1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
235 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
236 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
237 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
238 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
239 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
242 session_priv: SecretKey,
243 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
244 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
245 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
246 payment_id: PaymentId,
247 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
248 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
249 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
250 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
252 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
255 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
256 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
257 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
259 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
261 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
266 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
267 payment_id.hash(hasher);
268 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
269 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
270 payment_params.hash(hasher);
275 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
278 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
279 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
281 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
282 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
283 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
284 payment_secret: None,
285 payment_params: None,
290 struct ReceiveError {
296 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
297 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
299 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
300 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
301 pub enum FailureCode {
302 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
303 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
304 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
305 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
306 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
307 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
308 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
309 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
310 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
311 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
312 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
315 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
317 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
318 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
319 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
320 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
321 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
323 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
324 err: msgs::LightningError,
325 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
326 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
328 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
330 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 shutdown_finish: None,
346 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
348 err: LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
353 shutdown_finish: None,
357 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
358 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
361 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
363 err: LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
373 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
377 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
380 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
382 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
383 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
387 log_level: Level::Warn,
390 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
394 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
397 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 shutdown_finish: None,
410 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
411 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
412 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
413 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
414 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
416 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
417 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
418 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
419 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
420 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
421 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
422 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
424 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
428 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
429 struct ClaimingPayment {
431 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
432 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
434 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
435 (0, amount_msat, required),
436 (2, payment_purpose, required),
437 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
440 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
441 struct ClaimablePayments {
442 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
443 /// failed/claimed by the user.
445 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
446 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
448 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
449 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
450 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
452 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
453 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
454 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
455 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
458 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
459 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
460 /// quite some time lag.
461 enum BackgroundEvent {
462 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
463 /// commitment transaction.
464 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
467 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
468 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
469 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
470 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
471 /// event can be generated.
472 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
473 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
474 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
477 /// State we hold per-peer.
478 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
479 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
481 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
482 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
484 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
485 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
486 latest_features: InitFeatures,
487 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
488 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
489 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
490 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
491 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
492 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
496 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
497 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
499 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
502 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
503 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
504 struct PendingInboundPayment {
505 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
506 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
507 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
508 /// this payment being removed.
510 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
511 user_payment_id: u64,
512 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
513 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
514 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
517 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
518 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
519 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
520 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
521 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
522 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
523 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
525 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
526 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
534 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
536 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
541 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
542 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
543 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
544 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
545 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
546 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
547 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
548 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
550 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
551 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
553 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
554 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
556 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
557 /// to individual Channels.
559 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
560 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
561 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
562 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
564 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
565 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
566 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
567 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
568 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
569 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
570 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
572 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
573 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
574 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
575 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
578 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
579 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
580 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
581 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
582 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
584 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
585 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
586 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
587 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
588 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
591 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
592 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
593 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
594 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
595 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
599 // `total_consistency_lock`
601 // |__`forward_htlcs`
603 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
605 // |__`per_peer_state`
607 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
609 // | |__`claimable_payments`
611 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
617 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
619 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
623 // | |__`pending_events`
625 // | |__`pending_background_events`
627 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
629 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
630 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
631 ES::Target: EntropySource,
632 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
633 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
638 default_configuration: UserConfig,
639 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
640 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
646 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
648 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
650 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
651 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
653 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
654 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
655 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
656 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
658 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
659 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
661 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
662 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
663 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
664 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
665 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
666 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
667 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
668 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
670 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
672 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
673 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
675 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
677 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
678 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
679 /// and via the classic SCID.
681 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
682 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
684 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
686 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
688 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
689 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
690 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
692 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
693 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
695 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
696 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
698 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
699 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
701 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
702 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
703 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
704 /// active channel list on load.
706 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
707 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
709 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
711 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
712 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
713 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
715 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
716 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
717 /// the handling of the events.
719 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
720 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
723 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
724 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
725 /// would break backwards compatability.
726 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
727 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
728 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
731 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
733 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
735 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
736 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
737 /// confirmation depth.
739 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
740 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
741 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
743 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
745 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
747 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
749 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
751 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
753 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
754 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
755 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
757 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
758 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
760 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
761 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
762 /// keeping additional state.
763 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
765 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
766 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
767 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
768 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
770 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (message queues and the like). Currently
771 /// the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer basis, as well as the peer's latest
774 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
775 /// are currently open with that peer.
777 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
778 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
781 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
783 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
784 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
785 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
786 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
787 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
789 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
790 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
791 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
792 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
793 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
794 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
795 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
796 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
797 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
798 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
799 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
801 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
810 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
812 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
813 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
814 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
815 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
816 pub struct ChainParameters {
817 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
818 pub network: Network,
820 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
822 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
823 pub best_block: BestBlock,
826 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
832 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
833 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
834 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
835 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
836 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
837 /// updates are ready for persistence).
839 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
840 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
841 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
842 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
843 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
845 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
846 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
849 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
850 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
851 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
854 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
855 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
857 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
858 persistence_notifier: notifier,
859 should_persist: persist_check,
860 _read_guard: read_guard,
865 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
867 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
868 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
873 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
874 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
876 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
878 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
879 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
880 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
881 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
882 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
884 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
885 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
887 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
889 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
890 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
891 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
892 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
893 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
894 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
895 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
896 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
897 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
898 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
899 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
900 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
901 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
903 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
904 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
906 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
907 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
908 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
909 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
911 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
912 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
913 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
914 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
915 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
916 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
919 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
921 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
922 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
925 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
927 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
928 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
930 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
931 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
932 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
933 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
935 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
936 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
937 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
938 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
939 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
940 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
941 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
942 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
943 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
944 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
945 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
948 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
949 /// to better separate parameters.
950 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
951 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
952 /// The node_id of our counterparty
953 pub node_id: PublicKey,
954 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
955 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
956 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
957 pub features: InitFeatures,
958 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
959 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
960 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
962 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
964 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
965 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
966 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
967 /// payments to us through this channel.
968 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
969 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
970 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
971 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
972 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
973 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
974 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
978 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
979 pub struct ChannelDetails {
980 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
981 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
982 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
983 /// lifetime of the channel.
984 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
985 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
986 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
987 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
988 /// our counterparty already.
990 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
991 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
992 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
993 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
995 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
996 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
997 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
998 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1000 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1001 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1003 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1004 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1006 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1007 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1008 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1009 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1010 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1011 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1012 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1013 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1014 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1017 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1019 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1020 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1021 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1022 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1023 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1024 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1025 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1027 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1028 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1030 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1031 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1032 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1033 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1034 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1035 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1036 /// this value on chain.
1038 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1040 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1042 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1043 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1044 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1045 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1047 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1048 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1049 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1050 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1052 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1053 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1054 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1055 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1057 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1058 pub balance_msat: u64,
1059 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1060 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1061 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1062 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1064 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1066 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1067 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1068 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1069 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1070 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1071 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1072 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1073 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1075 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1076 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1077 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1078 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1079 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1080 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1081 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1083 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1084 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1085 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1086 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1087 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1088 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1089 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1090 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1091 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1093 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1095 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1096 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1097 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1098 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1099 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1101 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1102 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1103 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1104 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1105 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1106 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1107 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1109 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1110 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1111 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1112 pub is_outbound: bool,
1113 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1114 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1115 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1116 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1117 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1119 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1120 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1121 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1122 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1124 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1125 pub is_usable: bool,
1126 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1127 pub is_public: bool,
1128 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1129 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1130 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1131 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1132 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1133 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1135 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1136 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1139 impl ChannelDetails {
1140 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1141 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1142 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1144 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1145 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1146 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1147 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1150 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1151 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1152 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1154 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1155 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1156 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1157 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1161 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1162 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1163 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1164 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1165 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1167 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1169 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1170 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1171 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1174 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1175 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1176 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1178 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1179 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1180 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1182 /// After a payment is explicitly abandoned by calling [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it
1183 /// is marked as abandoned until an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated. A payment could also
1184 /// be marked as abandoned if pathfinding fails repeatedly or retries have been exhausted.
1186 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1187 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1191 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1193 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1195 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1196 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1197 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1198 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1200 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1201 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1202 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1205 macro_rules! handle_error {
1206 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1209 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1210 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
1212 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1213 // entering the macro.
1214 debug_assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1215 debug_assert!($self.per_peer_state.try_write().is_ok());
1218 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1220 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1221 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1222 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1223 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1227 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1228 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1229 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1230 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1235 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1236 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1238 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1239 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1240 action: err.action.clone()
1244 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1245 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1246 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1247 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1248 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1250 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
1252 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1253 // This shouldn't occour in tests unless an unkown counterparty_node_id
1254 // has been passed to our message handling functions.
1255 let expected_error_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", $counterparty_node_id);
1257 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1258 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { ref channel_id, ref data }
1261 assert_eq!(*data, expected_error_str);
1262 if let Some((err_channel_id, _user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1263 debug_assert_eq!(*channel_id, err_channel_id);
1266 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Unexpected event"),
1272 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1279 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1280 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1281 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1282 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1283 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1284 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1286 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1287 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1288 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1289 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1290 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1292 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1293 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1295 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1299 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1300 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1301 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1303 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1304 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1306 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1307 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1309 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1310 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1311 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1312 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1313 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1314 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1320 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1321 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1325 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1327 $entry.remove_entry();
1335 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1336 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1340 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1342 $entry.remove_entry();
1350 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1351 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1353 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1354 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1360 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1361 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1363 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1364 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1365 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1366 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1367 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1368 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1369 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1370 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1371 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1372 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1373 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1374 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1375 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1376 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1379 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1380 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1381 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1382 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1383 match $action_type {
1384 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1385 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1387 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1388 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1390 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1391 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1392 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1393 if !$resend_commitment {
1394 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1397 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1399 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1400 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1402 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1407 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1408 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1410 $entry.remove_entry();
1414 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1415 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1416 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1418 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1419 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1421 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1422 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1424 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1425 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1427 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1428 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1432 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1433 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1434 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1435 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1436 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1438 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1439 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1440 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1441 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1442 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1443 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1444 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1445 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1446 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1447 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1452 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1453 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1454 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1456 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1457 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1458 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1459 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1460 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1461 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1464 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1469 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1471 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1472 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1473 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1474 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1475 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1476 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1480 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1482 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1483 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1485 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1487 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1488 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1489 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1490 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1491 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1492 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1493 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1494 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1496 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1497 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1498 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1503 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1505 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1506 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1507 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1508 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1509 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1510 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1511 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1512 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1514 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1517 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1518 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1520 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1522 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1524 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1526 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1527 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1528 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1529 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1539 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1540 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1541 &self.default_configuration
1544 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1545 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1546 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1549 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1550 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1552 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1554 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1558 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1563 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1565 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1566 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1567 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1568 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1569 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1571 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1572 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1574 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1575 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1576 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1578 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1579 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1580 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1581 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1582 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1583 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1585 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1586 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1587 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1588 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1589 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1594 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1595 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1597 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1599 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key);
1600 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1601 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) });
1604 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1606 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1607 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1608 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1609 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1610 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1611 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1615 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1620 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1622 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1623 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1626 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1628 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1631 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1635 node_id: their_network_key,
1638 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1641 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1642 let mut res = Vec::new();
1643 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1644 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1645 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1646 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1647 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1648 // the same channel.
1649 res.reserve(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1651 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1653 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1654 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1655 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1656 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1657 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1658 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1659 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1660 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1661 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1662 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1663 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1664 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1665 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1666 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1667 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1668 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1669 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1670 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1671 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1672 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1673 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1674 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1676 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1677 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1678 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1679 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1680 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1681 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1682 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1683 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1684 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1685 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1686 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1687 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1688 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1689 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1690 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1691 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1692 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1693 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1694 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1695 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1696 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1697 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1698 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1699 config: Some(channel.config()),
1707 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1708 /// more information.
1709 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1710 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1713 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1714 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1716 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1717 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1720 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1721 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1722 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1723 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1724 // really wanted anyway.
1725 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1728 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1729 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1731 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1732 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1733 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider retrying the payment.
1735 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1736 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1737 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1738 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1739 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1740 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1741 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1742 total_msat: *total_msat,
1745 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1746 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1748 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1749 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1751 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1756 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1757 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1758 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1759 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1760 Some(transaction) => {
1761 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1765 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1766 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1767 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1768 reason: closure_reason
1772 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1775 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1776 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1779 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
1780 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1781 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
1784 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1785 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1786 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1787 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1788 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1789 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1791 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1792 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1793 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1794 let (result, is_permanent) =
1795 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1797 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1803 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1807 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1808 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1809 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1810 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1814 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1818 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1822 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1823 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1824 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1825 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1828 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1832 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1833 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1834 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1836 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1837 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1839 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1840 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1841 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1842 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1844 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1846 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1847 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1848 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1849 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1850 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1853 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1854 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1855 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1857 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1858 /// the channel being closed or not:
1859 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1860 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1861 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1862 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1863 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1864 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1865 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1867 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1869 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1870 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1871 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1872 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1873 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1877 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1878 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1879 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1880 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1881 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1882 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1883 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1884 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1886 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1887 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1888 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1889 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1890 // ignore the result here.
1891 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1895 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1896 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1897 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1898 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1900 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id);
1902 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
1903 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) });
1905 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1906 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1907 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1908 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1909 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1911 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1913 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1915 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1918 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1919 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1920 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1921 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1922 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1927 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1930 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1932 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1933 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1935 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1936 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1937 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
1938 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1939 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1940 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1941 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1952 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1953 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1954 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1956 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1957 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1958 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1961 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1962 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1963 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1965 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1966 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1967 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1968 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1969 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
1972 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1973 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1974 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
1975 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1976 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1980 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
1981 /// local transaction(s).
1982 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
1983 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1984 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1988 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1989 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1991 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1992 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1993 return Err(ReceiveError {
1994 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1996 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
1999 // final_expiry_too_soon
2000 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2001 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2003 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2004 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2005 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2006 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2007 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2008 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2009 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2010 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2011 return Err(ReceiveError {
2012 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2013 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2016 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2017 return Err(ReceiveError {
2019 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2020 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2024 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2025 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2026 return Err(ReceiveError {
2027 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2028 err_data: Vec::new(),
2029 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2032 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2033 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2034 return Err(ReceiveError {
2035 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2036 err_data: Vec::new(),
2037 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2039 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2040 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2042 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2043 phantom_shared_secret,
2045 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2046 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2047 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2048 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2049 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2050 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2051 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2052 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2053 return Err(ReceiveError {
2054 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2055 err_data: Vec::new(),
2056 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2060 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2062 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2065 return Err(ReceiveError {
2066 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2067 err_data: Vec::new(),
2068 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2073 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2076 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2077 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2078 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2079 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2083 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2084 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2085 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2087 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2088 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2089 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2090 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2091 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2092 failure_code: $err_code,
2098 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2099 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2102 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2103 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2104 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2106 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2107 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2108 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2109 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2110 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2111 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2112 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2113 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2115 macro_rules! return_err {
2116 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2118 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2119 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2120 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2121 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2122 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2123 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2129 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2131 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2132 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2134 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2135 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2139 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2140 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2142 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2144 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2145 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2146 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2147 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2148 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2150 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2153 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2154 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2155 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2157 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2158 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2159 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2162 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2163 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2164 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2165 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2169 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2170 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2171 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2174 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2175 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2176 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2177 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2178 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2183 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2184 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2185 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2186 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2187 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2188 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2189 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2190 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2191 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2192 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2193 // phantom or an intercept.
2194 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2195 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2196 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2200 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2203 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2205 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2206 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2207 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2208 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2209 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2211 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2212 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2213 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2215 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2216 // have no consistency guarantees.
2217 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2221 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2222 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2223 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2224 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2225 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2227 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2228 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2229 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2230 // we don't have the channel here.
2231 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2233 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2235 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2236 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2237 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2238 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2239 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2240 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2241 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2243 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2244 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2246 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2247 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2251 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2252 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2253 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2254 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2256 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2263 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2264 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2265 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2266 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2267 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2268 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2270 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2271 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2273 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2274 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2275 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2276 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2277 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2278 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2279 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2280 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2281 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2282 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2288 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2289 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2290 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2291 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2293 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2294 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2296 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2297 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2298 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2300 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2301 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2302 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2303 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2304 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2305 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2306 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2310 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2315 pending_forward_info
2318 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2319 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2320 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2322 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2323 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2324 if !chan.should_announce() {
2325 return Err(LightningError {
2326 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2327 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2330 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2331 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2333 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2334 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2337 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2338 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2339 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2340 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2341 /// May be called with peer_state already locked!
2342 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2344 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2345 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2349 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2351 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2353 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2355 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2356 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2358 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2359 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2360 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2361 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2362 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2363 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2364 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2365 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2367 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2368 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2369 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2371 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2373 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2379 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2380 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2382 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2383 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2385 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2386 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2387 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2388 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2389 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2391 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2395 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2396 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2397 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2398 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2402 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2403 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2404 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" });
2406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2408 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2410 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2411 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2413 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2414 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2416 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2417 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2419 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2420 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2421 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2424 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2425 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2426 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2428 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2429 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2431 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2432 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2433 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2434 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2435 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2436 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2437 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2438 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2439 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2440 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2442 _ => unreachable!(),
2445 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2446 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2447 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2448 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2449 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2450 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2451 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2452 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2461 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2462 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2463 // `channel_by_id` map.
2464 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2465 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2470 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2471 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2473 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2478 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2480 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2481 /// fields for more info.
2483 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2484 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2486 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2488 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2489 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2490 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2491 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2494 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2495 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2496 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2497 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2498 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2500 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2501 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2502 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2503 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2505 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2507 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2508 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2509 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2511 /// In general, a path may raise:
2512 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2513 /// node public key) is specified.
2514 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2515 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2517 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2518 /// relevant updates.
2520 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2521 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2522 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2524 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2526 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2527 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2528 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2529 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2530 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2532 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2533 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2534 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2536 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2537 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2538 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2539 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2540 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2541 self.pending_outbound_payments
2542 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2543 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2544 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2547 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2548 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2549 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2550 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2551 self.pending_outbound_payments
2552 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2553 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2554 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2555 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2556 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2560 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2561 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2562 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2563 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2564 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2568 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2569 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2570 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2574 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2576 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2577 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2578 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2579 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2580 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2582 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2583 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2584 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2586 self.pending_outbound_payments.retry_payment_with_route(route, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2587 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2588 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2591 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2593 /// After this method returns, no future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2594 /// are allowed. If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be
2595 /// generated as soon as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2597 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2598 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2599 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2601 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2602 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, the payment may still be in the pending state
2603 /// upon restart. This allows further calls to [`retry_payment`] (and requiring a second call
2604 /// to [`abandon_payment`] to mark the payment as failed again). Otherwise, future calls to
2605 /// [`retry_payment`] will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`].
2607 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
2608 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2609 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2610 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2611 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2613 if let Some(payment_failed_ev) = self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id) {
2614 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(payment_failed_ev);
2618 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2619 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2620 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2621 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2622 /// never reach the recipient.
2624 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2625 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2627 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2628 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2630 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2632 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2633 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2634 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2635 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2636 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2638 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2639 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2642 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2643 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2644 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2645 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2646 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2647 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2648 self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2650 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2651 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2654 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2655 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2656 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2657 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2658 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2659 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2660 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2661 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2664 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2667 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2668 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2671 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2672 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2673 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2674 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2675 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2676 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2677 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2678 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2679 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })
2682 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2686 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2688 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2690 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2691 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2692 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2693 } else { unreachable!(); })
2696 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2699 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2700 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2703 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2704 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2709 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2710 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2713 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2715 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2717 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2718 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2719 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2720 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2729 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2730 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2731 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2735 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2737 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2738 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2740 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2741 /// across the p2p network.
2743 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2744 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2746 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2747 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2748 /// keys per-channel).
2750 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2751 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2752 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2754 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2755 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2756 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2758 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2759 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2760 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2761 /// for more details.
2763 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2764 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2765 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2766 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2768 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2769 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2771 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2776 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2777 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2778 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2779 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2780 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2781 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2782 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2786 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2787 let mut output_index = None;
2788 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2789 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2790 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2791 if output_index.is_some() {
2792 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2793 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2796 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2797 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2798 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2801 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2804 if output_index.is_none() {
2805 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2806 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2809 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2813 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2815 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2816 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2817 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2818 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2820 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2821 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2823 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2824 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2826 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2828 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2829 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2830 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2831 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2832 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2833 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2834 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2835 pub fn update_channel_config(
2836 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2837 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2838 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2839 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2840 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2845 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2848 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
2849 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
2850 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
2852 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2853 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2854 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2855 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2856 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2857 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2861 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2862 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2863 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2866 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2867 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2868 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2869 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2870 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2878 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2879 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2881 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2882 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2884 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2885 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2886 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2887 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2888 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2890 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2891 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2893 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2896 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2897 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2898 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2899 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2900 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2903 let next_hop_scid = {
2904 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2905 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id) {
2906 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2907 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2908 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2910 if !chan.is_usable() {
2911 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2912 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2915 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2917 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2918 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) });
2926 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2927 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2928 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2931 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2932 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2933 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2935 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2937 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2938 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2941 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2942 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2943 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2944 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2945 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2947 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2951 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2952 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2954 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2957 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2958 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2961 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2962 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2963 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2966 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
2967 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2968 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2969 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2970 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
2971 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2972 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2975 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
2976 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
2977 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
2978 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2983 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2985 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2986 /// Will likely generate further events.
2987 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2990 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2991 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2992 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2994 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
2995 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
2997 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
2998 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2999 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3001 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3002 match forward_info {
3003 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3004 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3005 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3006 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3007 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3010 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3011 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3012 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3014 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3015 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3016 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3017 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3018 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3019 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3022 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3023 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3025 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3028 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3029 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3035 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3036 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3038 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3042 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3043 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3045 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3049 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3050 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3051 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3052 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3053 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3055 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3056 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3057 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3058 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3059 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3061 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3063 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3064 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3068 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3069 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3070 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3071 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3077 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3080 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3083 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3084 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3085 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3086 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3087 // problem, not ours.
3093 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3094 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3096 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3101 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3102 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
3103 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3106 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3107 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3108 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3110 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3114 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3115 match forward_info {
3116 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3117 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3118 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3119 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3120 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3123 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3124 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3125 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3126 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3127 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3128 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3129 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3130 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3132 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3133 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3134 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3136 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3137 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3139 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3141 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3142 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3143 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3144 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3149 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3150 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3152 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3153 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3154 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3155 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3157 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3160 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3162 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3163 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3164 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3173 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3174 match forward_info {
3175 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3176 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3177 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3178 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3181 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3182 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3183 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3184 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3186 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3187 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3189 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3192 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3193 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3194 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3195 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3196 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3197 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3198 phantom_shared_secret,
3200 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3202 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3207 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3208 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3209 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3210 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3211 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3213 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3214 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3215 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3216 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3217 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3218 phantom_shared_secret,
3220 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3221 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3225 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3226 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3227 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3228 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3229 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3232 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3233 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3234 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3236 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3237 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3238 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3241 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3242 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3243 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3246 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3247 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3248 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3249 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3251 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3255 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3256 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3257 total_value += htlc.value;
3258 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3259 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3260 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3262 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3263 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3265 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3267 _ => unreachable!(),
3270 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3272 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3273 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3274 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3275 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3276 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3277 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3278 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3281 amount_msat: total_value,
3282 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3283 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3285 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3287 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3288 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3290 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3292 payment_claimable_generated
3296 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3297 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3298 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3299 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3300 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3301 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3302 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3303 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3304 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3305 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3306 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3307 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3308 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3309 Ok(result) => result,
3311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3312 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3316 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3317 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3318 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3320 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3321 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3325 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3327 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3328 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3329 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3330 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3333 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3335 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3336 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3337 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3338 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3339 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3341 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3343 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3344 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3349 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3356 if payment_data.is_none() {
3357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3358 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3361 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3362 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3364 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3365 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3366 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3367 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3368 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3370 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3371 if payment_claimable_generated {
3372 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3378 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3379 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3387 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3388 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3389 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3390 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3391 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3393 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3394 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3396 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3398 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3399 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3400 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3402 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3404 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3405 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3406 events.append(&mut new_events);
3409 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3411 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3412 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3414 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3415 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3416 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3417 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3418 if background_events.is_empty() {
3422 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3424 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3425 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3426 // monitor updating completing.
3427 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3434 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3435 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3436 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3437 self.process_background_events();
3440 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3441 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3442 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3443 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3445 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3446 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3448 if !chan.is_live() {
3449 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3450 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3451 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3453 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3454 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3456 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3457 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3461 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3462 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3463 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3464 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3465 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3466 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3467 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3469 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3471 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3472 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3473 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3474 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3475 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3476 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3477 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3485 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3487 /// This currently includes:
3488 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3489 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3490 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3492 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3493 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3495 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3496 /// estimate fetches.
3497 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3498 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3499 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3500 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3502 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3504 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3505 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3507 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3508 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3509 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3510 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3511 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3512 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3513 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3514 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3516 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3517 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3518 handle_errors.push((Err(err), *counterparty_node_id));
3519 if needs_close { return false; }
3522 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3523 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3524 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3525 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3526 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3527 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3528 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3533 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3534 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3536 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3537 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3538 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3542 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3543 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3548 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3555 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3556 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3557 // This should be unreachable
3558 debug_assert!(false);
3561 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3562 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3563 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3564 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3566 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3567 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3568 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3570 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3577 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3578 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3579 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3580 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3581 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3584 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3585 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3588 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3590 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3591 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3592 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3593 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3594 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3601 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3602 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3603 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3605 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3606 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3607 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3608 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3610 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3611 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3612 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3613 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3614 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3615 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3618 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3619 /// reason for the failure.
3621 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3622 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3625 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3626 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3627 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3628 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3629 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3630 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3631 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3636 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3637 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3638 match failure_code {
3639 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3640 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3641 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3642 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3643 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3644 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3649 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3650 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3652 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3654 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3655 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3656 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3657 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3658 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3659 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3660 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3662 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3664 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3665 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3667 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3672 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3673 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3674 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3675 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3676 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3677 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3678 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3679 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3680 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3681 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3683 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3684 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3685 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3686 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3688 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3689 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3690 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3691 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3692 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3696 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3697 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3698 // be surfaced to the user.
3699 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3700 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3701 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3703 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3705 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3708 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3709 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3710 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3712 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3714 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3717 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3718 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3719 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3720 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3724 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3725 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3726 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3727 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
3729 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is not held when calling this
3731 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3732 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3733 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock aquired would.
3734 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3735 for (_, peer) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3736 debug_assert!(peer.try_lock().is_ok());
3740 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3741 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3742 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3745 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3746 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3747 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3749 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3750 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3752 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3753 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3754 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3756 let mut forward_event = None;
3757 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3758 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3759 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3761 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3763 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3765 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3766 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3769 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3770 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3771 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3772 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3773 time_forwardable: time
3776 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3777 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3778 failed_next_destination: destination,
3784 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3785 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3787 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3788 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3789 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3791 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3792 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3793 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3794 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3796 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3797 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3798 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3799 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3800 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3801 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3802 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3807 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3808 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3809 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3810 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3811 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3812 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3813 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3814 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3819 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3820 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3821 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3823 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3824 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3825 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3826 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3831 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3833 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3834 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3835 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3836 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3837 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3839 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3840 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3842 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3843 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3844 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3845 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3846 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3848 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3849 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3850 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3851 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3853 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3854 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3855 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3862 if let None = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3867 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id).unwrap();
3868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3871 if let None = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id) {
3876 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3877 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3878 debug_assert!(false);
3883 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3884 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3885 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3886 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3887 if sources.len() != 1 {
3888 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3889 debug_assert!(false);
3895 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3897 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3898 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3899 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3900 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3903 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3904 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3905 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3906 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3910 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3911 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3912 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3913 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3915 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3916 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3917 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3918 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3919 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3924 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3925 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3926 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3927 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3928 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3929 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3930 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3932 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3935 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
3936 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3937 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3938 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3942 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
3943 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
3944 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
3945 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3948 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
3950 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3951 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
3955 let (found_channel, mut peer_state_opt) = if counterparty_node_id_opt.is_some() && per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).is_some() {
3956 let peer_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id_opt.unwrap()).unwrap();
3957 let peer_state = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3958 let found_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&chan_id);
3959 (found_channel, Some(peer_state))
3960 } else { (false, None) };
3963 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap();
3964 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3965 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3966 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3967 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3968 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3969 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
3970 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3972 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3973 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3974 payment_preimage, e);
3975 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
3976 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3977 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3978 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
3979 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
3982 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3983 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3984 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3985 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3986 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3987 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3988 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3989 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3990 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3991 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3997 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
3998 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3999 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4005 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4006 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4007 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4009 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4010 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4011 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4012 // again on restart.
4013 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4014 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4015 payment_preimage, e);
4018 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4020 chan.remove_entry();
4022 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4023 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4024 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4025 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4029 // We've held the peer_state mutex since finding the channel and setting
4030 // found_channel to true, so the channel can't have been dropped.
4034 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4035 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4036 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4040 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4041 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4042 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4043 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4044 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4045 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4046 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4047 // again on restart.
4048 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4049 payment_preimage, update_res);
4051 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4052 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4053 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4054 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4055 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4056 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4057 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4058 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4063 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4064 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4067 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4069 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4070 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4072 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4073 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4074 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4075 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4076 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4077 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4078 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4081 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4082 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4084 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4086 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4092 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4093 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4094 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4100 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4101 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4102 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4105 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4106 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4108 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4109 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4110 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4111 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4112 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4116 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4117 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4123 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4124 /// update completion.
4125 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4126 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4127 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4128 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4129 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4130 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4131 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4133 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4134 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4135 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4136 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4139 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4140 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4142 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4144 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4149 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4151 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4152 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4153 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4154 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4159 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4160 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4161 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4162 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4163 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4168 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4172 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4178 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4179 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4180 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4186 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4190 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4191 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4192 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4194 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4195 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4196 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4197 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4198 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4203 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4204 let mut peer_state_lock;
4205 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4206 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return }
4207 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4210 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4211 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4215 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4219 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4220 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4221 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4222 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4223 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4224 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4226 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4227 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4228 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4233 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4234 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4235 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4238 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4240 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4241 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4243 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4244 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4245 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4246 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4250 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4252 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4253 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4256 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4257 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4258 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4260 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4261 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4262 /// used to accept such channels.
4264 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4265 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4266 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4267 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4270 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4271 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4273 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4274 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4275 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4277 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4278 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4280 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4281 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4283 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4284 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4286 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4287 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4288 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4289 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4292 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4295 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4296 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4297 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4298 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) });
4300 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4302 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4304 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4305 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4308 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4309 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4310 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4311 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4312 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4313 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4316 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4317 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4318 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4321 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4322 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4323 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4327 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4333 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4334 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4335 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4338 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4342 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4343 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4344 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4346 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4347 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4348 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4349 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4354 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4355 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4356 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4359 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4360 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4364 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4366 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4370 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4371 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4372 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4374 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4375 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4376 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4379 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4380 pending_events.push(
4381 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4382 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4383 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4384 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4385 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4386 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4391 entry.insert(channel);
4397 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4398 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4400 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4401 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4402 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4404 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4405 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4406 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4408 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4409 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4414 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4415 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4416 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4417 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4418 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4420 user_channel_id: user_id,
4425 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4426 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4427 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4428 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4429 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4431 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4432 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4435 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4437 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4439 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4442 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4443 // lock before watch_channel
4444 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4445 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4446 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4447 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4448 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4449 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4450 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4451 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4452 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4453 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4454 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4455 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4456 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4458 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4459 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4460 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4461 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4462 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4463 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4464 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4467 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4468 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4469 // the channel above.
4470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4472 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4476 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4477 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4478 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4480 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4481 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4482 funding_msg.channel_id))
4484 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4485 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4488 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4489 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4492 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4493 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4501 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4503 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4505 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4506 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4510 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4511 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4512 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4514 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4515 Ok(update) => update,
4516 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4518 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4519 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4521 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4522 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4523 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4524 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4525 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4526 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4527 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4533 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4534 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4538 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4541 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4542 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4546 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4547 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4548 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4549 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4550 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4552 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4553 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4554 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4555 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4556 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4557 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4558 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4559 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4560 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4561 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4562 msg: announcement_sigs,
4564 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4565 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4566 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4567 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4568 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4569 // announcement_signatures.
4570 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4571 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4572 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4573 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4579 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4587 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4588 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4589 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4590 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4591 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4592 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4593 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4597 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4600 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4601 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4602 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4603 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4606 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4607 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4609 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4610 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4611 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4612 let (result, is_permanent) =
4613 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4615 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4620 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4621 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4622 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4632 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4633 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4634 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4635 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4638 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4642 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4643 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4644 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4645 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4646 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4648 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4649 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4650 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4651 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4652 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4653 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4654 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4655 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4656 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4661 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4662 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4663 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4664 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4665 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4666 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4667 } else { (tx, None) }
4669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4672 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4673 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4674 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4676 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4677 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4678 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4679 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4680 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4684 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4689 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4690 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4691 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4692 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4694 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4695 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4696 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4697 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4699 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4700 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4701 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4702 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4703 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4705 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4706 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4707 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4710 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4711 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4712 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4713 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4714 match pending_forward_info {
4715 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4716 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4717 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4718 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4720 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4721 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4722 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4723 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4724 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4727 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4729 _ => pending_forward_info
4732 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4739 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4740 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4742 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4743 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4744 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4746 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4747 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4748 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4750 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4755 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4759 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4760 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4761 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4762 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4763 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
4765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4767 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4769 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4776 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4778 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4779 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4780 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4784 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4786 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4787 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4788 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4790 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4797 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4799 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4800 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4801 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4803 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4805 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4807 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4808 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4809 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4810 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4811 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4812 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4813 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4818 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4819 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4823 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4824 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4825 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4827 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4828 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4829 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4830 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4831 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4832 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4833 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4834 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4836 commitment_signed: msg,
4842 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4847 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4848 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4849 let mut forward_event = None;
4850 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4851 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4852 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4853 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4854 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4855 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4856 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4857 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4859 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4860 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4862 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4863 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4864 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4866 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4867 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4870 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4871 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4873 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4874 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4875 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4877 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4878 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4879 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4880 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4881 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4884 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4885 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4887 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4888 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4889 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4890 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4891 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4892 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4893 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4894 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4897 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4898 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4899 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4904 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4905 // payments are being processed.
4906 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4907 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4909 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4910 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4917 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4921 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4922 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4923 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4926 match forward_event {
4928 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4929 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4930 time_forwardable: time
4938 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4939 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4941 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4942 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
4943 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
4944 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4946 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4947 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4948 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4950 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4951 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4952 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4953 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4954 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
4955 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
4956 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4957 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4958 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4959 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4960 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4961 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4963 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4964 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
4965 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4966 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4967 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4968 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4970 } else { unreachable!(); }
4972 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4973 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4974 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4978 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4979 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4980 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4981 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4982 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
4983 chan.get().get_user_id()))
4985 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4988 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4990 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4991 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
4993 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4994 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4995 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4997 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
4998 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5005 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5006 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5007 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
5008 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
5009 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
5011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5013 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5015 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5022 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5024 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
5025 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
5026 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
5028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5030 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5032 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5033 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5037 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5038 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5039 msg, &self.default_configuration
5041 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5042 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5043 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5051 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5052 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5053 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5054 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5056 // It's not a local channel
5057 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5061 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5062 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
5063 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5067 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5069 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5070 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5071 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5072 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5073 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5074 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5076 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5078 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5079 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5080 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5081 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5083 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5084 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5087 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5089 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5092 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5094 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5097 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
5098 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt {
5099 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id));
5101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5103 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5105 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5106 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5107 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5108 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5109 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5110 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5111 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5112 let mut channel_update = None;
5113 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5114 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5115 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5118 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5119 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5120 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5121 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5122 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5123 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5124 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5129 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5130 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5131 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5132 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5133 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5134 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5138 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5142 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5143 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5146 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5147 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5152 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5153 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5154 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5155 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5156 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5157 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5158 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5159 match monitor_event {
5160 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5161 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5162 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5163 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5166 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5167 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5168 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5171 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5172 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5173 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5174 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5176 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5177 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5178 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5179 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5182 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5183 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5184 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5185 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5186 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5187 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5188 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5189 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5190 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5191 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5192 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5196 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5197 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5199 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5201 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5202 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5203 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5204 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5205 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5212 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5213 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5219 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5220 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5223 has_pending_monitor_events
5226 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5227 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5228 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5230 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5231 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5234 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5235 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5236 /// update was applied.
5237 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5238 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5239 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5240 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5242 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5244 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5245 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5246 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5247 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5248 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5249 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5250 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5251 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5253 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5255 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5258 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5259 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5260 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5261 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5262 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5263 updates: commitment_update,
5267 has_monitor_update = true;
5268 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5269 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5270 if close_channel { return false; }
5277 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5278 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5279 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5287 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5288 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5289 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5292 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5293 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5299 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5300 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5301 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5302 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5303 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5304 let mut has_update = false;
5306 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5308 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5311 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5312 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5313 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5314 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5315 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5318 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5321 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5322 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5323 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5324 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5325 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5330 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5332 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5333 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5334 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5340 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5341 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5349 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5350 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5356 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5357 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5359 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5360 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5361 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5362 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5363 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5364 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5365 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5366 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5367 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5368 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5369 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5370 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5371 assert!(should_broadcast);
5372 } else { unreachable!(); }
5373 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5375 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5379 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5380 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5382 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5383 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5386 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5389 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5390 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5392 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5393 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5394 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5395 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5396 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5397 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5398 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5399 // never fail a payment too early.
5400 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5402 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5410 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5413 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5414 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5416 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5417 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5418 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5420 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5422 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5423 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5427 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5428 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5430 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5432 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5433 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5435 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5436 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5437 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5438 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5439 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5440 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5441 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5442 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5443 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5446 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5447 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5449 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5452 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5454 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5456 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5457 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5458 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5459 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5460 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5463 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5464 /// stored external to LDK.
5466 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5467 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5468 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5470 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5471 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5474 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5475 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5476 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5477 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5479 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5480 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5481 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5482 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5483 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5485 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5486 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5487 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5488 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5489 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5491 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5492 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5494 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5495 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5499 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5500 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5502 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5504 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5505 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5507 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5508 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5509 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5510 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5511 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5512 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5513 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5516 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5517 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5519 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5522 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5524 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5526 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5527 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5530 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5531 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5533 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5534 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5535 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5538 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5539 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5541 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5542 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5543 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5544 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5546 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5547 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5548 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5549 Some(_) => continue,
5550 None => return scid_candidate
5555 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5557 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5558 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5560 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5561 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5562 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5566 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5567 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5568 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5570 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5571 /// times to get a unique scid.
5572 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5573 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5574 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5576 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5577 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5578 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5579 return scid_candidate
5583 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5584 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5585 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5586 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5589 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5592 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5593 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5594 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5595 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5604 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5605 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5606 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5607 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5608 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5612 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5613 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5614 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5619 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5620 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5621 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5625 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5626 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5630 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5631 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5634 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5635 /// using the given event handler.
5637 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5638 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5641 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5642 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5643 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5645 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5647 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5648 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5649 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5650 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5653 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5654 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5655 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5658 for event in pending_events {
5659 handler(event).await;
5662 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5663 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5668 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5670 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5671 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5672 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5673 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5674 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5675 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5679 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5680 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5681 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5682 /// is always placed next to each other.
5684 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5685 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5686 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5687 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5689 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5690 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5691 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5692 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5693 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5694 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5695 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5697 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5698 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5699 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5700 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5703 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5704 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5706 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5707 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5710 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5711 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5712 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5713 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5714 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5715 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5716 let mut peer_pending_events = Vec::new();
5717 mem::swap(&mut peer_pending_events, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5718 pending_events.append(&mut peer_pending_events);
5722 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5723 events.replace(pending_events);
5732 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5734 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5735 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5736 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5737 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5738 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5743 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5745 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5746 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5747 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5748 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5749 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5751 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5752 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5753 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5754 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5757 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5758 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5759 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5762 for event in pending_events {
5763 handler.handle_event(event);
5771 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5773 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5774 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5775 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5776 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5777 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5778 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5782 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5784 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5785 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5786 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5787 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5788 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5791 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5792 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5795 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5796 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5797 let new_height = height - 1;
5799 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5800 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5801 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5802 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5803 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5804 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5807 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5811 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5813 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5814 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5815 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5816 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5817 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5818 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5822 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5823 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5824 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5825 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5827 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5828 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5831 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5832 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5834 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5835 if height < last_best_block_height {
5836 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5837 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5841 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5842 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5843 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5844 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5846 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5847 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5851 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5853 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5855 macro_rules! max_time {
5856 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5858 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5859 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5860 // having an explicit local time source.
5861 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5862 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5863 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5864 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5865 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5871 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5872 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5873 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5874 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5878 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5879 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5880 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5881 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5882 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5883 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5884 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5885 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5892 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5893 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5894 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5895 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5896 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5897 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5898 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5899 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5904 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5906 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5907 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5908 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5909 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5910 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5915 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5916 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5918 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5919 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5920 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5921 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5922 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5924 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5925 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5927 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5928 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5929 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5930 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5931 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5932 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5933 let res = f(channel);
5934 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5935 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5936 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5937 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5938 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5940 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5941 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5942 if channel.is_usable() {
5943 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5944 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5945 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5946 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5951 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5955 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5957 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5960 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5961 msg: announcement_sigs,
5963 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5964 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5967 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5968 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5969 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5974 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5975 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5976 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5977 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5978 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5979 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5980 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5981 // is always consistent.
5982 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5983 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5984 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5985 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5986 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5989 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5990 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5991 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5992 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5993 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5994 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5995 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5999 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6000 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6001 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6002 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6003 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6004 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6005 data: reason_message,
6015 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6016 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6017 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6018 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6019 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6020 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6021 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6022 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6023 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6024 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6026 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6027 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6028 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6032 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6035 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6036 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6037 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6038 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6039 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6040 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6041 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6042 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6043 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6046 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6047 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6048 _ => unreachable!(),
6050 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6051 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6052 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6059 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6061 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6062 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6066 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6067 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6068 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6069 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6071 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6073 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6074 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6075 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6076 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6077 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6078 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6081 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6082 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6083 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6085 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6086 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6087 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6088 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6091 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6092 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6093 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6094 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6095 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6098 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6099 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6100 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6103 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6104 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6105 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6106 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6109 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6110 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6111 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6112 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6115 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6116 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6118 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6119 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6120 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6121 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6122 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6125 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6126 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6127 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6128 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6131 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6132 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6133 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6134 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6137 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6138 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6139 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6140 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6144 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6145 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6147 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6148 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6149 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6150 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6151 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6152 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6156 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6158 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6161 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6163 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6166 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6171 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6176 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6181 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6186 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6191 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6196 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6206 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6211 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6216 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6226 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6231 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6232 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6233 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6236 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6241 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6248 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6249 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6250 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6252 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6253 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6254 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6255 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6257 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6258 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6259 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6260 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6261 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6262 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6265 no_channels_remain = false;
6269 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6271 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6272 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6273 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6274 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6275 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6276 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6277 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6282 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6283 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6284 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6286 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6293 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6294 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6297 if no_channels_remain {
6298 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6300 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6302 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6303 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6307 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6308 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6309 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6313 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6318 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6319 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6321 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6322 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6323 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6324 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6329 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6330 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6331 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6332 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6337 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6339 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6342 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6343 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6344 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6345 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6346 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6347 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6348 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6352 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6353 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6354 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6359 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6360 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6361 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6362 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6363 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6372 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6376 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6377 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6379 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6380 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6381 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6382 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6383 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6384 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6385 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6386 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6388 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6389 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6390 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6394 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6395 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6396 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6397 if let None = peer_state_mutex_opt { return; }
6398 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6399 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6400 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6401 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6402 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6403 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6411 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6412 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6416 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6417 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6420 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6421 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6425 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6426 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6427 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6428 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6431 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6432 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6434 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6435 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6436 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6437 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6438 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6441 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6442 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6443 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6444 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6447 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6448 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6449 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6450 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6453 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6454 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6455 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6456 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6457 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6458 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6459 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6460 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6461 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6462 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6463 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6464 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6465 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6466 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6467 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6468 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6469 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6470 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6472 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6473 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6474 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6480 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6481 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6483 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6484 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6485 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6486 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6489 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6490 (2, node_id, required),
6491 (4, features, required),
6492 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6493 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6494 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6495 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6498 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6499 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6500 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6501 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6502 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6503 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6504 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6505 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6506 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6507 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6508 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6509 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6510 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6511 (7, self.config, option),
6512 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6513 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6514 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6515 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6516 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6517 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6518 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6519 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6520 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6521 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6522 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6523 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6524 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6525 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6526 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6527 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6528 (32, self.is_public, required),
6529 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6530 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6531 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6537 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6538 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6539 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6540 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6541 (2, channel_id, required),
6542 (3, channel_type, option),
6543 (4, counterparty, required),
6544 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6545 (6, funding_txo, option),
6546 (7, config, option),
6547 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6548 (9, confirmations, option),
6549 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6550 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6551 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6552 (16, balance_msat, required),
6553 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6554 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6555 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6556 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6557 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6558 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6559 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6560 (26, is_outbound, required),
6561 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6562 (30, is_usable, required),
6563 (32, is_public, required),
6564 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6565 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6566 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6569 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6570 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6571 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6572 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6573 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6577 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6579 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6580 outbound_scid_alias,
6584 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6585 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6587 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6588 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6589 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6590 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6591 confirmations_required,
6593 force_close_spend_delay,
6594 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6595 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6596 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6597 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6598 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6599 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6605 (2, channels, vec_type),
6606 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6607 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6610 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6612 (0, onion_packet, required),
6613 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6616 (0, payment_data, required),
6617 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6618 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6620 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6621 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6622 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6626 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6627 (0, routing, required),
6628 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6629 (4, payment_hash, required),
6630 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6631 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6632 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6636 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6637 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6639 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6641 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6642 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6643 reason.write(writer)?;
6645 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6646 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6649 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6650 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6651 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6652 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6659 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6660 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6661 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6665 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6666 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6667 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6671 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6672 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6673 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6674 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6675 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6678 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6679 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6680 // messages contained in the variants.
6681 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6682 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6683 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6685 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6687 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6688 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6689 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6692 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6693 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6694 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6695 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6696 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6698 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6703 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6708 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6709 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6710 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6711 (2, outpoint, required),
6712 (4, htlc_id, required),
6713 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6716 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6717 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6718 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6719 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6720 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6722 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6723 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6724 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6725 (2, self.value, required),
6726 (4, payment_data, option),
6727 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6728 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6734 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6735 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6736 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6738 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6739 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6740 let mut total_msat = None;
6741 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6742 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6743 (0, prev_hop, required),
6744 (1, total_msat, option),
6745 (2, value, required),
6746 (4, payment_data, option),
6747 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6748 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6750 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6752 if payment_data.is_some() {
6753 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6755 if total_msat.is_none() {
6756 total_msat = Some(value);
6758 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6761 if total_msat.is_none() {
6762 if payment_data.is_none() {
6763 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6765 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6767 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6771 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6774 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6781 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6782 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6783 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6786 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6787 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6788 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6789 let mut payment_id = None;
6790 let mut payment_secret = None;
6791 let mut payment_params = None;
6792 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6793 (0, session_priv, required),
6794 (1, payment_id, option),
6795 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6796 (3, payment_secret, option),
6797 (4, path, vec_type),
6798 (5, payment_params, option),
6800 if payment_id.is_none() {
6801 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6803 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6805 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6806 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6807 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6808 path: path.unwrap(),
6809 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6814 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6815 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6820 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6821 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6823 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6825 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6826 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6827 (0, session_priv, required),
6828 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6829 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6830 (3, payment_secret, option),
6831 (4, *path, vec_type),
6832 (5, payment_params, option),
6835 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6837 field.write(writer)?;
6844 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6845 (0, forward_info, required),
6846 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6847 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6848 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6849 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6852 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6854 (0, htlc_id, required),
6855 (2, err_packet, required),
6860 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6861 (0, payment_secret, required),
6862 (2, expiry_time, required),
6863 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6864 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6865 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6868 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6870 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6871 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6872 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6873 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6874 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6875 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6879 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6880 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6882 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6884 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6886 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6887 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6888 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6892 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6893 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6894 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6895 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6898 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6899 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6900 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6901 unfunded_channels += 1;
6906 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6908 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6911 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6912 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6913 channel.write(writer)?;
6920 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6921 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6922 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6923 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6924 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6925 for forward in pending_forwards {
6926 forward.write(writer)?;
6931 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6933 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6934 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6935 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6937 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6938 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6939 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6940 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6941 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6942 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6943 htlc.write(writer)?;
6945 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6948 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6949 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6950 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6951 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6952 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6955 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6956 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6957 for event in events.iter() {
6958 event.write(writer)?;
6961 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6962 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6963 for event in background_events.iter() {
6965 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6967 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6968 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6973 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6974 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6975 // likely to be identical.
6976 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6977 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6979 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6980 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6981 hash.write(writer)?;
6982 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6985 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6986 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6987 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6988 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6989 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6992 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6993 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6995 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6996 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6997 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6998 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7001 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7002 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7006 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7007 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7008 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7010 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7011 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7012 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7018 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7019 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7020 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7021 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7024 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7025 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7026 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7027 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7028 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7030 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7033 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7034 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7035 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7036 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7037 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7038 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7039 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7040 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7041 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7048 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7050 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7052 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7053 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7054 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7055 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7056 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7057 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7058 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7059 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7060 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7061 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7062 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7063 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7064 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7066 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7067 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7069 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7070 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7072 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7073 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7074 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7075 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7076 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7077 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7079 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7080 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7082 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7083 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7084 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7085 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7086 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7087 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7091 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7092 pub entropy_source: ES,
7094 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7095 pub node_signer: NS,
7097 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7098 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7100 pub signer_provider: SP,
7102 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7104 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7105 pub fee_estimator: F,
7106 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7108 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7109 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7110 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7111 pub chain_monitor: M,
7113 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7114 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7115 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7116 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7117 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7118 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7120 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7122 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7123 /// deserialization.
7125 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7126 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7127 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7129 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7130 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7132 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7133 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7134 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7135 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7137 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7140 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7141 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7144 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7145 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7147 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7148 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7149 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7150 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7151 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7152 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7156 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7157 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7158 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7159 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7160 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7162 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7163 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7168 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7169 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7170 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7171 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7173 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7174 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7175 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7176 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7177 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7178 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7182 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7183 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7184 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7188 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7189 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7191 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7192 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7193 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7194 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7195 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7196 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7200 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7201 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7203 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7205 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7207 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7209 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7210 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7211 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7212 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7213 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7214 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7215 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7216 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7217 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7219 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7220 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7221 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7222 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7223 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7224 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7225 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7226 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7227 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7228 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7229 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7230 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7231 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7232 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7233 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7234 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7235 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7236 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7237 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7238 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7239 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7240 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7241 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7242 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7243 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7244 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7245 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7246 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7247 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7248 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7249 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7250 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7252 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7253 let mut found_htlc = false;
7254 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7255 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7258 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7259 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7260 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7261 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7262 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7263 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7264 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7265 log_info!(args.logger,
7266 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7267 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7268 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7272 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7273 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7274 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7276 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7277 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7279 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7280 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7281 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7282 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7285 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7286 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7287 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7291 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7292 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7293 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7294 // safely discard the channel.
7295 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7296 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7297 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7298 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7299 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7302 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7303 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7304 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7305 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7306 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7307 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7311 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7312 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7313 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7314 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7318 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7319 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7321 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7322 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7323 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7324 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7325 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7326 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7328 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7331 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7333 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7334 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7335 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7336 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7337 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7338 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7340 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7343 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7345 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7346 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7347 let peer_state = PeerState {
7348 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7349 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7350 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7351 is_connected: false,
7353 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7356 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7357 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7358 for _ in 0..event_count {
7359 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7360 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7365 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7366 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7367 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7368 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7369 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7370 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7374 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7375 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7377 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7379 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7380 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7381 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7385 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7386 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7387 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7388 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7389 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7390 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7391 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7393 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7394 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7398 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7399 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7400 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7401 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7402 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7403 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7404 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7405 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7406 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7407 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7408 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7409 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7410 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7411 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7412 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7413 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7414 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7415 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7417 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7418 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7421 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7422 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7425 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7426 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7427 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7428 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7429 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7430 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7432 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7434 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7435 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7436 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7437 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7438 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7439 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7440 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7442 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7443 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7444 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7445 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7446 if path.is_empty() {
7447 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7448 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7450 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7451 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7452 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7453 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7455 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7456 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7457 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7460 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7461 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7462 retry_strategy: None,
7463 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7464 payment_params: None,
7465 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7466 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7468 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7469 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7470 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7471 total_msat: path_amt,
7472 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7474 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7475 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7480 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7481 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7482 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7483 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7484 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7486 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7487 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7488 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7489 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7490 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7491 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7492 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7493 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7494 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7495 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7496 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7501 !forwards.is_empty()
7503 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7504 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7505 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7506 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7507 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7508 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7509 intercepted_id != ev_id
7521 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7522 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7523 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7524 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7525 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7526 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7527 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7528 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7532 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7533 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7535 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7536 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7537 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7538 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7540 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7541 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7544 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7545 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7546 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7547 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7548 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7550 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7551 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7552 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7553 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7554 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7555 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7556 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7557 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7559 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7560 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7564 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7566 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7568 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7569 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7571 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7575 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7576 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7578 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7579 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7582 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7584 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7586 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7587 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7588 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7589 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7593 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7594 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7597 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7598 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7599 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7601 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7602 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7603 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7605 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7606 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7607 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7608 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7609 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7610 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7612 if chan.is_usable() {
7613 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7614 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7615 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7616 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7617 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7623 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7625 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7626 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7627 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7628 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7629 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7630 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7631 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7632 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7633 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7634 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7635 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7637 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7638 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7640 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7641 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7642 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7643 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7645 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7646 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7647 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7648 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7650 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7651 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7652 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7653 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7655 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7656 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7657 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7660 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7661 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7664 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7665 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7668 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7671 purpose: payment_purpose,
7672 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7678 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7680 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7681 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7682 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7683 router: args.router,
7685 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7687 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7688 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7689 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()) },
7690 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7692 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7693 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7694 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7695 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7696 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7697 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7699 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7704 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7706 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7708 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7709 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7710 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7711 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7713 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7714 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7715 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7717 logger: args.logger,
7718 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7721 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7722 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7723 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7724 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7725 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7728 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7729 //connection or two.
7731 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7737 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7738 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7739 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7740 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7741 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature;
7742 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7743 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
7745 use core::time::Duration;
7746 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7747 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7748 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7749 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7750 use crate::ln::msgs;
7751 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, OptionalField};
7752 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7753 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7754 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7755 use crate::util::test_utils;
7756 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7757 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7760 fn test_notify_limits() {
7761 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7762 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7765 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7766 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7768 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7769 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7770 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7771 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7772 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7774 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7776 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7777 // to connect messages with new values
7778 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7779 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7780 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7781 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7783 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7784 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7785 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7786 // ... but the last node should not.
7787 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7788 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7789 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7790 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7792 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7793 // about the channel.
7794 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7795 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7796 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7798 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7800 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7801 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7802 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7803 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7804 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7805 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7807 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7808 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7809 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7811 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7812 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7813 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7814 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7815 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7816 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7818 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7819 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7820 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7821 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7822 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7823 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7824 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7825 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7827 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7828 // the channel info has updated.
7829 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7830 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7831 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7832 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7833 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7834 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7838 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7839 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7841 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7842 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7843 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7844 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7845 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7847 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7848 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7849 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7850 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7852 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7853 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7854 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7855 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7856 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7857 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7859 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7860 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7861 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7863 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7864 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7866 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7867 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7868 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7869 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7870 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7872 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7873 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7874 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7876 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7877 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7878 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7879 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7880 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7881 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7882 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7883 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7884 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7886 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7887 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7889 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7890 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7891 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7893 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7894 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7895 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7896 // lightning messages manually.
7897 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7898 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7901 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7902 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7903 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7905 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7906 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7908 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7909 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7911 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7912 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7913 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7915 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7916 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7917 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7919 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7921 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7923 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7927 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7928 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7929 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7930 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7932 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7933 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7934 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7935 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7937 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7940 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7941 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7942 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7943 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7948 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7949 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7950 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7951 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7958 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7959 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7960 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7961 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7962 // fails as expected.
7963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7967 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7968 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7969 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7971 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7972 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7973 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7975 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7976 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7977 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
7978 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7979 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7981 let route = find_route(
7982 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7983 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7985 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7987 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7988 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7989 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7990 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7991 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7993 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7994 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7995 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7997 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7999 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8000 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8001 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8002 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8003 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8004 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8005 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8006 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8007 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8009 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8010 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8012 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8013 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8014 let route = find_route(
8015 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8016 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8018 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8020 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8022 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8023 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8024 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8026 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8027 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8028 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8030 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8031 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8032 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8033 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8034 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8036 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8037 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8038 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8040 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8041 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8042 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8043 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8044 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8045 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8047 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8048 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8050 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8051 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8055 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8056 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8057 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8058 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8059 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8061 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8063 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8064 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8066 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8067 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8068 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8069 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8070 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8072 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8073 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8074 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8075 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8076 let route = find_route(
8077 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8078 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8081 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8082 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8083 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8084 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8087 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8088 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8089 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8090 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8091 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8092 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8093 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8095 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8099 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8100 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8104 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8106 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8107 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8109 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8110 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8111 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8112 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8113 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8115 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8116 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8117 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8118 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8119 let route = find_route(
8120 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8121 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8124 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8125 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8126 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8127 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8128 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8131 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8132 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8133 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8134 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8135 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8136 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8137 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8139 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8143 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8146 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8147 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8149 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8150 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8151 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8152 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8154 // Marshall an MPP route.
8155 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8156 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8157 route.paths.push(path);
8158 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8159 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8160 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8161 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8162 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8163 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8165 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8166 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8167 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8168 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8173 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8174 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8175 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8176 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8178 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8180 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8181 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8183 total_msat: 100_000,
8186 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8187 // payment verification fails as expected.
8188 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8189 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8190 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8191 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8193 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8197 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8198 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8202 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8203 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8204 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8205 // the channel is successfully closed.
8206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8211 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8212 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8213 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8214 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8215 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8217 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8218 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8220 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8221 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8222 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8223 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8226 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8228 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8229 // as it has the funding transaction.
8230 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8231 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8232 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8234 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8237 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8239 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8241 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8242 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8243 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8245 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8246 // as it has the funding transaction.
8247 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8248 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8249 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8252 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8253 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8255 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8256 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8257 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8259 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8260 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8261 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8262 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8264 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8265 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8267 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8268 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8269 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8270 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8271 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8272 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8273 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8275 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8276 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8277 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8278 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8279 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8280 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8281 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8284 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8286 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8287 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8288 // closing transaction).
8289 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8290 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8291 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8293 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8294 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8295 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8296 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8297 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8300 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8302 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8304 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8305 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8306 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8308 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8310 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8311 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8314 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8315 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8316 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8319 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8320 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8321 check_api_misuse_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8324 fn check_api_misuse_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8326 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8327 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8329 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8330 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8335 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8336 // Tests that our API functions and message handlers that expects a `counterparty_node_id`
8337 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8338 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8339 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8340 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8341 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8342 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8344 // Boilerplate code to produce `open_channel` and `accept_channel` msgs more densly than
8345 // creating dummy ones.
8346 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8347 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8348 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8349 let accept_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8352 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8353 let signature = Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() });
8354 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8355 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8358 let funding_created_msg = msgs::FundingCreated {
8359 temporary_channel_id: open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id,
8360 funding_txid: Txid::from_hex("ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap(),
8361 funding_output_index: 0,
8362 signature: signature,
8365 let funding_signed_msg = msgs::FundingSigned {
8366 channel_id: channel_id,
8367 signature: signature,
8370 let channel_ready_msg = msgs::ChannelReady {
8371 channel_id: channel_id,
8372 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8373 short_channel_id_alias: None,
8376 let announcement_signatures_msg = msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
8377 channel_id: channel_id,
8378 short_channel_id: 0,
8379 node_signature: signature,
8380 bitcoin_signature: signature,
8383 let channel_reestablish_msg = msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8384 channel_id: channel_id,
8385 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8386 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8387 data_loss_protect: OptionalField::Absent,
8390 let closing_signed_msg = msgs::ClosingSigned {
8391 channel_id: channel_id,
8393 signature: signature,
8397 let shutdown_msg = msgs::Shutdown {
8398 channel_id: channel_id,
8399 scriptpubkey: Script::new(),
8402 let onion_routing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
8404 public_key: Ok(unkown_public_key),
8405 hop_data: [1; 20*65],
8409 let update_add_htlc_msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
8410 channel_id: channel_id,
8412 amount_msat: 1000000,
8413 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
8414 cltv_expiry: 821716,
8415 onion_routing_packet
8418 let commitment_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
8419 channel_id: channel_id,
8420 signature: signature,
8421 htlc_signatures: Vec::new(),
8424 let update_fee_msg = msgs::UpdateFee {
8425 channel_id: channel_id,
8426 feerate_per_kw: 1000,
8429 let malformed_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
8430 channel_id: channel_id,
8432 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
8433 failure_code: 0x8000,
8436 let fulfill_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
8437 channel_id: channel_id,
8439 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([1; 32]),
8442 let fail_update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
8443 channel_id: channel_id,
8445 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
8448 let revoke_and_ack_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
8449 channel_id: channel_id,
8450 per_commitment_secret: [1; 32],
8451 next_per_commitment_point: unkown_public_key,
8454 // Test the API functions and message handlers.
8455 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8457 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&unkown_public_key, &open_channel_msg);
8459 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&unkown_public_key, &accept_channel_msg);
8461 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8463 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&unkown_public_key, &funding_created_msg);
8465 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&unkown_public_key, &funding_signed_msg);
8467 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&unkown_public_key, &channel_ready_msg);
8469 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&unkown_public_key, &announcement_signatures_msg);
8471 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8473 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8475 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8477 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8479 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8481 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&unkown_public_key, &shutdown_msg);
8483 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&unkown_public_key, &closing_signed_msg);
8485 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&unkown_public_key, &channel_reestablish_msg);
8487 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &update_add_htlc_msg);
8489 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&unkown_public_key, &commitment_signed_msg);
8491 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &malformed_update_msg);
8493 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fail_update_msg);
8495 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&unkown_public_key, &fulfill_update_msg);
8497 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&unkown_public_key, &revoke_and_ack_msg);
8499 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&unkown_public_key, &update_fee_msg);
8504 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8505 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8506 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8507 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8510 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8511 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8512 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8516 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8517 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8518 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8520 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8521 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8523 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8524 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8526 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8529 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8530 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8532 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8533 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8535 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8539 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8541 use crate::chain::Listen;
8542 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8543 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8544 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8545 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8546 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8547 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8548 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8549 use crate::util::test_utils;
8550 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8551 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8553 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8554 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8555 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8557 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8561 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8562 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8563 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8564 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8565 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8566 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8567 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8568 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8573 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8574 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8577 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8578 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8579 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8581 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8582 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8584 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8585 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8586 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8587 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)));
8589 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8590 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8592 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8593 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8594 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8595 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8597 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8599 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8601 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8602 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8603 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8604 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8605 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8607 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8609 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8611 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8612 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8613 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8614 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8615 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8618 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8619 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8620 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8622 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8623 } else { panic!(); }
8625 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8626 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8628 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8631 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8634 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8635 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8637 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8638 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8639 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8640 match msg_events[0] {
8641 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8642 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8643 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8647 match msg_events[1] {
8648 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8652 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8653 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8655 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8656 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8658 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8661 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8662 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8664 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8665 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8670 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8672 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8673 macro_rules! send_payment {
8674 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8675 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8676 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8677 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8678 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8679 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8680 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8681 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8682 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8683 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8685 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8686 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8688 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8689 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8691 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8692 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8693 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8694 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8695 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8696 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8697 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8698 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8700 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8701 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8702 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8703 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8705 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8706 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8707 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8708 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8709 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8711 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8714 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8715 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8716 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8717 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8719 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8724 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8725 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);