1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
236 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
237 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
238 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
239 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
240 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
243 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
245 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
246 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
247 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
250 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
254 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
255 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
256 (0, short_channel_id, required),
257 (2, htlc_id, required),
259 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
260 (0, session_priv, required),
265 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
266 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
267 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
268 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
269 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
272 session_priv: SecretKey,
273 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
274 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
275 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
276 payment_id: PaymentId,
277 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
278 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
279 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
280 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
282 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
285 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
286 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
287 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
289 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
291 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
293 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
296 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
297 payment_id.hash(hasher);
298 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
299 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
300 payment_params.hash(hasher);
305 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
308 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
311 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
312 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
313 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
314 payment_secret: None,
315 payment_params: None,
320 struct ReceiveError {
326 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
327 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
329 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
330 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
331 pub enum FailureCode {
332 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
333 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
334 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
335 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
336 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
337 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
338 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
339 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
340 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
341 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
342 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
345 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
347 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
348 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
349 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
350 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
351 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
353 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
354 err: msgs::LightningError,
355 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
356 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
358 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
360 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
362 err: LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
376 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
377 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
380 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
382 err: LightningError {
384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
385 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
391 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
392 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
396 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
399 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
402 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
406 log_level: Level::Warn,
409 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
411 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
413 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
416 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
424 shutdown_finish: None,
429 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
430 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
431 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
432 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
433 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
435 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
436 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
437 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
438 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
439 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
440 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
441 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
443 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
447 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
448 struct ClaimingPayment {
450 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
451 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
453 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
454 (0, amount_msat, required),
455 (2, payment_purpose, required),
456 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
459 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
460 struct ClaimablePayments {
461 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
462 /// failed/claimed by the user.
464 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
465 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
467 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
468 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
469 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
471 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
472 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
473 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
474 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
477 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
478 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
479 /// quite some time lag.
480 enum BackgroundEvent {
481 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
482 /// commitment transaction.
483 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
487 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
488 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
489 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
490 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
491 /// event can be generated.
492 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
493 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
494 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
497 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
498 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
499 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
502 /// State we hold per-peer.
503 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
504 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
506 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
507 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
509 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
510 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
511 latest_features: InitFeatures,
512 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
513 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
514 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
515 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
516 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
518 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
519 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
520 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
521 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
523 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
524 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
525 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
526 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
527 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
528 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
529 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
530 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
531 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
532 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
536 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
537 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
538 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
539 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
540 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
541 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
544 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
548 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
549 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
551 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
554 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
555 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
556 struct PendingInboundPayment {
557 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
558 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
559 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
560 /// this payment being removed.
562 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
563 user_payment_id: u64,
564 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
565 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
566 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
569 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
570 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
571 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
572 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
573 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
574 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
575 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
577 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
578 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
586 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
588 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
593 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
594 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
595 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
596 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
597 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
598 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
599 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
600 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
602 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
603 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
605 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
606 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
608 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
609 /// to individual Channels.
611 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
612 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
613 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
614 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
616 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
617 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
618 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
619 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
620 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
621 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
622 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
624 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
625 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
626 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
627 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
630 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
631 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
632 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
633 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
634 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
636 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
637 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
638 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
639 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
641 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
642 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
643 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
645 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
646 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
647 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
648 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
649 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
652 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
653 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
654 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
655 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
656 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
660 // `total_consistency_lock`
662 // |__`forward_htlcs`
664 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
666 // |__`per_peer_state`
668 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
670 // | |__`claimable_payments`
672 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
678 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
680 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
684 // | |__`pending_events`
686 // | |__`pending_background_events`
688 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
690 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
691 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
692 ES::Target: EntropySource,
693 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
694 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
695 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
699 default_configuration: UserConfig,
700 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
701 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
707 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
709 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
711 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
712 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
714 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
715 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
716 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
717 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
719 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
720 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
722 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
723 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
724 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
725 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
726 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
727 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
728 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
729 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
731 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
736 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
738 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
739 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
740 /// and via the classic SCID.
742 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
743 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
745 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
747 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
749 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
750 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
751 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
753 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
754 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
756 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
757 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
759 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
760 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
762 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
763 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
764 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
765 /// active channel list on load.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
770 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
772 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
773 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
774 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
776 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
777 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
778 /// the handling of the events.
780 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
781 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
784 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
785 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
786 /// would break backwards compatability.
787 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
788 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
789 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
791 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
792 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
794 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
796 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
797 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
798 /// confirmation depth.
800 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
801 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
802 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
804 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
808 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
810 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
812 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
814 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
815 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
816 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
818 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
819 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
821 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
822 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
823 /// keeping additional state.
824 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
826 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
827 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
828 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
829 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
831 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
832 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
834 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
835 /// are currently open with that peer.
837 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
838 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
841 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
843 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
844 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
845 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
846 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
847 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
849 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
850 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
851 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
852 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
853 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
854 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
855 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
856 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
857 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
858 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
859 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
861 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
870 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
872 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
873 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
874 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
875 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
876 pub struct ChainParameters {
877 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
878 pub network: Network,
880 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
882 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
883 pub best_block: BestBlock,
886 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
892 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
893 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
894 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
895 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
896 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
897 /// updates are ready for persistence).
899 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
900 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
901 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
902 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
903 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
905 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
906 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
909 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
910 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
911 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
914 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
915 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
917 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
918 persistence_notifier: notifier,
919 should_persist: persist_check,
920 _read_guard: read_guard,
925 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
927 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
928 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
933 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
934 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
936 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
938 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
939 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
940 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
941 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
942 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
944 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
945 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
947 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
949 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
950 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
951 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
952 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
953 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
954 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
955 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
956 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
957 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
958 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
959 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
960 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
961 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
963 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
964 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
966 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
967 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
968 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
969 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
971 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
972 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
973 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
974 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
975 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
976 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
979 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
981 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
982 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
985 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
987 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
988 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
990 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
991 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
992 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
993 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
995 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
996 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
997 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
998 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1000 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1001 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1002 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1004 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1005 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1006 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1008 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1009 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1010 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1011 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1012 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1013 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1014 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1015 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1016 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1017 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1018 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1021 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1022 /// to better separate parameters.
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1025 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1026 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1027 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1028 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1029 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1030 pub features: InitFeatures,
1031 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1032 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1033 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1035 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1037 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1038 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1039 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1040 /// payments to us through this channel.
1041 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1042 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1043 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1044 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1045 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1046 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1047 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1050 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1051 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1052 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1053 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1054 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1055 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1056 /// lifetime of the channel.
1057 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1058 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1059 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1060 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1061 /// our counterparty already.
1063 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1064 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1065 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1066 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1068 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1069 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1070 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1071 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1073 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1074 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1076 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1077 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1079 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1080 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1081 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1082 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1083 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1084 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1085 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1086 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1087 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1090 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1092 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1093 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1094 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1095 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1096 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1097 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1098 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1100 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1101 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1103 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1104 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1105 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1106 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1107 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1108 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1109 /// this value on chain.
1111 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1113 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1115 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1116 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1117 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1118 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1120 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1121 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1122 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1123 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1125 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1126 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1127 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1128 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1130 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1131 pub balance_msat: u64,
1132 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1133 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1134 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1135 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1137 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1139 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1140 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1141 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1142 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1143 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1144 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1145 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1146 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1148 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1149 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1150 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1151 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1152 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1153 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1154 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1156 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1157 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1158 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1159 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1160 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1161 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1162 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1163 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1164 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1166 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1168 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1169 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1170 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1171 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1172 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1174 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1175 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1176 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1177 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1178 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1179 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1180 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1182 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1183 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1184 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1185 pub is_outbound: bool,
1186 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1187 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1188 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1189 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1190 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1192 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1193 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1194 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1195 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1197 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1198 pub is_usable: bool,
1199 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1200 pub is_public: bool,
1201 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1202 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1203 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1204 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1205 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1206 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1208 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1209 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1212 impl ChannelDetails {
1213 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1214 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1215 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1217 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1218 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1219 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1220 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1223 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1224 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1225 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1227 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1228 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1229 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1230 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1233 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1234 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1236 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1237 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1238 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1240 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1241 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1242 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1243 features: latest_features,
1244 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1245 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1246 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1247 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1248 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1249 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1250 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1251 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1252 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1253 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1255 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1256 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1257 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1258 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1259 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1260 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1261 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1262 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1263 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1264 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1265 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1266 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1267 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1268 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1269 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1270 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1271 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1272 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1273 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1274 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1275 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1276 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1277 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1278 config: Some(channel.config()),
1283 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1284 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1285 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1286 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1287 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1289 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1291 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1292 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1293 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1296 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1297 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1298 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1300 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1301 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1302 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1304 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1305 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1306 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1308 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1309 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1313 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1315 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1317 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1318 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1319 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1320 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1322 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1323 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1324 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1327 macro_rules! handle_error {
1328 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1331 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1332 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1333 // entering the macro.
1334 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1335 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1337 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1339 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1340 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1341 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1342 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1346 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1347 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1348 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1349 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1354 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1355 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1357 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1358 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1359 action: err.action.clone()
1363 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1364 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1365 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1366 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1367 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1371 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1378 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1379 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1380 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1381 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1382 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1383 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1385 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1386 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1387 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1388 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1389 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1391 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1392 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1394 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1398 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1399 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1400 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1402 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1403 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1405 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1406 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1408 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1409 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1410 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1411 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1412 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1413 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1419 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1420 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1424 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1426 $entry.remove_entry();
1434 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1435 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1439 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1441 $entry.remove_entry();
1449 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1450 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1452 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1453 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1459 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1460 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1461 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1462 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1463 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1465 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1466 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1467 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1468 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1469 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1470 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1471 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1472 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1473 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1474 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1479 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1480 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1481 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1483 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1484 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1485 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1486 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1487 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1488 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1491 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1496 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1497 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1498 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1499 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1500 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1501 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1502 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1503 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1504 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1505 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1506 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1508 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1509 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1510 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1516 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1517 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1519 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1520 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1521 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1522 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1523 updates.announcement_sigs);
1524 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1525 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1528 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1529 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1530 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1532 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1534 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1535 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1537 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1538 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1539 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1540 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1545 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1546 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1547 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1548 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1549 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1551 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1552 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1553 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1556 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1557 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1558 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1559 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1560 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1561 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1562 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1563 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1567 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1568 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1569 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1570 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1571 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1573 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1579 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1580 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1584 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1586 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1587 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1588 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1589 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1590 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1591 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1595 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1597 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1598 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1600 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1602 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1603 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1604 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1605 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1606 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1607 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1608 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1609 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1611 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1612 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1613 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1618 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1620 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1621 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1622 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1623 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1624 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1625 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1626 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1627 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1629 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1632 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1633 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1635 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1637 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1639 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1641 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1642 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1643 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1644 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1654 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1655 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1656 &self.default_configuration
1659 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1660 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1661 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1664 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1665 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1667 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1669 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1673 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1678 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1680 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1681 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1682 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1683 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1684 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1686 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1687 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1689 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1690 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1691 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1693 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1694 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1695 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1696 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1697 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1698 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1700 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1701 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1702 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1703 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1704 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1705 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1708 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1709 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1710 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1714 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1715 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1717 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1719 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1720 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1721 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1722 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1723 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1724 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1728 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1733 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1735 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1736 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1739 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1741 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1747 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1748 node_id: their_network_key,
1751 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1754 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1755 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1756 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1757 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1758 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1759 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1760 // the same channel.
1761 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1763 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1765 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1768 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1769 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1770 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1778 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1779 /// more information.
1780 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1781 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1784 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1785 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1787 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1788 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1790 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1791 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1792 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1793 // really wanted anyway.
1794 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1797 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1798 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1799 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1802 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1803 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1805 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1806 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1809 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1815 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1816 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1818 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1819 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1820 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1822 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1823 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1824 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1825 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1826 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1827 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1828 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1829 total_msat: *total_msat,
1832 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1833 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1835 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1836 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1838 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1843 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1844 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1845 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1846 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1847 Some(transaction) => {
1848 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1852 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1853 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1854 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1855 reason: closure_reason
1859 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1862 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1863 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1866 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1867 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1869 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1870 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1871 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1872 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1873 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1874 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1875 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1876 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1877 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1879 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1880 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1881 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1882 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1883 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1887 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1888 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1889 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1890 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1891 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1894 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1895 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1896 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1901 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1909 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1910 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1911 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1912 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1915 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1919 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1920 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1921 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1923 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1924 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1926 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1927 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1928 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1929 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1931 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1933 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1934 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1935 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1936 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1937 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1940 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1941 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1942 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1944 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1945 /// the channel being closed or not:
1946 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1947 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1948 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1949 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1950 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1951 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1952 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1954 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1956 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1957 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1958 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1959 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1960 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1964 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1965 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1966 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1967 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1968 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1969 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1970 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1971 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1973 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1974 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1975 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1976 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1977 // ignore the result here.
1978 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1982 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1983 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1984 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1985 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1987 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1988 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1992 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1993 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1994 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1996 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1998 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2000 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2003 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2004 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2005 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2006 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2007 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2012 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2015 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2017 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2018 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2019 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2020 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2021 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2022 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2023 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2024 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2025 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2026 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2037 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2038 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2039 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2041 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2042 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2043 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2046 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2047 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2048 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2050 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2051 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2052 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2053 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2054 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2057 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2058 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2059 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2060 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2061 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2065 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2066 /// local transaction(s).
2067 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2068 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2069 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2073 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2074 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2076 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2077 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2078 return Err(ReceiveError {
2079 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2081 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2084 // final_expiry_too_soon
2085 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2086 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2088 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2089 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2090 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2091 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2092 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2093 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2094 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2095 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2096 return Err(ReceiveError {
2097 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2098 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2101 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2102 return Err(ReceiveError {
2104 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2105 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2109 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2111 return Err(ReceiveError {
2112 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2113 err_data: Vec::new(),
2114 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2117 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2118 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2119 return Err(ReceiveError {
2120 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2121 err_data: Vec::new(),
2122 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2124 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2125 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2127 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2128 phantom_shared_secret,
2130 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2131 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2132 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2133 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2134 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2135 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2136 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2137 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2138 return Err(ReceiveError {
2139 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2140 err_data: Vec::new(),
2141 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2145 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2147 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2150 return Err(ReceiveError {
2151 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2152 err_data: Vec::new(),
2153 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2158 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2161 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2162 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2163 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2164 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2168 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2169 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2170 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2173 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2174 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2175 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2176 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2177 failure_code: $err_code,
2183 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2184 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2187 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2188 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2189 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2191 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2192 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2193 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2194 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2195 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2196 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2197 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2198 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2200 macro_rules! return_err {
2201 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2203 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2204 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2205 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2206 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2207 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2208 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2214 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2216 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2217 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2219 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2220 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2224 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2225 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2227 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2229 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2230 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2231 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2232 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2233 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2235 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2238 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2239 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2240 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2242 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2243 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2244 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2247 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2248 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2249 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2250 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2254 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2255 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2256 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2259 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2260 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2261 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2262 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2263 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2268 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2269 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2270 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2271 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2272 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2273 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2274 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2275 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2276 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2277 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2278 // phantom or an intercept.
2279 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2280 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2281 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2285 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2288 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2290 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2292 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2293 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2294 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2296 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2297 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2298 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2300 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2301 // have no consistency guarantees.
2302 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2306 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2307 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2308 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2309 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2310 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2312 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2313 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2314 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2315 // we don't have the channel here.
2316 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2318 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2320 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2321 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2322 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2323 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2324 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2325 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2326 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2328 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2329 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2331 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2332 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2336 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2337 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2338 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2339 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2341 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2348 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2349 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2350 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2351 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2352 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2353 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2355 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2356 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2358 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2359 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2360 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2361 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2362 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2363 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2364 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2365 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2366 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2367 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2373 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2374 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2375 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2376 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2378 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2379 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2381 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2382 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2383 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2385 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2386 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2387 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2388 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2389 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2390 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2391 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2395 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2400 pending_forward_info
2403 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2404 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2405 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2407 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2408 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2409 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2410 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2411 if !chan.should_announce() {
2412 return Err(LightningError {
2413 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2414 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2417 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2418 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2421 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2424 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2425 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2426 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2427 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2429 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2430 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2431 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2432 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2433 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2434 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2435 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2439 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2441 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2442 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2443 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2445 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2446 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2448 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2449 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2450 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2451 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2452 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2453 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2454 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2455 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2457 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2458 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2459 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2461 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2463 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2470 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2471 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2472 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2475 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2476 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2477 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2480 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2481 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2483 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2484 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2485 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2486 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2487 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2489 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2491 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2492 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2493 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2494 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2499 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2502 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2503 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2504 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2506 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2507 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2508 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2510 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2511 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2513 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2514 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2515 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2516 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2517 Some(monitor_update) => {
2518 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2519 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2520 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2523 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2524 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2525 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2526 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2527 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2528 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2529 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2530 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2536 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2537 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2538 // `channel_by_id` map.
2539 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2540 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2545 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2546 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2548 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2553 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2555 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2556 /// fields for more info.
2558 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2559 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2561 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2563 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2564 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2565 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2566 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2567 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2569 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2570 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2571 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2572 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2573 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2575 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2576 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2577 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2578 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2580 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2582 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2583 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2584 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2586 /// In general, a path may raise:
2587 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2588 /// node public key) is specified.
2589 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2590 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2592 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2593 /// relevant updates.
2595 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2596 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2597 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2599 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2601 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2602 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2603 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2604 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2605 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2607 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2608 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2609 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2611 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2612 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2613 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2614 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2615 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2616 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2617 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2618 self.pending_outbound_payments
2619 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2620 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2621 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2624 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2625 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2626 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2627 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2629 self.pending_outbound_payments
2630 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2631 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2632 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2633 &self.pending_events,
2634 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2635 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2639 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2640 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2642 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2643 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2644 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2648 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2649 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2650 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2654 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2655 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2656 /// retries are exhausted.
2658 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2659 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2661 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2662 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2663 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2665 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2666 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2668 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2669 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2670 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2672 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2675 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2676 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2677 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2678 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2679 /// never reach the recipient.
2681 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2682 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2684 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2685 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2687 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2689 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2690 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2691 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2693 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2694 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2696 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2697 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2700 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2701 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2703 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2706 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2707 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2708 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2710 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2711 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2712 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2713 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2714 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2715 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2718 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2719 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2720 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2721 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2722 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2724 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2725 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2726 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2729 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2732 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2733 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2736 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2737 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2738 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2739 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2740 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2742 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2743 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2749 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2751 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2753 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2754 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2755 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2756 } else { unreachable!(); })
2759 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2762 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2763 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2766 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2767 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2772 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2773 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2776 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2778 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2781 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2782 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2783 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2792 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2793 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2794 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2798 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2800 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2801 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2803 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2804 /// across the p2p network.
2806 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2807 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2809 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2810 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2811 /// keys per-channel).
2813 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2814 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2815 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2817 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2818 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2819 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2821 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2822 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2823 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2824 /// for more details.
2826 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2827 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2828 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2831 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2832 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2833 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2834 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2839 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2840 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2841 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2842 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2843 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2844 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2845 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2849 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2850 let mut output_index = None;
2851 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2852 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2853 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2854 if output_index.is_some() {
2855 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2856 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2859 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2860 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2861 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2864 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2867 if output_index.is_none() {
2868 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2869 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2872 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2876 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2878 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2879 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2880 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2881 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2883 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2884 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2886 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2887 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2889 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2891 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2892 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2893 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2894 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2895 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2896 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2897 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2898 pub fn update_channel_config(
2899 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2900 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2901 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2903 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2908 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2911 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2912 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2913 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2914 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2915 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2916 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2917 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2918 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2922 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2923 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2924 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2927 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2928 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2929 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2930 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2931 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2939 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2940 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2942 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2943 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2945 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2946 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2947 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2948 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2949 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2951 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2952 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2954 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2957 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2958 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2959 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2960 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2961 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2964 let next_hop_scid = {
2965 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2966 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2967 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2970 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2972 if !chan.is_usable() {
2973 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2974 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2977 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2979 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2980 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2985 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2986 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2987 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2990 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2991 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2992 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2994 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2996 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2997 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3000 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3001 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3002 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3003 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3004 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3006 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3010 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3011 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3013 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3016 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3017 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3020 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3021 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3022 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3025 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3026 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3027 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3028 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3029 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3030 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3031 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3034 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3035 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3036 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3037 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3042 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3044 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3045 /// Will likely generate further events.
3046 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3049 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3050 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3051 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3053 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3054 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3056 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3057 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3058 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3060 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3061 match forward_info {
3062 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3063 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3064 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3065 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3066 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3069 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3070 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3071 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3073 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3074 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3075 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3076 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3077 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3078 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3081 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3082 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3084 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3087 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3088 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3094 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3095 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3097 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3101 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3102 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3104 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3108 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3109 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3110 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3111 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3112 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3114 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3115 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3116 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3117 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3118 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3120 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3122 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3123 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3127 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3128 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3129 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3130 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3136 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3139 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3142 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3143 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3144 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3145 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3146 // problem, not ours.
3152 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3153 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3155 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3160 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3161 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3162 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3167 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3169 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3173 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3174 match forward_info {
3175 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3176 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3177 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3178 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3179 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3182 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3183 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3184 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3185 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3186 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3187 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3188 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3189 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3191 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3192 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3193 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3195 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3198 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3200 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3201 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3202 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3203 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3208 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3209 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3211 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3213 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3214 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3216 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3217 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3219 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3221 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3222 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3223 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3232 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3233 match forward_info {
3234 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3235 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3236 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3237 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3240 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3241 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3242 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3243 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3245 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3246 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3248 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3251 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3252 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3253 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3254 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3255 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3256 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3257 phantom_shared_secret,
3259 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3261 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3266 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3267 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3268 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3269 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3270 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3272 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3273 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3274 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3275 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3276 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3277 phantom_shared_secret,
3279 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3280 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3284 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3285 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3286 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3287 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3288 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3291 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3292 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3293 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3295 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3296 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3297 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3300 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3301 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3302 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3305 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3306 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3307 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3308 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3310 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3314 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3315 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3316 total_value += htlc.value;
3317 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3318 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3319 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3320 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3321 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3322 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3324 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3326 _ => unreachable!(),
3329 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3330 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3331 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3332 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3333 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3334 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3335 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3336 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3337 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3340 amount_msat: total_value,
3341 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3342 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3344 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3346 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3347 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3349 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3351 payment_claimable_generated
3355 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3356 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3357 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3358 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3359 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3360 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3361 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3362 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3364 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3365 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3366 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3367 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3368 Ok(result) => result,
3370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3371 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3375 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3376 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3377 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3379 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3380 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3384 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3386 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3387 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3388 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3389 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3392 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3394 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3395 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3396 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3397 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3398 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3400 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3402 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3403 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3407 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3408 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3415 if payment_data.is_none() {
3416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3417 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3420 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3421 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3423 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3424 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3425 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3426 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3427 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3429 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3430 if payment_claimable_generated {
3431 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3437 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3438 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3446 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3447 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3448 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3449 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3450 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3451 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3453 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3454 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3456 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3458 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3459 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3460 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3462 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3464 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3465 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3466 events.append(&mut new_events);
3469 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3471 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3472 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3474 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3475 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3476 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3477 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3478 if background_events.is_empty() {
3482 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3484 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3485 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3486 // monitor updating completing.
3487 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3494 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3495 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3496 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3497 self.process_background_events();
3500 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3501 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3502 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3503 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3504 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3505 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3506 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3508 if !chan.is_live() {
3509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3510 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3511 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3514 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3516 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3517 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3521 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3522 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3523 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3524 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3525 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3526 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3527 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3529 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3532 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3533 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3534 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3535 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3536 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3537 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3545 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3547 /// This currently includes:
3548 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3549 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3550 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3552 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3553 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3554 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3556 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3557 /// estimate fetches.
3558 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3559 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3560 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3561 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3563 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3565 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3566 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3567 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3569 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3570 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3571 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3572 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3573 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3574 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3575 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3576 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3577 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3579 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3580 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3581 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3582 if needs_close { return false; }
3585 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3586 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3587 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3588 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3589 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3590 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3591 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3592 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3596 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3597 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3599 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3600 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3601 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3605 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3606 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3611 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3615 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3616 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3621 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3622 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3623 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3624 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3625 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3626 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3627 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3628 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3629 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3630 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3631 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3633 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3634 // have no channels to the peer.
3635 let remove_entry = {
3636 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3637 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3640 entry.remove_entry();
3643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3648 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3649 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3650 // This should be unreachable
3651 debug_assert!(false);
3654 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3655 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3656 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3657 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3659 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3660 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3661 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3663 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3670 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3671 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3672 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3673 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3674 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3677 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3678 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3681 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3683 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3684 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3685 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3686 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3687 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3694 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3695 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3696 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3698 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3699 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3700 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3701 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3703 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3704 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3705 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3706 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3707 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3708 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3711 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3712 /// reason for the failure.
3714 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3715 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3718 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3719 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3720 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3721 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3722 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3723 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3724 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3729 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3730 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3731 match failure_code {
3732 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3733 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3734 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3735 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3736 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3737 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3742 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3743 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3745 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3747 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3748 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3749 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3750 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3751 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3752 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3753 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3755 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3757 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3758 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3760 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3765 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3766 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3767 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3768 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3769 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3770 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3771 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3772 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3773 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3774 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3776 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3777 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3778 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3779 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3781 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3782 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3783 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3784 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3785 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3789 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3790 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3791 // be surfaced to the user.
3792 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3793 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3794 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3796 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3797 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3798 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3799 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3800 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3801 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3803 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3805 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3807 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3810 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3811 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3812 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3813 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3817 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3818 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3819 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3820 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3821 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3822 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3823 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3824 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3825 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3828 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3829 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3830 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3833 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3834 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3835 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3837 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3838 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3839 session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3840 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3841 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3843 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3844 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3845 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3847 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3848 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3849 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3850 push_forward_ev = true;
3852 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3854 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3857 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3860 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3861 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3862 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3863 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3864 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3865 failed_next_destination: destination,
3871 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3872 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3874 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3875 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3876 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3878 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3879 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3880 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3881 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3883 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3884 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3885 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3886 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3887 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3888 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3889 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3894 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3895 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3896 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3897 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3898 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3899 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3900 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3901 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3906 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3907 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3908 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3910 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3911 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3912 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3913 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3918 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3920 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3921 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3922 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3923 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3924 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3926 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3927 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3929 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3930 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3931 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3932 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3933 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3935 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3936 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3937 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3938 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3940 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3941 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3942 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3949 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3950 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3958 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3963 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3964 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3965 debug_assert!(false);
3970 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3971 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3972 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3973 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3974 if sources.len() != 1 {
3975 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3976 debug_assert!(false);
3982 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3984 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3985 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3986 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3987 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3990 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3991 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3992 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3993 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3997 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3998 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3999 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4000 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4002 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4003 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4004 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4005 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4006 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4011 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4012 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4013 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4014 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4015 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4016 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4017 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4019 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4022 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4023 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4024 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4025 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4029 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4030 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4031 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4032 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4035 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4036 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4037 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4041 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4042 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4043 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4047 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4050 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4051 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4052 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4054 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4055 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4057 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4058 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4060 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4061 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4062 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4063 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4064 if let Err(e) = res {
4065 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4066 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4067 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4068 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4069 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4075 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4076 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4077 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4081 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4082 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4083 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4084 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4085 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4086 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4087 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4088 // again on restart.
4089 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4090 payment_preimage, update_res);
4092 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4093 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4094 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4095 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4096 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4097 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4101 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4102 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4105 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4107 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4108 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4110 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4111 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4112 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4113 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4114 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4115 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4116 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4119 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4120 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4122 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4124 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4130 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4131 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4132 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4138 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4139 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4140 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4143 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4144 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4146 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4147 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4148 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4149 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4150 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4154 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4155 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4161 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4162 /// update completion.
4163 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4164 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4165 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4166 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4167 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4168 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4170 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4171 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4172 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4173 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4174 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4175 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4177 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4179 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4180 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4181 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4182 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4185 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4186 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4188 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4189 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4190 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4195 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4197 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4198 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4199 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4200 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4205 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4206 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4208 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4209 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4214 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4218 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4224 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4225 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4226 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4232 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4233 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4235 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4236 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4238 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4239 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4240 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4241 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4242 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4248 let mut peer_state_lock;
4249 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4250 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4251 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4252 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4254 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4259 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4260 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4261 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4264 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4267 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4269 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4270 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4273 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4274 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4275 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4277 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4278 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4279 /// used to accept such channels.
4281 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4282 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4283 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4284 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4287 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4288 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4290 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4291 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4292 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4294 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4295 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4297 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4298 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4300 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4301 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4303 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4304 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4305 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4306 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4309 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4312 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4313 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4314 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4315 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4316 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4317 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4318 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4319 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4321 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4322 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4325 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4326 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4327 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4328 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4330 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4333 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4334 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4335 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4337 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4338 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4339 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4340 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4341 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4342 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4343 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4344 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4347 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4348 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4349 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4353 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4354 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4355 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4359 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4365 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4366 /// or 0-conf channels.
4368 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4369 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4370 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4371 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4372 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4373 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4375 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4376 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4377 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4378 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4379 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4380 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4381 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4385 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4388 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4389 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4391 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4392 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4393 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4394 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4396 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4399 num_unfunded_channels
4402 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4403 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4407 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4408 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4411 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4412 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4413 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4414 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4416 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4417 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4418 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4419 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4422 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4424 debug_assert!(false);
4425 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4427 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4428 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4430 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4431 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4432 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4433 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4434 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4435 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4438 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4439 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4442 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4443 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4445 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4446 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4449 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4450 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4451 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4454 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4459 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4460 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4461 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4462 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4465 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4466 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4467 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4469 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4470 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4471 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4474 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4475 pending_events.push(
4476 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4477 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4478 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4479 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4480 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4481 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4486 entry.insert(channel);
4492 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4493 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4494 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4495 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4497 debug_assert!(false);
4498 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4502 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4504 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4505 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4510 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4511 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4512 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4513 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4514 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4516 user_channel_id: user_id,
4521 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4522 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4524 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4525 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4527 debug_assert!(false);
4528 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4533 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4534 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4535 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4536 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4541 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4542 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4543 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4546 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4548 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4549 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4550 funding_msg.channel_id))
4552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4553 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4557 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4558 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4559 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4560 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4561 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4562 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4563 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4567 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4569 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4570 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4571 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4573 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4574 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4575 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4576 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4577 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4578 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4579 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4580 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4588 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4589 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4590 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4591 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4593 debug_assert!(false);
4594 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4597 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4598 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4599 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4601 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4602 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4603 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4604 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4605 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4606 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4607 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4608 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4609 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4610 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4619 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4621 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4623 debug_assert!(false);
4624 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4626 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4627 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4628 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4630 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4631 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4632 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4633 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4635 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4636 msg: announcement_sigs,
4638 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4639 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4640 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4641 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4642 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4643 // announcement_signatures.
4644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4645 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4646 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4647 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4653 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4661 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4662 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4663 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4665 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4667 debug_assert!(false);
4668 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4670 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4671 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4672 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4675 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4676 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4677 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4678 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4681 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4682 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4683 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4684 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4686 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4687 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4688 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4689 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4690 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4691 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4696 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4697 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4698 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4699 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4700 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4707 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4708 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4709 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4710 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4716 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4717 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4718 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4720 debug_assert!(false);
4721 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4723 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4728 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4729 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4730 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4731 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4736 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4737 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4738 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4739 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4740 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4741 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4742 } else { (tx, None) }
4744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4747 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4748 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4749 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4751 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4752 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4753 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4754 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4755 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4759 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4764 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4765 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4766 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4767 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4769 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4770 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4771 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4772 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4774 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4775 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4776 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4778 debug_assert!(false);
4779 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4781 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4782 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4783 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4786 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4787 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4788 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4789 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4790 match pending_forward_info {
4791 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4792 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4793 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4794 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4796 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4797 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4798 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4799 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4800 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4803 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4805 _ => pending_forward_info
4808 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4815 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4816 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4817 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4818 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4820 debug_assert!(false);
4821 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4823 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4824 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4825 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4827 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4832 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4836 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4838 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4840 debug_assert!(false);
4841 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4843 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4844 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4845 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4847 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4854 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4856 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4858 debug_assert!(false);
4859 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4861 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4865 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4866 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4867 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4869 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4876 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4877 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4878 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4880 debug_assert!(false);
4881 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4885 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4887 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4888 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4889 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4890 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4891 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4892 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4899 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4900 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4901 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4902 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4903 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4904 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4905 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4906 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4907 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4908 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4909 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4911 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4912 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4914 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4915 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4916 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4918 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4919 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4922 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4923 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4925 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4926 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4927 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4928 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4929 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4930 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4931 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4932 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4933 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4936 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4937 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4940 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4941 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4942 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4943 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4944 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4945 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4946 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4949 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4950 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4951 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4956 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4957 // payments are being processed.
4958 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4959 push_forward_event = true;
4961 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4962 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4969 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4970 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4973 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4974 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4975 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4977 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4981 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4982 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4983 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4984 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4985 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4987 if !forward_ev_exists {
4988 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4990 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
4995 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4996 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
4997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4998 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5000 debug_assert!(false);
5001 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5002 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5004 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5006 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5007 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5008 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5009 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5010 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5011 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5012 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5014 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5017 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5021 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5023 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5025 debug_assert!(false);
5026 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5030 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5032 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5039 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5041 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5043 debug_assert!(false);
5044 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5048 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5050 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5051 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5055 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5056 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5057 msg, &self.default_configuration
5059 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5060 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5061 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5064 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5069 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5070 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5071 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5072 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5074 // It's not a local channel
5075 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5079 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5080 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5081 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5083 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5084 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5085 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5086 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5087 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5088 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5089 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5090 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5091 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5092 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5094 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5096 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5097 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5098 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5099 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5101 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5102 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5105 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5107 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5110 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5112 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5113 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5115 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5117 debug_assert!(false);
5118 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5122 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5124 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5125 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5126 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5127 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5128 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5129 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5130 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5131 let mut channel_update = None;
5132 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5134 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5137 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5138 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5139 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5140 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5141 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5142 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5143 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5148 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5149 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5150 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5151 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5152 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5153 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5161 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5162 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5165 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5166 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5171 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5172 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5173 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5175 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5176 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5177 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5178 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5179 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5180 match monitor_event {
5181 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5182 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5183 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5184 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5187 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5188 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5189 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5192 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5193 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5194 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5195 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5197 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5198 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5199 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5200 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5203 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5204 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5205 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5208 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5209 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5210 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5211 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5212 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5213 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5217 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5218 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5220 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5222 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5223 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5224 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5225 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5226 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5233 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5234 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5240 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5241 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5244 has_pending_monitor_events
5247 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5248 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5249 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5251 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5252 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5253 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5254 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5256 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5261 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5262 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5263 /// update was applied.
5264 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5265 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5266 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5267 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5269 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5270 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5271 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5272 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5275 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5278 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5279 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5280 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5281 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5282 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5283 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5284 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5285 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5287 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5288 has_monitor_update = true;
5290 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5291 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5292 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5293 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5294 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5295 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5296 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5298 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5300 continue 'peer_loop;
5309 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5310 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5311 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5314 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5315 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5321 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5322 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5323 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5324 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5325 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5326 let mut has_update = false;
5328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5330 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5331 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5332 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5333 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5334 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5335 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5336 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5337 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5339 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5340 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5343 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5344 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5345 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5346 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5347 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5352 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5354 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5355 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5356 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5362 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5363 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5371 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5372 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5378 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5379 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5381 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5382 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5383 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5384 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5385 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5386 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5387 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5388 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5389 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5390 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5391 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5392 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5393 assert!(should_broadcast);
5394 } else { unreachable!(); }
5395 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5397 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5401 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5402 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5404 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5405 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5408 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5411 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5412 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5414 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5415 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5416 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5417 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5418 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5419 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5420 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5421 // never fail a payment too early.
5422 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5424 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5427 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5432 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5435 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5436 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5438 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5439 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5440 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5441 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5443 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5445 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5446 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5450 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5451 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5453 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5455 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5456 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5458 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5459 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5460 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5461 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5462 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5463 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5464 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5465 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5466 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5467 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5468 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5471 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5472 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5474 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5477 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5479 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5481 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5482 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5483 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5484 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5485 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5488 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5489 /// stored external to LDK.
5491 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5492 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5493 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5495 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5496 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5499 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5500 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5501 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5502 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5504 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5505 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5506 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5507 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5508 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5510 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5511 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5512 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5513 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5514 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5516 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5517 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5519 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5520 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5524 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5525 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5527 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5529 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5530 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5532 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5533 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5534 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5535 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5536 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5537 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5538 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5541 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5542 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5544 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5547 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5549 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5551 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5552 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5555 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5556 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5558 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5559 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5560 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5563 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5564 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5566 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5567 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5568 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5569 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5571 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5572 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5573 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5574 Some(_) => continue,
5575 None => return scid_candidate
5580 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5582 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5583 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5585 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5586 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5587 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5591 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5592 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5593 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5595 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5596 /// times to get a unique scid.
5597 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5598 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5599 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5601 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5602 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5603 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5604 return scid_candidate
5608 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5609 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5610 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5611 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5613 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5614 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5615 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5616 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5617 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5618 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5619 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5620 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5629 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5630 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5631 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5632 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5633 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5637 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5638 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5639 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5644 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5645 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5646 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5650 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5651 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5655 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5656 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5659 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5660 /// using the given event handler.
5662 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5663 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5666 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5667 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5668 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5670 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5672 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5673 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5674 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5675 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5678 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5679 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5680 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5683 for event in pending_events {
5684 handler(event).await;
5687 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5688 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5693 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5695 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5696 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5697 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5698 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5699 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5700 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5704 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5705 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5706 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5707 /// is always placed next to each other.
5709 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5710 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5711 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5712 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5714 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5715 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5716 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5717 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5718 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5719 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5720 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5722 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5723 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5724 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5725 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5728 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5729 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5731 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5732 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5735 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5737 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5740 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5741 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5745 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5746 events.replace(pending_events);
5755 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5757 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5758 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5759 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5760 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5761 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5762 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5766 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5768 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5769 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5770 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5771 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5772 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5774 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5775 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5776 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5777 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5780 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5781 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5782 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5785 for event in pending_events {
5786 handler.handle_event(event);
5794 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5796 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5797 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5798 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5799 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5800 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5801 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5805 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5807 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5808 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5809 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5810 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5811 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5814 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5815 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5818 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5820 let new_height = height - 1;
5822 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5823 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5824 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5825 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5826 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5827 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5830 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5834 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5836 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5837 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5838 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5839 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5840 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5841 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5845 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5846 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5847 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5848 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5850 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5851 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5854 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5855 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5857 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5858 if height < last_best_block_height {
5859 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5860 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5864 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5865 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5866 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5867 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5869 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5870 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5874 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5876 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5878 macro_rules! max_time {
5879 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5881 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5882 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5883 // having an explicit local time source.
5884 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5885 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5886 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5887 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5888 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5894 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5895 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5896 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5897 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5901 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5902 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5903 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5906 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5907 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5908 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5915 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5917 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5918 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5919 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5920 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5921 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5922 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5927 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5929 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5930 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5931 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5932 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5933 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5934 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5938 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5939 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5941 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5942 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5943 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5944 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5945 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5947 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5948 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5951 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5954 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5955 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5956 let res = f(channel);
5957 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5958 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5959 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5960 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5961 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5963 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5964 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5965 if channel.is_usable() {
5966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5967 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5968 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5969 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5974 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5978 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5980 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5982 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5983 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5984 msg: announcement_sigs,
5986 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5987 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5988 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5990 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5991 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5992 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5997 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5998 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5999 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6000 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6001 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6002 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6003 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6004 // is always consistent.
6005 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6006 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6007 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6008 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6009 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6012 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6013 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6014 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6015 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6016 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6017 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6018 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6022 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6023 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6024 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6025 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6026 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6027 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6028 data: reason_message,
6038 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6039 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6040 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6041 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6042 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6043 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6044 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6045 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6046 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6047 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6049 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6050 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6051 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6055 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6058 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6059 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6060 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6061 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6062 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6063 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6064 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6065 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6066 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6069 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6070 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6071 _ => unreachable!(),
6073 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6074 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6075 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6076 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6082 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6084 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6085 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6089 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6090 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6091 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6092 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6094 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6096 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6097 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6098 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6099 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6100 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6101 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6104 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6105 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6106 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6108 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6109 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6110 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6111 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6114 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6115 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6116 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6117 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6118 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6121 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6122 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6123 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6126 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6127 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6128 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6129 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6132 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6133 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6134 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6135 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6138 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6139 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6141 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6142 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6143 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6144 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6145 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6148 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6149 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6150 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6151 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6154 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6155 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6156 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6157 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6160 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6161 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6162 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6163 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6167 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6168 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6170 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6171 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6172 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6173 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6174 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6175 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6179 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6181 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6184 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6186 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6189 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6190 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6191 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6194 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6196 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6199 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6200 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6201 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6204 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6205 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6206 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6209 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6211 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6214 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6215 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6216 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6219 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6221 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6224 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6225 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6226 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6229 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6230 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6231 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6234 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6239 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6244 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6249 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6254 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6255 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6256 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6259 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6264 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6269 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6271 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6272 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6274 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6275 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6276 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6277 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6278 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6279 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6280 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6281 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6282 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6283 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6284 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6289 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6292 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6294 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6297 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6302 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6303 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6304 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6305 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6307 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6308 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6309 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6310 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6314 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6315 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6316 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6317 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6320 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6322 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6324 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6325 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6329 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6330 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6331 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6337 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6338 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6339 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6340 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6341 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6342 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6345 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6346 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6347 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6348 if inbound_peer_limited {
6351 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6352 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6353 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6354 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6355 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6360 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6361 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6363 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6364 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6365 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6366 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6371 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6372 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6377 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6380 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6383 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6384 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6385 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6386 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6387 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6388 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6389 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6393 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6394 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6395 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6400 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6401 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6402 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6403 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6404 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6413 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6417 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6420 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6421 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6422 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6423 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6424 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6427 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6429 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6430 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6431 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6435 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6437 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6438 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6441 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6442 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6443 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6444 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6452 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6453 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6457 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6458 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6461 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6462 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6466 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6467 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6468 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6469 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6472 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6473 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6475 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6476 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6477 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6478 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6479 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6482 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6483 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6484 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6485 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6488 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6489 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6490 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6491 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6494 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6495 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6496 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6497 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6498 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6499 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6500 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6501 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6502 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6503 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6504 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6505 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6506 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6507 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6508 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6509 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6510 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6511 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6513 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6514 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6515 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6521 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6522 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6524 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6525 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6526 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6527 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6531 (2, node_id, required),
6532 (4, features, required),
6533 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6534 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6535 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6536 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6539 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6540 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6541 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6542 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6543 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6544 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6545 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6546 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6547 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6548 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6549 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6550 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6551 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6552 (7, self.config, option),
6553 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6554 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6555 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6556 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6557 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6558 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6559 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6560 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6561 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6562 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6563 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6564 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6565 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6566 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6567 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6568 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6569 (32, self.is_public, required),
6570 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6571 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6572 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6578 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6579 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6580 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6581 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6582 (2, channel_id, required),
6583 (3, channel_type, option),
6584 (4, counterparty, required),
6585 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6586 (6, funding_txo, option),
6587 (7, config, option),
6588 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6589 (9, confirmations, option),
6590 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6591 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6592 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6593 (16, balance_msat, required),
6594 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6595 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6596 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6597 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6598 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6599 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6600 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6601 (26, is_outbound, required),
6602 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6603 (30, is_usable, required),
6604 (32, is_public, required),
6605 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6606 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6607 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6610 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6611 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6612 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6613 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6614 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6618 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6620 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6621 outbound_scid_alias,
6625 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6626 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6628 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6629 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6630 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6631 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6632 confirmations_required,
6634 force_close_spend_delay,
6635 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6636 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6637 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6638 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6639 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6640 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6645 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6646 (2, channels, vec_type),
6647 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6648 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6651 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6653 (0, onion_packet, required),
6654 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6657 (0, payment_data, required),
6658 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6659 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6661 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6662 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6663 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6667 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6668 (0, routing, required),
6669 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6670 (4, payment_hash, required),
6671 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6672 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6673 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6677 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6678 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6680 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6682 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6683 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6684 reason.write(writer)?;
6686 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6687 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6690 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6691 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6692 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6693 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6700 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6701 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6702 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6705 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6706 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6707 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6708 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6712 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6713 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6714 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6715 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6716 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6719 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6720 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6721 // messages contained in the variants.
6722 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6723 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6724 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6726 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6727 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6728 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6729 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6730 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6733 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6734 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6735 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6736 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6737 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6739 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6744 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6749 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6750 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6751 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6752 (2, outpoint, required),
6753 (4, htlc_id, required),
6754 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6757 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6758 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6759 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6760 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6761 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6763 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6764 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6765 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6766 (2, self.value, required),
6767 (4, payment_data, option),
6768 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6769 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6775 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6776 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6777 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6779 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6780 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6781 let mut total_msat = None;
6782 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6783 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6784 (0, prev_hop, required),
6785 (1, total_msat, option),
6786 (2, value, required),
6787 (4, payment_data, option),
6788 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6789 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6791 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6793 if payment_data.is_some() {
6794 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6796 if total_msat.is_none() {
6797 total_msat = Some(value);
6799 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6802 if total_msat.is_none() {
6803 if payment_data.is_none() {
6804 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6806 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6808 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6812 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6815 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6822 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6823 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6824 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6827 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6828 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6829 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6830 let mut payment_id = None;
6831 let mut payment_secret = None;
6832 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6833 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6834 (0, session_priv, required),
6835 (1, payment_id, option),
6836 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6837 (3, payment_secret, option),
6838 (4, path, vec_type),
6839 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6841 if payment_id.is_none() {
6842 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6844 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6846 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6847 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6849 let path = path.unwrap();
6850 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6851 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6852 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6855 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6856 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6857 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6859 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6864 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6865 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6870 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6871 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6873 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6875 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6876 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6877 (0, session_priv, required),
6878 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6879 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6880 (3, payment_secret, option),
6881 (4, *path, vec_type),
6882 (5, payment_params, option),
6885 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6887 field.write(writer)?;
6894 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6895 (0, forward_info, required),
6896 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6897 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6898 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6899 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6902 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6904 (0, htlc_id, required),
6905 (2, err_packet, required),
6910 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6911 (0, payment_secret, required),
6912 (2, expiry_time, required),
6913 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6914 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6915 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6918 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6920 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6921 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6922 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6923 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6924 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6925 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6929 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6930 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6932 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6934 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6936 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6937 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6938 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6941 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6943 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6944 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6945 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6946 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6947 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6948 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6949 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6950 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6952 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6953 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6954 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6955 unfunded_channels += 1;
6960 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6962 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6965 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6966 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6967 channel.write(writer)?;
6974 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6975 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6976 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6977 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6978 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6979 for forward in pending_forwards {
6980 forward.write(writer)?;
6985 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6987 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6988 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6989 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6991 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6992 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6993 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6994 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6995 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6996 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6997 htlc.write(writer)?;
6999 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7002 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7003 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7004 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7005 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7006 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7007 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7008 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7011 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7012 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7013 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7014 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7015 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7017 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7018 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7019 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7020 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7021 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7022 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7023 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7028 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7029 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7030 for event in events.iter() {
7031 event.write(writer)?;
7034 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7035 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7036 for event in background_events.iter() {
7038 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7040 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7041 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7046 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7047 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7048 // likely to be identical.
7049 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7050 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7052 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7053 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7054 hash.write(writer)?;
7055 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7058 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7059 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7060 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7061 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7062 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7065 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7066 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7068 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7069 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7070 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7071 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7074 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7075 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7079 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7080 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7081 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7083 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7084 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7085 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7091 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7092 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7093 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7094 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7097 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7098 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7099 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7100 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7101 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7104 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7105 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7106 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7107 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7108 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7109 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7110 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7111 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7112 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7113 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7120 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7122 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7124 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7125 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7126 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7127 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7128 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7129 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7130 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7131 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7132 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7133 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7134 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7135 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7136 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7138 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7139 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7141 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7142 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7144 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7145 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7146 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7147 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7148 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7149 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7151 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7152 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7154 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7155 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7156 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7157 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7158 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7163 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7164 pub entropy_source: ES,
7166 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7167 pub node_signer: NS,
7169 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7170 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7172 pub signer_provider: SP,
7174 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7176 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7177 pub fee_estimator: F,
7178 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7180 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7181 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7182 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7183 pub chain_monitor: M,
7185 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7186 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7187 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7188 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7189 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7190 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7192 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7194 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7195 /// deserialization.
7197 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7198 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7199 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7201 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7202 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7204 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7205 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7206 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7207 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7209 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7212 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7213 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7216 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7217 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7219 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7220 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7221 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7222 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7223 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7224 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7228 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7229 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7230 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7231 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7232 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7234 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7235 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7240 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7241 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7242 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7243 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7245 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7246 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7247 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7248 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7249 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7250 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7254 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7255 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7256 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7260 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7261 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7263 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7264 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7265 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7267 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7268 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7272 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7273 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7275 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7276 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7277 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7279 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7281 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7282 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7283 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7284 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7285 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7286 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7287 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7288 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7289 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7291 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7292 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7293 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7294 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7295 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7296 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7297 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7298 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7299 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7300 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7301 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7302 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7303 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7304 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7305 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7306 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7307 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7308 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7309 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7310 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7311 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7312 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7313 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7314 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7315 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7316 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7317 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7318 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7319 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7320 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7321 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7322 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7324 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7325 let mut found_htlc = false;
7326 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7327 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7330 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7331 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7332 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7333 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7334 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7335 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7336 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7337 log_info!(args.logger,
7338 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7339 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7340 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7344 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7345 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7346 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7348 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7349 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7351 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7353 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7354 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7357 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7358 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7359 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7363 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7364 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7365 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7366 // safely discard the channel.
7367 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7368 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7369 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7370 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7371 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7374 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7375 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7376 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7377 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7378 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7379 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7383 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7384 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7385 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7386 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7390 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7391 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7392 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7393 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7394 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7395 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7396 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7397 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7398 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7400 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7403 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7404 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7405 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7406 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7407 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7409 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7410 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7412 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7415 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7416 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7417 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7418 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7419 let peer_state = PeerState {
7420 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7421 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7422 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7423 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7424 is_connected: false,
7426 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7429 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7430 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7431 for _ in 0..event_count {
7432 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7433 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7438 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7439 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7440 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7441 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7442 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7443 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7447 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7448 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7452 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7453 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7458 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7459 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7460 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7461 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7462 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7464 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7466 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7471 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7472 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7473 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7474 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7475 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7476 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7477 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7478 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7479 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7480 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7481 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7482 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7483 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7484 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7485 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7486 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7487 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7488 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7489 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7490 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7492 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7493 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7496 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7497 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7500 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7501 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7504 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7505 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7506 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7507 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7508 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7509 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7511 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7513 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7514 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7515 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7519 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7520 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7521 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7522 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7523 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7524 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7525 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7527 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7528 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7529 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7530 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7531 if path.is_empty() {
7532 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7533 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7536 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7537 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7538 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7539 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7541 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7542 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7543 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7546 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7547 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7548 retry_strategy: None,
7549 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7550 payment_params: None,
7551 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7552 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7554 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7555 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7556 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7557 total_msat: path_amt,
7558 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7560 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7561 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7566 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7568 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7569 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7570 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7571 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7573 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7574 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7575 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7576 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7577 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7578 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7579 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7580 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7581 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7582 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7583 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7588 !forwards.is_empty()
7590 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7591 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7592 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7593 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7594 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7595 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7596 intercepted_id != ev_id
7603 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7604 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7605 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7606 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7607 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7608 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7609 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7610 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7611 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7612 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7613 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7614 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7615 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7624 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7625 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7626 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7627 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7628 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7629 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7630 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7631 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7635 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7636 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7638 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7639 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7640 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7641 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7643 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7644 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7647 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7648 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7649 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7650 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7651 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7653 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7654 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7655 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7656 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7657 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7658 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7659 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7660 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7662 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7663 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7667 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7669 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7671 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7672 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7674 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7678 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7679 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7681 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7683 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7685 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7686 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7687 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7692 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7693 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7696 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7697 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7698 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7700 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7701 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7702 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7704 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7705 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7706 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7707 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7708 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7709 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7711 if chan.is_usable() {
7712 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7713 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7714 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7715 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7716 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7722 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7724 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7725 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7726 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7727 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7728 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7729 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7730 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7731 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7732 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7733 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7734 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7736 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7737 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7739 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7740 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7741 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7742 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7744 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7745 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7746 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7747 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7749 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7750 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7751 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7752 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7754 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7755 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7756 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7759 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7760 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7763 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7764 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7767 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7770 purpose: payment_purpose,
7771 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7777 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7778 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7779 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7781 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7782 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7786 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7788 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7789 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7790 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7791 router: args.router,
7793 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7795 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7796 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7797 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7798 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7800 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7801 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7802 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7803 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7804 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7805 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7807 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7812 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7814 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7816 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7817 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7818 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7819 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7821 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7822 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7823 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7825 logger: args.logger,
7826 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7829 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7830 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7831 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7832 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7833 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7836 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7837 //connection or two.
7839 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7845 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7846 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7847 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7848 use core::time::Duration;
7849 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7850 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7851 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7852 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7853 use crate::ln::msgs;
7854 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7855 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7856 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7857 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7858 use crate::util::test_utils;
7859 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7860 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7863 fn test_notify_limits() {
7864 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7865 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7869 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7871 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7872 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7873 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7874 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7875 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7877 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7879 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7880 // to connect messages with new values
7881 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7882 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7883 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7884 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7885 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7886 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7888 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7889 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7890 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7891 // ... but the last node should not.
7892 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7893 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7894 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7895 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7897 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7898 // about the channel.
7899 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7900 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7901 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7903 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7905 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7906 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7907 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7908 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7909 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7910 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7912 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7913 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7914 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7916 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7917 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7918 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7919 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7920 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7921 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7923 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7924 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7925 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7926 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7927 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7928 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7929 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7930 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7932 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7933 // the channel info has updated.
7934 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7935 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7936 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7937 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7938 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7939 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7943 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7944 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7946 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7947 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7948 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7949 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7950 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7952 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7953 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7954 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7955 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7957 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7958 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7959 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7960 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7961 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7962 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7964 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7966 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7968 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7969 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7971 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7973 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7974 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7975 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7977 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7978 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7979 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7981 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7982 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7983 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7984 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7985 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7986 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7987 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7988 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7989 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7991 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7992 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7994 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7995 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7996 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7998 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7999 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8000 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8001 // lightning messages manually.
8002 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8003 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8006 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8007 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8008 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8010 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8011 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8013 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8014 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8016 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8017 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8018 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8020 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8021 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8022 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8024 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8026 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8028 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8029 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8032 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8033 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8034 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8035 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8037 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8038 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8039 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8040 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8045 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8046 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8047 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8048 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8053 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8054 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8055 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8056 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8063 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8064 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8065 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8066 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8067 // fails as expected.
8068 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8069 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8072 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8073 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8074 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8076 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8077 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8078 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8080 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8081 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8082 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8083 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8085 let route = find_route(
8086 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8087 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8089 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8091 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8093 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8094 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8095 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8097 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8098 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8099 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8100 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8103 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8104 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8105 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8106 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8107 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8108 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8109 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8110 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8111 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8113 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8114 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8116 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8117 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8118 let route = find_route(
8119 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8120 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8122 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8124 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8126 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8127 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8128 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8130 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8131 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8132 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8134 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8135 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8136 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8137 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8138 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8142 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8144 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8145 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8146 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8147 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8148 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8149 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8150 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8151 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8152 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8154 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8155 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8159 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8160 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8161 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8165 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8167 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8168 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8170 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8171 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8172 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8173 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8175 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8176 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8177 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8178 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8179 let route = find_route(
8180 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8181 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8184 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8185 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8186 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8187 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8190 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8191 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8192 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8193 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8194 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8195 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8196 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8198 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8202 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8203 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8207 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8209 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8210 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8212 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8213 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8214 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8215 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8217 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8218 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8219 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8220 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8221 let route = find_route(
8222 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8223 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8226 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8227 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8228 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8229 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8230 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8233 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8234 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8235 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8236 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8237 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8238 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8239 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8241 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8245 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8249 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8251 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8252 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8253 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8254 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8256 // Marshall an MPP route.
8257 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8258 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8259 route.paths.push(path);
8260 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8261 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8262 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8263 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8264 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8265 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8267 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8268 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8269 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8270 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8275 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8276 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8277 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8279 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8281 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8283 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8284 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8286 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8287 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8289 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8292 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8293 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8294 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8295 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8296 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8297 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8300 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8303 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8304 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8309 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8310 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8314 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8316 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8317 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8319 total_msat: 100_000,
8322 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8323 // payment verification fails as expected.
8324 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8325 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8326 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8327 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8329 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8333 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8334 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8338 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8339 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8340 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8341 // the channel is successfully closed.
8342 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8343 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8344 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8345 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8347 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8348 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8349 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8350 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8351 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8353 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8354 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8356 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8357 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8358 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8359 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8362 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8364 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8365 // as it has the funding transaction.
8366 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8367 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8368 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8371 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8373 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8375 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8377 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8378 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8379 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8383 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8384 // as it has the funding transaction.
8385 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8386 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8387 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8390 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8391 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8393 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8394 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8395 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8397 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8398 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8399 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8400 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8402 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8403 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8405 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8406 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8407 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8408 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8409 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8410 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8411 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8415 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8416 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8417 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8418 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8419 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8420 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8421 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8424 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8426 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8427 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8428 // closing transaction).
8429 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8430 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8431 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8433 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8434 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8435 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8436 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8437 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8440 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8442 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8444 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8445 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8446 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8448 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8450 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8451 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8454 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8455 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8456 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8459 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8460 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8461 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8464 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8466 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8467 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8469 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8470 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8472 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8473 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8478 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8479 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8480 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8481 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8482 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8483 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8484 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8485 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8488 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8489 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8490 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8492 // Test the API functions.
8493 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8495 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8497 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8499 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8501 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8503 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8505 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8509 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8510 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8516 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8519 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8521 let mut funding_tx = None;
8522 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8523 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8524 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8527 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8528 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8529 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8530 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8531 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8533 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8534 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8535 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8537 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8540 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8543 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8544 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8545 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8546 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8547 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8549 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8550 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8552 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8553 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8554 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8555 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8556 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8557 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8558 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8560 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8561 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8562 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8563 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8565 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8566 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8567 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8568 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8569 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8570 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8571 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8573 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8574 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8575 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8576 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8578 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8579 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8580 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8581 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8583 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8584 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8586 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8587 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8588 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8589 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8590 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8592 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8593 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8594 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8596 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8597 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8598 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8600 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8601 // "protected" and can connect again.
8602 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8603 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8604 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8605 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8607 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8609 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8610 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8614 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8615 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8616 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8619 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8621 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8623 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8624 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8627 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8628 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8629 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8632 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8634 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8635 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8636 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8638 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8639 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8640 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8642 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8643 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8644 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8645 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8649 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8650 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8651 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8654 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8655 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8657 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8659 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8661 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8662 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8664 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8665 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8666 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8667 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8668 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8669 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8671 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8672 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8674 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8675 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8677 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8679 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8680 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8683 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8684 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8685 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8686 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8687 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8688 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8689 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8691 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8692 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8693 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8694 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8700 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8701 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8703 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8704 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8705 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8707 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8708 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8712 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8717 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8718 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8719 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8720 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8723 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8724 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8725 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8726 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8727 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8729 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8730 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8731 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8733 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8734 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8736 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8737 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8739 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8742 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8743 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8745 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8746 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8748 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8752 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8754 use crate::chain::Listen;
8755 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8756 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8757 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8758 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8759 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8760 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8761 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8762 use crate::util::test_utils;
8763 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8764 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8766 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8767 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8768 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8770 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8774 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8775 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8776 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8777 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8778 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8779 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8780 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8781 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8786 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8787 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8790 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8791 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8792 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8794 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8796 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8797 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8798 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8799 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8800 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8802 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8803 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8805 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8806 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8807 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8808 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8810 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8812 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8814 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8815 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8816 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8817 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8818 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8820 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8822 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8824 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8825 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8826 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8827 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8828 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8831 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8832 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8833 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8835 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8836 } else { panic!(); }
8838 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8839 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8841 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8844 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8847 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8848 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8850 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8851 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8852 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8853 match msg_events[0] {
8854 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8855 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8856 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8860 match msg_events[1] {
8861 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8865 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8866 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8868 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8869 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8871 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8874 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8875 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8877 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8878 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8883 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8885 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8886 macro_rules! send_payment {
8887 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8888 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8889 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8890 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8891 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8892 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8893 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8894 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8895 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8896 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8898 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8899 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8901 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8902 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8904 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8905 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8906 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8907 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8908 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8909 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8910 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8911 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8914 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8915 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8916 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8918 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8920 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8921 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8922 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8924 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8927 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8928 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8929 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8930 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8932 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8937 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8938 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);