1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
36 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
47 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
48 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
49 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
50 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
51 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
52 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
53 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
57 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
58 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
61 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
62 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
63 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
64 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
65 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
67 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
68 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
69 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
70 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
71 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
72 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
73 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
74 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
75 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
76 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
77 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
78 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
79 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
81 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
83 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
84 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
85 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
86 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
87 crate::sign::KeysManager,
91 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
92 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
95 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
98 use crate::prelude::*;
100 use core::cell::RefCell;
102 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
103 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
104 use core::time::Duration;
105 use core::ops::Deref;
107 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
108 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
109 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
111 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
113 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
114 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
115 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
117 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
118 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
119 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
120 // before we forward it.
122 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
123 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
124 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
125 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
126 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
128 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
131 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
132 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
134 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
135 /// do with the HTLC.
136 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
137 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
139 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
140 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
141 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
142 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
143 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
144 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
146 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
148 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
149 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
151 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
152 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
153 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
154 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
155 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
157 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
158 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
159 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
160 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
161 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
162 /// blinded path was not used.
164 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
165 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
166 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
168 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
169 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
170 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
171 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
173 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
176 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
177 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
179 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
180 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
181 requires_blinded_error: bool,
183 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
184 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
185 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
187 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
188 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
190 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
191 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
192 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
194 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
195 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
196 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
198 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
199 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
200 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
201 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
203 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
204 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
205 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
207 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
208 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
209 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
210 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
211 requires_blinded_error: bool,
215 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
216 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
217 pub struct BlindedForward {
218 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
219 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
220 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
221 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
222 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
223 /// the introduction node.
224 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
227 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
228 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
229 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
231 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
232 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
233 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
239 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
243 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
244 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
245 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
246 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
248 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
249 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
250 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
251 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
252 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
254 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
256 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
257 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
258 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
260 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
261 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
262 /// it along another path).
264 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
265 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
266 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
267 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
268 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
269 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
270 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
271 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
272 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
274 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
277 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
279 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
281 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
286 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
287 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
290 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
291 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
292 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
293 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
294 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
297 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
298 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
299 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
301 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
302 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
303 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
306 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
307 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
309 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
310 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
311 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
314 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
315 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
316 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
319 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
324 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
328 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
329 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
330 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
331 pub enum BlindedFailure {
332 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
333 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334 FromIntroductionNode,
335 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
336 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
340 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
343 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
344 short_channel_id: u64,
345 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
348 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
349 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
350 channel_id: ChannelId,
352 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
353 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
358 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
360 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
361 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
362 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
364 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
365 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
368 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
369 struct ClaimableHTLC {
370 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
372 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
374 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
375 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
376 sender_intended_value: u64,
377 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
379 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
380 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
381 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
382 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
384 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
385 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
388 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
389 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
390 events::ClaimedHTLC {
391 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
392 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
393 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
394 value_msat: val.value,
395 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
400 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
401 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
403 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
404 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
405 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
408 /// Number of bytes in the id.
409 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
412 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
418 impl Readable for PaymentId {
419 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
420 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
425 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
426 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
427 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
431 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
433 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
434 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
435 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
437 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
443 impl Readable for InterceptId {
444 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
445 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
450 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
451 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
452 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
453 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
454 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
457 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
459 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
460 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
461 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
463 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
464 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
469 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
470 (0, short_channel_id, required),
471 (2, htlc_id, required),
473 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
474 (0, session_priv, required),
479 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
480 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
481 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
482 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
483 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
486 session_priv: SecretKey,
487 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
488 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
489 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
490 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
494 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
495 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
497 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
499 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
504 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
505 payment_id.hash(hasher);
506 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
512 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
514 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
515 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
516 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
517 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
518 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
519 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
523 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
524 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
525 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
526 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
527 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
528 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
530 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
536 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
537 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
539 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
540 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
541 pub enum FailureCode {
542 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
543 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
544 TemporaryNodeFailure,
545 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
546 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
547 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
548 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
549 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
550 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
551 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
552 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
553 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
554 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
556 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
557 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
558 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
561 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
562 fn into(self) -> u16 {
564 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
565 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
566 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
567 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
572 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
573 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
574 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
575 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
576 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
578 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
579 err: msgs::LightningError,
580 closes_channel: bool,
581 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
583 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
585 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
587 err: LightningError {
589 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
590 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
596 closes_channel: false,
597 shutdown_finish: None,
601 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
602 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
605 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
606 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
607 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
608 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
609 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
610 // commitment upon reconnecting.
611 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
613 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
616 err: LightningError { err, action },
617 closes_channel: true,
618 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
622 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
625 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
628 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
632 log_level: Level::Warn,
635 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
637 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
639 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
642 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
649 closes_channel: false,
650 shutdown_finish: None,
654 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
659 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
660 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
661 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
662 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
663 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
665 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
666 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
667 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
668 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
669 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
670 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
671 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
673 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
677 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
678 struct ClaimingPayment {
680 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
681 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
682 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
683 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
684 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
686 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
687 (0, amount_msat, required),
688 (2, payment_purpose, required),
689 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
690 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
691 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
692 (9, onion_fields, option),
695 struct ClaimablePayment {
696 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
697 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
698 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
701 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
702 struct ClaimablePayments {
703 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
704 /// failed/claimed by the user.
706 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
707 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
709 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
710 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
711 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
713 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
714 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
715 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
716 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
719 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
720 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
721 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
722 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
724 enum BackgroundEvent {
725 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
726 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
727 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
728 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
730 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
731 /// are regenerated on startup.
732 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
733 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
734 /// channel to continue normal operation.
736 /// In general this should be used rather than
737 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
738 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
739 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
741 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
742 /// are regenerated on startup.
743 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 funding_txo: OutPoint,
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
749 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
750 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
752 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
753 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
754 channel_id: ChannelId,
759 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
760 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
761 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
762 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
763 /// event can be generated.
764 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
765 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
766 /// operation of another channel.
768 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
769 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
770 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
771 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
773 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
774 event: events::Event,
775 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
777 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
778 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
779 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
781 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
782 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
783 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
784 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
785 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
787 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
788 /// stored for later processing.
789 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
790 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
793 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
798 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
799 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
800 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
801 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
802 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
803 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
804 (4, blocking_action, required),
805 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
806 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
807 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
809 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
810 (0, event, upgradable_required),
811 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
812 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
813 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
814 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
815 // downgrades to prior versions.
816 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
820 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
821 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
822 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
823 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
825 channel_id: ChannelId,
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
829 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
830 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
831 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
832 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
833 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
834 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
838 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
839 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
840 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
841 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
843 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
845 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
847 channel_id: ChannelId,
848 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
853 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
854 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
855 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
856 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
857 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
862 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
863 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
867 /// State we hold per-peer.
868 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
871 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
872 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
873 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
875 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
876 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
877 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
878 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
879 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
880 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
881 latest_features: InitFeatures,
882 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
883 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
884 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
885 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
886 /// user but which have not yet completed.
888 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
889 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890 /// for a missing channel.
891 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
892 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
893 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
895 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
896 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
897 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
898 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
900 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
901 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
902 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
903 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
904 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
905 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
906 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
907 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
908 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
909 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
910 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
911 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
912 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
913 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
914 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
915 pub is_connected: bool,
918 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
919 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
920 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
921 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
922 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
923 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
926 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
928 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
929 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
930 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
931 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
932 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
933 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
936 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
937 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
940 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
941 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
942 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
945 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
946 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
947 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
948 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
952 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
953 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
954 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
955 /// The original OpenChannel message.
956 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
957 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
958 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
961 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
962 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
963 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
965 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
966 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
968 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
971 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
972 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
973 struct PendingInboundPayment {
974 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
975 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
976 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
977 /// this payment being removed.
979 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
980 user_payment_id: u64,
981 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
982 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
983 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
986 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
987 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
988 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
989 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
990 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
991 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
992 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
993 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
995 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
996 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
997 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1005 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1008 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1009 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1010 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1015 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1016 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1017 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1018 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1019 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1020 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1021 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1022 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1023 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1025 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1026 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1027 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1036 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1039 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1040 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1041 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1046 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1048 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1050 pub trait AChannelManager {
1051 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1052 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1053 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1054 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1055 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1056 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1057 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1058 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1059 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1060 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1061 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1062 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1063 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1064 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1065 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1066 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1067 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1068 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1069 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1070 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1071 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1072 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1073 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1074 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1075 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1076 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1077 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1078 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1079 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1080 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1081 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1082 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1083 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1084 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1085 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1086 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1090 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1092 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1094 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1095 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1096 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1097 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1101 type Watch = M::Target;
1103 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1105 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1107 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1109 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1110 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1112 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1114 type Router = R::Target;
1116 type Logger = L::Target;
1118 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1121 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1122 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1124 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1125 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1127 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1128 /// closing channels
1129 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1130 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1131 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1132 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1134 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1135 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1137 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1138 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1139 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1140 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1141 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1142 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1144 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1145 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1147 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1149 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1150 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1151 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1152 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1153 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1155 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1156 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1157 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1159 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1160 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1161 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1163 /// # Initialization
1165 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1166 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1167 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1168 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1169 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1172 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1173 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1174 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1175 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1176 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1177 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1178 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1179 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1181 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1184 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1185 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1186 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1187 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1189 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1191 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1192 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1193 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1194 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1196 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1197 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1198 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1199 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1200 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1201 /// # mut reader: R,
1202 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1203 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1204 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1205 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1208 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1209 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1210 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1211 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1214 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1215 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1216 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1217 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1218 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1220 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1221 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1223 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1226 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1227 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1228 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1236 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1237 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1238 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1239 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1240 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1241 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1242 /// as documented by those traits
1243 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1245 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1246 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1247 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1249 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1250 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1252 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1253 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1254 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1255 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1259 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1260 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1261 /// currently open channels.
1264 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1266 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1267 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1268 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1269 /// for details in channels {
1270 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1275 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1276 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1277 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1278 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1280 /// ## Opening Channels
1282 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1283 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1284 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1287 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1288 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1289 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1290 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1292 /// # trait Wallet {
1293 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1294 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1295 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1298 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1299 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1300 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1301 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1302 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1303 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1304 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1307 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1308 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1309 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1310 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1311 /// user_channel_id, ..
1313 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1314 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1315 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1317 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1318 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1320 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1321 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1324 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1325 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1327 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1328 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1331 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1332 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1333 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1341 /// ## Accepting Channels
1343 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1344 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1345 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1348 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1349 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1350 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1352 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1354 /// # unimplemented!()
1357 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1358 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1359 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1360 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1361 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1362 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1363 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1365 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1366 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1371 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1372 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1373 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1375 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1376 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1385 /// ## Closing Channels
1387 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1388 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1389 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1390 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1391 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1394 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1395 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1396 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1397 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1399 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1400 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1402 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1403 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1404 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1405 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1408 /// // On the event processing thread
1409 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1410 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1411 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1412 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1422 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1423 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1424 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1425 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1426 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1429 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1430 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1431 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1432 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1434 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1436 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1437 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1438 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1439 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1440 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1441 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1443 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1444 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1445 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1448 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1449 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1451 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1452 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1453 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1454 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1455 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1457 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1458 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1461 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1464 /// // On the event processing thread
1465 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1466 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1467 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1468 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1469 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1470 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1472 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1473 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1475 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1476 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1477 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1478 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1483 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1484 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1485 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1493 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1494 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1497 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1498 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1499 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1500 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1502 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1503 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1504 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1506 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1507 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1508 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1509 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1510 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1511 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1513 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1514 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1517 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1518 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1520 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1522 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1523 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1524 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1530 /// // On the event processing thread
1531 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1532 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1533 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1540 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1542 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1543 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1544 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1545 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1546 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1547 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1550 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1551 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1552 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1554 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1555 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1556 /// let offer = channel_manager
1557 /// .create_offer_builder()?
1559 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1560 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1561 /// # let offer = builder
1562 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1563 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1565 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1567 /// // On the event processing thread
1568 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1569 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1570 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1571 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1572 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1574 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1575 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1580 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1581 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1590 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1591 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1592 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1595 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1596 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1597 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1599 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1600 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1601 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1603 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1604 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1605 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1606 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1608 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1609 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1612 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1613 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1615 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1617 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1621 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1623 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1625 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1629 /// // On the event processing thread
1630 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1631 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1632 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1633 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1640 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1642 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1643 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1644 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1645 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1648 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1649 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1650 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1651 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1653 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1654 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1655 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1656 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1657 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1658 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1659 /// let refund = channel_manager
1660 /// .create_refund_builder(
1661 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1664 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1665 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1666 /// # let refund = builder
1667 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1668 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1670 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1672 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1673 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1675 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1677 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1681 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1683 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1685 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1689 /// // On the event processing thread
1690 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1691 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1692 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1700 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1701 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1704 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1705 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1706 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1708 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1709 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1710 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1711 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1712 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1713 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1716 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1719 /// // On the event processing thread
1720 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1721 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1722 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1723 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1724 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1725 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1727 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1728 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1733 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1734 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1735 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1745 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1746 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1747 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1748 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1750 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1751 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1752 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1753 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1754 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1755 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1756 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1757 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1758 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1760 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1761 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1762 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1764 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1766 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1767 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1768 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1769 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1770 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1772 /// # DoS Mitigation
1774 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1775 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1776 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1777 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1779 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1780 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1781 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1785 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1786 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1787 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1788 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1789 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1791 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1792 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1793 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1794 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1795 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1796 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1797 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1798 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1799 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1800 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1801 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1802 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1803 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1804 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1805 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1806 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1807 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1808 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1809 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1810 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1811 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1812 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1813 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1814 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1815 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1816 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1817 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1818 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1819 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1820 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1821 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1822 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1823 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1824 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1825 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1826 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1827 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1828 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1829 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1830 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1833 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1834 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1835 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1836 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1837 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1841 // `pending_offers_messages`
1843 // `total_consistency_lock`
1845 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1847 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1849 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1851 // |__`per_peer_state`
1853 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1855 // |__`claimable_payments`
1857 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1861 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1863 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1865 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1869 // |__`pending_events`
1871 // |__`pending_background_events`
1873 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1875 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1876 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1877 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1878 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1879 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1880 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1884 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1885 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1886 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1892 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1894 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1896 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1897 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1899 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1900 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1901 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1902 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1904 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1905 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1907 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1908 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1909 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1910 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1911 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1912 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1913 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1914 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1916 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1918 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1919 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1921 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1923 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1924 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1925 /// and via the classic SCID.
1927 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1928 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1930 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1932 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1934 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1935 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1936 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1938 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1939 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1941 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1943 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1944 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1945 /// and via the classic SCID.
1947 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1948 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1950 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1951 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1953 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1954 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1956 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1957 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1959 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1960 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1961 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1962 /// active channel list on load.
1964 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1965 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1967 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1969 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1970 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1971 /// the handling of the events.
1973 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1974 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1977 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1978 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1979 /// would break backwards compatability.
1980 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1981 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1982 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1984 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1986 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1988 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1990 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1992 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1993 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1994 /// confirmation depth.
1996 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1997 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1998 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
2000 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2002 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2004 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2006 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2008 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2010 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2011 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2012 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2014 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2015 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2017 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2018 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2019 /// keeping additional state.
2020 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2022 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2023 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2024 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2025 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2027 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2028 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2030 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2031 /// are currently open with that peer.
2033 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2034 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2037 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2039 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2040 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2041 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2042 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2043 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2045 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2046 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2047 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2048 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2049 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2051 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2052 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2054 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2055 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2056 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2057 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2058 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2060 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2061 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2063 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2064 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2065 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2066 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2067 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2069 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2071 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2073 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2074 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2075 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2076 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2077 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2078 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2079 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2080 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2081 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2082 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2083 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2085 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2086 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2087 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2089 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2091 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2092 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2094 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2096 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2097 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2101 signer_provider: SP,
2106 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2108 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2109 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2110 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2111 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2112 pub struct ChainParameters {
2113 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2114 pub network: Network,
2116 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2118 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2119 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2122 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2126 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2127 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2130 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2131 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2132 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2133 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2134 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2135 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2137 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2138 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2139 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2140 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2141 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2142 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2144 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2145 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2148 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2149 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2150 /// events to handle.
2152 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2153 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2155 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2156 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2159 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2160 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2161 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2162 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2164 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2165 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2166 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2167 should_persist: move || {
2168 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2169 // processing and return that.
2170 let notify = persist_check();
2171 match (notify, force_notify) {
2172 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2173 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2174 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2175 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2176 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2179 _read_guard: read_guard,
2183 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2184 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2185 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2186 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2187 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2188 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2190 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2191 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2192 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2193 should_persist: persist_check,
2194 _read_guard: read_guard,
2199 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2200 fn drop(&mut self) {
2201 match (self.should_persist)() {
2202 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2203 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2204 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2206 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2207 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2208 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2213 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2214 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2216 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2218 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2219 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2220 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2221 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2222 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2224 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2225 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2227 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2229 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2230 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2231 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2232 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2233 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2234 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2235 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2236 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2237 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2238 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2239 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2240 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2241 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2243 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2244 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2246 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2247 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2248 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2249 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2251 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2252 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2253 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2254 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2255 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2256 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2258 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2260 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2261 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2263 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2265 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2266 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2268 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2269 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2270 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2272 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2273 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2274 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2276 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2277 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2278 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2279 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2281 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2282 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2283 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2285 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2286 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2287 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2289 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2290 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2291 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2292 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2293 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2294 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2295 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2296 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2297 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2298 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2299 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2302 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2303 /// to better separate parameters.
2304 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2305 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2306 /// The node_id of our counterparty
2307 pub node_id: PublicKey,
2308 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2309 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2310 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2311 pub features: InitFeatures,
2312 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2313 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2314 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2316 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2318 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2319 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2320 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2321 /// payments to us through this channel.
2322 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2323 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2324 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2325 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2326 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2327 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2328 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2331 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2332 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2333 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2334 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2335 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2336 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2337 /// lifetime of the channel.
2338 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2339 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2340 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2341 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2342 /// our counterparty already.
2343 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2344 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2346 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2347 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2348 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2349 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2351 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2352 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2354 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2355 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2357 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2358 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2359 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2360 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2361 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2362 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2363 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2364 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2365 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2368 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2370 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2371 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2372 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2373 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2374 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2375 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2376 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2378 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2379 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2381 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2382 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2383 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2384 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2385 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2386 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2387 /// this value on chain.
2389 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2391 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2393 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2394 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2395 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2396 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2397 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2398 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
2399 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2401 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2402 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2403 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2404 pub user_channel_id: u128,
2405 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2406 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2408 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2409 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2410 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2411 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2412 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2414 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2415 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2416 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2417 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2419 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2420 pub balance_msat: u64,
2421 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2422 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2423 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2424 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2426 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2428 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2429 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2430 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2431 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2432 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2433 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2434 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2435 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2437 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2438 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2439 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2440 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2441 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2442 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2443 /// route which is valid.
2444 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2445 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2446 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2447 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2448 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2449 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2451 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2452 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2453 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2454 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2455 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2456 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2457 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2459 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2461 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2463 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2464 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2465 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2466 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2467 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2469 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2470 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2471 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2472 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2473 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2474 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2475 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2477 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2478 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2479 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2480 pub is_outbound: bool,
2481 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2482 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2483 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2484 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2485 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2487 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2488 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2489 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2490 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2491 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2492 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2493 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2495 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2496 pub is_usable: bool,
2497 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2498 pub is_public: bool,
2499 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2500 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2501 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2502 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2503 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2504 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2506 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2507 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2508 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2510 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2511 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2512 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2514 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2515 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2518 impl ChannelDetails {
2519 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2520 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2521 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2523 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2524 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2525 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2526 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2529 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2530 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2531 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2533 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2534 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2535 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2536 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2539 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2540 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2541 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2544 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2545 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2547 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2548 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2549 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2551 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2552 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2553 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2554 features: latest_features,
2555 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2556 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2557 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2558 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2559 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2560 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2561 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2562 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2563 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2564 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2566 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2567 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2568 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2569 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2570 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2571 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2572 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2573 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2574 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2575 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2576 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2577 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2578 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2579 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2580 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2581 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2582 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2583 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2584 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2585 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2586 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2587 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2588 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2589 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2590 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2591 config: Some(context.config()),
2592 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2593 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2594 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2599 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2600 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2601 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2602 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2603 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2604 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2605 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2606 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2607 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2609 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2611 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2612 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2614 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2615 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2616 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2617 /// to drop the channel.
2621 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2622 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2623 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2624 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2625 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2627 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2628 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2629 payment_id: PaymentId,
2631 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2633 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2634 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2635 payment_id: PaymentId,
2636 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2638 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2639 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2640 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2643 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2644 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2645 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2647 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2648 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2649 payment_id: PaymentId,
2650 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2651 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2652 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2654 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2655 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2656 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2658 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2659 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2660 payment_id: PaymentId,
2661 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2662 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2666 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2668 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2670 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2671 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2672 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2673 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2675 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2676 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2677 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2680 macro_rules! handle_error {
2681 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2682 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2683 // entering the macro.
2684 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2685 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2689 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2690 let mut msg_event = None;
2692 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2693 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2694 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2695 let logger = WithContext::from(
2696 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2698 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2700 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2701 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2702 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2703 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2708 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2711 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2713 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2714 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2715 action: err.action.clone()
2719 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2720 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2721 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2722 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2723 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2727 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2734 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2735 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2736 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2737 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2739 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2740 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2741 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2743 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2744 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2745 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2746 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2747 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2749 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2750 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2752 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2756 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2757 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2758 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2760 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2761 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2763 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2764 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2766 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2767 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2768 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2769 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2770 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2771 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2773 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2778 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2779 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2781 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2782 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2784 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2785 match $channel_phase {
2786 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2787 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2789 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2790 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2792 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2793 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2795 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2796 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2797 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2799 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2800 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2801 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2807 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2808 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2812 let key = *$entry.key();
2813 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2815 $entry.remove_entry();
2823 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2824 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2828 let key = *$entry.key();
2829 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2831 $entry.remove_entry();
2839 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2840 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2842 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2843 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2849 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2850 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2851 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2852 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2853 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2855 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2856 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2857 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2858 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2859 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2860 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2861 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2862 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2863 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2864 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2869 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2870 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2871 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2872 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2873 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2874 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2875 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2876 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2877 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2878 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2880 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2885 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2886 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2887 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2888 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2889 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2890 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2891 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2892 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2893 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2895 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2900 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2901 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2902 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2903 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2904 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2905 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2906 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2907 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2908 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2909 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2910 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2911 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2913 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2914 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2915 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2921 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2922 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2924 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2925 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2926 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2927 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2928 updates.announcement_sigs);
2929 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2930 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2933 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2934 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2935 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2936 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2938 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2939 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2940 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2941 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2942 let mut batch_completed = false;
2943 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2944 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2945 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2946 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2948 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2949 channel_state.2 = true;
2951 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2953 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2955 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2958 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2959 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2960 if batch_completed {
2961 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2962 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2963 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2964 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2965 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2966 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2967 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2968 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2969 chan.set_batch_ready();
2970 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2971 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2975 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2976 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2977 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2982 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2984 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2985 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2987 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2988 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2990 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2991 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2992 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2993 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2998 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2999 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
3000 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
3001 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
3003 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
3004 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
3005 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
3006 panic!("{}", err_str);
3008 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
3009 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
3010 &$chan.context.channel_id());
3013 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3019 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3020 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3021 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3023 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3024 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3025 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3026 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3027 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3028 // filter for uniqueness here.
3029 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3030 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3031 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3032 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3034 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3035 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3037 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3038 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3039 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3045 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3046 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3047 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3048 while !processed_all_events {
3049 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3056 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3057 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3058 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3060 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3061 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3062 result = $self.process_background_events();
3064 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3065 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3066 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3067 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3071 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3072 let num_events = pending_events.len();
3073 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3074 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3077 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3079 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3080 $event_to_handle = event;
3082 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3083 post_event_actions.push(action);
3088 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3089 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3090 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3091 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3092 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3093 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3096 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3097 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3098 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3099 processed_all_events = false;
3103 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3104 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3105 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3107 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3108 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3109 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3115 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3117 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3118 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3119 ES::Target: EntropySource,
3120 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3121 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3122 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3126 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3128 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3130 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3131 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3133 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3135 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3136 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3137 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3140 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3141 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3142 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3144 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3145 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3146 current_timestamp: u32,
3148 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3149 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3150 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3151 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3153 default_configuration: config.clone(),
3154 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3155 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3160 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3162 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3163 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3164 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3165 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3166 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3167 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3168 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3169 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3170 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3172 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3175 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3176 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3178 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3180 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3182 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3184 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3185 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3186 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3187 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3188 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3189 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3190 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3191 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3193 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3194 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3204 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3205 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3206 &self.default_configuration
3209 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3210 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3211 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3214 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3215 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3217 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3219 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3223 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3228 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3230 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3231 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3232 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3233 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3234 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3236 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3237 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3239 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3240 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3241 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3243 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3244 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3245 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3247 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3248 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3250 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3251 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3252 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3253 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3254 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3255 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3257 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3258 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3259 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3260 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3261 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3262 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3266 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3267 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3271 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3272 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3274 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3276 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3277 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3278 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3283 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3284 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3285 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3286 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3287 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3288 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3292 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3297 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3299 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3300 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3301 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3303 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3305 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3311 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3312 node_id: their_network_key,
3315 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3318 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3319 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3320 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3321 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3322 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3323 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3324 // the same channel.
3325 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3327 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3329 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3330 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3331 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3332 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3333 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3334 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3335 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3339 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3340 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3341 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3349 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3350 /// more information.
3351 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3352 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3353 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3354 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3355 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3356 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3357 // the same channel.
3358 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3360 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3361 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3362 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3365 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3366 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3367 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3375 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3376 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3378 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3379 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3381 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3382 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3383 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3384 // really wanted anyway.
3385 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3388 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3389 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3390 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3391 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3393 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3394 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3395 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3396 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3397 let context_to_details = |context| {
3398 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3400 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3402 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3403 .map(context_to_details)
3409 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3410 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3412 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3413 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3414 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3416 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3417 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3418 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3419 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3420 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3421 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3423 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3424 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3425 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3427 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3428 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3429 payment_id: *payment_id,
3430 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3431 total_msat: *total_msat,
3434 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3435 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3437 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3438 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3440 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3445 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3448 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3449 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3452 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3454 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3455 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3460 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3461 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3462 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3463 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3464 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3465 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3466 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3467 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3469 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3470 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3471 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3472 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3473 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3477 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3478 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3480 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3481 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3482 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3483 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3486 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3487 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3491 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3493 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3494 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3501 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3502 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3503 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3504 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3507 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3508 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3514 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3515 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3516 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3518 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3519 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3521 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3522 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3523 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3524 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3526 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3528 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3529 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3530 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3533 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3534 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3535 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3536 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3537 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3538 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3541 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3542 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3543 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3545 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3546 /// the channel being closed or not:
3547 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3548 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3549 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3550 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3551 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3552 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3553 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3555 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3556 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3557 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3558 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3560 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3562 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3563 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3564 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3567 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3568 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3569 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3570 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3571 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3574 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3575 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3576 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3577 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3578 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3581 let logger = WithContext::from(
3582 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3585 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3586 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3587 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3588 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3589 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3590 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3591 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3593 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3594 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3595 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3596 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3597 // ignore the result here.
3598 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3600 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3601 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3602 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3603 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3605 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3606 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3607 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3608 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3609 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3610 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3611 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3614 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3617 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3618 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3623 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3624 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3625 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3626 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3627 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3628 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3629 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3630 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3633 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3634 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3635 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3639 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3640 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3644 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3645 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3646 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3647 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3648 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3649 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3650 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3651 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3652 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3653 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3654 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3656 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3658 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3659 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3660 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3661 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3662 mem::drop(peer_state);
3663 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3665 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3666 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3667 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3669 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3670 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3671 // Unfunded channel has no update
3672 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3674 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3675 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3676 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3677 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3678 // Unfunded channel has no update
3679 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3682 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3683 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3684 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3685 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3687 (None, *peer_node_id)
3689 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3692 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3693 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3694 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3695 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3700 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3703 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3704 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3705 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3706 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3707 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3708 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3709 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3710 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3711 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3712 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3713 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3714 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3725 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3726 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3727 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3729 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3730 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3731 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3734 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3735 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3736 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3738 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3739 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3740 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3741 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3742 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3745 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3746 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3747 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3748 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3749 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3753 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3754 /// local transaction(s).
3755 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3756 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3757 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3761 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3762 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3763 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3764 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3765 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3766 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3767 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3768 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3770 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3771 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3772 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3773 // we don't have the channel here.
3774 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3777 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3778 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3779 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3780 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3781 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3782 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3783 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3784 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3785 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3786 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3787 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3788 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3790 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3793 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3794 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3795 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3797 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3798 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3799 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3805 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3806 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3807 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3808 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3810 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3811 None => return None,
3812 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3815 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3816 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3819 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3820 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3821 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3822 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3825 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3829 fn can_forward_htlc(
3830 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3831 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3832 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3833 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3836 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3838 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3839 // intercept forward.
3840 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3841 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3842 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3844 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3849 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3850 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3851 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3853 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3854 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3856 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3862 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3863 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3864 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3865 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3866 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3867 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3868 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3869 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3870 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3871 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3873 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3874 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3876 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3877 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3878 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3880 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3881 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3882 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3883 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3884 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3885 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3886 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3888 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3892 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3893 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3895 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3896 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3897 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3898 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3899 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3900 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3901 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3905 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3906 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3908 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3910 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3911 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3912 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3913 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3914 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3918 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3919 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3921 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3923 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3924 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3927 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3928 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3929 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3930 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3933 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3934 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3935 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3936 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3937 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3938 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3939 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3943 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3946 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3947 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3948 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3949 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3950 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3951 macro_rules! return_err {
3952 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3954 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3955 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3956 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3957 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3958 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3959 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3960 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3961 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3962 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3966 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3967 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3968 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3969 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3970 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3976 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3978 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3979 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3980 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3981 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3984 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3985 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3986 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3987 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3988 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3990 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3993 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3994 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3995 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3996 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3997 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
4003 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
4004 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
4005 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
4007 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
4008 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
4009 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4011 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4012 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4013 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4014 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4015 return Err(LightningError {
4016 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4017 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4020 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4021 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4023 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4024 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4025 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4028 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4029 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4030 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4031 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4033 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4034 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4035 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4037 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4038 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4039 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4040 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4041 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4042 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4043 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4047 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4050 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4051 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4052 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4053 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4055 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4056 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4057 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4058 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4059 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4062 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4063 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4065 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4066 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4067 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4068 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4069 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4070 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4071 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4072 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4074 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4075 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4076 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4078 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4080 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4087 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4088 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4089 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4090 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
4091 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
4095 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4096 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4097 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4100 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4101 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4102 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4103 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4105 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4106 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4107 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4109 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
4110 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4114 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4115 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4117 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
4118 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4119 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4121 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4124 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
4126 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4127 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4130 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4131 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4134 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4135 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4136 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4137 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4138 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4140 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4141 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
4142 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4143 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4145 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4146 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4148 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4149 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4150 Some(monitor_update) => {
4151 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4153 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4154 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4155 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4156 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4157 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4158 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4159 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4167 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4170 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4171 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4172 // `channel_by_id` map.
4173 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4174 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4178 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4179 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4181 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4186 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4188 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4189 /// fields for more info.
4191 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4192 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4194 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4196 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4197 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4198 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4199 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4200 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4202 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4203 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4204 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4205 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4206 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4208 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4209 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4210 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4211 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4213 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4215 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4216 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4217 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4219 /// In general, a path may raise:
4220 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4221 /// node public key) is specified.
4222 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4223 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4224 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4225 /// relevant updates.
4227 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4228 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4229 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4231 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4232 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4233 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4234 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4235 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4236 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4237 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4238 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4240 self.pending_outbound_payments
4241 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4242 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4243 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4246 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4247 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4248 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4249 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4251 self.pending_outbound_payments
4252 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4253 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4254 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4255 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4259 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4260 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4262 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4263 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4264 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4268 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4269 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4270 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4274 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4275 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4278 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4279 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4281 self.pending_outbound_payments
4282 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4283 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4284 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4285 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4286 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4290 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4291 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4292 /// retries are exhausted.
4294 /// # Event Generation
4296 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4297 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4299 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4300 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4301 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4303 /// # Requested Invoices
4305 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4306 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4307 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4308 /// once the invoice has been received.
4310 /// # Restart Behavior
4312 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4313 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4314 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4316 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4317 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4319 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4322 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4323 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4324 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4325 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4326 /// never reach the recipient.
4328 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4329 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4331 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4332 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4334 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4335 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4336 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4337 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4338 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4339 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4340 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4343 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4344 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4346 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4349 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4350 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4351 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4352 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4353 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4354 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4355 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4356 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4359 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4360 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4361 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4362 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4363 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4365 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4366 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4367 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4370 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4373 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4374 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4377 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4378 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4380 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4381 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4382 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4383 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4384 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4385 let payment_params =
4386 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4388 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4390 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4393 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4394 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4396 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4397 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4398 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4399 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4401 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4402 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4403 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4404 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4405 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4406 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4407 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4408 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4409 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4410 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4412 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4413 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4414 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4415 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4419 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4421 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4422 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4425 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4427 let mut res = Vec::new();
4429 for mut path in route.paths {
4430 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4431 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4432 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4433 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4434 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4437 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4440 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4441 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4443 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4445 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4446 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4451 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4454 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4459 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4460 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4461 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4463 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4464 let used_liquidity =
4465 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4467 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4468 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4470 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4473 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4478 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4479 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4480 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4487 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4488 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4489 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4490 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4491 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4492 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4494 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4495 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4497 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4498 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4500 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4501 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4502 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4504 let err = if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = $err {
4505 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4506 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4507 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4508 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4509 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4510 } else { unreachable!(); };
4512 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4513 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4514 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4517 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4518 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4520 let chan_err = ChannelError::Close(err.to_owned());
4521 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4522 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4526 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4527 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4529 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4530 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4531 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4532 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4537 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4538 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4540 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4541 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4544 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4545 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4546 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4550 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4551 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4552 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4556 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4558 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4561 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4562 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4564 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4566 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4567 funding_txo, o.get()
4569 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4570 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4571 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4572 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4573 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4574 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4577 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4584 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4585 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4586 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4590 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4592 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4593 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4595 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4596 /// across the p2p network.
4598 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4599 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4601 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4602 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4603 /// keys per-channel).
4605 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4606 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4607 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4609 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4610 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4611 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4613 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4614 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4615 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4616 /// for more details.
4618 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4619 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4620 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4621 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4624 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4626 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4627 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4629 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4630 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4631 /// signature for each channel.
4633 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4634 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4635 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4636 let mut result = Ok(());
4638 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4639 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4640 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4641 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4642 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4647 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4648 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4649 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4653 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4654 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4655 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4656 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4657 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4658 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4659 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4660 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4662 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4663 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4668 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4669 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4670 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4671 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4675 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4676 match states.entry(txid) {
4677 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4678 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4679 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4683 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4686 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4687 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4688 temporary_channel_id,
4689 counterparty_node_id,
4690 funding_transaction.clone(),
4693 let mut output_index = None;
4694 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4695 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4696 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4697 if output_index.is_some() {
4698 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4700 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4703 if output_index.is_none() {
4704 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4706 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4707 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4708 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4709 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4710 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4711 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4717 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4718 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4719 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4720 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4721 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4722 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4723 .into_iter().flatten()
4724 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4726 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4727 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4729 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4731 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4732 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4733 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4734 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4735 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4736 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4737 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4738 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4739 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4740 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4741 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4742 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4743 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4745 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4752 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4753 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4754 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4760 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4762 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4763 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4764 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4765 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4767 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4768 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4770 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4771 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4773 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4775 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4776 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4777 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4778 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4779 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4780 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4781 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4782 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4783 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4784 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4785 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4787 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4791 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4794 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4795 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4796 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4798 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4799 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4800 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4801 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4805 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4806 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4807 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4808 config.apply(config_update);
4809 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4812 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4813 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4814 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4815 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4816 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4817 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4818 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4825 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4826 debug_assert!(false);
4827 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4829 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4830 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4837 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4839 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4840 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4841 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4842 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4844 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4845 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4847 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4848 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4850 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4852 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4853 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4854 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4855 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4856 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4857 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4858 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4859 pub fn update_channel_config(
4860 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4861 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4862 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4865 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4866 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4868 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4869 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4871 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4872 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4873 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4874 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4875 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4877 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4878 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4879 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4882 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4885 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4886 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4887 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4888 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4889 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4890 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4893 let next_hop_scid = {
4894 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4895 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4896 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4897 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4898 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4899 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4900 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4901 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4902 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4903 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4906 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4908 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4909 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4910 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4913 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4914 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4915 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4916 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4917 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4924 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4925 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4926 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4929 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4930 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4931 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4932 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4935 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4937 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4938 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4939 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4940 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4941 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4944 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4945 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4946 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4947 payment.prev_channel_id,
4948 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4949 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4951 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4955 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4956 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4958 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4961 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4962 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4965 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4966 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4967 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4970 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4971 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4972 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4973 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4974 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4975 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4976 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4977 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4978 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4979 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4982 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4983 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4984 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4985 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4990 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4991 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4992 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4994 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4995 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4996 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4997 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4998 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4999 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
5000 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
5002 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
5003 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
5007 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
5011 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
5012 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5013 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5014 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
5015 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
5016 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
5017 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
5018 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
5021 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
5022 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
5023 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
5024 incoming_channel_details
5026 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5030 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5031 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5032 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5033 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5034 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5036 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5038 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5043 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5044 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5046 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5047 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5048 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
5049 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5050 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5054 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5055 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5056 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5057 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5062 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5063 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5064 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5066 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5067 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5070 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5071 None => continue 'outer_loop,
5074 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5075 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5076 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5077 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5079 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5080 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5081 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5083 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5084 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5089 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5090 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5091 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5093 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5094 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5096 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5097 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5098 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5103 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5104 // proposed to as a batch.
5105 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5106 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5107 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5108 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5109 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5110 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5111 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5112 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5114 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5115 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5116 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5117 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5120 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5121 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5122 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5123 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5129 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5131 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5132 /// Will likely generate further events.
5133 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5134 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5136 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5138 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5139 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5140 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5142 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5143 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5145 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5146 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5147 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5148 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5150 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5151 match forward_info {
5152 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5153 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5154 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5155 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5156 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5159 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5160 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5161 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
5162 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5164 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5165 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5166 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5167 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5168 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5169 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5171 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5172 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5175 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5176 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5178 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5181 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5182 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5188 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5189 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5191 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5195 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5196 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5198 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5202 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5203 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5204 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5205 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5206 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5207 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5208 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5211 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5212 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5213 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5214 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5215 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5217 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5219 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5220 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5224 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5225 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5226 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5227 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5228 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5229 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5231 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5232 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5238 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5241 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5244 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5245 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5246 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5247 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5248 // problem, not ours.
5254 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5255 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5256 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5258 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5262 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5263 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5264 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5265 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5266 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5269 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5271 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5272 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5273 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5274 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5275 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5276 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5277 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5278 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5279 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5280 onion_packet, blinded, ..
5281 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5284 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
5285 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5286 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5287 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5288 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5289 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5290 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5291 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5292 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5293 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5294 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5295 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5297 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5298 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5299 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5300 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5301 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5302 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5305 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5306 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5307 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5310 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5311 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5313 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5315 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5316 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5317 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5318 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5324 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5325 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5327 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5328 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5329 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5331 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5332 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5333 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5334 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5336 Some((res, htlc_id))
5339 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5340 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5341 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5342 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5344 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5346 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5347 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5348 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5354 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5358 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5359 match forward_info {
5360 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5361 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5362 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5363 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5364 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5367 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5368 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5369 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5370 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5371 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5372 requires_blinded_error: _
5374 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5375 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5376 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5377 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5378 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5380 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5381 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5382 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5384 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5385 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5389 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5390 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5393 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5396 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5397 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5398 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5399 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5400 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5401 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5402 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5403 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5404 phantom_shared_secret,
5407 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5408 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5409 // if routing nodes overpay
5410 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5411 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5413 total_value_received: None,
5414 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5417 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5420 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5422 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5423 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5424 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5425 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5426 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5427 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5429 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5430 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5431 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5432 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5433 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5434 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5435 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5436 phantom_shared_secret,
5439 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5440 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5442 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5445 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5446 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5447 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5448 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5449 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5452 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5453 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5454 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5455 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5456 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5457 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5458 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5460 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5461 .entry(payment_hash)
5462 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5463 .or_insert_with(|| {
5464 committed_to_claimable = true;
5466 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5469 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5470 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5472 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5474 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5475 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5476 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5478 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5479 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5480 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5483 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5485 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5486 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5487 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5488 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5489 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5490 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5491 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5493 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5494 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5496 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5498 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5499 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5500 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5501 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5502 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5505 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5506 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5507 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5508 committed_to_claimable = true;
5510 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5511 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5512 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5513 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5514 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5515 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5516 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5517 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5518 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5522 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5523 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5524 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5525 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5526 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5528 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5530 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5531 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5533 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5534 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5535 committed_to_claimable = true;
5538 payment_claimable_generated
5542 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5543 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5544 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5545 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5546 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5547 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5548 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5549 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5550 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5551 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5552 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5553 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5554 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5555 Ok(result) => result,
5557 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5558 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5561 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5562 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5563 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5565 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5566 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5569 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5571 payment_data.payment_secret,
5574 check_total_value!(purpose);
5576 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5577 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5578 check_total_value!(purpose);
5582 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5583 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5584 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5585 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5587 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5588 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5590 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5591 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5593 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5594 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5596 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5597 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5598 payment_data.payment_secret,
5601 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5602 if payment_claimable_generated {
5603 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5609 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5610 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5618 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5619 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5620 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5621 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5623 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5624 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5626 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5628 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5629 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5630 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5632 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5634 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5635 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5636 events.append(&mut new_events);
5639 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5641 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5642 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5643 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5645 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5647 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5648 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5649 if background_events.is_empty() {
5650 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5653 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5655 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5656 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5657 // monitor updating completing.
5658 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5660 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5661 let mut updated_chan = false;
5663 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5664 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5665 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5666 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5667 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5668 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5669 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5670 updated_chan = true;
5671 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5672 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5674 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5682 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5683 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5686 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5688 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5689 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5690 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5691 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5692 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5694 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5695 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5696 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5697 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5698 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5704 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5707 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5708 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5709 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5710 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5711 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5714 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5715 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5717 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5719 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5720 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5721 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5723 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5724 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5725 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5726 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5728 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5729 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5731 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5732 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5736 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5737 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5738 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5739 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5740 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5741 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5742 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5744 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5745 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5748 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5751 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5752 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5754 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5759 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5760 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5768 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5770 /// This currently includes:
5771 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5772 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5773 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5775 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5776 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5777 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5778 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5779 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5780 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5781 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5782 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5784 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5785 /// estimate fetches.
5787 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5788 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5789 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5790 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5791 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5793 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5794 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5796 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5797 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5798 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5799 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5801 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5802 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5803 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5804 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5805 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5806 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5808 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5809 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5810 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5812 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5813 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5814 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5815 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5816 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5817 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5818 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5819 channel_id: *chan_id,
5820 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5832 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5835 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5836 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5837 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5839 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5840 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5845 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5846 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5848 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5849 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5850 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5851 if needs_close { return false; }
5854 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5855 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5856 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5857 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5858 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5859 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5860 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5861 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5863 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5864 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5865 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5866 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5867 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5871 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5873 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5876 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5878 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5879 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5880 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5881 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5882 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5886 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5888 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5894 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5896 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5897 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5898 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5899 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5900 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5901 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5902 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5903 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5904 channel_id: *chan_id,
5905 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5914 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5915 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5917 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5918 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5919 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5921 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5923 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5924 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5926 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5927 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5928 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5929 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5934 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5935 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5936 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5937 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5938 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5939 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5940 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5941 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5942 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5948 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5950 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5951 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5956 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5957 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5958 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5959 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5960 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5961 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5962 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5963 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5964 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5965 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5966 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5967 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5968 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5969 // have no channels to the peer.
5970 let remove_entry = {
5971 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5972 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5975 entry.remove_entry();
5978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5983 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5984 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5985 // This should be unreachable
5986 debug_assert!(false);
5989 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5990 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5991 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5992 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5993 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5994 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5995 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5998 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5999 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
6000 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
6002 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
6003 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
6010 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
6011 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
6012 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
6013 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
6014 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6017 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6018 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6021 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
6022 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6025 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6026 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
6027 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
6028 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
6029 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
6030 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6031 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6034 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6035 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6038 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6039 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6040 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6041 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6042 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6049 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6050 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6051 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6053 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6054 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6055 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6056 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6058 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6059 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6060 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6061 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6062 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6063 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6066 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6067 /// reason for the failure.
6069 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6070 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6073 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6074 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6075 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6076 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6077 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6078 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6079 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6084 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6085 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6086 match failure_code {
6087 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6088 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6089 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6090 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6091 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6092 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6094 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6095 let fail_data = match data {
6096 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6099 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6104 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6105 /// that we want to return and a channel.
6107 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6109 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6110 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6111 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6112 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6113 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6114 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6115 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6117 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6119 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6120 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6122 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6127 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6128 /// that we want to return and a channel.
6129 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6130 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6131 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6132 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6133 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6134 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6135 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6136 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6138 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6139 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6140 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6141 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6143 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6144 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6145 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6146 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6147 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6151 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6152 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6153 // be surfaced to the user.
6154 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6155 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6156 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6158 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6160 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6163 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6165 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6166 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6168 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6169 debug_assert!(false);
6170 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6173 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6175 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6178 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6179 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6180 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6181 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6185 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6186 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6187 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6190 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6191 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6192 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6193 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6194 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6195 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6196 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6197 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6198 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6199 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6202 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6203 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6204 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6207 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6208 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6209 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6210 let mut push_forward_event;
6212 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6213 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6214 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6215 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6217 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6218 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6219 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6222 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
6223 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6224 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6226 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6227 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6228 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6229 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6230 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6232 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6234 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6235 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6237 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6238 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6242 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6243 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6245 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6249 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6250 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6251 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6252 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6253 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6254 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6257 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6260 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6261 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6262 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6263 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6264 failed_next_destination: destination,
6271 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6272 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6274 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6275 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6276 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6277 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6279 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6280 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6281 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6282 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6284 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6285 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6286 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6288 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6289 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6290 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6291 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6292 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6293 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6294 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6295 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6296 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6299 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6300 /// even type numbers.
6304 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6305 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6307 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6308 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6309 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6312 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6313 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6318 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6319 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6320 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6321 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6322 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6323 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6324 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6325 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6330 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
6331 .entry(payment_hash)
6333 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6334 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6337 .or_insert_with(|| {
6338 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6339 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6341 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6342 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6345 sender_intended_value,
6346 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6350 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6351 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6352 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6353 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6354 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6355 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6356 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6357 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6358 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6359 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6360 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6369 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6371 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6372 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6373 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6374 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6375 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6376 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6377 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6378 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6379 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6380 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6381 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6382 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6383 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6384 debug_assert!(false);
6388 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6390 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6391 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6392 debug_assert!(false);
6396 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6397 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6399 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6400 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6401 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6402 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6405 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6406 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6407 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6408 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6412 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6413 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6414 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6415 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6416 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6417 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6418 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6421 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6422 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6423 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6424 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id), Some(payment_hash));
6425 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6426 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6431 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6432 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6433 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6434 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6435 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6436 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6437 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6439 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6442 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6443 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6444 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6445 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6449 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6450 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6451 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6452 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6454 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6455 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6456 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6457 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6459 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6460 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6461 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6462 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6466 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6467 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6468 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6472 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6473 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6474 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6477 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6480 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6481 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6482 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6483 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6484 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6487 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6488 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6489 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6491 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6494 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6495 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6497 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6498 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6499 // monitor update as a background event.
6500 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6501 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6502 counterparty_node_id,
6503 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6504 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6505 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6509 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6510 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6515 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6517 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6519 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6520 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6521 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6522 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6523 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6525 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6527 debug_assert!(false,
6528 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6531 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6532 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6533 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6534 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6535 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6537 let mut found_blocker = false;
6538 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6539 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6540 // which case we need to only remove the one
6541 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6542 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6543 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6544 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6546 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6549 debug_assert!(false);
6558 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6559 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6560 counterparty_node_id: None,
6561 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6564 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6568 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6569 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6570 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6571 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6572 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6573 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6574 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6575 // again on restart.
6576 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6577 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6578 payment_preimage, update_res);
6581 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6582 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6584 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6585 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6586 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6587 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6588 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6589 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6590 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6591 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6592 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6593 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6596 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6597 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6598 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6599 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6600 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6601 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6605 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6606 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6609 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6610 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6611 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6612 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6615 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6616 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6617 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6618 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6619 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6621 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6622 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6623 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6625 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6626 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6629 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6630 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6631 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6632 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6633 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6634 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6635 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6636 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6637 let chan_to_release =
6638 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6639 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6641 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6642 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6643 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6644 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6649 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6650 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6651 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6652 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6653 // in the background.
6654 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6655 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6656 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6657 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6659 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6660 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6661 funding_txo, update, ..
6663 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6664 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6665 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6666 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6668 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6674 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6675 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6676 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6678 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6679 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6681 monitor_update.updates[0],
6682 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6687 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6688 // immediately once we get going.
6689 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6692 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6694 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6697 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6698 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6699 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6700 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6701 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6702 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6703 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6707 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6708 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6709 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6712 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6713 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6714 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6715 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6716 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6717 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6718 prev_user_channel_id,
6719 next_user_channel_id,
6720 total_fee_earned_msat,
6722 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6723 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6725 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6729 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6730 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6731 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6737 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6738 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6739 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6742 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6743 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6744 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6745 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6747 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6749 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6750 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6751 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6753 payment_purpose: purpose,
6756 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6759 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6763 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6765 sender_intended_total_msat,
6770 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6771 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6773 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6774 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6775 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6778 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6779 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6781 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6782 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6783 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6784 downstream_channel_id,
6785 Some(blocking_action),
6792 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6793 /// update completion.
6794 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6795 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6796 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6797 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6798 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6799 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6800 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6801 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6802 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6803 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6804 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6805 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6806 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6807 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6808 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6809 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6811 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6812 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6814 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6815 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6816 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6817 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6819 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6820 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6821 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6824 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6825 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6827 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6828 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6829 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6834 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6835 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6836 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6837 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6842 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6843 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6844 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6845 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6846 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6851 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6855 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6861 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6862 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6863 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6867 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6868 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6869 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6872 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6875 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6876 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6878 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6879 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6881 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6882 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6883 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6884 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6885 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6890 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6891 let mut peer_state_lock;
6892 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6893 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6894 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6895 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6897 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6900 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6901 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6902 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6903 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6904 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6907 let remaining_in_flight =
6908 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6909 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6912 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6913 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6914 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6915 remaining_in_flight);
6916 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6919 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6922 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6924 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6925 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6928 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6929 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6930 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6932 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6933 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6934 /// used to accept such channels.
6936 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6937 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6938 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6939 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6942 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6943 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6945 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6946 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6947 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6949 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6950 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6952 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6953 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6955 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6956 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6958 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6959 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6960 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6961 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6964 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6966 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6969 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6970 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6972 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6974 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6975 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6977 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6981 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6983 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6984 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6985 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6987 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6988 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6989 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6990 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6991 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6992 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6993 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6996 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6997 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6999 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7005 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
7006 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7007 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
7008 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
7010 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
7014 Ok(mut channel) => {
7016 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
7017 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
7018 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
7019 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7020 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7021 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7022 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
7025 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7026 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
7027 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7031 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7032 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7033 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7034 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
7035 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7036 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7037 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
7038 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
7041 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7042 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7043 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7045 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7049 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7050 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7051 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7053 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7054 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7055 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7058 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7065 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7066 /// or 0-conf channels.
7068 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7069 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7070 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7071 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7072 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7073 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7075 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7076 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7077 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7078 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7079 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7080 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7081 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7085 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7088 fn unfunded_channel_count(
7089 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7091 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7092 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7094 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7095 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7096 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7097 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7098 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7100 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7103 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7104 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7105 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7108 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7109 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7110 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7111 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7112 // included in the unfunded count.
7113 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7114 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7115 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7118 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7119 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7122 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
7123 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7124 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7125 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7130 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7133 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7134 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7135 // likely to be lost on restart!
7136 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7137 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7138 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7141 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7142 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7143 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7146 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7147 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7148 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7149 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7150 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7153 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7155 debug_assert!(false);
7156 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7157 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7158 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7163 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7164 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7165 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7166 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7167 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7168 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7170 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7171 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7172 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7175 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7176 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7178 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7179 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7182 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7183 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7185 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7186 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7187 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7190 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7191 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7192 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7193 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7195 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7197 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7198 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7199 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7200 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7201 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7202 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7205 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7206 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7207 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7212 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7213 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7214 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7215 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7216 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7217 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7218 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7221 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7226 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7227 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7228 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7229 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7230 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7232 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7233 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7234 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7235 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7238 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7239 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7241 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7242 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7243 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7245 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7249 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7250 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7251 // likely to be lost on restart!
7252 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7253 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7254 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7256 debug_assert!(false);
7257 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7261 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7263 match phase.get_mut() {
7264 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7265 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7266 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7276 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7277 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7278 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7279 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7280 channel_value_satoshis: value,
7282 user_channel_id: user_id,
7287 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7288 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7290 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7291 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7293 debug_assert!(false);
7294 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7297 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7298 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7299 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7300 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7301 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7302 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
7303 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7305 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7306 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7307 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7308 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7309 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7310 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7311 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7312 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7313 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7317 Some(mut phase) => {
7318 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7319 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7320 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7322 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7325 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7327 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7328 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7329 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7330 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7331 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7332 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7334 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7335 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7336 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7339 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7341 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7343 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7344 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7345 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7346 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7347 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7349 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7350 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7351 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7352 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7353 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7355 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7356 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7357 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7358 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7359 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7361 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7366 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7367 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7368 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7370 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7374 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7375 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7376 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7384 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7385 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7386 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7387 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7389 debug_assert!(false);
7390 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7395 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7396 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7397 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7398 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7399 let logger = WithContext::from(
7401 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7402 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7406 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7408 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7409 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7410 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7411 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7412 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7413 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7414 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7415 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7416 } else { unreachable!(); }
7419 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7420 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7421 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7422 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7423 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7424 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7425 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7429 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7430 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7431 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7432 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7433 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7434 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7441 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7445 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7446 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7447 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7449 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7451 debug_assert!(false);
7452 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7454 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7455 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7456 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7458 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7459 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7460 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7461 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7462 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7463 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7464 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7465 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7466 msg: announcement_sigs,
7468 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7469 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7470 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7471 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7472 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7473 // announcement_signatures.
7474 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7475 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7476 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7477 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7484 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7485 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7490 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7491 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7495 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7500 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7501 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7502 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7505 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7507 debug_assert!(false);
7508 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7510 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7511 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7512 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7513 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7515 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7516 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7517 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7518 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7520 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7523 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7524 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7525 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7526 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7528 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7529 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7530 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7531 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7532 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7533 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7537 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7538 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7539 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7540 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7543 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7544 let context = phase.context_mut();
7545 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7546 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7547 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7548 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7550 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7551 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7552 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7553 let context = phase.context_mut();
7554 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7555 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7556 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7560 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7563 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7564 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7565 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7566 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7568 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7569 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7575 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7576 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7577 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7579 debug_assert!(false);
7580 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7582 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7585 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7587 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7588 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7589 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7590 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7591 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7592 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7597 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7598 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7599 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7600 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7601 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7602 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7603 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7605 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7606 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7609 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7612 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7613 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7614 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7615 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7617 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7618 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7619 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7620 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7625 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7626 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7627 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7632 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7633 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7634 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7635 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7637 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7638 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7639 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7640 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7642 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7643 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7645 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7646 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7647 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7649 debug_assert!(false);
7650 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7652 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7653 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7654 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7655 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7656 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7657 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7658 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7659 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7660 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7661 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7663 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7665 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7666 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7667 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7668 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7669 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7670 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7671 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7672 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7673 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7674 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7675 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7676 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7680 match pending_forward_info {
7681 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7682 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7684 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7685 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7686 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7687 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7688 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7690 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7691 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7692 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7693 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7694 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7697 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7703 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7705 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7706 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7714 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7716 let next_user_channel_id;
7717 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7719 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7721 debug_assert!(false);
7722 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7726 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7728 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7729 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7730 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7731 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7733 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7735 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7736 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7737 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7739 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7740 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7741 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7742 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7743 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7744 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7745 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7746 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7749 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7750 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7756 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7757 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7758 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7764 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7765 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7766 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7770 debug_assert!(false);
7771 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7777 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7778 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7780 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7781 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7789 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7790 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7791 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7795 debug_assert!(false);
7796 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7802 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7803 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7804 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7806 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7807 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7809 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7810 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7818 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7820 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7822 debug_assert!(false);
7823 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7829 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7830 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7831 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7832 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7833 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7834 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7835 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7839 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7840 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7847 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7848 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7849 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7850 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7851 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7852 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7856 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7860 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7861 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7862 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7866 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7867 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7868 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7869 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7870 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7871 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7872 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7873 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7874 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7875 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7876 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7878 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7879 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7881 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7882 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7883 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7884 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7885 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7886 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7887 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7890 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7891 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7893 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7894 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7895 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7897 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7898 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7899 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7900 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7901 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7904 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7905 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7908 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7909 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7910 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7911 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7912 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7913 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7914 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7915 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7916 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7917 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7918 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7921 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7922 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7923 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7928 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7929 // payments are being processed.
7930 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7931 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7932 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7939 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7940 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7943 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7944 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7945 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7951 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7952 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7953 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7954 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7955 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7957 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7958 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7959 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7960 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7961 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7962 // real by taking more time.
7963 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7964 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7965 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7970 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7971 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7972 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7973 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7974 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7975 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7976 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7978 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7979 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7980 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7981 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7982 channel_funding_outpoint,
7984 counterparty_node_id,
7989 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7990 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7991 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7994 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7995 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7996 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7998 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7999 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8000 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8006 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8007 let htlcs_to_fail = {
8008 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8009 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8011 debug_assert!(false);
8012 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8013 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
8014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8015 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8017 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8018 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8019 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8020 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
8021 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
8022 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
8023 *counterparty_node_id)
8025 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
8026 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
8027 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
8028 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
8029 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
8030 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
8031 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8035 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8036 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8039 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8042 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8046 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8048 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8050 debug_assert!(false);
8051 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8053 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8054 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8055 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8057 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8058 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8059 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8061 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8062 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8065 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8070 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8072 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8074 debug_assert!(false);
8075 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8079 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8081 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8082 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8083 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8086 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8087 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8088 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8089 msg, &self.default_configuration
8090 ), chan_phase_entry),
8091 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8092 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8093 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8096 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8097 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8100 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8105 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8106 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8107 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8108 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8110 // It's not a local channel
8111 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8114 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8115 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8116 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8117 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8121 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8123 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8124 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8125 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8126 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8127 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8128 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8129 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8133 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8134 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8135 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8136 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8138 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8139 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8140 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8141 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8144 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8148 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8149 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8152 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8154 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8157 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8158 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8161 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8163 debug_assert!(false);
8164 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8165 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8169 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
8170 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8171 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8172 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8174 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8175 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8176 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8177 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8178 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8179 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8180 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8181 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8182 let mut channel_update = None;
8183 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8184 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8185 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8188 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8189 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8190 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8191 // they have the latest channel parameters.
8192 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8193 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8194 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8199 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8200 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8201 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8202 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8203 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8204 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8205 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8206 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8210 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8211 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8215 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8217 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8218 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8219 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8220 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8221 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8222 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8224 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8225 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8226 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8227 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8228 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8229 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8230 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8231 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8232 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8233 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8234 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8235 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8236 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8237 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8238 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8239 next_funding_txid: None,
8242 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8243 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8244 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8250 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8251 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8253 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8256 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8257 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8258 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8260 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8261 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8262 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8263 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8264 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8265 match monitor_event {
8266 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8267 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
8268 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8269 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8270 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8271 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8272 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8274 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8275 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8276 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8277 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8280 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8281 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8282 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8284 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8285 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8286 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8287 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8290 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8292 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8293 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8294 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8295 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8296 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8297 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8298 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8301 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8303 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8304 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8305 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8306 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8310 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8311 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8312 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8313 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8321 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8322 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8328 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8329 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8332 has_pending_monitor_events
8335 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8336 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8337 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8339 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8341 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8344 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8345 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8346 /// update was applied.
8347 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8348 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8349 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8351 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8352 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8353 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8354 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8356 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8357 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8359 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8360 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8361 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8362 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8364 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8365 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8366 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8367 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8368 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8369 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8371 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8372 has_monitor_update = true;
8374 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8375 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8376 continue 'peer_loop;
8385 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8386 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8387 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8393 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8394 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8396 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8397 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8399 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8400 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8401 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8402 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8404 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8405 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8407 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8408 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8409 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8410 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8415 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8416 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8421 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8422 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8425 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8426 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8433 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8438 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8439 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8440 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8441 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8442 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8443 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8447 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8450 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8451 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8457 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8458 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8459 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8460 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8461 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8462 let mut has_update = false;
8463 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8467 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8468 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8469 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8470 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8471 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8473 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8474 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8475 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8476 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8477 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8479 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8480 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8483 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8484 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8485 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8487 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8488 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8489 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8490 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8491 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8492 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8497 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8498 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8499 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8505 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8506 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8511 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8517 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8518 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8521 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8522 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8528 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8529 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8531 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8532 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8533 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8534 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8535 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8536 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8537 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8538 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8539 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8540 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8541 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8542 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8543 assert!(should_broadcast);
8544 } else { unreachable!(); }
8545 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8546 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8547 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8550 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8555 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8556 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8557 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8558 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8562 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8563 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8564 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8565 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8566 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8568 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8572 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8577 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8579 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8580 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8581 pub fn create_offer_builder(&$self) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8582 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8583 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8584 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8585 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8587 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8588 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8589 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8591 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8598 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8599 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8600 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8604 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8605 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8607 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8608 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8609 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8612 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8613 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8614 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8616 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8617 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8621 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8622 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8623 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8624 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8625 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8627 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8631 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8632 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8637 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8638 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8639 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8641 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8642 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8643 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8644 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8645 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8646 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8647 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8648 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8649 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8650 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8651 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8652 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8654 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8655 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8656 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8658 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8659 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8664 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8665 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8666 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8667 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8669 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8675 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8677 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8678 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8679 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8680 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8681 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8686 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8687 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8688 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8689 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8692 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8694 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8696 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8697 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8698 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8700 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8701 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8702 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8703 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8704 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8705 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8706 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8708 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8709 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8713 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8714 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8717 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8718 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8719 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8723 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8724 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8725 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8726 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8730 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8731 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8732 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8737 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8738 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8739 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8740 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8743 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8744 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8745 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8746 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8747 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8748 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8749 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8750 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8751 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8752 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8753 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8754 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8755 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8756 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8757 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8759 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8760 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8762 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8764 let builder = match quantity {
8766 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8768 let builder = match amount_msats {
8770 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8772 let builder = match payer_note {
8774 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8776 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8777 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8781 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8782 self.pending_outbound_payments
8783 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8784 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8786 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8788 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8789 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8790 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8791 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8792 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8793 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8794 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8795 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8796 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8797 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8798 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8800 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8802 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8803 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8804 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8805 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8808 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8810 debug_assert!(false);
8811 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8817 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8820 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8821 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8822 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8826 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8827 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8828 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8829 /// received and no retries will be made.
8834 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8835 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8838 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8839 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8840 &self, refund: &Refund
8841 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8842 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8843 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8844 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8846 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8847 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8849 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8850 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8855 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8856 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8857 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8858 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8859 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8861 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8863 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8864 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8865 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8867 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8868 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8869 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8871 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8872 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8873 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8875 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8876 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8877 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8878 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8880 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8881 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8882 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8883 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8884 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8887 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8889 for path in refund.paths() {
8890 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8891 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8892 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8893 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8895 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8901 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8905 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8908 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8909 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8911 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8912 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8913 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8915 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8917 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8918 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8922 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8923 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8925 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8927 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8928 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8930 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8931 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8932 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8933 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8934 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8935 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8936 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8937 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8938 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8939 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8942 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8943 /// stored external to LDK.
8945 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8946 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8947 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8949 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8950 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8953 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8954 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8955 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8956 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8958 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8959 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8960 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8961 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8962 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8964 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8965 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8966 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8967 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8968 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8970 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8971 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8973 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8974 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8978 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8979 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8981 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8983 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8984 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8986 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8987 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8988 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8989 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8990 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8991 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8992 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8995 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8996 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8998 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8999 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
9000 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
9003 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
9005 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
9006 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
9007 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
9008 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9010 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
9012 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
9013 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
9014 .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
9016 short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
9018 .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
9019 .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
9020 .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
9022 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
9025 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
9026 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
9029 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
9030 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
9031 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
9032 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
9033 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
9034 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9036 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
9037 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
9038 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
9039 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
9040 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
9042 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
9044 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
9048 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9049 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9053 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9054 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9056 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9057 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9058 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9059 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9061 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9062 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9063 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9064 Some(_) => continue,
9065 None => return scid_candidate
9070 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9072 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9073 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9075 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9076 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9077 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9081 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9082 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9083 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9085 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9086 /// times to get a unique scid.
9087 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9088 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9089 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9091 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9092 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9093 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9094 return scid_candidate
9098 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9099 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9100 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9101 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9103 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9104 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9107 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9108 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9110 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9111 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9112 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9121 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9122 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9123 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9124 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9125 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9129 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9130 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9131 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9132 events.push_back((event, None));
9136 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9137 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9138 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9142 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9143 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9147 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9148 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9151 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9152 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9153 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9154 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9155 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9156 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9157 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9159 let logger = WithContext::from(
9160 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
9163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9164 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9165 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9167 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9168 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9169 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9170 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9172 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9176 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9177 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9178 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9179 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9180 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9181 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9186 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9188 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9189 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9190 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9191 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9193 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9194 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9195 if further_update_exists {
9196 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9201 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9208 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9209 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9215 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9216 for action in actions {
9218 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9219 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9221 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9227 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9228 /// using the given event handler.
9230 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9231 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9235 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9239 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9241 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9242 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9243 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9244 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9245 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9250 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9251 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9252 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9253 /// is always placed next to each other.
9255 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9256 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9257 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9258 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9260 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9261 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9262 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9263 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9264 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9265 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9266 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9268 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9269 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9270 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9271 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9274 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9275 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9277 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9278 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9281 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9282 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9283 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9284 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9285 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9286 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9287 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9288 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9290 if peer_state.is_connected {
9291 is_any_peer_connected = true
9295 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9296 if is_any_peer_connected {
9297 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9298 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9301 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9302 events.replace(pending_events);
9311 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9313 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9314 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9315 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9316 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9317 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9322 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9324 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9325 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9326 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9328 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9332 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9334 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9335 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9336 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9337 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9338 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9339 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9343 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9345 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9346 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9347 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9348 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9349 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9352 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9353 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9356 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9357 let _persistence_guard =
9358 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9359 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9360 let new_height = height - 1;
9362 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9363 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9364 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9365 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9366 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9367 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9370 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9374 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9376 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9377 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9378 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9379 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9380 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9381 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9385 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9386 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9387 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9388 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9390 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9391 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9393 let _persistence_guard =
9394 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9395 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9396 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9397 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9399 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9400 if height < last_best_block_height {
9401 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9402 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9406 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9407 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9408 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9409 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9411 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9412 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9414 let _persistence_guard =
9415 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9416 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9417 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9419 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9421 macro_rules! max_time {
9422 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9424 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9425 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9426 // having an explicit local time source.
9427 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9428 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9429 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9430 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9431 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9437 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9438 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9439 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9440 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9444 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9445 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9446 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9449 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9450 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9451 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9452 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9453 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9454 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9461 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9462 let _persistence_guard =
9463 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9464 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9465 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9466 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9467 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9468 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9469 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9470 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9475 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9477 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9478 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9479 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9480 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9481 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9482 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9486 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9487 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9489 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9490 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9491 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9492 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9493 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9495 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9496 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9498 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9499 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9502 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9504 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9506 // Retain unfunded channels.
9507 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9508 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9509 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9510 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9511 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9512 let res = f(channel);
9513 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9514 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9515 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9516 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9517 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9519 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9520 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9521 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9522 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9523 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9524 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9525 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9526 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9531 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9537 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9540 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9541 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9542 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9543 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9544 msg: announcement_sigs,
9546 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9547 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9550 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9551 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9552 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9557 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9558 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9559 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9560 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9561 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9562 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9563 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9564 // is always consistent.
9565 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9566 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9567 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9568 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9569 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9572 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9573 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9574 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9575 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9576 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9577 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9578 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9579 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9580 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9584 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9585 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9586 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9587 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9588 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9589 data: reason_message,
9602 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9603 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9604 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9605 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9606 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9607 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9608 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9609 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9610 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9611 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9613 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9614 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9615 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9619 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9622 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9623 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9624 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9625 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9626 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9627 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9628 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9629 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9630 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9631 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9632 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9633 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9636 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9637 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9638 _ => unreachable!(),
9640 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9641 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9642 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9643 let logger = WithContext::from(
9644 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9646 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9652 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9654 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9655 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9659 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9660 /// may have events that need processing.
9662 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9663 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9665 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9666 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9667 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9668 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9671 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9673 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9674 /// indicates this should be checked.
9675 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9676 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9679 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9680 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9681 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9684 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9685 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9686 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9687 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9690 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9691 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9692 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9693 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9696 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9697 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9699 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9700 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9701 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9702 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9703 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9706 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9707 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9708 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9709 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9712 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9713 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9714 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9715 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9718 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9719 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9720 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9721 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9724 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9725 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9726 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9727 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9731 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9732 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9734 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9735 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9736 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9737 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9738 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9743 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9744 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9745 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9746 // change to the contents.
9747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9748 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9749 let persist = match &res {
9750 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9751 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9752 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9754 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9756 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9761 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9762 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9763 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9764 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9767 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9768 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9769 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9770 // change to the contents.
9771 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9772 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9773 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9777 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9778 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9779 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9780 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9783 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9784 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9785 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9788 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9789 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9790 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9793 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9794 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9795 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9796 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9797 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9799 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9800 let persist = match &res {
9801 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9802 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9804 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9809 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9810 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9811 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9812 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9816 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9817 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9818 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9819 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9823 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9824 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9825 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9826 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9830 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9831 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9832 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9833 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9836 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9838 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9841 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9842 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9843 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9846 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9847 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9848 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9849 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9851 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9852 let persist = match &res {
9853 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9854 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9855 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9857 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9862 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9864 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9867 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9868 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9869 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9870 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9872 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9873 let persist = match &res {
9874 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9875 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9876 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9878 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9883 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9884 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9885 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9886 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9888 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9889 let persist = match &res {
9890 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9891 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9892 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9894 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9899 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9901 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9904 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9905 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9906 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9909 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9910 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9911 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9912 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9914 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9915 let persist = match &res {
9916 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9917 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9918 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9920 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9925 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9927 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9930 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9931 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9932 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9935 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9940 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9942 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9943 let persist = match &res {
9944 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9945 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9946 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9948 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9953 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9955 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9956 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9957 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9960 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9961 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9962 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9964 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9967 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9968 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9969 let context = match phase {
9970 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9971 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9972 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9973 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9978 // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
9979 // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
9980 // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
9981 // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
9982 // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
9984 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
9985 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
9986 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9987 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9990 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9991 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9994 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9995 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9999 // Clean up for removal.
10000 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
10001 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
10004 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10005 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10006 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10007 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
10009 // V1 Channel Establishment
10010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
10011 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
10012 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
10013 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
10014 // V2 Channel Establishment
10015 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
10016 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
10017 // Common Channel Establishment
10018 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
10019 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
10021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
10023 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
10024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
10025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
10026 // Interactive Transaction Construction
10027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
10028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
10029 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
10030 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
10031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
10032 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
10033 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
10034 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
10035 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
10036 // Channel Operations
10037 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
10038 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
10039 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
10040 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
10041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
10042 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
10044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
10045 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10046 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
10047 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
10048 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
10049 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
10052 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
10053 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
10054 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10055 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10056 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10057 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10060 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10061 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10062 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10063 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10066 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10068 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10070 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10071 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10075 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10076 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
10077 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10078 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10082 let mut res = Ok(());
10084 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10085 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10086 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10087 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10088 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10089 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10090 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10093 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10094 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10096 if inbound_peer_limited {
10098 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10100 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10101 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10102 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10103 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10104 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10105 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10106 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10107 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10108 is_connected: true,
10111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10112 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10113 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10115 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10116 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10117 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10118 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10121 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10124 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10125 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10130 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10132 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10133 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10134 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10135 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10136 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10138 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10140 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10141 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
10142 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10143 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10144 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10148 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10149 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10150 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10151 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10155 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10156 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10157 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10158 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10159 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10160 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10164 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10165 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10166 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10167 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10168 debug_assert!(false);
10171 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10172 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10173 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10174 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10175 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10176 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10177 debug_assert!(false);
10183 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10184 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10189 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10190 match &msg.data as &str {
10191 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10192 "link failed to shutdown" =>
10194 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10195 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10196 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10197 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10198 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10199 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10200 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10201 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10202 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10204 || -> NotifyOption {
10205 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10206 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10207 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10208 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10209 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10210 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10211 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10212 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10216 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10217 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10219 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10220 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10221 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10223 log_level: Level::Trace,
10226 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10227 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10228 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10230 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10241 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10242 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10243 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10244 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10245 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10246 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10247 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10248 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10249 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10250 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10251 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10253 for channel_id in channel_ids {
10254 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10255 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10259 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10260 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10261 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10262 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10265 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10266 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10267 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10268 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10269 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10275 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10276 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10277 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10278 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10279 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10285 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10286 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10287 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10291 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10292 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10296 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10297 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10300 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10301 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10304 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10305 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10308 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10309 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10310 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10311 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10314 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10315 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10316 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10317 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10320 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10321 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10322 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10323 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10326 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10327 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10328 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10329 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10332 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10333 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10334 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10335 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10338 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10339 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10340 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10341 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10344 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10345 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10346 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10347 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10350 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10351 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10352 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10353 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10356 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10357 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10358 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10359 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10363 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10364 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10366 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10367 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10368 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10369 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10370 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10371 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10375 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10376 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10377 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10380 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10381 let responder = match responder {
10382 Some(responder) => responder,
10383 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10385 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10388 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10389 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10391 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10392 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10394 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10395 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10399 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10400 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10401 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10403 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10405 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10406 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10410 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10411 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10412 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10414 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10415 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10417 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10419 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10420 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10424 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10425 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10426 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10429 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10430 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10431 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10432 payment_paths, payment_hash
10434 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10435 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10436 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10439 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10440 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10441 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10443 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10444 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10445 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10446 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10447 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10450 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10451 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10452 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10453 .and_then(|invoice| {
10455 let mut invoice = invoice;
10457 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10458 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10460 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10465 Ok(invoice) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10466 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10469 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10470 let response = invoice
10471 .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10472 .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10473 .and_then(|payment_id| {
10474 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10475 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10476 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10478 self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10481 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10486 match (responder, response) {
10487 (Some(responder), Err(e)) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10488 (None, Err(_)) => {
10491 "A response was generated, but there is no reply_path specified for sending the response."
10493 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10495 _ => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10498 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10499 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10500 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10505 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10506 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10510 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10511 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10513 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10514 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10515 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10516 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10517 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10518 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10522 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10523 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10527 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10528 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10529 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10530 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10531 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10535 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10536 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10538 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10539 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10540 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10541 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10542 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10545 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10546 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10547 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10548 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10551 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10552 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10553 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10554 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10557 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10558 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10559 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10560 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10563 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10564 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10565 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10566 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10567 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10568 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10569 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10570 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10571 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10572 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10573 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10574 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10575 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10576 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10577 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10578 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10579 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10580 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10581 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10582 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10583 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10588 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10589 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10591 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10592 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10593 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10594 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10597 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10598 (2, node_id, required),
10599 (4, features, required),
10600 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10601 (8, forwarding_info, option),
10602 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10603 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10606 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10607 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10608 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10609 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10610 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10611 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10612 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10613 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10614 (2, self.channel_id, required),
10615 (3, self.channel_type, option),
10616 (4, self.counterparty, required),
10617 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10618 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10619 (7, self.config, option),
10620 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10621 (9, self.confirmations, option),
10622 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10623 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10624 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10625 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10626 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10627 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10628 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10629 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10630 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10631 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10632 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10633 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10634 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10635 (32, self.is_public, required),
10636 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10637 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10638 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10639 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10640 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10641 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10642 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10648 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10649 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10650 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10651 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10652 (2, channel_id, required),
10653 (3, channel_type, option),
10654 (4, counterparty, required),
10655 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10656 (6, funding_txo, option),
10657 (7, config, option),
10658 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10659 (9, confirmations, option),
10660 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10661 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10662 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10663 (16, balance_msat, required),
10664 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10665 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10666 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10667 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10668 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10669 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10670 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10671 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10672 (26, is_outbound, required),
10673 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10674 (30, is_usable, required),
10675 (32, is_public, required),
10676 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10677 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10678 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10679 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10680 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10681 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10682 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10685 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10686 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10687 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10688 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10689 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10692 inbound_scid_alias,
10693 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10695 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10696 outbound_scid_alias,
10700 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10701 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10703 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10704 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10705 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10706 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10707 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10708 confirmations_required,
10710 force_close_spend_delay,
10711 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10712 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10713 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10714 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10715 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10716 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10717 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10718 channel_shutdown_state,
10719 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10720 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10725 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10726 (2, channels, required_vec),
10727 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10728 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10731 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10732 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10733 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10736 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10738 (0, onion_packet, required),
10739 (1, blinded, option),
10740 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10743 (0, payment_data, required),
10744 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10745 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10746 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10747 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10748 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10749 (9, payment_context, option),
10751 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10752 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10753 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10754 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10755 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10756 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10757 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10761 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10762 (0, routing, required),
10763 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10764 (4, payment_hash, required),
10765 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10766 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10767 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10768 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10772 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10773 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10775 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10776 0u8.write(writer)?;
10777 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10778 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10779 reason.write(writer)?;
10781 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10782 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10784 1u8.write(writer)?;
10785 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10786 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10787 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10788 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10795 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10796 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10797 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10800 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10801 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10802 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10803 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10807 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10808 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10809 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10810 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10811 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10814 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10815 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10816 // messages contained in the variants.
10817 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10818 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10819 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10821 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10822 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10823 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10824 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10825 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10828 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10829 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10830 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10831 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10832 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10834 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10839 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10844 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10845 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10846 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10849 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10850 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10851 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10852 (2, outpoint, required),
10853 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10854 (4, htlc_id, required),
10855 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10856 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10857 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10858 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10859 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10862 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10863 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10864 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10865 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10866 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10868 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10870 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10871 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10872 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10873 (2, self.value, required),
10874 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10875 (4, payment_data, option),
10876 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10877 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10878 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10879 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10885 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10886 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10887 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10888 (0, prev_hop, required),
10889 (1, total_msat, option),
10890 (2, value_ser, required),
10891 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10892 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10893 (5, total_value_received, option),
10894 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10895 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10896 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10898 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10899 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10900 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10902 if payment_data.is_some() {
10903 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10905 if total_msat.is_none() {
10906 total_msat = Some(value);
10908 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10911 if total_msat.is_none() {
10912 if payment_data.is_none() {
10913 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10915 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10917 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10921 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10924 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10925 total_value_received,
10926 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10928 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10929 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10934 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10935 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10936 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10939 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10940 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10941 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10942 let mut payment_id = None;
10943 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10944 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10945 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10946 (0, session_priv, required),
10947 (1, payment_id, option),
10948 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10949 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10950 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10951 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10953 if payment_id.is_none() {
10954 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10956 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10958 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10959 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10960 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10962 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10963 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10964 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10965 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10969 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10970 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10971 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10973 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10976 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10977 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10982 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10983 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10985 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10986 0u8.write(writer)?;
10987 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10988 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10989 (0, session_priv, required),
10990 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10991 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10992 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10993 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10994 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10995 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10998 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10999 1u8.write(writer)?;
11000 field.write(writer)?;
11007 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
11008 (0, forward_info, required),
11009 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
11010 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
11011 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
11012 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
11013 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
11014 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
11015 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
11018 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11019 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11020 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
11022 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
11026 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
11027 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
11028 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
11029 (0, htlc_id, required),
11030 (2, err_packet, required),
11033 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
11034 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
11035 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
11036 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
11037 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
11038 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
11039 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
11040 (0, htlc_id, required),
11041 (1, failure_code, required),
11042 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
11043 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
11051 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
11052 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11053 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
11055 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
11057 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
11058 (0, htlc_id, required),
11059 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
11060 (2, err_packet, required),
11061 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
11063 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
11064 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
11065 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11067 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
11071 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
11072 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11076 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11081 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11082 (0, payment_secret, required),
11083 (2, expiry_time, required),
11084 (4, user_payment_id, required),
11085 (6, payment_preimage, required),
11086 (8, min_value_msat, required),
11089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11091 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11092 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11093 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11094 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11095 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11100 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11101 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11103 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11105 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11107 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11108 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11109 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11112 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11114 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11116 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11117 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11118 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11119 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11120 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11121 serializable_peer_count += 1;
11124 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11125 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11129 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11131 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11134 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11135 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11136 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11139 channel.write(writer)?;
11145 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11146 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11147 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11148 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11149 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11150 for forward in pending_forwards {
11151 forward.write(writer)?;
11156 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11157 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11158 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11159 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11162 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11163 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11164 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11166 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11167 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11168 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11169 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11170 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11171 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11172 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11173 htlc.write(writer)?;
11175 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11176 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11179 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11180 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11181 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11182 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11183 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11184 // per_peer_state lock at all.
11185 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11188 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11189 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11190 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11191 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11192 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11194 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11195 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11196 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11197 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11198 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11199 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11200 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11205 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11206 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11207 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11208 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11209 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11210 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11211 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11212 // well save the space and not write any events here.
11213 0u64.write(writer)?;
11215 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11216 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11217 event.write(writer)?;
11221 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11222 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11223 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11224 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11225 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11226 0u64.write(writer)?;
11228 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11229 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11230 // likely to be identical.
11231 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11232 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11234 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11235 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11236 hash.write(writer)?;
11237 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11240 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11241 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11242 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11243 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11244 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11247 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11248 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11250 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11251 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11252 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11253 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11256 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11257 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11258 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11259 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11263 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11264 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11265 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11267 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11268 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11269 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11275 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11276 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11277 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11278 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11281 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11282 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11283 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11284 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11285 pending_claiming_payments = None;
11288 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11289 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11290 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11291 if !updates.is_empty() {
11292 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11293 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11298 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11299 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11300 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11301 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11302 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11303 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11304 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11305 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11306 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11307 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11308 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11309 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11310 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11311 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11318 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11319 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11320 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11321 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11325 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11326 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11327 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11328 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11329 // check that the event is sane here.
11330 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11331 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11332 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11333 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11339 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11340 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11341 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11342 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11343 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11344 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11347 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11348 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11349 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11350 events.push_back((ev, action));
11351 } else if action.is_some() {
11352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11359 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11360 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11361 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11362 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11363 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11364 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11367 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11369 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11371 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11372 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11373 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11374 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11375 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11376 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11377 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11378 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11379 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11380 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11381 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11382 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11383 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11385 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11386 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11388 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11389 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11391 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11392 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11393 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11394 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11395 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11396 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11398 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11399 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11401 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11402 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11403 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11404 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11405 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11406 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11410 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11411 pub entropy_source: ES,
11413 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11414 pub node_signer: NS,
11416 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11417 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11419 pub signer_provider: SP,
11421 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11423 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11424 pub fee_estimator: F,
11425 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11427 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11428 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11429 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11430 pub chain_monitor: M,
11432 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11433 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11434 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11435 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11436 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11437 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11439 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11441 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11442 /// deserialization.
11444 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11445 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11446 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11448 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11449 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11451 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11452 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11453 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11454 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11456 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11459 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11460 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11463 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11464 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11466 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11467 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11468 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11469 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11470 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11471 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11475 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11476 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11477 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11478 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11479 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11481 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11482 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11483 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11489 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11490 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11491 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11492 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11494 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11495 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11496 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11497 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11498 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11499 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11503 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11504 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11505 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11509 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11510 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11512 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11513 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11514 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11515 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11516 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11517 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11521 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11522 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11524 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11525 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11526 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11528 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11530 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11531 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11532 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11533 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11534 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11535 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11536 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11537 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11538 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11539 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11540 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11542 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11543 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11544 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11545 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11546 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11547 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11548 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11549 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11550 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11551 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11552 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11553 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11554 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11555 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11556 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11558 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11559 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11560 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11562 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11563 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11564 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11566 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11567 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11568 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11570 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11571 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11572 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11574 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11575 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11576 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11579 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11580 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11581 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11582 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11583 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11584 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11585 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11586 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11588 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11589 let mut found_htlc = false;
11590 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11591 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11594 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11595 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11596 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11597 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11598 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11599 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11600 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11601 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11603 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11604 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11605 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11609 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11610 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11611 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11612 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11613 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11614 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11616 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11617 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11619 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11621 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11622 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11625 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11626 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11627 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11631 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11632 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11633 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11634 // safely discard the channel.
11635 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11636 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11637 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11638 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11639 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11640 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11641 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11642 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11645 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11646 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11647 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11648 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11649 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11650 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11654 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11655 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11656 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11657 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11658 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11660 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11661 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11662 counterparty_node_id: None,
11663 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11664 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11666 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11670 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11671 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11672 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11673 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11674 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11675 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11676 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11677 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11678 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11680 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11683 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11684 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11685 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11686 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11687 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11688 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11689 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11690 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11692 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11695 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11698 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11699 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11700 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11701 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11702 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11703 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11704 is_connected: false,
11708 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11709 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11710 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11711 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11712 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11713 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11714 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11715 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11718 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11719 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11720 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11721 for _ in 0..event_count {
11722 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11723 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11728 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11729 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11730 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11732 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11733 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11734 // on-startup monitor updates.
11735 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11736 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11738 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11742 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11743 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11745 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11746 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11747 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11748 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11749 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11753 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11754 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11755 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11756 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11757 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11758 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11759 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11761 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11762 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11766 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11767 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11768 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11769 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11770 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11771 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11772 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11773 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11774 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11775 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11776 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11777 let mut events_override = None;
11778 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11779 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11780 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11781 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11782 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11783 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11784 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11785 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11786 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11787 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11788 (8, events_override, option),
11789 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11790 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11791 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11792 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11793 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11795 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11796 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11797 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11800 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11801 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11804 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11805 pending_events_read = events;
11808 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11809 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11812 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11813 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11814 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11815 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11816 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11817 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11819 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11821 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11822 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11823 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11826 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11827 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11828 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11829 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11830 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11832 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11833 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11834 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11836 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11837 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11838 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11839 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11840 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11842 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11843 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11844 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11845 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11846 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11847 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11848 pending_background_events.push(
11849 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11850 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11851 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11852 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11853 update: update.clone(),
11856 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11857 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11858 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11859 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11860 pending_background_events.push(
11861 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11862 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11863 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11866 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11867 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11868 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11870 max_in_flight_update_id
11874 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11875 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11876 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11877 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11878 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11879 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11881 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11883 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11884 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11885 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11886 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11887 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11888 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11889 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11890 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11891 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11894 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11895 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11896 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11897 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11898 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11899 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11900 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11901 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11902 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11903 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11904 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11907 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11908 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11909 debug_assert!(false);
11910 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11915 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11916 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11917 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11918 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11919 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11920 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11921 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11922 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11923 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11924 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11926 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11927 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11928 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11930 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11931 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11932 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11933 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11934 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11935 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11936 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11937 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11938 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11943 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11944 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11946 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11947 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11948 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11949 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11952 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11953 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11954 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11955 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11956 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11957 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11958 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11960 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11961 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11962 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11963 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11964 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11965 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11966 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11967 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11968 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11971 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11972 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11973 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11974 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11976 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11977 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11978 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11981 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11982 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11983 retry_strategy: None,
11984 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11985 payment_params: None,
11986 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11987 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11988 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11989 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11990 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11991 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11992 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11993 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11994 total_msat: path_amt,
11995 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11996 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11998 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11999 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
12004 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
12005 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
12006 match htlc_source {
12007 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
12008 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
12009 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
12010 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
12012 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
12013 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
12014 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
12015 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
12016 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
12017 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
12018 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
12019 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
12020 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
12022 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12023 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12027 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
12029 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
12030 forwards.retain(|forward| {
12031 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
12032 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
12033 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12034 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12039 !forwards.is_empty()
12041 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
12042 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
12043 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
12044 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
12045 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
12046 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
12047 intercepted_id != ev_id
12054 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
12055 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
12056 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
12057 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
12058 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
12059 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
12060 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
12061 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
12062 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
12063 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
12064 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
12066 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
12067 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
12068 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
12069 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
12071 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
12072 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
12073 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
12080 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12081 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12083 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12085 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12086 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12087 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12088 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12089 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12090 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12091 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12092 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12093 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12094 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12097 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12098 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12099 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12100 // channel still live case here.
12104 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12105 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12110 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12111 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12112 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12113 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12114 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12115 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12116 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12117 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12121 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12122 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12124 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12125 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12126 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12127 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12129 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12130 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12131 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12133 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12134 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12136 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12137 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12139 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12142 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12143 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12144 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12146 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12150 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12151 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12152 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12153 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12154 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12156 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12157 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
12158 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12159 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
12160 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12161 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12162 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12163 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12165 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12166 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12170 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12172 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12174 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12175 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12177 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12178 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12183 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12184 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12186 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12188 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12190 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12191 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12192 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12193 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12197 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12198 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12199 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12200 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12201 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12202 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12203 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
12204 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12205 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12207 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12208 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12209 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12211 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12212 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12213 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12214 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12215 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12216 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12218 if chan.context.is_usable() {
12219 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12220 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12221 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12222 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12223 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12227 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12228 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12229 debug_assert!(false);
12230 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12235 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12237 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12238 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12239 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12240 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12241 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12242 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12243 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12244 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12245 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12246 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12247 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12249 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12250 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12252 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12253 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12254 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12255 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12257 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12258 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12259 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12260 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12262 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12263 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12264 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12265 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12267 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12268 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12269 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12270 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12271 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12272 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12273 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
12274 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12277 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12278 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12281 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12284 purpose: payment.purpose,
12285 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12286 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12287 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12288 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
12294 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12295 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12296 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12297 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
12298 for action in actions.iter() {
12299 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12300 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12301 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12303 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12305 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12306 blocked_channel_id);
12307 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12308 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12309 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12311 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12312 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12313 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12314 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12318 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12319 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12323 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12325 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12326 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12330 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12332 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12333 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12334 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12335 router: args.router,
12337 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12339 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12340 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12341 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12342 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12344 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12345 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12346 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12347 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12348 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12349 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12350 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12352 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12354 our_network_pubkey,
12357 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12359 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12361 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12362 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12363 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12364 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12365 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12367 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12368 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12370 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12372 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12374 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12376 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12377 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12378 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12380 logger: args.logger,
12381 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12384 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12385 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12386 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12387 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12388 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12391 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12392 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12393 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12394 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12395 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12396 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12397 downstream_channel_id, None
12401 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12402 //connection or two.
12404 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12410 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12411 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12412 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12413 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12414 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12415 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12416 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12417 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12418 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12419 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12420 use crate::prelude::*;
12421 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12422 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12423 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12424 use crate::util::test_utils;
12425 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12426 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12429 fn test_notify_limits() {
12430 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12431 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12432 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12433 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12435 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12437 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12438 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12440 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12441 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12443 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12445 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12446 // to connect messages with new values
12447 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12448 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12449 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12450 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12451 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12452 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12454 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12455 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12456 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12457 // ... but the last node should not.
12458 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12459 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12460 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12461 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12463 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12464 // about the channel.
12465 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12466 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12467 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12469 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12471 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12472 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12473 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12474 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12475 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12476 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12478 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12479 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12480 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12482 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12483 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12484 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12485 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12486 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12487 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12489 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12490 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12491 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12492 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12493 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12494 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12495 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12496 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12498 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12499 // the channel info has updated.
12500 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12501 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12502 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12503 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12504 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12505 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12509 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12510 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12516 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12518 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12519 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12520 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12521 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12523 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12524 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12525 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12526 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12527 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12528 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12529 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12530 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12532 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12534 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12536 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12537 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12538 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12540 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12541 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12542 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12543 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12546 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12547 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12548 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12550 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12551 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12552 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12553 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12554 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12555 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12556 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12557 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12558 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12560 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12561 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12562 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12564 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12565 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12566 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12568 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12569 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12570 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12571 // lightning messages manually.
12572 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12573 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12576 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12577 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12578 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12579 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12581 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12582 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12584 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12585 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12587 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12588 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12589 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12591 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12592 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12593 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12595 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12597 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12599 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12600 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12603 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12604 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12605 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12606 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12608 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12609 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12610 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12611 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12613 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12616 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12617 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12618 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12619 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12621 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12626 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12627 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12628 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12631 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12632 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12633 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12634 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12635 // fails as expected.
12636 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12637 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12638 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12639 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12640 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12641 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12644 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12645 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12648 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12649 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12650 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12652 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12653 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12654 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12656 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12657 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12658 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12659 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12660 let route = find_route(
12661 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12662 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12664 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12665 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12667 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12668 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12669 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12670 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12671 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12673 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12674 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12675 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12676 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12677 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12679 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12680 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12681 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12682 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12683 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12684 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12685 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12686 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12687 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12689 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12690 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12692 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12693 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12694 let route = find_route(
12695 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12696 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12698 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12699 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12701 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12702 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12703 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12704 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12705 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12707 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12708 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12709 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12710 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12712 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12713 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12714 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12715 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12716 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12718 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12719 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12720 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12722 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12723 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12724 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12725 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12726 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12727 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12728 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12729 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12730 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12732 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12733 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12735 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12736 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12737 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12738 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12739 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12740 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12741 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12742 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12743 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12744 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12746 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12747 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12748 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12751 let route = find_route(
12752 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12753 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12755 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12756 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12757 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12759 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12761 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12762 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12763 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12765 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12766 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12767 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12769 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12770 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12771 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12772 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12773 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12774 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12775 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12776 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12777 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12779 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12780 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12784 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12785 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12786 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12789 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12790 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12792 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12793 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12795 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12796 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12797 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12798 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12799 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12800 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12801 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12802 let route = find_route(
12803 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12804 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12807 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12808 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12809 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12810 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12811 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12812 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12815 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12816 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12817 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12818 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12819 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12820 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12821 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12823 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12827 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12828 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12829 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12830 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12831 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12832 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12833 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12834 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12835 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12837 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12838 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12840 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12841 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12842 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12843 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12844 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12845 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12846 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12847 let route = find_route(
12848 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12849 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12852 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12853 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12854 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12855 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12856 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12857 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12858 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12859 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12862 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12863 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12864 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12865 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12866 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12867 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12870 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12874 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12878 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12880 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12881 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12882 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12883 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12885 // Marshall an MPP route.
12886 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12887 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12888 route.paths.push(path);
12889 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12890 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12891 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12892 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12893 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12894 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12896 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12897 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12899 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12900 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12902 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12907 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12911 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12913 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12915 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12917 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12919 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12920 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12921 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12924 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12925 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12926 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12929 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12930 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12931 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12933 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12934 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12936 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12937 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12939 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12940 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12941 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12943 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12944 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12945 }, false).unwrap();
12947 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12948 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12949 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12950 match &node_0_events[0] {
12951 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12955 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12956 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12957 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12962 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12968 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12970 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12971 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12973 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12974 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12976 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12979 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12980 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12981 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12982 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12983 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12984 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12987 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12990 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12991 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12996 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12997 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13001 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13003 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
13004 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13006 total_msat: 100_000,
13009 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
13010 // payment verification fails as expected.
13011 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
13012 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
13013 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
13014 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
13016 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
13020 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
13021 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
13025 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
13026 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
13027 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
13028 // the channel is successfully closed.
13029 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13030 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13031 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13032 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13034 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13035 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13036 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
13037 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13038 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13040 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
13041 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
13043 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
13044 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
13045 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13046 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13049 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13051 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
13052 // as it has the funding transaction.
13053 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13054 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13055 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13058 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13060 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13062 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13064 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13065 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13066 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13068 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13071 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
13072 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
13073 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13074 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13075 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13078 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13079 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13081 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13082 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13083 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13084 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13086 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13087 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13088 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13089 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13091 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13092 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13094 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13095 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13096 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13097 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13098 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13099 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13100 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13104 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13105 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13106 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13107 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13108 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13109 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13110 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13113 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13115 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13116 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13117 // closing transaction).
13118 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13119 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13120 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13122 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13123 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13124 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13125 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13126 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13129 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13131 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13133 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13134 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13135 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13137 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13139 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13140 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13143 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13144 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13145 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13148 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13149 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13150 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13153 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13154 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13155 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13158 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13159 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13160 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13163 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13165 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13166 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13168 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13169 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13171 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13172 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13177 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13178 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13179 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13180 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13181 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13182 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13183 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13187 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13188 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13189 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13191 // Test the API functions.
13192 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13194 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13196 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13198 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13200 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13202 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13204 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13208 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13209 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13210 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13211 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13212 // the given `channel_id`.
13213 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13214 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13215 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13216 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13218 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13221 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13223 // Test the API functions.
13224 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13226 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13228 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13230 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13232 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13234 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13238 fn test_connection_limiting() {
13239 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13242 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13243 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13245 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13247 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13248 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13250 let mut funding_tx = None;
13251 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13252 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13253 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13256 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13257 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13258 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13259 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13260 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13262 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13264 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13266 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13268 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13270 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13272 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13275 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13276 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13277 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13278 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13279 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13280 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13282 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13283 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13285 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13286 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13287 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13288 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13289 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13290 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13291 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13294 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13295 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13296 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13297 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13298 }, true).unwrap_err();
13300 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13301 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13302 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13303 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13304 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13305 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13306 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13308 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13309 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13311 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13312 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13313 }, true).unwrap_err();
13315 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13316 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13317 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13318 }, false).unwrap();
13319 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13321 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13322 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13324 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13325 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13326 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13327 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13328 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13330 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13331 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13332 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13334 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13335 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13336 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13338 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13339 // "protected" and can connect again.
13340 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13341 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13342 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13344 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13346 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13348 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13349 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13353 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13354 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13360 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13362 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13363 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13365 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13366 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13367 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13368 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13371 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13373 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13374 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13375 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13377 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13378 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13379 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13381 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13382 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13383 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13384 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13388 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13389 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13390 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13393 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13394 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13396 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13398 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13400 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13401 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13403 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13404 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13405 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13406 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13407 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13408 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13411 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13412 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13414 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13415 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13419 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13420 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13423 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13424 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13425 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13426 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13427 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13429 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13430 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13432 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13433 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13434 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13435 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13441 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13442 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13444 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13445 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13446 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13448 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13449 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13453 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13457 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13458 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13459 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13460 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13461 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13462 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13463 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13464 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13465 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13466 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13467 payment_metadata: None,
13468 keysend_preimage: None,
13469 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13470 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13472 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13474 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13475 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13476 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13477 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13478 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13479 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13480 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13482 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13483 } else { panic!(); }
13485 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13486 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13487 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13488 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13489 payment_metadata: None,
13490 keysend_preimage: None,
13491 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13492 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13494 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13496 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13497 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13498 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13499 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13503 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13504 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13505 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13506 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13507 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13509 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13510 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13511 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13512 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13513 payment_metadata: None,
13514 keysend_preimage: None,
13515 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13516 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13518 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13519 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13520 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13522 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13523 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13524 // is not satisfied.
13525 assert!(result.is_ok());
13529 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13530 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13531 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13532 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13533 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13535 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13536 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13541 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13542 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13544 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13545 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13547 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13548 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13549 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13550 match &msg_events[0] {
13551 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13552 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13554 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13555 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13556 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13559 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13562 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13563 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13565 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13566 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13567 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13569 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13573 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13574 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13575 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13576 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13577 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13579 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13580 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13581 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13585 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13586 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13587 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13589 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13590 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13592 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13593 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13595 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13598 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13599 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13601 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13602 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13604 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13605 // not have generated any events.
13606 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13610 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13611 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13612 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13613 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13614 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13615 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13616 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13617 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13619 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13620 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13623 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13624 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13625 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13626 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13629 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13630 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13633 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13634 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13635 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13637 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13638 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13639 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13640 ..Default::default()
13642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13643 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13644 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13646 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13647 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13650 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13651 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13652 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13653 ..Default::default()
13655 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13656 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13657 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13660 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13661 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13664 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13665 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13666 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13667 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13668 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13671 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13672 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13673 ..Default::default()
13675 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13678 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13679 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13680 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13681 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13685 fn test_payment_display() {
13686 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13687 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13688 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13689 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13690 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13691 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13695 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13696 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13697 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13698 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13699 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13700 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13702 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13703 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13704 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13705 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13706 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13707 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13708 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13709 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13711 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13712 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13713 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13716 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13717 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13719 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13720 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13722 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13723 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13724 }, false).unwrap();
13725 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13726 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13727 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13729 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13731 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13732 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13733 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13734 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13735 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13736 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13737 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13738 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13739 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13740 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13741 } else { panic!() };
13742 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13743 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13744 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13745 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13747 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13749 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13750 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13751 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13756 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13757 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13758 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13759 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13762 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13763 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13764 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13766 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13767 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13769 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13770 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13773 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13774 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13775 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13777 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13781 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13782 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13783 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13785 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13790 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13791 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13792 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13793 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13795 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13796 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13797 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13799 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13801 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13802 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13803 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13804 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13806 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13807 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13809 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13815 use crate::chain::Listen;
13816 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13817 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13818 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13819 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13820 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13821 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13822 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13823 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13824 use crate::util::test_utils;
13825 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13827 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13828 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13829 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13830 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13832 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13834 use criterion::Criterion;
13836 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13837 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13838 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13839 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13840 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13841 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13842 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13844 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13845 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13847 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13848 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13850 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13852 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13855 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13856 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13859 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13860 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13861 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13863 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13864 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13866 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13867 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13868 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13869 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13870 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13872 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13873 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13874 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13876 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13877 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13878 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13879 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13881 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13882 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13883 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13885 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13886 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13887 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13888 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13889 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13891 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13892 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13893 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13895 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13896 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13898 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13899 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13900 }, false).unwrap();
13901 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13902 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13903 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13906 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13907 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13908 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13910 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13911 } else { panic!(); }
13913 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13914 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13915 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13916 match events_b[0] {
13917 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13918 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13923 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13924 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13925 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13926 match events_a[0] {
13927 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13928 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13930 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13933 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13935 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13936 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13937 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13939 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13940 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13941 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13942 match msg_events[0] {
13943 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13944 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13945 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13949 match msg_events[1] {
13950 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13954 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13955 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13956 match events_a[0] {
13957 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13958 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13960 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13963 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13964 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13965 match events_b[0] {
13966 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13967 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13972 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13973 macro_rules! send_payment {
13974 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13975 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13976 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13977 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13978 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13979 payment_count += 1;
13980 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13981 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13983 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13984 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13985 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13986 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13987 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13988 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13989 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13990 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13991 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13992 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13993 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13995 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13996 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13997 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13998 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
14000 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
14001 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
14002 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
14003 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
14004 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
14006 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
14009 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
14010 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
14011 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
14012 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
14014 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
14018 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
14019 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
14020 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);