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1343 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1344 // entering the macro.
1345 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1346 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1349 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1351 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1352 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1353 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1354 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1358 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1359 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1360 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1361 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1366 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1367 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1369 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1370 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1371 action: err.action.clone()
1375 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1376 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1379 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1386 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1387 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1388 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1390 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1391 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1393 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1394 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1396 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1397 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1398 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1399 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1401 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1402 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1403 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1405 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1406 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1407 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1408 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1410 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1411 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1412 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1418 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1419 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1423 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1425 $entry.remove_entry();
1433 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1434 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1438 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1440 $entry.remove_entry();
1448 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1449 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1451 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1452 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1453 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1460 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1463 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1464 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1465 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1466 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1468 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1469 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1470 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1471 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1472 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1473 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1474 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1475 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1476 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1477 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1478 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1481 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1482 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1483 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1484 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1485 match $action_type {
1486 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1487 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1489 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1490 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1492 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1493 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1494 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1495 if !$resend_commitment {
1496 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1499 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1501 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1502 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1506 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1507 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1509 $entry.remove_entry();
1513 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1514 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1515 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1517 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1518 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1520 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1521 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1523 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1524 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1528 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1529 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1530 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1532 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1533 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1537 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1538 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1539 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1540 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1541 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1544 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1549 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1550 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1551 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1552 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1553 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1554 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1556 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1557 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1559 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1560 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1561 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1562 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1565 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1566 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1567 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1568 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1569 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1570 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1571 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1572 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1573 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1574 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1575 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1576 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1579 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1580 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1581 // before it should be allowed to.
1582 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1583 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1584 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1587 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1589 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1590 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1591 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1596 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1597 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1598 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1599 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1600 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1601 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1602 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1603 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1604 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1605 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1606 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1607 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1608 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1609 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1610 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1611 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1612 let mut order = $order;
1614 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1616 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1620 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1621 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1622 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1623 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1628 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1629 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1630 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1631 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1632 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1637 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1641 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1646 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1647 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1648 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1653 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1654 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1655 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1656 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1657 assert!(res.is_ok());
1660 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1664 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1665 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1666 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1668 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1670 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1671 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1676 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1677 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1678 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1679 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1680 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1683 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1685 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1686 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1688 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1690 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1692 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1693 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1694 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1695 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1696 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1697 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1698 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1699 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1701 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1702 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1703 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1707 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1709 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1710 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1711 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1712 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1713 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1714 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1716 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1717 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1719 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1720 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1723 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1724 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1726 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1727 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1729 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1731 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1732 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1733 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1734 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1742 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1743 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1744 &self.default_configuration
1747 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1749 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1750 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1751 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1752 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1753 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1756 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1757 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1759 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1760 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1761 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1763 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1764 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1765 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1766 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1767 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1768 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1770 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1771 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1772 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1773 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1774 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1775 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1779 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1780 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1781 Some(peer_state) => {
1782 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1783 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1784 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1785 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1786 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1788 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1791 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1794 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1795 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1797 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1798 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1799 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1802 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1804 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1809 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1810 node_id: their_network_key,
1813 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1816 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1817 let mut res = Vec::new();
1819 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1820 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1821 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1822 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1823 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1824 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1825 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1826 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1827 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1828 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1829 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1830 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1831 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1832 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1834 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1835 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1836 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1837 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1839 inbound_capacity_msat,
1840 outbound_capacity_msat,
1841 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1842 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1843 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1844 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1845 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1846 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1847 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1852 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1853 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1854 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1860 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1861 /// more information.
1862 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1863 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1866 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1867 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1869 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1870 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1872 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1873 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1874 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1875 // really wanted anyway.
1876 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1879 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1880 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1881 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1882 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1883 Some(transaction) => {
1884 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1888 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1889 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1890 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1891 reason: closure_reason
1895 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1898 let counterparty_node_id;
1899 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1900 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1901 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1902 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1903 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1905 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1906 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1907 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1908 Some(peer_state) => {
1909 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1910 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1911 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1913 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1915 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1917 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1918 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1919 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1920 let (result, is_permanent) =
1921 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1923 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1929 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1930 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1934 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1935 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1936 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1937 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1941 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1949 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1953 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1957 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1958 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1959 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1961 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1964 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1965 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1966 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1967 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1969 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1971 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1972 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1973 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1974 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1975 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1978 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1979 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1980 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1982 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1983 /// the channel being closed or not:
1984 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1985 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1986 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1987 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1988 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1989 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1990 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1992 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1994 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1995 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1996 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1997 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1998 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2002 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2003 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2004 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2005 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2006 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2008 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2009 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2010 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2011 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2012 // ignore the result here.
2013 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2017 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2018 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2019 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2021 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2022 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2023 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2024 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2025 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2026 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2029 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2030 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2032 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2033 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2034 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2037 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2039 chan.remove_entry().1
2041 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2044 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2045 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2046 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2047 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2048 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2053 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2056 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2057 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2058 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2060 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2061 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2062 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2063 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2064 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2065 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2066 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2076 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2077 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2078 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2079 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2080 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2084 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2085 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2087 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2088 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2089 return Err(ReceiveError {
2090 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2092 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2095 // final_expiry_too_soon
2096 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2097 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2098 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2099 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2100 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2101 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2102 return Err(ReceiveError {
2104 err_data: Vec::new(),
2105 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2108 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2109 return Err(ReceiveError {
2111 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2112 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2116 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2117 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2118 return Err(ReceiveError {
2119 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2120 err_data: Vec::new(),
2121 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2124 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2125 return Err(ReceiveError {
2126 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2127 err_data: Vec::new(),
2128 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2131 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2132 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2133 return Err(ReceiveError {
2134 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2135 err_data: Vec::new(),
2136 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2138 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2139 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2141 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2142 phantom_shared_secret,
2144 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2145 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2146 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2147 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2148 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2149 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2150 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2151 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2152 return Err(ReceiveError {
2153 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2154 err_data: Vec::new(),
2155 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2159 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2161 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2164 return Err(ReceiveError {
2165 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2166 err_data: Vec::new(),
2167 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2172 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2175 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2176 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2177 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2181 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2182 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2183 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2185 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2186 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2187 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2188 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2189 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2190 failure_code: $err_code,
2191 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2196 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2197 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2200 let shared_secret = {
2201 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2202 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2206 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2207 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2208 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2209 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2210 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2211 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2212 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2213 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2216 let mut channel_state = None;
2217 macro_rules! return_err {
2218 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2220 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2221 if channel_state.is_none() {
2222 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2224 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2225 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2226 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2227 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2228 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2233 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2235 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2236 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2238 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2239 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2243 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2244 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2246 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2248 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2249 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2250 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2251 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2252 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2254 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2257 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2258 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2260 let blinding_factor = {
2261 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2262 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2263 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2264 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2267 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2269 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2271 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2274 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2275 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2278 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2279 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2280 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2281 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2282 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2286 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2287 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2288 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2291 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2292 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2293 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2294 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2299 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2300 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2301 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2302 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2303 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2304 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2305 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2306 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2307 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2308 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2309 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2311 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2314 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2317 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2319 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2320 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2321 // Leave channel updates as None for private channels.
2322 let chan_update_opt = if chan.should_announce() {
2323 Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap()) } else { None };
2324 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2325 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2326 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2327 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2328 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2331 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2332 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2333 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2334 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2335 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2336 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2337 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2339 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2340 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2342 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2343 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2344 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2345 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2346 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2348 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2349 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2351 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2352 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2354 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2355 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2356 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2357 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2358 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2359 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2361 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2362 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2364 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2365 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2366 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2367 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2368 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2369 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2370 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2371 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2372 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2373 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2379 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2380 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2381 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2382 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2384 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2385 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2387 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2388 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2389 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2391 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2393 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2398 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2401 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2402 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2403 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2405 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2406 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2407 if !chan.should_announce() {
2408 return Err(LightningError {
2409 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2410 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2414 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2417 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2418 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2419 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2420 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2421 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2422 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2424 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2425 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2429 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2431 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2432 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2434 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2435 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2436 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2437 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2438 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2439 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2440 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2441 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2444 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2445 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2447 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2453 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2454 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2455 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2456 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2457 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2458 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2460 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2461 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2462 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2463 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2464 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2466 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2468 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2470 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2471 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2473 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2474 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2475 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2476 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2477 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2478 err: "Payment already completed"
2483 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2484 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2485 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2488 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2490 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2491 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2492 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2493 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2494 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2495 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2496 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2497 total_msat: total_value,
2499 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2504 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2506 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2507 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2509 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2510 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2512 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2513 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2515 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2516 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2518 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2519 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2520 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2521 channel_state, chan)
2523 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2524 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2525 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2526 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2527 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2528 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2529 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2530 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2531 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2532 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2534 insert_outbound_payment!();
2536 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2537 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2538 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2539 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2540 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2541 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2542 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2543 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2549 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2551 } else { unreachable!(); }
2555 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2556 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2558 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2563 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2565 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2566 /// fields for more info.
2568 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2569 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2570 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2571 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2572 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2573 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2575 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2577 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2578 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2579 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2581 /// In general, a path may raise:
2582 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2583 /// node public key) is specified.
2584 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2585 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2587 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2588 /// relevant updates.
2590 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2591 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2592 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2594 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2595 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2596 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2597 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2599 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2600 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2601 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2602 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2603 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2606 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2607 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2608 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2610 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2611 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2612 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2613 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2614 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2616 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2617 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2619 let mut total_value = 0;
2620 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2621 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2622 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2623 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2624 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2625 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2626 continue 'path_check;
2628 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2629 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2630 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2631 continue 'path_check;
2634 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2635 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2637 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2638 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2640 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2641 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2642 total_value = amt_msat;
2645 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2646 let mut results = Vec::new();
2647 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2648 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2650 let mut has_ok = false;
2651 let mut has_err = false;
2652 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2653 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2654 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2655 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2656 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2657 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2658 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2662 } else if res.is_err() {
2663 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2664 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2667 if has_err && has_ok {
2668 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2671 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2672 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2673 Some(RouteParameters {
2674 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2675 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2676 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2682 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2683 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2684 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2685 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2691 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2693 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2694 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2695 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2696 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2697 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2699 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2700 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2701 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2702 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2703 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2704 if path.len() == 0 {
2705 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2706 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2711 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2712 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2713 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2715 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2716 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2718 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2719 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2720 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2721 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2724 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2726 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2727 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2728 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2731 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2732 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2733 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2736 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2737 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2738 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2743 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2744 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2748 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2751 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2753 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2754 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2755 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2756 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2758 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2759 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2760 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2762 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2763 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2764 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2765 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2766 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2768 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2769 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2770 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2771 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2772 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2774 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2782 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2783 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2784 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2785 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2786 /// never reach the recipient.
2788 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2790 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2791 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2793 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2795 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2796 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2797 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2799 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2801 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2802 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2803 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2808 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2809 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2810 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2811 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2813 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2815 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2817 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2818 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2819 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2820 } else { unreachable!(); })
2823 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2825 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2826 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2829 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2830 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2835 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2836 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2837 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2840 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2841 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2842 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2852 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2853 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2854 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2858 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2860 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2861 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2863 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2864 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2866 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2867 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2868 /// keys per-channel).
2870 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2871 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2872 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2874 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2875 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2876 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2878 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2879 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2880 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2881 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2883 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2884 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2885 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2886 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2890 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2891 let mut output_index = None;
2892 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2893 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2894 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2895 if output_index.is_some() {
2896 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2897 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2900 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2902 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2905 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2908 if output_index.is_none() {
2909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2910 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2913 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2918 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2919 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2920 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2922 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2925 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2926 // smaller than 500:
2927 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2929 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2930 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2931 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2932 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2933 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2934 /// our network addresses.
2936 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2937 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2939 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2940 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2941 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2942 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2944 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2946 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2947 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2950 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2951 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2954 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2955 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2956 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2958 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2959 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2960 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2961 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2962 rgb, alias, addresses,
2963 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2964 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2966 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2967 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2969 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2972 let mut announced_chans = false;
2973 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2974 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2975 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2977 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2982 announced_chans = true;
2984 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2985 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2986 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2990 if announced_chans {
2991 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2992 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2993 signature: node_announce_sig,
2994 contents: announcement
3000 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3002 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3003 /// Will likely generate further events.
3004 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3005 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3007 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3008 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3009 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3010 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3012 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3013 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3015 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3016 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3017 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3018 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3020 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3021 match forward_info {
3022 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3023 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3024 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3025 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3026 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3028 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3029 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3030 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3031 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3032 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3033 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3034 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3036 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3037 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3043 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3044 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3045 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3046 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3047 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3048 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3051 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3053 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3054 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3055 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3056 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3057 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3059 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3061 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3062 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3066 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3067 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3068 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3069 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3075 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3078 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3081 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3082 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3083 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3084 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3085 // problem, not ours.
3092 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3093 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3094 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3095 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3096 match forward_info {
3097 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3098 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3100 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3101 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3103 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3104 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3105 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3106 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3107 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3108 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3109 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3111 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3113 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3114 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3116 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3118 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3119 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3120 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3126 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3128 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3129 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3130 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3131 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3132 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3133 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3134 // this channel currently :/.
3140 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3141 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3143 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3145 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3147 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3150 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3152 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3153 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3154 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3157 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3159 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3160 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3161 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3162 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3163 // messages when we can.
3164 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3165 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3166 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3173 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3174 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3177 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3178 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3179 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3180 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3181 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3182 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3184 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3186 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3187 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3188 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3190 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3191 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3193 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3195 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3199 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3200 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3203 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3204 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3205 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3206 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3207 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3208 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3209 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3210 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3211 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3213 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3221 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3222 match forward_info {
3223 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3224 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3225 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3226 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3227 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3228 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3229 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3230 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3232 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3235 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3236 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3237 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3238 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3239 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3240 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3241 phantom_shared_secret,
3243 value: amt_to_forward,
3248 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3250 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3251 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3252 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3254 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3255 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3256 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3257 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3258 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3259 phantom_shared_secret,
3261 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3266 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3267 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3268 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3269 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3270 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3271 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3272 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3273 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3274 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3278 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3279 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3280 total_value += htlc.value;
3281 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3282 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3283 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3285 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3286 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3288 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3290 _ => unreachable!(),
3293 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3294 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3295 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3296 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3297 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3298 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3299 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3301 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3302 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3303 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3307 payment_received_generated = true;
3309 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3310 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3312 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3314 payment_received_generated
3318 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3319 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3320 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3321 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3322 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3323 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3324 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3325 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3327 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3328 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3329 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3330 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3332 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3336 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3337 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3338 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3340 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3341 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3342 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3343 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3344 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3346 amt: amt_to_forward,
3347 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3352 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3358 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3360 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3364 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3367 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3368 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3369 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3370 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3372 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3373 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3375 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3376 if payment_received_generated {
3377 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3383 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3384 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3392 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3393 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3395 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3397 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3398 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3401 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3402 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3403 events.append(&mut new_events);
3406 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3408 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3409 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3411 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3412 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3413 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3414 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3415 if background_events.is_empty() {
3419 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3421 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3422 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3423 // monitor updating completing.
3424 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3431 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3432 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3433 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3434 self.process_background_events();
3437 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3438 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3439 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3440 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3442 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3443 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3445 if !chan.is_live() {
3446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3447 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3448 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3450 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3451 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3453 let mut retain_channel = true;
3454 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3457 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3458 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3462 let ret_err = match res {
3463 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3464 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3465 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3466 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3469 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3470 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3471 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3472 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3473 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3474 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3475 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3476 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3486 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3490 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3491 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3492 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3493 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3494 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3495 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3496 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3498 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3500 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3502 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3504 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3505 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3506 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3507 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3508 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3510 handle_errors.push(err);
3520 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3522 /// This currently includes:
3523 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3524 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3525 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3528 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3529 /// estimate fetches.
3530 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3531 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3532 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3533 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3535 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3537 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3539 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3540 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3541 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3542 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3543 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3544 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3545 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3546 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3548 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3550 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3552 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3553 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3554 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3555 if needs_close { return false; }
3558 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3559 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3560 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3561 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3562 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3563 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3564 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3565 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3569 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3570 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3572 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3573 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3574 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3578 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3579 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3588 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3589 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3595 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3596 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3597 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3598 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3599 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3600 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3603 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3604 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3605 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3606 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3607 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3608 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3609 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3610 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3611 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3612 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3613 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3619 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3620 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3621 // be surfaced to the user.
3622 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3623 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3625 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3626 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3627 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3628 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3629 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3630 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3632 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3637 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3638 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3639 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3641 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3642 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3643 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3644 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3645 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3646 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3647 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3648 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3649 Some(RouteParameters {
3650 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3651 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3652 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3655 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3656 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3657 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3659 rejected_by_dest: false,
3660 network_update: None,
3661 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3663 short_channel_id: None,
3670 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3671 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3673 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3679 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3686 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3687 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3688 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3689 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3690 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3691 /// still-available channels.
3692 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3693 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3694 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3695 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3698 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3699 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3700 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3702 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3703 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3704 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3705 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3706 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3707 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3708 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3709 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3710 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3713 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3714 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3717 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3718 all_paths_failed = true;
3719 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3720 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3722 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3731 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3732 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3733 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3734 Some(RouteParameters {
3735 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3736 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3737 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3740 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3742 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3743 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3745 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3747 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3748 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3749 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3750 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3751 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3752 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3753 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3754 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3761 error_code: onion_error_code,
3763 error_data: onion_error_data
3766 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3772 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3773 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3774 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3775 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3777 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3778 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3779 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3780 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3781 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3782 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3783 network_update: None,
3786 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3789 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3791 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3795 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3796 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3797 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3799 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3800 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3801 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3802 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3803 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3804 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3805 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3806 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3808 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3809 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3812 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3813 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3814 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3818 let mut forward_event = None;
3819 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3820 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3822 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3824 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3827 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3830 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3831 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3832 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3833 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3834 time_forwardable: time
3841 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3842 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3844 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3845 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3846 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3847 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3849 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3850 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3852 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3853 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3854 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3855 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3856 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3857 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3861 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3862 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3863 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3864 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3866 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3867 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3868 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3869 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3871 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3872 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3873 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3874 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3875 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3877 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3878 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3879 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3885 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3886 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3887 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3889 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3890 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3891 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3892 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3894 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3895 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3897 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3898 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3899 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3900 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3901 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3902 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3903 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3904 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3906 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3907 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3908 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3909 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3910 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3911 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3913 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3918 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3919 // which were generated.
3920 channel_state.take();
3922 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3923 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3924 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3931 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3932 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3933 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3934 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3935 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3937 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3941 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3942 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3943 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3944 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3945 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3946 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3947 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3948 payment_preimage, e);
3949 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3950 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3951 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3952 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3955 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3956 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3957 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3959 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3960 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3961 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3962 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3963 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3964 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3970 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3972 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3975 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3976 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3977 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3978 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3979 payment_preimage, e);
3981 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3982 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3984 chan.remove_entry();
3986 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3989 } else { unreachable!(); }
3992 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3993 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3994 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3995 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3996 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3997 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3998 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3999 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4000 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4001 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4002 pending_events.push(
4003 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4005 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4010 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4018 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4020 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4021 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4022 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4023 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4024 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4025 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4026 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4027 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4028 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4029 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4030 pending_events.push(
4031 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4032 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4038 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4042 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4043 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4044 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4046 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4047 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4048 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4049 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4050 pending_events.push(
4051 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4059 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4067 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4068 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4069 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4070 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4071 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4072 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4073 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4076 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4077 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4078 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4079 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4080 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4083 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4084 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4085 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4086 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4087 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4088 payment_preimage, e);
4090 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4091 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4092 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4093 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4096 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4097 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4098 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4099 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4103 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4104 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4105 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4108 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4109 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4111 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4119 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4120 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4121 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4124 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4127 let chan_restoration_res;
4128 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4129 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4130 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4131 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4135 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4139 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4140 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4141 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4142 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4143 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4144 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4146 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4147 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4148 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4151 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4152 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4153 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4155 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4157 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4158 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4159 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4160 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4164 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4167 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4169 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: crate::util::events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4170 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4171 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4173 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4174 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4175 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4177 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4178 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4180 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4181 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4182 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(),
4185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4186 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4192 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4193 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4194 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4197 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4198 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4201 let mut channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4202 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4203 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4206 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4209 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4211 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4212 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
4215 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4216 pending_events.push(
4217 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4218 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4219 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4220 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4221 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4226 entry.insert(channel);
4232 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4233 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4234 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4236 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4238 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4241 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4242 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4247 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4248 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4249 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4250 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4252 user_channel_id: user_id,
4257 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4258 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4259 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4260 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4261 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4262 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4264 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4265 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4267 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4269 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4272 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4273 // lock before watch_channel
4274 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4276 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4277 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4278 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4279 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4280 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4281 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4282 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4283 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4284 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4285 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4288 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4289 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4290 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4291 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4292 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4293 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4297 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4298 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4299 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4304 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4305 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4314 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4316 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4317 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4319 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4321 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4322 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4324 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4325 Ok(update) => update,
4326 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4328 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4329 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4330 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4331 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4332 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4333 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4334 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4335 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4342 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4345 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4346 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4350 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4351 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4352 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4353 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4355 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4358 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4359 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4360 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4363 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4364 msg: announcement_sigs,
4366 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4367 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4368 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4369 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4370 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4371 // announcement_signatures.
4372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4374 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4375 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4380 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4384 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4385 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4386 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4387 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4388 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4390 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4391 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4392 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4393 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4396 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4397 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4398 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4399 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4402 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4403 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4405 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4406 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4407 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4408 let (result, is_permanent) =
4409 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4411 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4417 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4419 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4429 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4430 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4433 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4437 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4438 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4439 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4440 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4443 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4446 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4447 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4449 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4454 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4455 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4456 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4457 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4458 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4459 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4460 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4462 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4463 } else { (tx, None) }
4465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4468 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4469 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4470 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4472 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4473 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4474 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4475 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4479 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4484 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4485 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4486 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4487 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4489 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4490 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4491 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4492 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4494 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4495 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4497 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4499 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4500 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4503 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4504 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4505 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4506 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4507 match pending_forward_info {
4508 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4509 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4510 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4511 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4512 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4513 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4514 if error_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4515 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4517 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4521 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4522 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4523 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4524 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4525 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4526 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4527 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4528 // no problem just calling this
4529 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4530 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4533 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4535 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4536 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4537 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4540 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4542 _ => pending_forward_info
4545 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4552 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4553 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4554 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4556 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4558 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4561 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4566 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4570 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4571 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4572 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4573 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4574 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4575 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4576 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4578 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4585 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4586 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4587 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4588 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4589 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4590 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4591 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4593 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4594 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4595 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4597 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4604 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4606 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4607 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4608 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4609 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4610 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4612 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4613 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4614 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4615 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4616 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4617 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4618 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4623 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4624 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4626 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4627 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4628 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4630 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4631 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4632 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4633 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4634 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4635 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4636 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4637 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4639 commitment_signed: msg,
4645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4650 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4651 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4652 let mut forward_event = None;
4653 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4654 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4655 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4656 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4658 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4659 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4660 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4661 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4662 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4664 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4665 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4666 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4669 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4670 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4675 match forward_event {
4677 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4678 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4679 time_forwardable: time
4687 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4688 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4690 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4691 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4692 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4693 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4694 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4695 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4697 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4698 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4699 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4700 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4701 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4702 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4703 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4704 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4705 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4706 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4707 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4709 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4710 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4711 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4712 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4713 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4715 } else { unreachable!(); }
4718 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4719 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4720 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4724 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4725 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4726 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4727 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4728 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4733 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4735 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4736 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4738 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4739 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4741 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4742 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4749 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4750 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4751 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4752 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4754 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4755 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4757 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4764 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4765 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4766 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4768 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4770 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4771 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4773 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4777 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4778 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4779 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4780 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4781 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4782 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4790 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4791 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4792 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4793 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4794 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4795 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4797 // It's not a local channel
4798 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4801 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4803 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4804 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4805 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4806 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4807 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4808 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4812 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4813 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4814 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4815 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4817 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4822 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4825 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4826 let chan_restoration_res;
4827 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4833 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4836 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4837 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4838 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4839 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4840 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4841 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4842 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4843 let mut channel_update = None;
4844 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4845 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4846 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4849 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4850 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4851 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4852 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4853 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4854 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4855 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4858 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4859 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4860 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4861 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4862 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4865 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4870 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4871 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4873 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4874 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4879 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4880 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4881 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4882 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4883 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4884 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4885 match monitor_event {
4886 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4887 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4888 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4889 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4892 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4895 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4896 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4897 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4898 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4899 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4900 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4901 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4902 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4903 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4904 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4906 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4907 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4908 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4912 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4913 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4915 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4917 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4918 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4919 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4920 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4921 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4926 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4927 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4932 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4933 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4936 has_pending_monitor_events
4939 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4940 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4941 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4943 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4944 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4947 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4948 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4949 /// update was applied.
4951 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4952 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4953 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4954 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4955 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4956 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4957 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4958 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4962 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4963 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4964 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4966 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4967 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4968 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4969 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4970 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4972 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4973 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4974 has_monitor_update = true;
4975 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4976 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4977 if close_channel { return false; }
4979 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4980 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4981 updates: commitment_update,
4988 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4989 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4990 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4997 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4998 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4999 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5002 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5003 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5009 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5010 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5011 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5012 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5013 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5014 let mut has_update = false;
5016 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5018 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5019 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5020 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5022 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5023 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5024 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5025 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5027 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5028 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5031 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5032 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5033 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5034 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5035 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5038 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5039 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5044 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5046 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5047 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5053 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5054 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5061 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5062 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5068 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5069 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5071 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5072 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5073 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5074 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5075 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5076 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5077 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5078 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5079 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5080 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5081 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5082 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5083 assert!(should_broadcast);
5084 } else { unreachable!(); }
5085 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5087 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5091 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5092 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5094 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5095 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5098 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5100 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5101 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5102 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5104 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5105 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5106 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5107 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5108 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5109 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5110 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5111 // never fail a payment too early.
5112 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5114 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5122 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5125 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5126 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5128 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5129 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5130 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5132 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5134 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5135 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5139 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5140 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5142 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5144 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5145 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5146 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5147 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5148 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5149 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5152 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5153 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5156 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5158 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5160 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5161 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5162 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5163 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5164 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5167 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5168 /// stored external to LDK.
5170 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5171 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5172 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5174 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5175 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5178 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5179 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5180 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5181 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5183 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5184 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5185 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5186 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5187 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5189 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5190 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5191 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5192 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5193 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5195 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5197 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5198 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5200 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5201 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5205 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5206 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5208 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5210 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5211 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5212 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5213 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5216 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5217 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5220 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5222 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5224 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5225 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5228 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5229 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5231 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5232 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5233 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5236 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5237 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5239 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5240 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5241 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5242 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5244 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::get_phantom_scid(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.keys_manager);
5245 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5246 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5247 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5253 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5255 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5256 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5258 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5259 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5260 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5264 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5265 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5266 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5267 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5268 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5273 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5274 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5278 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5279 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5283 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5284 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5285 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5286 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5287 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5290 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5291 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5292 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5293 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5295 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5296 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5297 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5298 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5301 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5302 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5304 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5305 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5308 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5309 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5310 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5312 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5313 events.replace(pending_events);
5322 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5324 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5325 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5326 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5327 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5330 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5332 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5333 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5335 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5336 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5337 /// restarting from an old state.
5338 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5339 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5340 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5342 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5343 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5344 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5345 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5348 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5349 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5350 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5353 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5354 handler.handle_event(&event);
5362 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5364 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5365 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5366 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5367 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5370 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5372 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5373 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5374 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5375 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5376 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5379 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5380 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5381 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5384 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5386 let new_height = height - 1;
5388 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5389 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5390 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5391 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5392 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5393 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5396 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5400 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5402 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5403 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5404 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5405 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5408 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5409 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5410 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5411 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5413 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5414 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5417 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5418 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5421 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5422 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5423 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5424 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5426 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5427 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5431 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5433 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5435 macro_rules! max_time {
5436 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5438 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5439 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5440 // having an explicit local time source.
5441 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5442 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5443 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5444 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5445 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5451 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5452 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5453 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5454 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5455 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5458 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5459 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5460 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5461 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5462 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5463 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5464 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5465 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5466 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5474 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5475 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5476 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5477 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5478 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5479 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5485 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5487 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5488 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5489 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5490 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5491 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5492 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5497 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5499 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5500 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5501 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5502 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5505 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5506 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5508 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5509 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5510 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5511 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5512 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5514 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5515 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5517 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5518 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5519 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5520 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5521 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5522 let res = f(channel);
5523 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5524 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5525 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5526 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5527 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5531 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5532 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5533 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5534 msg: funding_locked,
5536 if channel.is_usable() {
5537 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5539 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5540 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5545 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5547 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5549 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5550 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5551 msg: announcement_sigs,
5553 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5554 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5555 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5557 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5558 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5559 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5564 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5565 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5566 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5568 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5569 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5570 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5571 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5576 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5577 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5578 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5579 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5580 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5581 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5582 data: reason_message,
5590 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5591 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5592 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5593 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5594 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5595 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5596 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5597 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5598 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5599 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5600 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5601 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5602 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5607 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5612 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5614 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5615 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5619 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5620 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5621 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5624 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5626 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5627 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5630 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5631 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5633 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5634 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5637 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5638 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5639 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5640 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5641 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5645 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5646 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5647 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5648 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5652 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5653 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5654 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5655 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5656 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5657 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5660 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5662 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5665 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5667 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5670 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5672 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5675 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5680 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5682 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5685 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5687 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5690 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5692 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5695 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5697 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5700 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5702 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5705 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5706 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5707 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5710 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5712 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5715 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5717 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5720 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5721 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5722 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5725 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5726 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5727 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5730 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5732 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5735 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5736 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5737 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5740 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5745 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5747 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5750 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5752 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5753 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5755 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5756 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5757 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5758 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5759 if no_connection_possible {
5760 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5761 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5762 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5763 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5764 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5766 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5767 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5772 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5779 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5780 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5781 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5782 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5783 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5784 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5785 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5787 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5790 no_channels_remain = false;
5796 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5798 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5799 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5800 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5801 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5802 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5804 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5806 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5809 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5810 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5811 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5813 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5815 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5820 if no_channels_remain {
5821 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5824 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5825 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5829 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5830 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5832 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5835 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5836 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5838 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5839 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5843 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5848 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5849 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5850 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5851 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5852 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5853 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5854 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5855 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5856 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5860 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5861 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5862 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5868 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5871 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5874 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5875 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5876 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5877 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5878 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5882 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5883 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5888 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5889 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5890 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5891 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5892 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5893 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5896 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5899 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5905 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5906 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5911 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5912 let result = *guard;
5920 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5921 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5922 let current_time = Instant::now();
5924 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5925 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5930 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5931 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5932 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5933 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5934 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5936 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5937 let result = *guard;
5938 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5942 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5943 None => return result,
5949 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5951 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5952 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5953 *persistence_lock = true;
5954 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5959 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5960 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5962 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5963 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5964 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5965 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5968 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5969 (2, node_id, required),
5970 (4, features, required),
5971 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5972 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5975 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5976 (2, channel_id, required),
5977 (4, counterparty, required),
5978 (6, funding_txo, option),
5979 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5980 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5981 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5982 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5983 (16, balance_msat, required),
5984 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5985 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5986 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5987 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5988 (26, is_outbound, required),
5989 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5990 (30, is_usable, required),
5991 (32, is_public, required),
5994 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5995 (2, channels, vec_type),
5996 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5997 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6000 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6002 (0, onion_packet, required),
6003 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6006 (0, payment_data, required),
6007 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6008 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6010 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6011 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6012 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6016 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6017 (0, routing, required),
6018 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6019 (4, payment_hash, required),
6020 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6021 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6025 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6026 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6028 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6030 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6031 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6032 reason.write(writer)?;
6034 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6035 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6038 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6039 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6040 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6041 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6048 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6049 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6050 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6053 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6054 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6055 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6056 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6060 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6061 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6062 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6063 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6064 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6067 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6068 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6069 // messages contained in the variants.
6070 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6071 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6072 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6074 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6075 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6076 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6077 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6078 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6081 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6082 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6083 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6084 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6085 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6087 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6092 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6097 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6098 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6099 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6100 (2, outpoint, required),
6101 (4, htlc_id, required),
6102 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6105 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6106 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6107 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6108 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6111 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6112 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6113 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6118 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6119 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6120 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6126 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6127 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6128 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6130 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6131 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6132 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6136 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6137 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6138 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6140 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6142 if payment_data.is_some() {
6143 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6145 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6148 if payment_data.is_none() {
6149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6151 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6155 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6163 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6164 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6165 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6168 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6169 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6170 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6171 let mut payment_id = None;
6172 let mut payment_secret = None;
6173 let mut payment_params = None;
6174 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6175 (0, session_priv, required),
6176 (1, payment_id, option),
6177 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6178 (3, payment_secret, option),
6179 (4, path, vec_type),
6180 (5, payment_params, option),
6182 if payment_id.is_none() {
6183 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6185 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6187 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6188 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6189 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6190 path: path.unwrap(),
6191 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6196 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6197 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6202 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6203 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6205 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6207 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6208 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6209 (0, session_priv, required),
6210 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6211 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6212 (3, payment_secret, option),
6213 (4, path, vec_type),
6214 (5, payment_params, option),
6217 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6219 field.write(writer)?;
6226 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6227 (0, LightningError) => {
6231 (0, failure_code, required),
6232 (2, data, vec_type),
6236 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6238 (0, forward_info, required),
6239 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6240 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6241 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6244 (0, htlc_id, required),
6245 (2, err_packet, required),
6249 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6250 (0, payment_secret, required),
6251 (2, expiry_time, required),
6252 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6253 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6254 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6257 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6259 (0, session_privs, required),
6262 (0, session_privs, required),
6263 (1, payment_hash, option),
6266 (0, session_privs, required),
6267 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6268 (2, payment_hash, required),
6269 (4, payment_secret, option),
6270 (6, total_msat, required),
6271 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6272 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6275 (0, session_privs, required),
6276 (2, payment_hash, required),
6280 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6281 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6282 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6283 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6284 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6287 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6288 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6290 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6292 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6294 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6295 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6296 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6299 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6300 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6301 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6302 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6303 unfunded_channels += 1;
6306 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6307 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6308 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6309 channel.write(writer)?;
6313 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6314 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6315 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6316 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6317 for forward in pending_forwards {
6318 forward.write(writer)?;
6322 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6323 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6324 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6325 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6326 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6327 htlc.write(writer)?;
6331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6332 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6333 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6334 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6335 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6336 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6339 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6340 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6341 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6342 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6343 for event in events.iter() {
6344 event.write(writer)?;
6347 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6348 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6349 for event in background_events.iter() {
6351 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6353 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6354 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6359 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6360 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6362 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6363 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6364 hash.write(writer)?;
6365 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6368 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6369 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6370 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6371 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6372 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6375 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6376 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6378 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6379 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6380 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6381 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6384 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6385 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6389 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6390 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6391 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6393 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6394 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6395 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6400 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6401 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6402 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6403 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6404 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6411 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6413 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6415 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6416 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6417 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6418 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6419 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6420 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6421 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6422 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6423 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6424 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6425 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6426 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6427 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6429 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6430 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6432 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6433 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6435 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6436 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6437 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6438 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6439 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6440 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6442 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6443 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6444 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6445 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6446 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6447 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6450 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6451 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6453 pub keys_manager: K,
6455 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6457 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6458 pub fee_estimator: F,
6459 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6461 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6462 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6463 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6464 pub chain_monitor: M,
6466 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6467 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6468 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6469 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6470 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6471 /// deserialization.
6473 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6474 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6475 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6477 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6478 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6480 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6481 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6482 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6483 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6485 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6488 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6489 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6492 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6493 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6494 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6495 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6496 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6497 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6500 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6501 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6502 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6503 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6504 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6506 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6507 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6512 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6513 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6514 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6515 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6516 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6517 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6518 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6519 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6522 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6523 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6524 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6528 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6529 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6530 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6531 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6532 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6533 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6536 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6537 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6539 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6540 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6541 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6543 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6545 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6546 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6547 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6548 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6549 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6550 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6551 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6552 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6553 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6554 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6555 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6556 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6557 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6558 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6559 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6560 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6561 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6562 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6563 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6564 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6565 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6566 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6567 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6568 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6569 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6570 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6571 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6572 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6573 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6574 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6575 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6576 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6577 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6578 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6579 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6580 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6581 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6582 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6583 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6586 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6587 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6588 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6590 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6593 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6594 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6595 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6596 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6597 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6602 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6603 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6604 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6605 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6609 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6610 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6611 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6612 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6613 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6614 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6615 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6616 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6617 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6619 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6622 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6623 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6624 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6625 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6626 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6627 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6628 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6629 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6631 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6634 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6635 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6636 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6637 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6638 let peer_state = PeerState {
6639 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6641 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6644 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6646 for _ in 0..event_count {
6647 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6648 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6652 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6653 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6654 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6655 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6656 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6657 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6658 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6659 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6663 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6665 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6666 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6667 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6668 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6672 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6673 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6675 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6677 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6678 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6679 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6683 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6685 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6686 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6687 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6688 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6689 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6691 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6692 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6696 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6697 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6698 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6699 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6700 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6701 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6702 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6703 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6704 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6705 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6707 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6708 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6711 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6712 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6713 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6714 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6715 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6716 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6718 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6720 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6721 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6722 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6723 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6724 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6725 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6726 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6728 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6729 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6730 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6731 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6732 if path.is_empty() {
6733 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6734 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6736 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6737 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6738 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6739 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6741 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6742 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6743 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6746 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6747 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6748 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6749 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6751 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6752 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6753 total_msat: path_amt,
6754 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6756 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6757 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6766 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6767 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6769 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6770 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6773 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6775 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6777 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6778 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6779 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6780 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6781 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6785 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6786 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6787 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6789 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6790 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6791 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6793 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6795 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6800 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6802 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6803 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6804 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6805 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6811 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6812 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6814 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6816 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6817 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6818 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6819 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6821 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6822 logger: args.logger,
6823 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6826 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6827 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6830 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6831 //connection or two.
6833 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6839 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6840 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6841 use core::time::Duration;
6842 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6843 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6844 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6845 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6846 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6847 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6849 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6850 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6851 use util::errors::APIError;
6852 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6853 use util::test_utils;
6855 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6857 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6858 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6860 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6863 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6864 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6866 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6867 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6868 thread::spawn(move || {
6870 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6871 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6872 *persistence_lock = true;
6875 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6881 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6882 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6884 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6887 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6892 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6894 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6897 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6904 fn test_notify_limits() {
6905 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6906 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6907 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6910 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6912 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6913 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6914 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6915 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6916 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6918 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6920 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6921 // to connect messages with new values
6922 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6923 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6924 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6925 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6927 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6928 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6929 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6930 // ... but the last node should not.
6931 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6932 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6933 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6934 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6936 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6937 // about the channel.
6938 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6939 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6940 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6942 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6944 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6945 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6946 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6947 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6948 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6949 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6951 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6952 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6953 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6955 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6956 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6957 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6958 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6959 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6960 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6962 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6963 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6964 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6965 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6966 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6967 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6968 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6969 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6971 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6972 // the channel info has updated.
6973 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6974 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6975 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6976 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6977 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6978 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6982 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6983 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6985 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6986 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6988 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6989 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6991 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6992 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6993 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6994 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6995 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6996 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6997 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6999 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7000 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7001 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7003 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7004 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7006 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7008 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7009 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7010 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7012 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7014 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7016 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7017 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7018 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7019 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7020 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7021 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7022 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7023 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7024 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7026 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7027 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7029 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7030 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7031 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7033 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7034 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7035 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7036 // lightning messages manually.
7037 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7039 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7040 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7041 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7043 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7044 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7046 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7047 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7049 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7050 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7051 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7054 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7055 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7057 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7059 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7061 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7062 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7065 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7066 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7067 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7070 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7071 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7072 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7073 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7078 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7079 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7080 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7081 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7086 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7087 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7088 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7089 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7096 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7097 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7098 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7099 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7100 // fails as expected.
7101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7104 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7105 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7106 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7108 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7109 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7110 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7112 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7113 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7114 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7115 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7116 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7118 let route = find_route(
7119 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7120 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7122 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7124 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7126 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7127 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7130 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7131 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7134 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7135 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7136 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7137 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7138 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7139 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7140 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7141 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7142 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7144 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7145 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7147 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7148 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7149 let route = find_route(
7150 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7151 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7153 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7155 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7156 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7157 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7158 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7159 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7161 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7162 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7163 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7165 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7166 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7167 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7168 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7169 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7172 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7173 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7175 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7176 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7177 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7178 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7179 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7180 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7181 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7182 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7183 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7185 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7186 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7190 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7191 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7192 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7193 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7194 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7195 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7196 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7198 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7199 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7200 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7201 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7203 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7204 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7205 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7206 final_value_msat: 10000,
7207 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7209 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7210 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7211 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7212 let route = find_route(
7213 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7214 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7217 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7218 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7219 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7222 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7223 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7224 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7225 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7226 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7227 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7228 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7230 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7234 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7235 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7241 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7242 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7243 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7244 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7246 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7247 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7248 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7249 final_value_msat: 10000,
7250 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7252 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7253 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7254 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7255 let route = find_route(
7256 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7257 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7260 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7261 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7262 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7263 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7266 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7267 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7268 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7269 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7270 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7271 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7272 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7274 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7278 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7282 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7284 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7285 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7286 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7287 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7289 // Marshall an MPP route.
7290 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7291 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7292 route.paths.push(path);
7293 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7294 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7295 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7296 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7297 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7298 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7300 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7301 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7302 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7303 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7308 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7309 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7310 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7311 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7312 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7313 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7315 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7316 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7318 total_msat: 100_000,
7321 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7322 // payment verification fails as expected.
7323 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7324 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7325 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7326 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7328 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7332 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7333 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7337 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7340 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7341 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7342 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7343 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7344 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7345 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7346 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7347 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7348 use util::test_utils;
7349 use util::config::UserConfig;
7350 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7352 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7353 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7354 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7356 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7360 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7361 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7362 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7363 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7364 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7365 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7366 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7371 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7372 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7375 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7376 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7377 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7379 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7380 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7382 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7383 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7385 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7386 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7388 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7389 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7390 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7391 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7392 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7394 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7396 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7398 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7399 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7400 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7401 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7402 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7404 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7406 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7408 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7409 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7410 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7411 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7412 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7415 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7416 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7417 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7419 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7420 } else { panic!(); }
7422 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7423 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7425 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7428 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7431 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7432 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7434 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7435 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7436 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7437 match msg_events[0] {
7438 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7439 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7440 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7444 match msg_events[1] {
7445 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7449 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7451 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7452 macro_rules! send_payment {
7453 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7454 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7455 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7456 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7457 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7458 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7459 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7461 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7462 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7464 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7465 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7467 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7468 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7469 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7470 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7471 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7472 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7473 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7474 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7476 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7477 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7478 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7480 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7481 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7482 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7483 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7484 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7486 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7489 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7490 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7491 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7492 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7494 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7499 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7500 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);