1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
58 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
59 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
60 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
68 use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
73 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
76 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
77 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
80 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
81 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
82 // before we forward it.
84 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
85 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
86 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
87 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
88 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
91 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
94 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
95 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
101 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
104 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
105 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
111 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
112 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
113 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
114 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
115 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
120 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
121 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
124 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
125 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
126 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
127 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
128 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
131 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
133 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
135 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
136 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
137 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
140 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
141 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
143 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
147 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
151 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
152 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
153 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
154 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
155 short_channel_id: u64,
157 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
158 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
160 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
161 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
166 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
168 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
169 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
170 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
172 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
173 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
176 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
177 struct ClaimableHTLC {
178 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
180 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
182 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
184 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
188 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
189 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
190 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
191 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
193 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
194 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
199 impl Readable for PaymentId {
200 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
201 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
205 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
206 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
207 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
208 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
209 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
212 session_priv: SecretKey,
213 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
214 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
215 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
216 payment_id: PaymentId,
217 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
218 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
221 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
222 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
223 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
225 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
227 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
229 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
232 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
233 payment_id.hash(hasher);
234 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
235 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
236 payment_params.hash(hasher);
241 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
244 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
245 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
247 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
248 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
249 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
250 payment_secret: None,
251 payment_params: None,
256 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
257 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
259 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
267 struct ReceiveError {
273 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
274 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
276 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
281 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
283 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
284 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
285 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
286 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
287 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
289 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
290 err: msgs::LightningError,
291 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
292 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
294 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
296 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
298 err: LightningError {
300 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
301 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
308 shutdown_finish: None,
312 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
314 err: LightningError {
316 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
319 shutdown_finish: None,
323 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
324 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
327 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
329 err: LightningError {
331 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
332 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
338 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
339 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
343 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
346 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
348 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
349 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
353 log_level: Level::Warn,
356 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
358 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
360 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
362 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
363 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 shutdown_finish: None,
376 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
377 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
378 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
379 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
380 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
382 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
383 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
384 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
385 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
386 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
387 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
388 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
390 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
394 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
395 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
396 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
397 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
399 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
400 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
401 /// confirmation depth.
402 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
403 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
405 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
406 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
407 /// and via the classic SCID.
409 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
410 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
411 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
412 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
413 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
414 /// failed/claimed by the user.
416 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
417 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
419 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
420 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
421 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
422 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
425 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
426 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
427 /// quite some time lag.
428 enum BackgroundEvent {
429 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
430 /// commitment transaction.
431 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
434 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
435 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
437 latest_features: InitFeatures,
440 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
441 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
443 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
446 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
447 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
448 struct PendingInboundPayment {
449 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
450 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
451 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
452 /// this payment being removed.
454 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
455 user_payment_id: u64,
456 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
457 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
458 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
461 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
462 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
463 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
465 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
468 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
470 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
471 pending_amt_msat: u64,
472 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
473 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
476 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
477 starting_block_height: u32,
479 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
480 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
481 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
483 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
484 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
486 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
487 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
488 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
489 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
490 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
492 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
494 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
495 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
499 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
500 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
502 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
506 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
508 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
512 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
518 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
520 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
525 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
534 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
535 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
536 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
543 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
544 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
547 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
548 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
549 let our_payment_hash;
550 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
551 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
554 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
556 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
560 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
564 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
565 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
566 let remove_res = match self {
567 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
571 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
575 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
576 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
577 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
578 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
579 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
580 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
587 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
588 let insert_res = match self {
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
591 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
597 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
598 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
599 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
600 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
601 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
608 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
610 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
620 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
621 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
622 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
623 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
624 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
625 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
626 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
628 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
629 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
631 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
632 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
633 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
634 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
635 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
636 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
637 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
638 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
640 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
641 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
643 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
644 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
646 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
647 /// to individual Channels.
649 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
650 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
651 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
652 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
654 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
655 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
656 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
657 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
658 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
659 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
660 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
662 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
663 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
664 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
665 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
668 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
669 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
670 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
671 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
672 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
674 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
675 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
676 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
677 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
678 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
679 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
680 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
681 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
682 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
683 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
686 default_configuration: UserConfig,
687 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
688 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
693 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
695 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
696 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
699 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
700 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
701 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
703 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
704 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
705 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
706 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
707 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
708 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
710 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
711 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
712 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
713 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
714 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
715 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
716 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
717 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
719 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
721 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
722 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
724 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
725 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
726 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
727 /// active channel list on load.
728 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
730 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
732 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
733 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
734 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
736 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
737 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
738 /// the handling of the events.
741 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
742 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
743 /// would break backwards compatability.
744 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
745 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
746 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
747 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
749 our_network_key: SecretKey,
750 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
752 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
754 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
755 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
756 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
758 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
759 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
761 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
762 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
763 /// keeping additional state.
764 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
766 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
767 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
768 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
769 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
771 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
772 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
773 /// are currently open with that peer.
774 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
775 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
778 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
779 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
781 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
782 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
783 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
784 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
785 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
786 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
787 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
788 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
789 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
791 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
798 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
800 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
801 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
802 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
803 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
804 pub struct ChainParameters {
805 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
806 pub network: Network,
808 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
810 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
811 pub best_block: BestBlock,
814 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
820 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
821 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
822 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
823 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
824 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
825 /// updates are ready for persistence).
827 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
828 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
829 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
830 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
831 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
833 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
834 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
837 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
838 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
839 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
842 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
843 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
845 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
846 persistence_notifier: notifier,
847 should_persist: persist_check,
848 _read_guard: read_guard,
853 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
855 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
856 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
861 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
862 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
864 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
866 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
867 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
868 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
869 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
870 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
872 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
873 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
875 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
877 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
878 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
879 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
880 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
881 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
882 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
883 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
884 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
885 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
886 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
887 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
888 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
889 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
891 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
892 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
894 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
895 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
896 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
897 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
899 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
900 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
901 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
902 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
903 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
904 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
907 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
909 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
910 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
913 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
915 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
916 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
917 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
919 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
920 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
922 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
923 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
924 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
925 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
926 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
927 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
928 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
929 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
930 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
931 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
932 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
935 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
936 /// to better separate parameters.
937 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
938 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
939 /// The node_id of our counterparty
940 pub node_id: PublicKey,
941 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
942 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
943 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
944 pub features: InitFeatures,
945 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
946 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
947 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
949 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
951 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
952 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
953 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
954 /// payments to us through this channel.
955 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
956 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
957 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
958 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
959 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
960 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
961 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
964 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
965 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
966 pub struct ChannelDetails {
967 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
968 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
969 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
970 /// lifetime of the channel.
971 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
972 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
973 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
974 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
975 /// our counterparty already.
977 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
978 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
979 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
980 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
982 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
983 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
984 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
985 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
987 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
988 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
990 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
991 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
993 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
994 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
995 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
996 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
997 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
998 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
999 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1000 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1001 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1004 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1006 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1007 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1008 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1009 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1010 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1011 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1012 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1014 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1015 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1017 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1018 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1019 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1020 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1021 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1022 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1023 /// this value on chain.
1025 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1027 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1029 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1030 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1031 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1032 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1033 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1034 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1035 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1037 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1038 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1039 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1040 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1042 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1043 pub balance_msat: u64,
1044 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1045 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1046 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1047 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1049 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1051 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1052 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1053 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1054 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1055 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1056 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1057 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1058 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1060 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1061 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1062 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1063 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1064 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1065 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1066 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1068 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1069 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1070 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1071 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1072 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1073 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1074 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1075 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1076 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1078 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1080 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1081 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1082 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1083 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1084 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1085 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1086 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1087 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1088 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1090 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1091 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1092 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1093 pub is_outbound: bool,
1094 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1095 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1096 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1097 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1098 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1100 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1101 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1102 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1103 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1105 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1106 pub is_usable: bool,
1107 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1108 pub is_public: bool,
1109 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1110 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1111 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1112 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1113 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1114 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1116 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1117 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1120 impl ChannelDetails {
1121 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1122 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1123 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1125 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1126 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1127 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1128 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1131 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1132 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1133 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1135 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1136 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1137 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1138 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1142 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1143 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1144 /// states for more.
1145 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1146 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1147 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1148 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1149 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1150 ParameterError(APIError),
1151 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1152 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1153 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1154 /// payment in full.
1156 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1158 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1159 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1160 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1161 /// paths than the ones selected).
1162 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1163 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1164 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1165 /// in over-/re-payment.
1167 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1168 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1169 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1171 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1172 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1173 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1174 /// with the latest update_id.
1176 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1177 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1178 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1179 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1180 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1181 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1182 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1183 payment_id: PaymentId,
1187 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1189 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1191 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1192 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1193 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1194 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1196 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1197 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1198 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1201 macro_rules! handle_error {
1202 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1205 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1206 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1208 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1209 // entering the macro.
1210 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1211 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1214 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1216 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1217 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1218 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1219 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1223 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1224 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1225 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1226 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1231 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1232 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1234 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1235 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1236 action: err.action.clone()
1240 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1241 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1244 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1251 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1252 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1253 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1254 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1256 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1257 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1258 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1259 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1260 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1262 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1263 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1265 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1266 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1270 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1271 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1272 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1274 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1275 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1277 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1278 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1280 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1281 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1282 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1283 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1284 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1285 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1291 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1292 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1296 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1298 $entry.remove_entry();
1306 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1307 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1311 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1313 $entry.remove_entry();
1321 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1322 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1324 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1325 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1331 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1332 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1334 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1335 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1336 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1337 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1338 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1339 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1340 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1341 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1342 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1343 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1344 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1345 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1346 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1347 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1350 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1351 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1352 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1353 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1354 match $action_type {
1355 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1356 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1358 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1359 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1361 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1362 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1363 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1364 if !$resend_commitment {
1365 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1368 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1370 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1371 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1375 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1376 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1378 $entry.remove_entry();
1382 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1383 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1384 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1386 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1387 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1389 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1390 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1392 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1393 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1395 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1396 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1400 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1401 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1402 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1404 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1405 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1409 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1410 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1411 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1412 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1413 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1416 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1421 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1422 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1423 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1424 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1425 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1427 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1428 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1429 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1430 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1431 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1432 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1433 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1434 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1435 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1440 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1441 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1442 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1443 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1444 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1446 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1447 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1448 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1450 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1451 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1452 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1453 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1456 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1457 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1458 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1459 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1460 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1461 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1462 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1463 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1464 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1465 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1466 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1467 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1470 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1471 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1472 // before it should be allowed to.
1473 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1474 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1476 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1477 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1478 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1483 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1484 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1485 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1486 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1487 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1488 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1489 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1490 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1491 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1492 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1493 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1494 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1495 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1496 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1497 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1498 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1499 let mut order = $order;
1501 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1503 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1507 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1508 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1509 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1510 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1515 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1516 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1517 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1518 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1519 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1524 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1528 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1533 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1534 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1535 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1540 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1541 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1542 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1543 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1544 assert!(res.is_ok());
1547 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1551 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1552 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1553 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1555 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1557 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1558 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1563 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1564 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1565 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1566 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1567 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1570 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1572 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1573 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1575 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1577 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1578 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1579 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1580 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1581 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1582 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1583 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1584 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1586 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1587 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1588 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1592 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1594 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1595 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1596 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1597 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1598 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1599 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1601 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1602 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1603 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1604 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1606 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1607 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1610 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1611 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1613 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1615 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1617 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1619 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1620 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1621 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1622 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1630 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1631 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1632 &self.default_configuration
1635 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1636 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1637 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1640 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1641 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1643 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1645 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1649 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1654 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1656 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1657 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1658 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1659 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1660 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1663 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1664 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1666 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1667 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1668 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1670 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1671 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1672 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1673 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1674 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1675 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1677 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1678 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1679 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1680 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1681 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1682 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1686 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1687 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1688 Some(peer_state) => {
1689 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1690 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1691 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1692 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1693 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1694 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1695 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1699 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1704 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1707 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1710 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1711 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1713 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1714 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1715 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1718 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1720 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1725 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1726 node_id: their_network_key,
1729 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1732 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1733 let mut res = Vec::new();
1735 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1736 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1737 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1738 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1739 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1740 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1741 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1742 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1743 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1744 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1745 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1746 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1747 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1748 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1749 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1750 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1751 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1752 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1753 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1754 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1755 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1757 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1758 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1759 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1760 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1761 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1762 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1763 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1764 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1765 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1766 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1767 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1768 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1769 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1770 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1771 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1772 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1773 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1774 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1775 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1776 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1777 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1778 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1779 config: Some(channel.config()),
1783 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1784 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1785 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1786 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1792 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1793 /// more information.
1794 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1795 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1798 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1799 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1801 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1802 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1805 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1806 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1807 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1808 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1809 // really wanted anyway.
1810 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1813 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1814 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1815 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1816 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1817 Some(transaction) => {
1818 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1822 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1823 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1824 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1825 reason: closure_reason
1829 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1830 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1832 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1833 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1834 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1835 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1836 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1837 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1838 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1839 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1841 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1842 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1843 Some(peer_state) => {
1844 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1845 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1846 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1848 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1850 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1852 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1853 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1854 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1855 let (result, is_permanent) =
1856 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1858 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1864 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1865 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1869 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1870 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1871 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1872 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1876 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1884 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1885 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1886 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1889 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1893 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1894 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1895 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1897 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1898 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1900 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1901 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1902 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1903 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1905 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1907 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1908 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1909 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1910 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1911 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1914 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1915 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1916 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1918 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1919 /// the channel being closed or not:
1920 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1921 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1922 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1923 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1924 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1925 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1926 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1928 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1930 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1931 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1932 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1933 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1934 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1938 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1939 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1940 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1941 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1942 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1943 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
1944 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1946 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1947 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1948 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1949 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1950 // ignore the result here.
1951 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1955 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1956 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1957 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1958 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1962 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1963 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1964 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1966 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1967 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1969 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1971 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1973 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1976 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1977 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1978 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1979 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1985 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1988 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1989 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1990 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1991 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1992 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1993 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1994 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1995 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1996 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2006 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2007 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2008 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2010 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2011 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2012 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2015 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2016 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2017 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2019 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2020 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2021 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2022 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2023 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2026 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2027 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2028 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2029 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2030 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2034 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2035 /// local transaction(s).
2036 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2037 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2038 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2042 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2043 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2045 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2046 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2047 return Err(ReceiveError {
2048 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2050 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2053 // final_expiry_too_soon
2054 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2055 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2056 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2057 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2058 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2059 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2060 return Err(ReceiveError {
2062 err_data: Vec::new(),
2063 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2066 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2067 return Err(ReceiveError {
2069 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2070 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2074 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2075 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2076 return Err(ReceiveError {
2077 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2078 err_data: Vec::new(),
2079 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2082 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2083 return Err(ReceiveError {
2084 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2085 err_data: Vec::new(),
2086 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2089 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2090 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2091 return Err(ReceiveError {
2092 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2093 err_data: Vec::new(),
2094 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2096 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2097 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2099 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2100 phantom_shared_secret,
2102 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2103 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2104 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2105 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2106 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2107 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2108 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2109 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2110 return Err(ReceiveError {
2111 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2112 err_data: Vec::new(),
2113 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2117 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2119 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2122 return Err(ReceiveError {
2123 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2124 err_data: Vec::new(),
2125 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2130 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2133 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2134 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2135 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2139 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2140 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2141 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2143 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2144 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2145 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2146 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2147 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2148 failure_code: $err_code,
2154 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2155 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2158 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2160 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2161 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2162 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2163 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2164 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2165 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2166 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2167 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2169 macro_rules! return_err {
2170 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2173 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2174 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2175 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2176 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2182 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2184 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2185 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2187 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2188 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2192 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2193 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2195 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2197 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2198 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2199 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2200 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2201 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2203 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2206 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2207 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2208 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2210 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2211 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2212 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2215 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2216 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2217 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2218 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2219 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2223 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2224 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2225 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2228 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2229 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2230 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2231 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2236 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2237 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2238 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2239 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2240 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2241 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2242 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2243 let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2244 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2245 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2246 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2248 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2251 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2254 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2256 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2257 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2258 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2259 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2260 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2261 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2262 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2264 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2265 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2266 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2267 // we don't have the channel here.
2268 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2270 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2272 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2273 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2274 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2275 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2276 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2277 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2278 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2280 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2281 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2283 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2284 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2288 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2290 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2297 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2298 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2299 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2300 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2301 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2302 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2304 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2305 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2307 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2308 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2309 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2310 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2311 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2312 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2313 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2314 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2315 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2316 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2322 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2323 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2324 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2325 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2327 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2328 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2330 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2331 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2332 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2334 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2335 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2336 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2338 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2343 pending_forward_info
2346 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2347 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2348 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2350 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2351 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2352 if !chan.should_announce() {
2353 return Err(LightningError {
2354 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2358 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2359 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2362 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2365 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2366 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2367 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2368 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2369 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2370 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2372 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2373 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2377 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2379 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2381 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2383 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2384 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2386 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2387 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2388 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2389 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2390 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2391 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2392 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2393 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2396 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2397 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2399 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2405 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2406 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2407 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2408 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2409 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2410 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2412 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2413 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2414 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2415 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2416 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2418 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2420 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2422 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2423 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2425 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2426 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2427 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2428 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2429 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2430 err: "Payment already completed"
2435 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2436 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2437 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2440 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2442 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2443 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2444 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2445 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2446 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2447 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2448 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2449 total_msat: total_value,
2451 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2455 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2456 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2458 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2459 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2461 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2462 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2464 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2465 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2467 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2468 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2470 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2471 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2472 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2473 channel_state, chan)
2475 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2476 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2477 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2478 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2479 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2480 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2481 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2482 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2483 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2484 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2486 insert_outbound_payment!();
2488 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2489 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2490 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2491 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2492 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2493 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2494 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2495 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2501 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2503 } else { unreachable!(); }
2507 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2508 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2510 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2515 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2517 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2518 /// fields for more info.
2520 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2521 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2522 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2523 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2524 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2525 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2527 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2529 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2530 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2531 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2533 /// In general, a path may raise:
2534 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2535 /// node public key) is specified.
2536 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2537 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2539 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2540 /// relevant updates.
2542 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2543 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2544 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2546 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2547 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2548 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2549 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2551 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2552 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2553 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2554 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2555 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2558 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2559 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2560 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2562 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2563 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2565 let mut total_value = 0;
2566 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2567 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2568 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2569 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2570 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2571 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2572 continue 'path_check;
2574 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2575 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2576 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2577 continue 'path_check;
2580 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2581 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2583 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2584 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2586 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2587 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2588 total_value = amt_msat;
2591 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2592 let mut results = Vec::new();
2593 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2594 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2596 let mut has_ok = false;
2597 let mut has_err = false;
2598 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2599 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2600 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2601 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2602 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2603 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2604 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2608 } else if res.is_err() {
2609 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2610 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2613 if has_err && has_ok {
2614 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2617 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2618 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2619 Some(RouteParameters {
2620 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2621 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2622 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2628 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2629 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2630 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2631 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2637 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2639 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2640 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2641 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2642 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2643 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2645 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2646 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2647 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2648 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2649 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2650 if path.len() == 0 {
2651 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2652 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2657 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2658 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2659 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2661 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2662 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2664 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2665 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2666 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2667 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2670 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2672 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2673 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2674 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2677 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2678 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2679 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2682 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2683 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2684 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2689 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2690 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2694 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2697 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2699 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2700 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2701 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2702 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2704 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2705 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2706 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2708 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2709 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2710 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2711 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2714 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2715 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2716 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2717 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2718 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2720 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2728 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2729 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2730 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2731 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2732 /// never reach the recipient.
2734 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2736 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2737 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2739 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2741 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2742 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2743 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2745 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2747 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2748 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2749 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2754 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2755 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2756 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2757 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2758 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2760 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2763 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2764 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2768 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2770 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2771 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2776 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2778 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2779 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2780 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2783 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2784 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2785 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2786 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2787 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2788 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2791 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2792 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2793 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2794 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2795 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2797 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2799 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2801 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2802 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2803 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2804 } else { unreachable!(); })
2807 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2809 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2810 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2813 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2814 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2819 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2820 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2821 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2824 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2826 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2829 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2830 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2831 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2840 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2841 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2842 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2846 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2848 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2849 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2851 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2852 /// across the p2p network.
2854 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2855 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2857 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2858 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2859 /// keys per-channel).
2861 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2862 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2863 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2865 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2866 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2867 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2869 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2870 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2871 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2872 /// for more details.
2874 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2875 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2876 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2879 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2880 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2881 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2882 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2887 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2888 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2889 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2890 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2891 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2892 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2893 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2894 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2898 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2899 let mut output_index = None;
2900 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2901 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2902 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2903 if output_index.is_some() {
2904 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2905 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2908 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2910 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2913 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2916 if output_index.is_none() {
2917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2918 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2921 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2925 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2927 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2928 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2929 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2930 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2932 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2933 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2935 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2936 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2938 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2940 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2941 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2942 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2943 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2944 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2945 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2946 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2947 pub fn update_channel_config(
2948 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2949 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2950 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2952 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2957 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2962 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2963 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2964 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2965 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2967 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2968 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2969 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2970 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2974 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2975 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2976 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2979 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2980 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2981 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2983 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2992 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2994 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2995 /// Will likely generate further events.
2996 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2997 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2999 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3000 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3001 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3002 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3004 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3005 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3007 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3008 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3009 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3010 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3012 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3013 match forward_info {
3014 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3015 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3016 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3017 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3018 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3019 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3021 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3022 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3023 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3024 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3025 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3026 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3029 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3030 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3032 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3035 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3036 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3042 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3043 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3045 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3049 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3050 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3052 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3056 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3057 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3058 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3059 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3060 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3062 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3063 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3064 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3065 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3066 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3068 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3070 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3071 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3075 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3076 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3077 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3078 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3084 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3087 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3090 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3091 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3092 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3093 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3094 // problem, not ours.
3101 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3102 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3103 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3104 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3105 match forward_info {
3106 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3107 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3109 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3110 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3111 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3112 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3113 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3114 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3115 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3116 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3117 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3118 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3120 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3122 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3123 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3125 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3127 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3128 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3129 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3130 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3136 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3138 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3139 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3140 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3141 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3142 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3143 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3144 // this channel currently :/.
3150 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3151 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3153 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3155 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3157 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3160 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3162 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3163 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3164 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3167 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3169 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3170 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3171 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3172 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3173 // messages when we can.
3174 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3175 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3176 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3183 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3184 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3187 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3188 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3189 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3190 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3191 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3192 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3194 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3196 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3197 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3198 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3201 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3205 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3206 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3209 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3210 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3212 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3213 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3214 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3215 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3216 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3217 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3219 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3227 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3228 match forward_info {
3229 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3230 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3231 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3232 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3233 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3234 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3235 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3237 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3238 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3240 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3243 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3244 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3245 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3246 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3247 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3248 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3249 phantom_shared_secret,
3251 value: amt_to_forward,
3253 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3258 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3259 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3260 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3261 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3262 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3264 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3265 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3266 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3267 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3268 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3269 phantom_shared_secret,
3271 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3272 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3277 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3278 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3279 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3281 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3282 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3283 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3286 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3287 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3288 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3289 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3290 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3291 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3295 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3296 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3297 total_value += htlc.value;
3298 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3299 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3300 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3301 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3302 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3303 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3305 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3307 _ => unreachable!(),
3310 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3311 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3312 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3313 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3314 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3315 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3316 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3319 amount_msat: total_value,
3321 payment_received_generated = true;
3323 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3324 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3326 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3328 payment_received_generated
3332 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3333 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3334 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3335 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3336 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3337 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3338 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3339 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3341 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3342 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3343 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3344 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3345 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3347 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3351 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3353 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3354 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3356 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3357 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3358 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3360 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3364 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3366 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3373 if payment_data.is_none() {
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3375 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3378 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3379 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3381 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3382 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3383 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3384 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3385 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3387 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3388 if payment_received_generated {
3389 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3395 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3396 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3404 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3405 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3407 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3409 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3410 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3413 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3414 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3415 events.append(&mut new_events);
3418 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3420 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3421 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3423 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3424 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3425 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3426 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3427 if background_events.is_empty() {
3431 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3433 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3434 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3435 // monitor updating completing.
3436 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3443 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3444 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3445 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3446 self.process_background_events();
3449 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3450 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3451 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3452 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3453 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3454 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3455 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3457 if !chan.is_live() {
3458 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3459 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3460 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3462 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3463 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3465 let mut retain_channel = true;
3466 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3469 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3470 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3474 let ret_err = match res {
3475 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3476 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3477 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3478 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3481 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3482 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3483 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3484 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3485 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3486 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3487 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3488 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3498 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3502 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3503 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3504 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3505 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3506 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3507 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3508 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3510 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3512 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3514 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3515 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3516 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3517 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3518 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3519 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3520 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3522 handle_errors.push(err);
3532 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3534 /// This currently includes:
3535 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3536 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3537 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3539 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3540 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3542 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3543 /// estimate fetches.
3544 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3545 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3546 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3547 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3549 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3551 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3552 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3554 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3555 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3556 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3557 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3558 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3559 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3560 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3561 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3563 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3565 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3567 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3568 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3569 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3570 if needs_close { return false; }
3573 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3574 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3575 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3576 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3577 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3578 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3579 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3584 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3585 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3587 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3588 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3589 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3593 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3594 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3599 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3604 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3605 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3606 // This should be unreachable
3607 debug_assert!(false);
3610 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3611 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3612 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3613 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3615 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3616 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3617 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3619 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3627 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3628 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3629 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3632 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3633 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3639 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3640 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3641 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3643 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3644 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3645 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3646 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3648 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3649 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3650 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3651 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3652 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3655 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3656 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3657 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3658 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3659 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3660 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3661 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3662 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3663 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3664 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3665 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3666 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3671 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3672 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3674 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3676 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3677 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3678 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3679 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3680 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3681 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3682 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3684 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3686 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3687 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3689 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3694 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3695 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3696 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3697 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3698 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3699 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3700 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3701 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3702 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3703 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3705 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3706 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3707 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3708 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3710 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3711 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3712 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3713 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3714 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3718 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3719 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3720 // be surfaced to the user.
3721 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3722 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3723 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3725 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3726 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3727 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3728 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3730 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3732 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3735 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3740 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3741 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3742 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3743 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3744 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3745 /// still-available channels.
3746 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3747 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3748 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3749 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3752 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3753 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3754 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3756 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3757 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3758 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3759 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3760 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3761 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3762 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3763 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3764 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3767 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3768 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3771 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3772 all_paths_failed = true;
3773 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3774 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3776 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3782 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3785 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3786 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3787 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3788 Some(RouteParameters {
3789 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3790 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3791 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3796 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3797 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3799 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3801 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3803 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3804 if !payment_retryable {
3805 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3807 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3811 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3812 payment_id: payment_id,
3813 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3819 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3820 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3821 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3822 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3823 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3825 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3826 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3827 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3828 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
3835 error_code: onion_error_code,
3837 error_data: onion_error_data
3841 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3847 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3848 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3849 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3850 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3852 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3853 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3854 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3855 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3857 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3858 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3859 payment_id: payment_id,
3860 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3862 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3865 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3866 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3867 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3868 payment_failed_permanently: false,
3869 network_update: None,
3872 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
3875 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3877 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3882 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3883 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3884 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3886 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
3887 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3888 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3889 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3890 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3891 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3892 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3893 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3895 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3896 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3899 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3901 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3905 let mut forward_event = None;
3906 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3907 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3909 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3911 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3914 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3917 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3918 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3919 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3920 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3921 time_forwardable: time
3924 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3925 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3926 failed_next_destination: destination
3932 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3933 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3935 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3936 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3937 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3939 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3940 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3941 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3942 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3944 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3945 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3946 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3947 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3948 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3949 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3950 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3951 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3955 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3956 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3957 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3958 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3960 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3961 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3962 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3963 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3965 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3966 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3967 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3968 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3969 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3971 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3972 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3973 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3974 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3975 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3979 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3980 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3981 debug_assert!(false);
3985 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3986 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3987 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3988 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3989 if sources.len() != 1 {
3990 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3991 debug_assert!(false);
3997 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3999 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4000 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4003 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4004 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4005 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4009 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4010 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4011 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4013 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4014 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4015 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4016 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4017 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4018 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4019 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4020 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4022 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4023 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4024 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4025 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4026 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4027 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4028 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4029 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4031 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4032 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4033 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4034 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4035 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4036 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4038 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4043 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4044 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4046 purpose: payment_purpose,
4047 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4051 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4052 // which were generated.
4053 channel_state.take();
4055 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4056 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4057 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4062 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4063 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4064 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4065 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4066 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4068 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4072 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4073 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4074 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4075 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4076 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4077 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4078 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4079 payment_preimage, e);
4080 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4081 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4082 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4083 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4086 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4087 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4088 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4089 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4090 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4091 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4092 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4093 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4094 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4095 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4101 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4103 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4106 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4107 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4108 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4109 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4110 payment_preimage, e);
4112 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4113 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4115 chan.remove_entry();
4117 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4120 } else { unreachable!(); }
4123 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4124 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4125 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4126 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4127 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4128 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4129 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4130 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4131 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4132 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4133 pending_events.push(
4134 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4136 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4141 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4149 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4151 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4152 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4153 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4154 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4155 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4156 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4157 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4158 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4159 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4160 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4161 pending_events.push(
4162 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4163 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4169 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4173 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4174 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4175 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4177 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4178 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4179 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4180 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4181 pending_events.push(
4182 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4190 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4198 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4199 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4200 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4201 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4202 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4203 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4204 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4207 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4208 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4209 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4210 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4211 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4214 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4215 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4216 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4217 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4218 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4219 payment_preimage, e);
4221 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4222 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4223 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4224 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4227 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4228 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4229 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4230 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4234 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4235 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4236 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4239 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4240 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4241 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4243 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4245 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4255 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4256 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4257 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4260 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4263 let chan_restoration_res;
4264 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4265 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4266 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4267 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4269 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4271 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4275 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4276 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4277 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4278 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4279 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4280 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4281 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4283 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4284 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4285 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4290 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4291 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4292 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4295 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4297 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4298 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4299 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4300 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4301 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4305 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4307 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4308 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4311 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4312 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4313 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4315 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4316 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4317 /// used to accept such channels.
4319 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4320 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4321 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4322 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4325 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4326 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4328 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4329 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4330 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4332 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4333 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4335 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4336 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4338 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4339 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4341 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4342 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4343 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4344 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4347 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4350 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4351 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4352 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4353 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4354 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4355 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4357 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4358 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4361 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4362 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4363 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4364 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4369 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4370 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4371 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4374 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4375 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4376 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4379 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4380 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4386 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4387 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4388 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4391 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4392 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4395 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4396 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4397 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4398 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4401 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4402 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4406 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4407 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4408 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4410 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4411 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4414 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4415 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4416 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4419 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4420 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4423 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4424 pending_events.push(
4425 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4426 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4427 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4428 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4429 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4430 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4435 entry.insert(channel);
4441 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4442 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4443 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4444 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4445 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4447 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4448 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4450 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4451 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4453 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4456 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4457 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4458 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4459 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4460 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4462 user_channel_id: user_id,
4467 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4468 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4469 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4470 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4471 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4472 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4474 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4477 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4479 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4482 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4483 // lock before watch_channel
4484 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4486 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4487 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4488 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4489 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4490 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4491 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4492 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4493 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4494 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4495 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4496 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4498 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4499 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4500 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4501 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4502 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4503 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4504 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4508 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4509 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4510 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4514 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4515 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4516 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4517 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4518 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4519 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4520 funding_msg.channel_id))
4522 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4523 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4526 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4527 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4530 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4531 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4539 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4541 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4542 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4543 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4544 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4546 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4547 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4549 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4550 Ok(update) => update,
4551 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4553 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4554 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4555 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4556 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4557 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4558 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4559 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4560 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4565 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4566 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4573 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4574 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4578 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4579 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4580 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4581 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4582 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4583 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4584 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4586 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4587 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4588 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4590 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4591 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4592 msg: announcement_sigs,
4594 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4595 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4596 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4597 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4598 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4599 // announcement_signatures.
4600 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4601 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4602 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4603 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4614 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4615 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4616 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4617 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4618 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4620 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4622 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4626 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4627 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4628 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4629 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4632 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4633 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4635 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4636 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4637 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4638 let (result, is_permanent) =
4639 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4641 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4647 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4648 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4649 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4659 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4660 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4661 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4664 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4668 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4669 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4670 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4671 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4672 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4674 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4677 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4678 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4679 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4680 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4685 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4686 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4687 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4688 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4689 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4690 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4691 } else { (tx, None) }
4693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4696 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4697 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4698 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4700 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4701 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4702 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4703 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4707 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4712 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4713 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4714 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4715 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4717 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4718 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4719 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4720 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4722 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4723 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4724 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4726 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4728 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4732 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4733 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4734 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4735 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4736 match pending_forward_info {
4737 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4738 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4739 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4740 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4742 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4744 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4745 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4746 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4749 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4751 _ => pending_forward_info
4754 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4761 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4762 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4763 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4764 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4765 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4766 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4767 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4768 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4770 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4772 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4775 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4779 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4780 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4781 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4782 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4783 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4784 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4785 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4787 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4794 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4795 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4796 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4797 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4798 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4799 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4800 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4802 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4803 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4804 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4806 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4813 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4814 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4815 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4816 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4817 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4818 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4819 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4821 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4822 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4823 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4824 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4825 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4826 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4827 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4832 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4833 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4835 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4836 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4837 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4839 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4841 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4842 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4843 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4844 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4845 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4846 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4848 commitment_signed: msg,
4854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4859 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4860 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4861 let mut forward_event = None;
4862 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4863 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4864 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4865 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4867 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4868 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4869 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4870 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4871 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4873 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4874 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4875 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4878 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4879 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4884 match forward_event {
4886 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4887 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4888 time_forwardable: time
4896 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4897 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4899 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4900 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4901 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4902 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4903 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4904 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4906 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4907 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4908 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4909 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4910 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4911 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4912 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4913 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4914 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4915 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4916 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4918 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4919 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4920 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4921 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4922 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4924 } else { unreachable!(); }
4927 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4928 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4929 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4933 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4934 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4935 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4936 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4937 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4939 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4942 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4944 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4945 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4947 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4948 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
4949 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4951 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4952 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4959 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4960 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4964 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4967 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4974 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4975 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4976 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4978 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4979 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4980 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4981 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4983 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4987 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4988 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4989 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4990 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4991 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4992 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5000 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5001 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5002 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5003 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5004 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5005 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5007 // It's not a local channel
5008 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5011 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5012 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5013 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5014 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5015 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5016 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5017 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5018 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5022 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5023 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5024 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5025 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5027 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5028 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5031 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5033 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5036 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5037 let chan_restoration_res;
5038 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5039 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5040 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5042 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5044 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5047 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5048 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5049 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5050 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5051 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5052 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5053 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5054 let mut channel_update = None;
5055 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5056 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5057 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5060 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5061 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5062 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5063 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5064 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5065 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5066 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5071 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5072 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5073 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5074 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5075 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5076 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5078 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5083 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5084 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5086 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5087 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5092 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5093 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5094 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5095 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5096 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5097 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5098 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5099 match monitor_event {
5100 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5101 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5103 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5105 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5106 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5107 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5110 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5111 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5112 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5113 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5114 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5115 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5116 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5117 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5118 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5119 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5120 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5124 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5125 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5127 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5129 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5130 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5131 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5132 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5133 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5138 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5139 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5145 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5146 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5149 has_pending_monitor_events
5152 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5153 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5154 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5156 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5157 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5160 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5161 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5162 /// update was applied.
5164 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5165 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5166 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5167 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5168 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5169 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5170 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5171 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5173 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5174 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5175 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5176 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5177 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5179 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5180 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5181 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5182 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5184 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5186 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5189 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5190 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5191 has_monitor_update = true;
5192 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5193 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5194 if close_channel { return false; }
5196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5197 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5198 updates: commitment_update,
5205 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5206 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5207 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5214 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5215 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5216 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5219 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5220 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5226 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5227 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5228 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5229 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5230 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5231 let mut has_update = false;
5233 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5234 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5235 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5236 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5237 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5239 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5240 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5241 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5242 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5244 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5245 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5248 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5249 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5250 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5251 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5252 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5257 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5259 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5260 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5261 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5267 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5268 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5275 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5276 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5282 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5283 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5285 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5286 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5287 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5288 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5289 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5290 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5291 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5292 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5293 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5294 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5295 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5296 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5297 assert!(should_broadcast);
5298 } else { unreachable!(); }
5299 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5301 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5305 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5306 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5308 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5309 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5312 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5315 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5316 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5318 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5319 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5320 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5321 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5322 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5323 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5324 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5325 // never fail a payment too early.
5326 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5328 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5336 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5339 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5340 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5342 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5343 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5344 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5346 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5348 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5349 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5353 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5354 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5356 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5358 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5359 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5360 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5361 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5362 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5363 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5366 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5367 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5369 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5372 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5374 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5376 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5377 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5378 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5379 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5380 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5383 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5384 /// stored external to LDK.
5386 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5387 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5388 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5390 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5391 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5394 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5395 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5396 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5397 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5399 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5400 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5401 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5402 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5403 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5405 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5406 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5407 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5408 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5409 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5411 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5412 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5414 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5415 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5419 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5420 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5422 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5424 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5425 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5426 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5427 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5430 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5431 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5433 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5436 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5438 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5440 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5441 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5444 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5445 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5447 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5448 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5449 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5452 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5453 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5455 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5456 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5457 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5458 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5460 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5461 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5462 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5463 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5469 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5471 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5472 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5474 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5475 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5476 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5480 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5481 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5482 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5483 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5484 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5489 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5490 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5494 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5495 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5499 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5500 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5501 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5502 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5503 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5506 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5507 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5508 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5509 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5511 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5512 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5513 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5514 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5517 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5518 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5520 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5521 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5524 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5525 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5526 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5528 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5529 events.replace(pending_events);
5538 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5540 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5541 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5542 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5543 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5546 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5548 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5549 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5550 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5551 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5552 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5554 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5555 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5556 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5557 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5560 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5561 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5562 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5565 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5566 handler.handle_event(&event);
5574 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5576 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5577 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5578 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5579 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5582 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5584 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5585 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5586 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5587 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5588 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5591 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5592 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5595 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5596 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5597 let new_height = height - 1;
5599 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5600 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5601 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5602 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5603 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5604 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5607 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5611 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5613 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5614 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5615 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5616 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5619 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5620 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5621 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5622 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5624 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5625 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5628 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5629 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5631 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5632 if height < last_best_block_height {
5633 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5634 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5638 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5639 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5640 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5641 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5643 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5644 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5648 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5650 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5652 macro_rules! max_time {
5653 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5655 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5656 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5657 // having an explicit local time source.
5658 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5659 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5660 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5661 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5662 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5668 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5669 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5670 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5671 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5674 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5675 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5676 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5677 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5678 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5679 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5680 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5681 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5682 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5690 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5691 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5692 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5693 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5694 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5695 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5701 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5702 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5703 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5704 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5705 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5706 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5707 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5708 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5713 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5715 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5716 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5717 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5721 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5722 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5724 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5725 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5726 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5727 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5728 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5730 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5731 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5733 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5734 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5735 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5736 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5737 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5738 let res = f(channel);
5739 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5740 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5741 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5742 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5744 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5746 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5747 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5748 if channel.is_usable() {
5749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5750 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5751 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5752 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5757 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5760 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5761 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5762 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5763 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5764 msg: announcement_sigs,
5766 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5767 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5770 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5771 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5772 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5777 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5778 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5779 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5780 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5781 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5782 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5783 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5784 // is always consistent.
5785 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5786 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5787 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5788 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5791 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5792 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5793 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5794 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5795 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5796 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5797 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5801 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5802 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5803 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5804 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5805 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5806 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5807 data: reason_message,
5815 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5816 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5817 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5818 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5819 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5820 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5821 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5822 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5823 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5824 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5826 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5827 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5828 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5829 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5833 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5838 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5840 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5841 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
5845 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5846 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5847 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5850 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5851 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5852 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5853 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5856 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5857 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5859 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5860 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5863 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5864 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5865 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5866 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5867 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5870 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5871 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5872 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
5875 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5876 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5877 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5878 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5882 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5883 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5884 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5885 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5886 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5887 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5890 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5891 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5892 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5895 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5897 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5900 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5902 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5905 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5907 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5910 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5912 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5915 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5920 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5922 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5925 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5927 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5930 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5932 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5935 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5937 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5940 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5942 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5945 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5947 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5950 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5952 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5955 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5960 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5962 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5965 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5966 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5967 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5970 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5975 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5976 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5977 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5980 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5982 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5983 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5985 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5987 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5988 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5989 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5990 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5991 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5992 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5993 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5994 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5995 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5996 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5999 no_channels_remain = false;
6004 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6006 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6007 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6008 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6009 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6011 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6012 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6013 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6014 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6015 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6016 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6017 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6018 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6019 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6020 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6021 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6022 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6023 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6029 if no_channels_remain {
6030 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6033 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6034 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6038 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6039 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6044 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6045 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6047 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6048 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6052 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6057 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6058 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6059 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6060 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6061 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6062 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6063 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6064 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6065 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6069 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6070 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6071 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6076 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6077 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6078 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6079 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6080 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6088 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6091 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6092 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6094 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6095 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6096 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6097 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6098 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6103 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6104 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6105 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6106 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6109 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6110 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6111 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6119 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6120 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6124 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6125 NodeFeatures::known_channel_features()
6128 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6129 InitFeatures::known_channel_features()
6133 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6134 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6136 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6137 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6138 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6139 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6142 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6143 (2, node_id, required),
6144 (4, features, required),
6145 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6146 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6147 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6148 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6151 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6152 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6153 (2, channel_id, required),
6154 (3, channel_type, option),
6155 (4, counterparty, required),
6156 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6157 (6, funding_txo, option),
6158 (7, config, option),
6159 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6160 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6161 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6162 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6163 (16, balance_msat, required),
6164 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6165 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6166 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6167 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6168 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6169 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6170 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6171 (26, is_outbound, required),
6172 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6173 (30, is_usable, required),
6174 (32, is_public, required),
6175 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6176 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6179 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6180 (2, channels, vec_type),
6181 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6182 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6185 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6187 (0, onion_packet, required),
6188 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6191 (0, payment_data, required),
6192 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6193 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6195 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6196 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6197 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6201 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6202 (0, routing, required),
6203 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6204 (4, payment_hash, required),
6205 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6206 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6210 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6211 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6213 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6215 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6216 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6217 reason.write(writer)?;
6219 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6220 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6223 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6224 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6225 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6226 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6233 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6234 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6235 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6238 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6239 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6240 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6241 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6245 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6246 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6247 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6248 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6249 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6252 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6253 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6254 // messages contained in the variants.
6255 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6256 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6257 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6259 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6260 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6261 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6262 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6263 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6266 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6267 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6268 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6269 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6270 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6272 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6277 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6282 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6283 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6284 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6285 (2, outpoint, required),
6286 (4, htlc_id, required),
6287 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6290 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6291 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6292 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6293 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6294 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6296 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6297 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6298 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6299 (2, self.value, required),
6300 (4, payment_data, option),
6301 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6302 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6308 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6309 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6310 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6312 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6313 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6314 let mut total_msat = None;
6315 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6316 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6317 (0, prev_hop, required),
6318 (1, total_msat, option),
6319 (2, value, required),
6320 (4, payment_data, option),
6321 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6322 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6324 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6326 if payment_data.is_some() {
6327 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6329 if total_msat.is_none() {
6330 total_msat = Some(value);
6332 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6335 if total_msat.is_none() {
6336 if payment_data.is_none() {
6337 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6339 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6341 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6345 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6348 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6355 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6356 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6357 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6360 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6361 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6362 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6363 let mut payment_id = None;
6364 let mut payment_secret = None;
6365 let mut payment_params = None;
6366 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6367 (0, session_priv, required),
6368 (1, payment_id, option),
6369 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6370 (3, payment_secret, option),
6371 (4, path, vec_type),
6372 (5, payment_params, option),
6374 if payment_id.is_none() {
6375 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6377 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6379 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6380 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6381 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6382 path: path.unwrap(),
6383 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6388 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6389 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6394 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6397 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6399 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6400 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6401 (0, session_priv, required),
6402 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6403 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6404 (3, payment_secret, option),
6405 (4, path, vec_type),
6406 (5, payment_params, option),
6409 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6411 field.write(writer)?;
6418 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6419 (0, LightningError) => {
6423 (0, failure_code, required),
6424 (2, data, vec_type),
6428 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6430 (0, forward_info, required),
6431 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6432 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6433 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6436 (0, htlc_id, required),
6437 (2, err_packet, required),
6441 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6442 (0, payment_secret, required),
6443 (2, expiry_time, required),
6444 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6445 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6446 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6449 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6451 (0, session_privs, required),
6454 (0, session_privs, required),
6455 (1, payment_hash, option),
6458 (0, session_privs, required),
6459 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6460 (2, payment_hash, required),
6461 (4, payment_secret, option),
6462 (6, total_msat, required),
6463 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6464 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6467 (0, session_privs, required),
6468 (2, payment_hash, required),
6472 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6473 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6474 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6475 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6476 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6479 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6480 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6482 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6484 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6486 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6487 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6488 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6491 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6492 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6493 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6494 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6495 unfunded_channels += 1;
6498 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6499 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6500 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6501 channel.write(writer)?;
6505 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6506 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6507 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6508 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6509 for forward in pending_forwards {
6510 forward.write(writer)?;
6514 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6515 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6516 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6517 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6518 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6519 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6520 htlc.write(writer)?;
6522 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6526 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6527 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6528 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6529 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6530 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6533 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6534 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6535 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6536 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6537 for event in events.iter() {
6538 event.write(writer)?;
6541 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6542 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6543 for event in background_events.iter() {
6545 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6547 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6548 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6553 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6554 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6555 // likely to be identical.
6556 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6557 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6559 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6560 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6561 hash.write(writer)?;
6562 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6565 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6566 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6567 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6568 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6569 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6572 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6573 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6575 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6576 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6577 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6578 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6581 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6582 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6586 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6587 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6588 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6592 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6597 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6598 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6599 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6600 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6601 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6602 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6603 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6610 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6612 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6614 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6615 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6616 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6617 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6618 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6619 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6620 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6621 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6622 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6623 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6624 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6625 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6626 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6628 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6629 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6631 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6632 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6634 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6635 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6636 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6637 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6638 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6639 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6641 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6642 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6643 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6644 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6645 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6646 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6649 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6650 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6652 pub keys_manager: K,
6654 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6656 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6657 pub fee_estimator: F,
6658 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6660 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6661 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6662 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6663 pub chain_monitor: M,
6665 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6666 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6667 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6668 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6669 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6670 /// deserialization.
6672 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6673 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6674 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6676 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6677 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6679 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6680 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6681 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6682 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6684 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6687 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6688 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6691 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6692 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6693 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6695 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6696 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6699 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6700 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6701 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6702 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6703 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6705 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6706 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6711 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6712 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6713 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6714 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6715 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6716 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6717 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6721 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6722 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6723 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6727 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6728 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6729 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6730 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6731 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6732 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6735 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6736 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6738 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6740 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6742 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6744 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6746 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6747 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6748 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6749 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6750 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6751 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6752 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6753 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6754 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6755 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6756 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6757 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6758 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6759 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6760 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6761 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6762 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6763 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6764 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6765 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6766 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6767 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6768 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6769 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6770 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6771 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6772 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6773 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6774 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6775 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6776 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6777 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6778 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6779 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6780 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6781 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6782 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6783 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6786 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6787 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6788 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6790 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6791 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6793 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6796 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6797 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6798 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6799 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6800 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6801 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6805 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6806 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6807 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6808 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6812 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6813 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6814 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6815 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6816 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6817 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6819 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6820 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6822 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6825 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6826 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6827 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6828 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6830 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6831 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6832 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6834 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6837 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6838 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6839 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6840 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let peer_state = PeerState {
6842 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6844 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6847 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6849 for _ in 0..event_count {
6850 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6851 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6855 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6856 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6857 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6858 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6859 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6860 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6861 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6862 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6866 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6868 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6869 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6870 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6871 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6875 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
6876 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6880 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6881 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6882 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6886 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6888 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6889 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6890 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6892 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6894 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6895 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6899 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6900 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6901 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6902 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6903 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6904 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6905 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6906 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6907 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6908 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6909 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6910 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6911 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6912 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
6914 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6915 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6918 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
6919 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6922 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6923 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6924 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6925 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6926 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6927 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6929 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6931 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6932 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6933 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6934 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6935 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6936 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6937 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6939 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6940 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6941 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6942 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6943 if path.is_empty() {
6944 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6945 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6947 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6948 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6949 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6950 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6952 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6953 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6954 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6956 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6957 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6958 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6959 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6960 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6962 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6963 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6964 total_msat: path_amt,
6965 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6967 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6968 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6977 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6978 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6980 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
6981 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
6982 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
6983 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6985 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
6986 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
6989 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
6990 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
6991 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
6992 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
6993 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6995 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
6996 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
6997 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
6998 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
6999 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7000 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7001 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7002 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7004 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7005 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7009 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7011 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7013 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7014 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7016 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7020 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7021 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7023 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7024 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7027 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7029 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7031 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7032 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7033 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7034 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7035 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7039 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7040 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7041 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7042 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7044 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7045 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7046 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7048 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7049 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7050 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7051 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7052 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7053 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7055 if chan.is_usable() {
7056 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7057 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7058 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7059 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7060 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7065 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7067 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7068 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7069 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7070 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7071 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7072 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7073 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7075 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7076 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7077 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7078 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7080 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7081 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7082 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7083 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7085 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7086 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7087 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7088 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7090 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7091 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7092 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7094 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7095 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7098 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7100 purpose: payment_purpose,
7101 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7107 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7109 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7110 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7111 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7113 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7115 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7120 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7122 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7123 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7124 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7126 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7127 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7128 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7130 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7136 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7138 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7140 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7141 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7142 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7143 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7145 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7146 logger: args.logger,
7147 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7150 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7151 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7152 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7153 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7156 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7157 //connection or two.
7159 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7165 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7166 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7167 use core::time::Duration;
7168 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7169 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7170 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7171 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7172 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7173 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7175 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7176 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7177 use util::errors::APIError;
7178 use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7179 use util::test_utils;
7180 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7183 fn test_notify_limits() {
7184 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7185 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7186 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7187 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7188 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7189 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7191 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7192 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7193 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7194 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7195 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7197 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7199 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7200 // to connect messages with new values
7201 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7202 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7203 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7204 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7206 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7207 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7208 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7209 // ... but the last node should not.
7210 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7211 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7212 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7213 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7215 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7216 // about the channel.
7217 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7218 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7219 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7221 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7223 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7224 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7225 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7226 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7227 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7228 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7230 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7231 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7232 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7234 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7235 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7236 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7237 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7238 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7239 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7241 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7242 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7243 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7244 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7245 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7246 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7247 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7248 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7250 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7251 // the channel info has updated.
7252 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7253 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7254 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7255 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7256 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7257 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7261 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7262 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7267 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7268 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7270 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7271 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7272 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7273 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7274 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7275 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7276 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7278 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7280 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7282 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7283 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7285 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7286 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7287 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7288 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7289 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7291 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7292 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7293 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7295 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7296 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7297 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7298 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7299 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7300 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7301 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7302 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7303 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7305 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7306 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7308 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7309 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7310 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7312 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7313 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7314 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7315 // lightning messages manually.
7316 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7317 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7320 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7321 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7322 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7324 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7325 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7327 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7328 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7330 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7331 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7332 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7334 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7335 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7336 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7338 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7340 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7342 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7343 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7346 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7347 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7348 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7349 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7351 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7352 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7353 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7354 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7359 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7360 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7361 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7362 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7364 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7367 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7368 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7369 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7370 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7377 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7378 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7379 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7380 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7381 // fails as expected.
7382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7385 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7387 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7388 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7390 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7391 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7392 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7394 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7395 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7396 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7397 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7398 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7400 let route = find_route(
7401 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7402 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7404 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7406 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7407 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7408 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7409 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7410 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7412 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7413 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7414 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7416 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7418 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7419 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7420 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7421 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7422 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7423 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7424 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7425 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7426 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7428 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7429 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7431 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7432 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7433 let route = find_route(
7434 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7435 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7437 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7439 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7440 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7441 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7442 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7443 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7445 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7446 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7447 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7449 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7450 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7451 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7452 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7453 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7455 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7456 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7457 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7459 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7460 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7461 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7462 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7463 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7464 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7465 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7466 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7467 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7469 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7470 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7474 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7475 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7476 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7480 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7482 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7483 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7484 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7485 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7487 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7488 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7489 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7490 final_value_msat: 10000,
7491 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7493 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7494 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7495 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7496 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7497 let route = find_route(
7498 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7499 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7502 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7503 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7504 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7507 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7508 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7509 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7510 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7511 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7512 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7513 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7515 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7519 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7520 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7526 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7527 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7528 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7529 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7531 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7532 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7533 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7534 final_value_msat: 10000,
7535 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7537 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7538 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7539 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7540 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7541 let route = find_route(
7542 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7543 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7546 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7547 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7548 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7549 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7552 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7553 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7554 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7555 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7556 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7557 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7558 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7560 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7564 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7565 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7566 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7567 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7568 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7570 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7571 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7572 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7573 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7575 // Marshall an MPP route.
7576 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7577 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7578 route.paths.push(path);
7579 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7580 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7581 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7582 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7583 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7584 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7586 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7587 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7588 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7589 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7594 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7595 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7596 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7597 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7598 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7599 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7601 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7602 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7604 total_msat: 100_000,
7607 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7608 // payment verification fails as expected.
7609 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7610 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7611 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7612 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7614 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7618 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7619 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7623 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7624 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7625 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7626 // the channel is successfully closed.
7627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7632 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7633 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7634 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7635 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7636 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7638 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7639 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7641 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7642 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7643 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7644 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7647 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7649 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7650 // as it has the funding transaction.
7651 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7652 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7653 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7655 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7658 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7660 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7662 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7663 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7664 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7666 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7667 // as it has the funding transaction.
7668 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7669 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7670 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7673 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7674 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7676 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7677 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7678 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7680 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7681 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7682 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7683 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7685 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7686 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7688 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7689 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7690 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7691 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7692 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7693 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7694 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7696 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7697 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7698 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7699 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7700 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7701 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7702 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7705 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7707 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7708 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7709 // closing transaction).
7710 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7711 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7712 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7714 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7715 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7716 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7717 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7718 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7721 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7723 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7725 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7726 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7727 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7729 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7731 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7732 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7736 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7739 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7740 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7741 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7742 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7743 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7744 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7745 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7746 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7747 use util::test_utils;
7748 use util::config::UserConfig;
7749 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7751 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7752 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7753 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7755 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7759 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7760 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7761 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7762 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7763 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7764 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7765 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7770 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7771 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7774 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7775 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7776 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7778 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7779 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7781 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7782 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7784 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7785 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7787 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7788 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7789 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7790 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7791 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7793 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7795 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7797 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7798 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7799 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7800 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7801 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7803 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7805 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7807 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7808 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7809 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7810 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7811 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7814 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7815 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7816 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7818 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7819 } else { panic!(); }
7821 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7822 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7824 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7827 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7830 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7831 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7833 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7834 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7835 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7836 match msg_events[0] {
7837 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7838 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7839 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7843 match msg_events[1] {
7844 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7848 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7850 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7851 macro_rules! send_payment {
7852 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7853 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7854 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7855 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7856 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7857 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7858 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7859 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7860 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7861 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7863 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7864 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7866 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7867 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7869 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7870 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7871 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7872 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7873 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7874 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7875 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7876 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7878 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7879 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7880 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7881 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7883 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7884 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7885 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7886 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7887 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7889 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7892 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7893 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7894 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7895 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7897 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7902 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7903 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);