1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
363 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
364 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
365 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
366 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
368 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
369 err: msgs::LightningError,
370 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
371 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
373 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
375 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
377 err: LightningError {
379 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
380 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
387 shutdown_finish: None,
391 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
392 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
395 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
397 err: LightningError {
399 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
400 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
406 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
407 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
411 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
414 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
417 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
421 log_level: Level::Warn,
424 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
430 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
431 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
444 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
445 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
446 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
447 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
448 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
450 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
451 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
452 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
453 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
454 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
455 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
456 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
458 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
462 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
463 struct ClaimingPayment {
465 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
466 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
469 (0, amount_msat, required),
470 (2, payment_purpose, required),
471 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
474 struct ClaimablePayment {
475 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
476 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
477 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
480 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
481 struct ClaimablePayments {
482 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
483 /// failed/claimed by the user.
485 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
486 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
488 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
489 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
490 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
492 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
493 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
494 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
495 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
498 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
499 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
500 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
501 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
502 enum BackgroundEvent {
503 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
504 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
505 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
506 /// need the counterparty node_id.
508 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
509 /// are regenerated on startup.
510 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
511 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
512 /// channel to continue normal operation.
514 /// In general this should be used rather than
515 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
516 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
517 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
519 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
520 /// are regenerated on startup.
521 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
522 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
523 funding_txo: OutPoint,
524 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
529 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
530 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
531 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
532 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
533 /// event can be generated.
534 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
535 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
536 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
539 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
540 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
541 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
544 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
545 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
546 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
547 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
548 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
551 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
552 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
553 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
554 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
558 /// State we hold per-peer.
559 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
560 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
562 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
563 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
565 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
566 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
567 latest_features: InitFeatures,
568 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
569 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
570 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
571 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
572 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
574 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
575 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
576 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
577 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
579 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
580 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
581 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
582 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
583 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
584 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
585 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
586 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
587 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
588 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
592 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
593 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
594 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
595 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
596 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
597 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
600 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
604 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
605 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
607 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
610 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
611 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
612 struct PendingInboundPayment {
613 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
614 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
615 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
616 /// this payment being removed.
618 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
619 user_payment_id: u64,
620 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
621 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
622 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
625 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
626 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
627 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
628 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
629 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
630 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
631 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
632 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
634 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
635 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
643 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
645 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
650 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
651 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
652 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
653 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
654 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
655 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
656 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
657 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
658 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
660 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
661 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
663 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
664 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
665 $vis trait AChannelManager {
666 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
667 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
668 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
669 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
670 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
671 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
672 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
673 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
674 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
675 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
676 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
677 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
678 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
679 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
680 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
681 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
682 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
683 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
686 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
687 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
688 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
689 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
690 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
691 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
693 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
695 ES::Target: EntropySource,
696 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
697 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
702 type Watch = M::Target;
704 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
706 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
708 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
710 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
711 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
713 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
715 type Router = R::Target;
717 type Logger = L::Target;
719 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
722 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
723 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
725 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
726 /// to individual Channels.
728 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
729 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
730 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
731 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
733 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
734 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
735 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
736 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
737 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
738 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
739 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
741 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
742 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
743 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
745 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
746 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
747 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
748 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
749 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
751 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
752 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
753 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
754 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
756 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
757 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
758 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
760 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
761 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
762 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
763 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
764 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
766 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
767 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
768 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
769 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
770 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
771 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
772 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
773 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
776 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
777 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
778 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
779 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
780 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
784 // `total_consistency_lock`
786 // |__`forward_htlcs`
788 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
790 // |__`per_peer_state`
792 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
794 // | |__`claimable_payments`
796 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
802 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
804 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
808 // | |__`pending_events`
810 // | |__`pending_background_events`
812 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
814 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
815 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
817 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
818 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
819 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
823 default_configuration: UserConfig,
824 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
825 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
831 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
833 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
835 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
836 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
838 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
839 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
840 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
841 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
843 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
844 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
846 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
847 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
848 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
849 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
850 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
851 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
852 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
853 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
855 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
857 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
858 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
860 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
862 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
863 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
864 /// and via the classic SCID.
866 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
867 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
869 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
871 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
873 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
874 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
875 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
877 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
878 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
880 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
881 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
883 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
884 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
886 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
887 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
888 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
889 /// active channel list on load.
891 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
892 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
894 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
896 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
897 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
898 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
900 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
901 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
902 /// the handling of the events.
904 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
905 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
908 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
909 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
910 /// would break backwards compatability.
911 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
912 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
913 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
915 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
916 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
918 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
920 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
921 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
922 /// confirmation depth.
924 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
925 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
926 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
928 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
930 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
932 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
934 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
936 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
938 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
939 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
940 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
942 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
943 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
945 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
946 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
947 /// keeping additional state.
948 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
950 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
951 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
952 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
953 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
955 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
956 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
958 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
959 /// are currently open with that peer.
961 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
962 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
965 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
967 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
968 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
969 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
970 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
971 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
973 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
974 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
975 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
976 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
977 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
979 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
980 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
982 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
983 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
984 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
985 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
987 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
988 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
989 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
990 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
991 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
993 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
995 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
997 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
998 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
999 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1000 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1001 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1002 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1003 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1004 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1005 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1007 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1008 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1010 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1014 signer_provider: SP,
1019 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1021 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1022 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1023 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1024 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1025 pub struct ChainParameters {
1026 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1027 pub network: Network,
1029 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1031 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1032 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1035 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1042 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1043 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1044 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1045 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1046 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1047 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1049 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1050 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1051 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1052 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1053 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1055 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1056 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1059 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1060 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1061 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1062 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1064 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1065 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1066 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1067 _read_guard: read_guard,
1072 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1073 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1074 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1075 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1077 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1078 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1079 should_persist: persist_check,
1080 _read_guard: read_guard,
1085 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1086 fn drop(&mut self) {
1087 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1088 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1093 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1094 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1096 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1098 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1099 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1100 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1101 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1102 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1104 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1105 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1107 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1109 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1110 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1111 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1112 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1113 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1114 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1115 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1116 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1117 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1118 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1119 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1120 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1121 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1123 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1124 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1126 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1127 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1128 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1129 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1131 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1132 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1133 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1134 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1135 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1136 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1139 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1141 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1142 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1145 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1147 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1148 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1150 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1151 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1152 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1153 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1155 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1156 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1157 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1159 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1160 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1161 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1163 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1164 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1165 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1166 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1168 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1169 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1170 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1172 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1173 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1174 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1176 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1177 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1178 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1179 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1180 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1181 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1182 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1183 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1184 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1185 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1186 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1189 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1190 /// to better separate parameters.
1191 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1192 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1193 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1194 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1195 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1196 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1197 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1198 pub features: InitFeatures,
1199 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1200 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1201 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1203 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1205 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1206 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1207 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1208 /// payments to us through this channel.
1209 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1210 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1211 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1212 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1213 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1214 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1215 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1218 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1219 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1220 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1221 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1222 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1223 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1224 /// lifetime of the channel.
1225 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1226 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1227 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1228 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1229 /// our counterparty already.
1231 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1232 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1233 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1234 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1236 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1237 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1238 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1239 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1241 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1242 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1244 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1245 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1247 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1248 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1249 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1250 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1251 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1252 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1253 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1254 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1255 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1258 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1260 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1261 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1262 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1263 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1264 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1265 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1266 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1268 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1269 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1271 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1272 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1273 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1274 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1275 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1276 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1277 /// this value on chain.
1279 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1281 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1283 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1284 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1285 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1286 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1288 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1289 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1290 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1292 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1293 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1294 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1295 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1296 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1298 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1299 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1300 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1301 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1303 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1304 pub balance_msat: u64,
1305 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1306 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1307 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1308 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1310 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1312 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1313 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1314 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1315 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1316 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1317 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1318 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1319 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1321 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1322 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1323 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1324 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1325 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1326 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1327 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1329 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1330 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1331 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1332 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1333 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1334 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1335 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1336 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1337 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1339 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1341 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1342 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1343 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1344 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1345 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1347 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1348 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1349 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1350 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1351 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1352 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1353 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1355 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1356 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1357 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1358 pub is_outbound: bool,
1359 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1360 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1361 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1362 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1363 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1365 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1366 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1367 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1368 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1370 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1371 pub is_usable: bool,
1372 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1373 pub is_public: bool,
1374 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1375 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1376 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1377 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1378 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1379 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1381 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1382 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1385 impl ChannelDetails {
1386 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1387 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1388 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1390 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1391 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1392 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1393 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1396 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1397 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1398 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1400 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1401 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1402 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1403 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1406 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1407 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1409 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1410 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1411 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1413 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1414 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1415 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1416 features: latest_features,
1417 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1418 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1419 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1420 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1421 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1422 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1423 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1424 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1425 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1426 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1428 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1429 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1430 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1431 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1432 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1433 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1434 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1435 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1436 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1437 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1438 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1439 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1440 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1441 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1442 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1443 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1444 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1445 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1446 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1447 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1448 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1449 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1450 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1451 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1452 config: Some(channel.config()),
1457 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1458 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1459 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1460 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1461 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1463 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1465 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1466 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1467 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1470 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1471 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1472 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1474 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1475 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1476 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1478 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1479 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1480 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1482 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1483 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1487 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1489 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1491 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1492 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1493 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1494 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1496 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1497 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1498 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1501 macro_rules! handle_error {
1502 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1503 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1504 // entering the macro.
1505 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1506 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1510 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1511 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1513 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1514 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1515 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1516 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1520 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1521 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1522 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1523 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1528 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1529 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1531 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1532 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1533 action: err.action.clone()
1537 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1538 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1539 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1540 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1541 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1545 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1552 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1553 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1554 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1555 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1556 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1557 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1559 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1560 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1561 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1562 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1563 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1565 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1566 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1568 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1572 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1573 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1574 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1576 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1577 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1579 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1580 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1582 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1583 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1584 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1585 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1586 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1587 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1593 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1594 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1598 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1600 $entry.remove_entry();
1608 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1609 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1613 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1615 $entry.remove_entry();
1623 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1624 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1626 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1627 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1633 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1634 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1635 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1636 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1637 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1639 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1640 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1641 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1642 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1643 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1644 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1645 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1646 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1647 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1648 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1653 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1654 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1655 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1656 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1657 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1658 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1659 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1660 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1661 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1663 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1668 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1669 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1670 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1671 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1672 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1673 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1674 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1675 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1676 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1678 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1683 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1684 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1685 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1686 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1687 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1688 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1689 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1690 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1691 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1692 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1693 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1695 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1696 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1697 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1703 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1704 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1706 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1707 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1708 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1709 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1710 updates.announcement_sigs);
1711 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1712 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1715 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1716 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1717 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1719 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1721 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1722 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1724 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1725 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1726 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1727 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1732 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1733 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1734 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1735 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1736 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1737 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1738 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1741 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1742 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1743 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1746 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1747 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1748 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1749 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1750 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1751 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1752 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1753 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1757 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1758 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1759 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1760 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1766 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1767 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1771 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1772 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1773 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1774 while !processed_all_events {
1775 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1779 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1782 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1783 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1784 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1786 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1787 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1788 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1790 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1791 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1792 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1793 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1797 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1798 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1799 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1800 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1803 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1805 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1806 $event_to_handle = event;
1808 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1809 post_event_actions.push(action);
1814 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1815 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1816 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1817 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1820 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1821 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1822 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1823 processed_all_events = false;
1826 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1827 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1833 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1835 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1837 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1838 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1839 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1844 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1846 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1847 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1849 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1851 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1852 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1853 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1856 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1857 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1858 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1859 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1860 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1861 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1862 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1863 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1865 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1866 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1867 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1872 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1874 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1875 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1876 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1877 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1878 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1879 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1880 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1881 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1883 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1886 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1887 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1889 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1891 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1893 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1895 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1896 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1897 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1898 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1899 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1900 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
1901 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1911 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1912 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1913 &self.default_configuration
1916 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1917 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1918 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1921 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1922 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1924 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1926 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1930 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1935 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1937 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1938 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1939 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1940 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1941 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1943 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1944 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1946 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1947 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1948 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1950 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1951 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1952 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1954 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1955 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1956 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1957 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1958 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1959 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1961 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1962 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1963 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1964 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1965 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
1970 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1971 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1975 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1976 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1978 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1980 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1981 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1982 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1983 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1984 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1985 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1989 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1994 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1996 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1997 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1998 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2000 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2002 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2008 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2009 node_id: their_network_key,
2012 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2015 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2016 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2017 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2018 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2019 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2020 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2021 // the same channel.
2022 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2024 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2026 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2029 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2030 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
2031 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2039 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2040 /// more information.
2041 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2042 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
2045 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2046 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2048 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2049 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2051 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2052 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2053 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2054 // really wanted anyway.
2055 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2058 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2059 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2060 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2061 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2063 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2066 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2067 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2070 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2076 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2077 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2079 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2080 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2081 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2083 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2084 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2085 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2086 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2087 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2088 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2089 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2090 total_msat: *total_msat,
2093 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2094 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2096 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2097 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2099 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2104 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2105 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2106 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2107 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2108 Some(transaction) => {
2109 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2110 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2115 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2116 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2117 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2118 reason: closure_reason
2122 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2123 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2125 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2126 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2127 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2129 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2130 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2134 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2135 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2136 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2137 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2138 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2139 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2140 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2142 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2143 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2144 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2145 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2146 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2150 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2151 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2152 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2153 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2154 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2157 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2158 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2159 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2160 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2164 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2172 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2173 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2174 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2175 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2178 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2182 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2183 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2184 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2186 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2187 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2189 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2190 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2191 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2192 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2194 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2196 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2197 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2198 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2201 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2202 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2203 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2204 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2205 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2206 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2209 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2210 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2211 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2213 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2214 /// the channel being closed or not:
2215 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2216 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2217 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2218 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2219 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2220 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2221 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2223 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2224 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2225 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2226 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2228 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2230 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2231 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2232 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2235 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2236 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2237 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2238 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2239 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2240 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2244 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2245 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2246 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2247 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2248 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2249 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2250 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2251 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2253 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2254 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2255 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2256 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2257 // ignore the result here.
2258 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2262 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2263 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2264 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2265 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2266 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2267 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2268 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2270 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2271 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2272 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2273 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2274 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2276 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2278 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2280 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2283 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2284 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2285 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2286 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2287 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2292 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2295 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2296 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2297 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2298 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2300 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2301 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2302 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2303 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2304 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2305 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2306 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2317 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2318 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2319 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2321 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2322 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2323 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2326 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2327 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2328 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2330 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2331 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2332 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2333 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2334 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2337 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2338 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2339 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2340 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2341 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2345 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2346 /// local transaction(s).
2347 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2348 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2349 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2353 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2354 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2356 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2357 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2358 return Err(ReceiveError {
2359 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2361 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2364 // final_expiry_too_soon
2365 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2366 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2368 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2369 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2370 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2371 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2372 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2373 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2374 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2375 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2376 return Err(ReceiveError {
2377 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2378 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2381 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2382 return Err(ReceiveError {
2384 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2385 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2389 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2390 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2391 return Err(ReceiveError {
2392 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2393 err_data: Vec::new(),
2394 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2397 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2398 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2399 return Err(ReceiveError {
2400 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2401 err_data: Vec::new(),
2402 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2404 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2405 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2408 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2409 phantom_shared_secret,
2411 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2412 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2413 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2414 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2415 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2416 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2417 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2418 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2419 return Err(ReceiveError {
2420 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2421 err_data: Vec::new(),
2422 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2426 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2429 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2432 return Err(ReceiveError {
2433 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2434 err_data: Vec::new(),
2435 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2440 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2443 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2444 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2445 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2446 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2450 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2451 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2452 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2454 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2455 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2456 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2457 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2458 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2459 failure_code: $err_code,
2465 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2466 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2469 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2470 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2471 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2473 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2474 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2475 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2476 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2477 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2478 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2479 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2480 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2482 macro_rules! return_err {
2483 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2485 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2486 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2487 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2488 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2489 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2490 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2496 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2498 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2499 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2501 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2502 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2506 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2507 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2509 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2511 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2512 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2513 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2514 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2515 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2517 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2520 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2521 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2522 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2524 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2525 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2526 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2529 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2530 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2531 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2532 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2536 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2537 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2538 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2541 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2542 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2543 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2544 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2545 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2550 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2551 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2552 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2553 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2554 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2555 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2556 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2557 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2558 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2559 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2560 // phantom or an intercept.
2561 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2562 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2563 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2567 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2570 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2572 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2573 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2574 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2575 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2576 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2580 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2582 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2583 // have no consistency guarantees.
2584 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2588 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2589 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2590 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2591 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2592 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2594 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2595 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2596 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2597 // we don't have the channel here.
2598 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2600 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2602 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2603 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2604 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2605 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2606 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2607 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2608 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2609 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2610 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2611 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2612 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2614 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2617 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2618 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2620 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2621 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2625 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2626 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2627 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2628 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2630 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2637 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2638 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2639 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2640 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2641 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2642 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2644 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2645 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2647 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2648 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2649 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2650 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2651 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2652 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2653 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2654 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2655 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2656 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2662 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2663 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2664 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2665 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2667 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2668 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2670 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2671 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2672 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2674 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2675 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2676 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2677 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2678 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2679 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2680 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2684 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2689 pending_forward_info
2692 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2693 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2694 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2696 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2697 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2698 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2700 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2701 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2702 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2703 if !chan.should_announce() {
2704 return Err(LightningError {
2705 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2706 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2709 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2710 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2712 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2713 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2716 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2717 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2718 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2719 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2721 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2722 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2723 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2725 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2726 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2727 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2728 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2729 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2730 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2734 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2736 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2738 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2740 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2741 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2742 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2743 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2744 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2747 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2748 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2750 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2751 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2752 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2753 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2754 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2755 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2756 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2757 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2759 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2760 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2761 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2763 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2765 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2772 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2773 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2774 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2777 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2778 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2779 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2782 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2783 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2785 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2786 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2787 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2788 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2789 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2791 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2793 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2794 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2795 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2796 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2800 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2801 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2804 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2805 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2806 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2808 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2809 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2810 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2812 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2813 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2815 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2816 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2817 Some(monitor_update) => {
2818 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2819 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2820 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2823 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2824 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2825 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2826 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2827 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2828 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2829 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2830 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2836 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2837 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2838 // `channel_by_id` map.
2839 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2840 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2845 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2846 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2848 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2853 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2855 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2856 /// fields for more info.
2858 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2859 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2861 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2863 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2864 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2865 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2866 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2867 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2869 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2870 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2871 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2872 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2873 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2875 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2876 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2877 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2878 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2880 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2882 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2883 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2884 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2886 /// In general, a path may raise:
2887 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2888 /// node public key) is specified.
2889 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2890 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2892 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2893 /// relevant updates.
2895 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2896 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2897 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2899 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2900 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2901 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2902 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2903 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2904 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2905 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2907 self.pending_outbound_payments
2908 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2909 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2910 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2913 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2914 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2915 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2916 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2918 self.pending_outbound_payments
2919 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2920 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2921 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2922 &self.pending_events,
2923 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2924 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2928 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2929 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2931 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2932 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2933 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2937 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2938 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2939 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2943 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2944 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2948 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2949 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2950 /// retries are exhausted.
2952 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2953 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2955 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2956 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2957 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2959 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2960 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2962 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2963 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2964 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2966 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2969 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2970 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2971 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2972 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2973 /// never reach the recipient.
2975 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2976 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2978 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2979 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2981 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2983 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2984 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2985 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2987 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2988 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2989 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2990 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2991 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2994 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2995 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2997 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3000 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3001 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3002 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3004 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3005 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3006 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3007 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3008 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3009 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3012 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3013 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3014 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3015 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3016 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3017 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3018 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3019 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3020 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3023 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3026 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3027 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3030 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3031 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3032 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3033 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3034 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3036 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3037 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3039 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3040 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3041 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3043 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3045 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3046 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3047 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
3048 } else { unreachable!(); });
3050 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
3052 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3053 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3055 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
3056 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3057 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3063 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3065 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3066 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3071 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3072 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3075 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3076 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3077 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3080 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3081 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3082 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3091 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3092 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3093 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3097 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3099 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3100 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3102 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3103 /// across the p2p network.
3105 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3106 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3108 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3109 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3110 /// keys per-channel).
3112 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3113 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3114 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3116 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3117 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3118 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3120 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3121 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3122 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3123 /// for more details.
3125 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3126 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3127 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3128 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3130 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3131 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3132 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3133 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3138 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3139 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3140 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3141 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3142 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3143 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3144 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3145 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3149 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3150 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3151 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3152 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3156 let mut output_index = None;
3157 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3158 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3159 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3160 if output_index.is_some() {
3161 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3162 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3165 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3168 if output_index.is_none() {
3169 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3170 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3173 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3177 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3179 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3180 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3181 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3182 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3184 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3185 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3187 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3188 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3190 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3192 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3193 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3194 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3195 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3196 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3197 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3198 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3199 pub fn update_channel_config(
3200 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3201 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3202 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3203 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3204 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3210 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3211 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3214 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3215 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3216 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3217 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3221 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3222 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3223 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3226 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3227 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3228 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3229 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3230 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3238 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3239 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3241 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3242 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3244 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3245 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3246 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3247 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3248 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3250 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3251 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3253 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3256 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3257 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3258 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3259 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3260 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3261 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3263 let next_hop_scid = {
3264 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3265 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3266 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3267 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3268 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3269 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3271 if !chan.is_usable() {
3272 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3273 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3276 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3278 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3279 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3284 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3285 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3286 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3289 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3290 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3291 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3293 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3295 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3296 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3299 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3300 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3301 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3302 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3303 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3305 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3309 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3310 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3312 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3315 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3316 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3317 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3319 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3320 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3321 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3324 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3325 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3326 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3327 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3328 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3329 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3330 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3333 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3334 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3335 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3336 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3341 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3343 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3344 /// Will likely generate further events.
3345 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3348 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3349 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3350 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3352 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3353 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3355 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3356 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3357 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3359 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3360 match forward_info {
3361 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3362 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3363 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3364 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3365 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3368 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3369 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3370 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3372 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3373 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3374 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3375 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3376 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3377 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3380 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3381 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3383 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3386 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3387 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3393 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3394 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3396 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3400 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3401 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3403 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3407 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3408 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3409 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3410 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3411 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3413 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3414 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3415 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3416 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3417 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3419 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3421 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3422 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3426 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3427 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3428 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3429 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3435 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3438 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3441 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3442 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3443 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3444 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3445 // problem, not ours.
3451 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3452 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3454 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3458 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3459 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3460 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3461 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3466 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3468 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3472 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3473 match forward_info {
3474 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3475 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3476 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3477 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3478 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3481 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3482 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3483 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3484 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3485 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3486 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3487 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3488 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3490 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3491 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3492 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3494 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3495 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3497 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3499 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3500 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3501 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3502 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3507 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3508 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3510 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3511 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3512 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3513 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3515 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3516 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3518 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3520 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3521 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3522 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3531 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3532 match forward_info {
3533 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3534 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3535 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3536 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3539 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3540 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3541 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3543 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3544 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3545 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3547 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3548 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3549 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3550 None, None, onion_fields)
3553 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3556 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3557 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3558 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3559 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3560 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3561 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3562 phantom_shared_secret,
3564 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3565 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3566 // if routing nodes overpay
3567 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3568 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3570 total_value_received: None,
3571 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3576 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3578 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3579 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3580 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3581 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3582 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3583 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3585 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3586 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3587 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3588 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3589 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3590 phantom_shared_secret,
3592 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3593 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3595 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3598 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3599 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3600 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3601 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3602 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3605 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3606 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3607 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3609 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3610 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3611 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3614 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3615 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3616 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3618 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3619 .entry(payment_hash)
3620 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3621 .or_insert_with(|| {
3622 committed_to_claimable = true;
3624 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3627 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3628 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3629 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3632 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3634 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3635 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3636 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3637 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3638 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3641 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3642 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3643 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3644 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3645 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3646 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3647 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3648 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3649 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3650 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3651 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3653 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3655 _ => unreachable!(),
3658 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3659 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3660 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3661 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3662 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3663 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3664 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3665 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3666 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3667 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3668 committed_to_claimable = true;
3670 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3671 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3672 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3673 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3674 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3675 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3679 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3680 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3681 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3682 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3684 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3686 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3687 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3689 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3690 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3691 committed_to_claimable = true;
3694 payment_claimable_generated
3698 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3699 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3700 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3701 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3702 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3703 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3704 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3705 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3707 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3708 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3709 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3710 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3711 Ok(result) => result,
3713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3714 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3717 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3718 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3719 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3721 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3722 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3725 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3727 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3728 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3729 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3730 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3732 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3734 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3735 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3736 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3737 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3738 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3739 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3740 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3741 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3743 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3744 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3745 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3749 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3750 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3752 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3757 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3763 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3764 if payment_data.is_none() {
3765 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3766 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3768 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3769 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3770 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3771 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3772 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3774 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3775 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3777 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3778 if payment_claimable_generated {
3779 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3785 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3786 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3794 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3795 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3796 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3797 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3798 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3799 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3801 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3802 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3804 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3806 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3807 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3808 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3810 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3812 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3813 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3814 events.append(&mut new_events);
3817 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
3819 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3820 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
3821 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
3823 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3824 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3826 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3827 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3828 if background_events.is_empty() {
3829 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3832 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3834 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
3835 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3836 // monitor updating completing.
3837 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3839 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
3840 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3844 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3845 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3846 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3847 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3849 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
3851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
3855 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
3856 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
3857 // however, ensure that.
3859 log_error!(self.logger,
3860 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
3862 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3866 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3869 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3870 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3871 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3872 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3873 let _ = self.process_background_events();
3876 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3877 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3878 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3879 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3880 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3881 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3882 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3884 if !chan.is_live() {
3885 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3886 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3887 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3889 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3890 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3892 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3893 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3897 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3898 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3899 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3900 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3901 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3902 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3903 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3905 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3907 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3908 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3911 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3912 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3913 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3921 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3923 /// This currently includes:
3924 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3925 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3926 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3928 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3929 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3930 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3932 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3933 /// estimate fetches.
3935 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3936 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3937 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3938 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3939 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
3941 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3943 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3944 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3945 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3947 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3948 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3951 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3952 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3953 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3954 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3955 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3957 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3958 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3959 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3960 if needs_close { return false; }
3963 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3964 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3965 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3966 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3967 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3968 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3969 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3970 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3972 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3973 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3974 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3975 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3979 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3981 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3984 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3986 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3987 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3988 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3989 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3993 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3995 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4001 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4005 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4006 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4011 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4012 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4013 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4014 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4015 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4016 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4017 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4018 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4019 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4020 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4021 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4023 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4024 // have no channels to the peer.
4025 let remove_entry = {
4026 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4027 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4030 entry.remove_entry();
4033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4038 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4039 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4040 // This should be unreachable
4041 debug_assert!(false);
4044 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4045 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4046 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4047 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4048 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4049 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4050 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4053 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4054 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4055 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4057 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4058 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4065 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4066 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4067 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4068 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4069 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4072 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4073 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4076 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4078 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4079 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4080 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4081 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4082 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4089 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4090 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4091 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4093 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4094 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4095 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4096 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4098 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4099 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4100 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4101 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4102 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4103 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4106 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4107 /// reason for the failure.
4109 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4110 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4113 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4114 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4115 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4116 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4117 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4118 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4119 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4124 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4125 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4126 match failure_code {
4127 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4128 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4129 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4130 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4131 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4132 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4137 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4138 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4140 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4142 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4143 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4144 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4145 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4146 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4147 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4148 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4150 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4152 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4153 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4155 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4160 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4161 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4162 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4163 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4164 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4165 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4166 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4167 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4168 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4169 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4171 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4172 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4173 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4174 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4176 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4177 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4178 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4179 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4180 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4184 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4185 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4186 // be surfaced to the user.
4187 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4188 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4189 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4191 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4192 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4193 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4194 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4195 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4196 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4198 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4202 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4205 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4206 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4207 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4212 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4213 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4214 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4215 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4216 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4217 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4218 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4219 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4220 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4223 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4224 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4225 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4228 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4229 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4230 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4233 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4234 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4235 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4236 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4238 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4240 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4242 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4243 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4244 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4245 push_forward_ev = true;
4247 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4249 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4251 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4252 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4255 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4256 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4257 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4258 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4259 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4260 failed_next_destination: destination,
4266 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4267 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4269 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4270 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4271 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4272 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4274 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4275 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4276 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4277 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4279 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4280 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4281 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4282 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4283 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4284 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4285 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4286 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4291 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4292 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4293 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4294 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4295 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4296 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4297 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4298 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4303 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4304 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4305 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4307 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4308 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4309 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4310 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4315 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4317 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4318 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4319 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4320 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4321 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4322 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4323 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4324 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4325 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4326 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4327 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4328 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4329 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4330 debug_assert!(false);
4334 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4336 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4337 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4338 debug_assert!(false);
4342 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4344 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4345 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4346 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4347 if sources.len() != 1 {
4348 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4349 debug_assert!(false);
4355 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4357 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4358 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4359 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4360 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4363 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4364 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4365 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4366 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4370 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4371 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4372 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4373 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4375 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4376 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4377 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4378 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4379 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4384 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4385 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4386 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4387 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4388 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4389 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4390 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4392 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4395 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4396 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4397 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4398 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4402 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4403 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4404 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4405 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4409 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4410 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4411 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4415 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4416 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4417 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4420 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4421 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4422 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4423 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4424 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4425 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4427 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4428 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4429 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4430 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4431 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4433 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4434 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4435 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4436 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4437 if let Err(e) = res {
4438 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4439 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4440 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4441 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4442 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4449 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4450 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4451 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4455 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4456 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4457 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4458 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4459 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4460 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4461 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4462 // again on restart.
4463 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4464 payment_preimage, update_res);
4466 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4467 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4468 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4469 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4470 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4471 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4475 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4476 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4479 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4481 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4482 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4484 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4485 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4486 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4487 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4488 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4489 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4490 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4493 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4494 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4496 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4498 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4501 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4505 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4506 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4507 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4513 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4514 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4515 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4518 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4519 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4521 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4522 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4523 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4524 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4525 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4529 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4530 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4536 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4537 /// update completion.
4538 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4539 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4540 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4541 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4542 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4543 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4545 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4546 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4547 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4548 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4549 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4550 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4552 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4554 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4555 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4556 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4557 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4560 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4561 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4563 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4564 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4565 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4570 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4571 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4572 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4573 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4578 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4579 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4581 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4582 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4587 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4591 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4597 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4598 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4599 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4603 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4604 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4605 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4611 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4612 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4614 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4615 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4617 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4618 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4619 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4620 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4621 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4627 let mut peer_state_lock;
4628 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4629 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4630 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4631 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4633 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4638 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4639 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4640 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4643 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4646 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4648 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4649 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4652 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4653 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4654 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4656 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4657 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4658 /// used to accept such channels.
4660 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4661 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4662 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4663 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4666 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4667 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4669 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4670 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4671 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4673 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4674 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4676 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4677 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4679 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4680 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4682 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4683 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4684 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4685 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4688 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4689 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4691 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4693 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4694 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4695 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4697 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4698 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4700 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4701 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4704 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4705 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4706 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4707 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4708 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4709 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4712 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4713 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4714 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4716 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4717 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4718 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4719 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4720 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4721 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4722 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4723 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4726 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4727 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4728 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4732 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4733 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4734 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4738 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4744 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4745 /// or 0-conf channels.
4747 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4748 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4749 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4750 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4751 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4752 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4754 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4755 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4756 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4757 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4758 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4759 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4760 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4764 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4767 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4768 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4770 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4771 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4772 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4773 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4775 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4778 num_unfunded_channels
4781 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4782 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4783 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4786 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4787 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4790 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4791 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4792 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4793 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4795 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4796 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4797 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4798 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4801 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4803 debug_assert!(false);
4804 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4806 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4807 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4809 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4810 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4811 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4812 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4813 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4814 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4816 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4817 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4818 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4821 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4822 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4823 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4824 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4825 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4828 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4829 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4830 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4833 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4838 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4840 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4844 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4845 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4846 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4848 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4849 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4850 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4853 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4854 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4855 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4856 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4857 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4858 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4859 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4863 entry.insert(channel);
4869 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4870 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4872 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4874 debug_assert!(false);
4875 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4879 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4881 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4882 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4887 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4888 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4889 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4890 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4891 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4893 user_channel_id: user_id,
4898 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4899 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4901 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4902 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4904 debug_assert!(false);
4905 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4910 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4911 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4913 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4918 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4919 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4920 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4923 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4926 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4927 funding_msg.channel_id))
4929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4930 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4934 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4935 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4936 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4937 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4938 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4939 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4940 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4944 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4946 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4947 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4948 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4950 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4951 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4952 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4953 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4954 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4955 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4956 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4957 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4965 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4966 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4967 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4968 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4970 debug_assert!(false);
4971 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4976 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4977 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4978 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4979 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4980 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4981 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4982 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4983 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4984 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4985 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4986 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4987 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4996 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4998 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5000 debug_assert!(false);
5001 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5005 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5007 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5008 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5009 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5010 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5011 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5012 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5013 msg: announcement_sigs,
5015 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5016 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5017 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5018 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5019 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5020 // announcement_signatures.
5021 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5022 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5023 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5024 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5031 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5032 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5041 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5042 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5043 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5044 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5045 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5047 debug_assert!(false);
5048 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5052 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5055 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5056 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5057 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5058 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5061 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
5062 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5063 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5064 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5066 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5067 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5068 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5069 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5070 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5071 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5076 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5077 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5078 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5079 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5080 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5087 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5088 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5089 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5090 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5096 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5097 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5098 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5100 debug_assert!(false);
5101 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5103 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5106 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5107 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5108 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5109 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5110 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5111 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5116 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5117 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5118 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5119 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5120 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5121 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5122 } else { (tx, None) }
5124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5127 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5128 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5129 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5131 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5132 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5133 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5134 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5135 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5139 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5144 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5145 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5146 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5147 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5149 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5150 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5151 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5152 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5154 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5156 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5158 debug_assert!(false);
5159 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5163 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5166 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5167 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5168 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5169 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5170 match pending_forward_info {
5171 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5172 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5173 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5174 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5176 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5177 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5178 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5179 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5180 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5183 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5185 _ => pending_forward_info
5188 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5190 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5195 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5196 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5197 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5198 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5200 debug_assert!(false);
5201 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5203 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5204 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5205 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5207 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5212 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5216 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5217 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5218 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5220 debug_assert!(false);
5221 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5223 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5225 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5227 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5234 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5235 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5236 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5238 debug_assert!(false);
5239 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5243 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5244 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5245 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5246 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5247 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5249 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5256 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5257 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5258 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5260 debug_assert!(false);
5261 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5265 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5267 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5268 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5269 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5270 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5271 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5272 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5273 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5276 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5281 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5282 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5283 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5284 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5285 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5286 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5287 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5288 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5289 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5290 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5291 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5293 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5294 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5296 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5297 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5298 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5300 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5301 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5303 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5304 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5305 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5307 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5308 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5309 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5311 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5312 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5313 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5314 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5315 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5318 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5319 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5322 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5323 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5324 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5325 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5326 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5327 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5328 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5331 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5332 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5333 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5338 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5339 // payments are being processed.
5340 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5341 push_forward_event = true;
5343 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5344 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5351 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5352 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5355 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5356 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5357 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5359 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5363 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5364 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5365 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5366 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5367 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5369 if !forward_ev_exists {
5370 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5372 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5377 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5378 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5380 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5382 debug_assert!(false);
5383 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5384 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5385 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5386 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5388 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5389 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5390 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5391 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5392 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5393 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5394 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5396 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5401 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5405 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5407 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5409 debug_assert!(false);
5410 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5414 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5416 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5423 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5424 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5425 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5427 debug_assert!(false);
5428 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5432 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5434 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5438 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5439 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5440 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5441 msg, &self.default_configuration
5443 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5444 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5445 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5448 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5453 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5454 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5455 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5456 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5458 // It's not a local channel
5459 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5462 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5463 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5464 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5465 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5469 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5471 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5472 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5473 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5474 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5475 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5476 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5478 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5480 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5481 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5482 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5483 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5485 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5486 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5491 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5494 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5496 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5499 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5501 debug_assert!(false);
5502 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5504 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5505 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5506 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5508 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5509 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5510 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5511 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5512 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5513 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5514 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5515 let mut channel_update = None;
5516 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5517 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5518 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5521 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5522 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5523 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5524 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5525 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5526 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5527 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5532 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5533 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5534 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5535 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5536 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5537 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5545 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5546 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5549 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5550 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5555 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5556 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5557 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5559 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5560 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5561 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5562 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5563 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5564 match monitor_event {
5565 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5566 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5568 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5570 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5571 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5572 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5573 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5576 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5577 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5578 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5579 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5581 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5582 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5583 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5584 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5587 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5589 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5592 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5593 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5594 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5595 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5596 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5597 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5601 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5602 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5604 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5606 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5607 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5608 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5609 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5610 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5617 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5618 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5624 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5625 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5628 has_pending_monitor_events
5631 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5632 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5633 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5635 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5637 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5640 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5641 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5642 /// update was applied.
5643 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5644 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5645 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5646 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5648 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5649 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5650 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5651 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5653 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5654 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5656 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5657 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5658 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5659 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5660 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5661 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5662 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5663 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5664 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5666 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5667 has_monitor_update = true;
5669 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5670 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5671 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5672 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5673 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5674 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5675 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5677 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5679 continue 'peer_loop;
5688 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5689 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5690 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5693 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5694 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5700 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5701 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5702 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5703 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5704 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5705 let mut has_update = false;
5707 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5709 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5710 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5711 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5712 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5713 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5714 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5715 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5716 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5718 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5719 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5722 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5723 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5724 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5725 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5726 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5731 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5733 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5734 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5735 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5741 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5742 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5750 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5751 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5757 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5758 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5760 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5761 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5762 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5763 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5764 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5765 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5766 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5767 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5768 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5769 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5770 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5771 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5772 assert!(should_broadcast);
5773 } else { unreachable!(); }
5774 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5775 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5776 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
5779 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5783 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5784 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5786 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5787 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5790 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5792 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5793 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5794 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5796 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5797 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5798 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5799 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5800 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5801 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5802 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5803 // never fail a payment too early.
5804 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5806 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5814 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5817 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5818 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5820 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5821 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5822 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5823 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5825 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5827 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5828 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5832 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5833 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5835 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5837 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5838 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5840 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5841 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5842 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5843 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5844 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5845 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5846 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5847 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5848 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5849 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5850 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5853 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5854 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5856 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5859 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5861 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5863 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5864 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5865 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5866 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5867 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5870 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5871 /// stored external to LDK.
5873 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5874 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5875 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5877 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5878 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5881 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5882 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5883 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5884 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5886 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5887 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5888 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5889 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5890 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5892 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5893 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5894 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5895 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5896 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5898 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5899 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5901 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5902 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5906 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5907 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5909 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5911 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5912 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5914 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5915 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5916 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5917 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5918 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5919 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5920 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5923 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5924 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5926 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5929 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5931 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5933 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5934 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5937 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5938 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5940 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5941 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5942 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5945 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5946 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5948 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5949 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5950 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5951 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5953 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5954 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5955 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5956 Some(_) => continue,
5957 None => return scid_candidate
5962 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5964 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5965 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5967 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5968 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5969 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5973 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5974 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5975 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5977 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5978 /// times to get a unique scid.
5979 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5980 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5981 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5983 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5984 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5985 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5986 return scid_candidate
5990 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5991 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5992 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5993 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5995 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5996 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5997 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5998 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5999 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6000 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6001 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6002 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6011 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6012 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6013 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6014 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6015 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6019 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6020 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6021 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6022 events.push_back((event, None));
6026 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6027 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6028 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6032 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6033 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6037 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6038 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6041 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
6042 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6044 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6045 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6046 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6048 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
6049 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6050 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6053 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
6054 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
6055 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
6056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
6057 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6060 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6061 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6062 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6063 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6064 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6065 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6066 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6067 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6068 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6070 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6072 if further_update_exists {
6073 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6078 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6079 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6083 log_debug!(self.logger,
6084 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6085 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6089 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6090 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6091 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6095 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6096 for action in actions {
6098 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6099 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6101 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6107 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6108 /// using the given event handler.
6110 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6111 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6115 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6119 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6121 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6122 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6123 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6124 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6125 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6126 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6130 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6131 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6132 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6133 /// is always placed next to each other.
6135 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6136 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6137 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6138 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6140 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6141 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6142 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6143 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6144 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6145 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6146 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6148 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6149 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6150 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6151 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6154 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6155 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6157 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6158 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6161 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6162 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6163 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6164 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6165 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6166 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6167 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6171 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6172 events.replace(pending_events);
6181 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6183 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6185 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6186 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6187 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6188 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6192 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6194 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6195 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6196 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6198 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6202 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6204 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6205 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6206 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6207 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6208 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6209 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6213 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6215 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6216 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6217 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6218 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6219 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6222 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6223 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6226 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6228 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6229 let new_height = height - 1;
6231 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6232 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6233 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6234 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6235 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6236 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6239 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6243 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6245 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6246 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6247 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6248 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6249 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6250 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6254 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6255 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6256 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6257 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6259 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6260 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6263 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6264 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6265 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6267 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6268 if height < last_best_block_height {
6269 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6270 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6274 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6275 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6276 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6277 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6279 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6280 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6282 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6283 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6284 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6286 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6288 macro_rules! max_time {
6289 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6291 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6292 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6293 // having an explicit local time source.
6294 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6295 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6296 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6297 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6298 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6304 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6305 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6306 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6307 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6311 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6312 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6313 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6316 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6317 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6318 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6325 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6327 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6328 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6329 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6330 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6331 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6332 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6333 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6338 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6340 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6341 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6342 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6343 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6344 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6345 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6349 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6350 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6352 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6353 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6354 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6355 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6356 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6358 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6359 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6361 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6362 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6365 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6366 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6367 let res = f(channel);
6368 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6369 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6370 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6371 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6372 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6374 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6375 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6376 if channel.is_usable() {
6377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6378 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6380 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6390 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6391 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6394 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6396 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6397 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6398 msg: announcement_sigs,
6400 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6401 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6402 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6404 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6405 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6406 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6411 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6412 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6413 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6414 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6415 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6416 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6417 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6418 // is always consistent.
6419 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6420 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6421 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6422 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6423 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6426 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6427 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6428 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6429 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6430 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6431 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6432 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6436 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6437 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6438 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6439 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6440 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6441 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6442 data: reason_message,
6452 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6453 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6454 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6455 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6456 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6457 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6458 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6459 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6460 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6461 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6463 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6464 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6465 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6469 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6472 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6473 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6474 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6475 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6476 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6477 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6478 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6479 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6480 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6483 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6484 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6485 _ => unreachable!(),
6487 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6488 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6489 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6496 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6498 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6499 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6503 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6505 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6506 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6508 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6509 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6512 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6513 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6514 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6517 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6518 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6519 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6520 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6523 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6524 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6525 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6526 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6529 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6530 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6532 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6533 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6534 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6535 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6536 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6539 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6540 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6541 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6542 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6545 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6546 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6547 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6548 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6551 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6552 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6553 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6554 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6558 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6559 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6561 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6562 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6563 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6564 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6565 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6566 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6570 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6571 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6572 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6575 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6576 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6577 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6578 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6581 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6583 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6586 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6587 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6588 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6589 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6592 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6594 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6597 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6599 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6602 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6604 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6607 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6609 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6612 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6614 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6617 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6619 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6622 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6623 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6624 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6627 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6629 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6632 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6634 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6637 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6639 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6642 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6644 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6647 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6649 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6652 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6653 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6654 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6657 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6658 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6659 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6660 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6661 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6663 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6668 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6669 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6670 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6673 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6675 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6676 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6678 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6679 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6680 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6681 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6682 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6683 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6684 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6685 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6686 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6687 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6688 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6693 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6695 // V1 Channel Establishment
6696 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6697 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6698 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6699 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6700 // V2 Channel Establishment
6701 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6702 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6703 // Common Channel Establishment
6704 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6705 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6706 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6707 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6708 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6709 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6710 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6711 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6712 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6713 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6714 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6715 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6716 // Channel Operations
6717 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6718 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6719 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6720 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6721 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6722 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6724 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6725 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6726 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6727 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6728 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6729 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6730 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6731 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6732 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6735 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6736 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6737 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6738 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6741 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6743 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6745 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6746 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6750 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6751 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6752 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6756 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6758 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6759 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6760 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6761 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6762 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6763 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6766 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6767 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6768 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6769 if inbound_peer_limited {
6772 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6773 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6774 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6775 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6776 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6781 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6782 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6784 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6785 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6786 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6787 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6792 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6793 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6798 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6801 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6804 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6805 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6806 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6807 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6808 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6809 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6810 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6814 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6815 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6816 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6821 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6822 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6823 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6824 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6825 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6834 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6838 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6841 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6842 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6844 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6845 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6846 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6848 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6850 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6851 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6852 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6856 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6858 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6859 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6860 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6861 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6862 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6863 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6864 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6865 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6873 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6874 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6878 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6879 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6882 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6883 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6886 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6887 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6888 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6889 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6892 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6893 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6894 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6895 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6898 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6899 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6900 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6901 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6904 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6905 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6906 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6907 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6910 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
6911 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6912 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6913 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6916 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
6917 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6918 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6919 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6922 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
6923 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6924 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6925 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6928 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
6929 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6930 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6931 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6934 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
6935 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6936 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6937 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6941 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6942 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6943 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6944 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6947 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6948 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6950 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6951 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6952 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6953 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6954 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6957 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6958 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6959 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6960 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6963 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6964 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6965 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6966 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6969 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6970 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6971 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6972 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6973 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6974 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6975 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6976 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6977 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6978 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6979 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6980 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6981 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6982 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6983 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6984 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6985 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6986 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6988 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6989 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6990 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6996 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6997 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6999 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7000 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7001 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7002 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7005 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7006 (2, node_id, required),
7007 (4, features, required),
7008 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7009 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7010 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7011 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7014 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7015 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7016 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7017 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7018 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7019 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7020 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7021 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7022 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7023 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7024 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7025 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7026 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7027 (7, self.config, option),
7028 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7029 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7030 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7031 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7032 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7033 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7034 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7035 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7036 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7037 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7038 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7039 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7040 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7041 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7042 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7043 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7044 (32, self.is_public, required),
7045 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7046 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7047 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7048 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7054 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7055 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7056 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7057 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7058 (2, channel_id, required),
7059 (3, channel_type, option),
7060 (4, counterparty, required),
7061 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7062 (6, funding_txo, option),
7063 (7, config, option),
7064 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7065 (9, confirmations, option),
7066 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7067 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7068 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7069 (16, balance_msat, required),
7070 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7071 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7072 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7073 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7074 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7075 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7076 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7077 (26, is_outbound, required),
7078 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7079 (30, is_usable, required),
7080 (32, is_public, required),
7081 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7082 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7083 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7084 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7087 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7088 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7089 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7090 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7091 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7095 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7097 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7098 outbound_scid_alias,
7102 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7103 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7105 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7106 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7107 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7108 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7109 confirmations_required,
7111 force_close_spend_delay,
7112 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7113 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7114 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7115 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7116 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7117 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7118 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7123 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7124 (2, channels, vec_type),
7125 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7126 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7129 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7131 (0, onion_packet, required),
7132 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7135 (0, payment_data, required),
7136 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7137 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7138 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7140 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7141 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7142 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7143 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7147 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7148 (0, routing, required),
7149 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7150 (4, payment_hash, required),
7151 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7152 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7153 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7157 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7158 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7160 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7162 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7163 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7164 reason.write(writer)?;
7166 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7167 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7170 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7171 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7172 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7173 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7180 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7181 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7182 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7186 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7187 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7188 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7192 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7193 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7194 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7195 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7196 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7199 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7200 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7201 // messages contained in the variants.
7202 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7203 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7204 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7206 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7207 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7208 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7209 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7210 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7213 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7214 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7215 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7216 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7217 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7219 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7224 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7229 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7230 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7231 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7232 (2, outpoint, required),
7233 (4, htlc_id, required),
7234 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7237 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7238 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7239 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7240 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7241 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7243 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7244 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7245 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7246 (2, self.value, required),
7247 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7248 (4, payment_data, option),
7249 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7250 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7251 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7257 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7258 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7259 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7261 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7262 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7263 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7264 let mut total_value_received = None;
7265 let mut total_msat = None;
7266 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7267 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7268 (0, prev_hop, required),
7269 (1, total_msat, option),
7270 (2, value, required),
7271 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7272 (4, payment_data, option),
7273 (5, total_value_received, option),
7274 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7275 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7277 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7279 if payment_data.is_some() {
7280 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7282 if total_msat.is_none() {
7283 total_msat = Some(value);
7285 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7288 if total_msat.is_none() {
7289 if payment_data.is_none() {
7290 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7292 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7294 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7298 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7301 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7302 total_value_received,
7303 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7310 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7311 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7312 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7316 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7317 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7318 let mut payment_id = None;
7319 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7320 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7321 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7322 (0, session_priv, required),
7323 (1, payment_id, option),
7324 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7325 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7326 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7327 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7329 if payment_id.is_none() {
7330 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7332 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7334 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7335 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7336 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7338 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7339 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7340 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7341 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7345 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7346 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7347 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7349 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7352 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7353 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7358 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7359 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7361 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7363 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7364 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7365 (0, session_priv, required),
7366 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7367 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7368 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7369 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7370 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7371 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7374 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7376 field.write(writer)?;
7383 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7384 (0, forward_info, required),
7385 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7386 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7387 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7388 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7391 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7393 (0, htlc_id, required),
7394 (2, err_packet, required),
7399 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7400 (0, payment_secret, required),
7401 (2, expiry_time, required),
7402 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7403 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7404 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7407 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7409 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7410 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7411 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7412 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7413 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7414 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7418 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7419 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7421 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7423 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7425 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7426 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7427 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7430 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7433 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7434 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7435 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7436 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7437 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7438 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7439 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7441 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7442 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7443 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7444 unfunded_channels += 1;
7449 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7451 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7453 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7454 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7455 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7456 channel.write(writer)?;
7463 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7464 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7465 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7466 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7467 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7468 for forward in pending_forwards {
7469 forward.write(writer)?;
7474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7476 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7477 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7478 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7480 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7481 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7482 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7483 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7484 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7485 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7486 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7487 htlc.write(writer)?;
7489 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7490 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7493 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7494 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7495 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7496 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7497 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7498 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7499 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7502 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7503 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7504 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7505 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7506 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7508 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7509 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7510 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7511 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7512 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7513 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7514 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7519 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7520 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7521 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7522 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7523 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7524 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7525 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7526 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7527 0u64.write(writer)?;
7529 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7530 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7531 event.write(writer)?;
7535 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7536 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7537 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7538 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7539 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7540 0u64.write(writer)?;
7542 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7543 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7544 // likely to be identical.
7545 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7546 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7548 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7549 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7550 hash.write(writer)?;
7551 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7554 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7555 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7556 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7557 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7558 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7561 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7562 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7564 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7565 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7566 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7567 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7575 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7576 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7577 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7579 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7580 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7581 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7587 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7588 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7589 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7590 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7593 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7594 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7595 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7596 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7597 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7600 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7601 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7602 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7603 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7604 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7605 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7606 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7607 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7608 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7609 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7610 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7611 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7618 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7619 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7620 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7621 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7624 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7625 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7626 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7627 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7628 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7629 // check that the event is sane here.
7630 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7631 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7632 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7633 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7639 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7640 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7641 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7642 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7643 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7644 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7647 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7648 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7649 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7650 events.push_back((ev, action));
7651 } else if action.is_some() {
7652 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7659 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7661 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7663 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7664 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7665 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7666 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7667 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7668 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7669 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7670 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7671 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7672 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7673 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7674 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7675 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7677 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7678 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7680 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7681 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7683 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7684 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7685 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7686 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7687 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7688 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7690 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7691 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7693 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7695 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7696 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7697 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7698 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7702 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7703 pub entropy_source: ES,
7705 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7706 pub node_signer: NS,
7708 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7709 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7711 pub signer_provider: SP,
7713 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7715 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7716 pub fee_estimator: F,
7717 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7719 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7720 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7721 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7722 pub chain_monitor: M,
7724 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7725 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7726 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7727 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7728 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7729 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7731 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7733 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7734 /// deserialization.
7736 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7737 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7738 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7740 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7741 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7743 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7744 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7745 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7746 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7748 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7751 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7752 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7755 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7756 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7758 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7759 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7760 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7761 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7762 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7763 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7767 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7768 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7769 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7770 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7771 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7773 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7774 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7779 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7780 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7781 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7782 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7784 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7785 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7786 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7787 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7788 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7789 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7793 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7794 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7795 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7799 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7800 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7802 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7803 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7804 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7805 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7806 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7807 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7811 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7812 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7814 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7815 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7816 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7818 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7820 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7821 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7822 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7823 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7824 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7825 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7826 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7827 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7828 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7829 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7831 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7832 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7833 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7834 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7835 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7836 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7837 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7838 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7839 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7840 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7841 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7842 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7843 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7844 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7845 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7846 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7847 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7848 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7849 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7850 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7851 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7852 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7853 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7854 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
7855 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7856 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7859 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7860 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7861 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7862 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7863 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7865 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7866 let mut found_htlc = false;
7867 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7868 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7871 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7872 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7873 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7874 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7875 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7876 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7877 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7878 log_info!(args.logger,
7879 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7880 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7881 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7885 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7886 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7887 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7889 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7890 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7892 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7894 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7895 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7898 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7899 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7900 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7904 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7905 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7906 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7907 // safely discard the channel.
7908 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7909 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7910 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7911 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7912 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7915 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7916 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7917 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7918 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7919 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7920 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7924 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7925 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7926 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
7927 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7928 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7929 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7930 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7932 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7936 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7937 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7938 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7939 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7940 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7941 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7942 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7943 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7944 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7946 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7949 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7950 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7951 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7952 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7953 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7955 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7956 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7958 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7961 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7962 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7963 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7964 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7965 let peer_state = PeerState {
7966 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7967 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7968 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7969 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7970 is_connected: false,
7972 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7975 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7976 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7977 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7978 for _ in 0..event_count {
7979 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7980 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7985 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7986 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7987 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7989 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
7990 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
7991 // on-startup monitor updates.
7992 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
7993 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
7995 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7999 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8000 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8002 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8003 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8004 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8005 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8006 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8010 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8011 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8012 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8013 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8014 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8015 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8016 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8018 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8019 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8023 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8024 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8025 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8026 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8027 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8028 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8029 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8030 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8031 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8032 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8033 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
8034 let mut events_override = None;
8035 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8036 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8037 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8038 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8039 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8040 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8041 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8042 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8043 (8, events_override, option),
8044 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8045 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8046 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8048 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8049 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8052 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8053 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8056 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8057 pending_events_read = events;
8060 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8061 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8064 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8065 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8066 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8067 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8068 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8069 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8071 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8073 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8074 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8075 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8079 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8080 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8081 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8082 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8083 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8084 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8085 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8087 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8088 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8089 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8090 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8091 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8092 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8093 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8096 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8097 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8098 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8099 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8100 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8101 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8102 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8103 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8105 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8106 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8107 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8108 retry_strategy: None,
8109 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8110 payment_params: None,
8111 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8112 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8113 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8114 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8115 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8116 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8117 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8118 total_msat: path_amt,
8119 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8121 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8122 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8127 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8129 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8130 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8131 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8132 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8134 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8135 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8136 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8137 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8138 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8139 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8140 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8141 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8142 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8143 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8144 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8149 !forwards.is_empty()
8151 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8152 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8153 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8154 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8155 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8156 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8157 intercepted_id != ev_id
8164 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8165 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8166 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8167 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8168 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8169 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8170 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8171 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8172 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8173 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8174 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8175 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8176 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8185 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8186 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8187 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8188 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8189 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8190 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8191 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8192 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8196 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8197 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8199 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8200 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8201 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8202 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8204 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8205 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8206 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8208 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8209 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8211 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8212 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8214 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8217 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8218 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8219 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8221 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8225 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8226 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8227 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8228 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8229 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8231 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8232 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8233 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8234 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8235 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8236 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8237 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8238 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8240 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8241 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8245 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8247 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8249 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8250 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8252 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8253 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8258 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8259 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8261 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8263 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8265 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8266 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8267 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8268 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8272 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8273 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8276 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8277 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8278 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8280 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8281 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8282 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8284 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8285 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8286 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8287 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8288 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8289 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8291 if chan.is_usable() {
8292 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8293 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8294 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8295 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8296 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8302 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8304 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8305 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8306 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8307 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8308 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8309 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8310 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8311 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8312 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8313 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8314 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8316 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8317 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8319 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8320 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8321 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8322 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8324 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8325 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8326 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8327 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8329 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8330 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8331 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8332 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8334 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8335 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8336 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8339 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8340 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8343 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8344 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8347 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8350 purpose: payment.purpose,
8351 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8357 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8358 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8359 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8361 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8366 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8368 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8369 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8370 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8371 router: args.router,
8373 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8375 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8376 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8377 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8378 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8380 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8381 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8382 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8383 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8384 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8385 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8387 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8392 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8394 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8396 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8397 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8398 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8399 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8400 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8401 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8402 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8404 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8405 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8406 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8408 logger: args.logger,
8409 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8412 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8413 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8414 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8415 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8416 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8419 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8420 //connection or two.
8422 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8428 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8429 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8430 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8431 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8432 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8433 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8434 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8435 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8436 use crate::ln::msgs;
8437 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8438 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8439 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8440 use crate::util::test_utils;
8441 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8442 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8445 fn test_notify_limits() {
8446 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8447 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8451 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8453 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8454 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8455 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8456 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8457 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8459 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8461 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8462 // to connect messages with new values
8463 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8464 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8465 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8466 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8467 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8468 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8470 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8471 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8473 // ... but the last node should not.
8474 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8475 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8476 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8477 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8479 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8480 // about the channel.
8481 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8482 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8483 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8485 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8487 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8488 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8489 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8490 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8491 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8492 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8494 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8495 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8496 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8498 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8499 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8500 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8501 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8502 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8503 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8505 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8506 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8507 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8508 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8509 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8510 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8511 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8512 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8514 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8515 // the channel info has updated.
8516 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8517 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8518 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8519 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8520 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8521 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8525 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8526 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8531 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8532 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8534 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8535 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8536 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8537 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8539 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8540 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8541 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8542 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8543 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8544 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8545 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8546 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8548 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8549 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8550 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8552 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8553 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8554 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8556 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8557 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8558 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8559 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8560 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8562 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8563 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8564 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8566 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8567 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8568 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8569 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8570 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8571 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8572 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8573 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8574 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8576 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8577 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8578 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8580 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8581 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8582 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8584 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8585 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8586 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8587 // lightning messages manually.
8588 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8589 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8592 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8593 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8594 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8596 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8597 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8599 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8600 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8602 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8603 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8604 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8606 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8607 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8608 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8610 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8612 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8614 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8615 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8618 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8619 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8620 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8621 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8623 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8624 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8625 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8626 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8631 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8632 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8633 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8634 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8639 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8640 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8641 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8642 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8649 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8650 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8651 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8652 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8653 // fails as expected.
8654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8657 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8658 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8659 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8660 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8662 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8663 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8664 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8666 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8667 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8668 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8669 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8671 let route = find_route(
8672 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8673 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8675 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8676 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8678 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8679 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8680 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8681 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8682 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8684 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8685 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8686 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8687 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8688 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8690 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8691 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8692 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8693 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8694 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8695 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8696 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8697 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8698 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8700 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8701 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8703 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8704 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8705 let route = find_route(
8706 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8707 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8709 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8710 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8711 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8712 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8713 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8714 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8715 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8716 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8718 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8719 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8720 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8721 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8723 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8725 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8726 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8727 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8728 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8729 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8730 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8731 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8733 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8734 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8735 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8736 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8737 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8738 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8739 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8740 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8741 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8743 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8744 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8748 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8749 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8750 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8751 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8752 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8753 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8754 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8756 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8757 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8759 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8760 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8761 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8762 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8764 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8765 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8766 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8767 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8768 let route = find_route(
8769 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8770 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8773 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8774 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8775 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8776 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8777 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8778 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8781 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8782 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8783 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8784 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8785 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8786 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8789 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8793 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8794 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8795 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8796 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8797 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8798 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8800 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8801 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8803 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8804 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8805 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8806 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8808 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8809 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8810 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8811 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8812 let route = find_route(
8813 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8814 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8817 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8818 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8819 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8820 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8821 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8822 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8823 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8824 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8827 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8828 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8829 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8830 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8831 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8832 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8835 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8839 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8840 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8841 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8843 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8845 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8846 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8847 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8848 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8850 // Marshall an MPP route.
8851 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8852 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8853 route.paths.push(path);
8854 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8855 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8856 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8857 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8858 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8859 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8861 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8862 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8864 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8865 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8867 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8872 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8873 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8874 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8875 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8876 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8878 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8880 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8881 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8883 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8884 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8886 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8889 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8890 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8891 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8892 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8893 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8894 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8897 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8900 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8901 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8906 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8907 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8908 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8909 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8910 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8911 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8913 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8914 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8916 total_msat: 100_000,
8919 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8920 // payment verification fails as expected.
8921 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8922 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8923 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8924 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8926 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8930 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8931 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8935 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8936 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8937 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8938 // the channel is successfully closed.
8939 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8940 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8941 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8942 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8944 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8945 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8946 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8947 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8948 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8950 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8951 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8953 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8954 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8955 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8956 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8959 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8961 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8962 // as it has the funding transaction.
8963 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8964 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8965 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8968 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8970 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8972 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8974 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8975 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8976 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8978 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8981 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8982 // as it has the funding transaction.
8983 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8984 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8985 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8988 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8989 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8991 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8992 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8993 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8994 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8996 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8997 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8998 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8999 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9001 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9002 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9004 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9005 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9006 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9007 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9008 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9009 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9010 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9014 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9015 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9016 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9017 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9018 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9019 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9020 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9023 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9025 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9026 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9027 // closing transaction).
9028 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9029 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9030 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9032 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9033 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9034 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9035 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9036 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9039 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9041 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9043 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9044 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9045 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9047 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9049 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9050 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9053 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9054 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9055 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9058 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9059 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9060 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9063 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9065 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9066 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9068 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9069 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9071 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9072 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9077 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9078 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9079 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9080 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9081 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9082 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9083 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9084 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9087 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9088 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9089 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9091 // Test the API functions.
9092 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9094 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9096 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9098 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9100 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9102 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9104 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9108 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9109 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9110 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9111 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9112 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9113 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9115 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9117 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9118 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9120 let mut funding_tx = None;
9121 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9122 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9123 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9126 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9127 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9128 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9129 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9130 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9132 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9134 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9136 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9138 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9140 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9142 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9145 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9146 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9147 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9148 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9149 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9151 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9152 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9154 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9155 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9156 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9157 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9158 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9159 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9160 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9162 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9163 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9164 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9165 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9167 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9168 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9169 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9170 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9171 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9172 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9173 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9175 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9176 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9177 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9178 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9180 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9181 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9182 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9183 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9185 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9186 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9188 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9189 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9190 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9191 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9192 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9194 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9195 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9196 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9198 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9199 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9200 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9202 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9203 // "protected" and can connect again.
9204 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9205 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9206 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9207 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9209 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9211 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9212 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9216 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9217 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9218 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9219 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9220 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9221 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9223 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9225 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9226 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9228 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9229 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9230 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9231 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9234 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9236 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9237 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9238 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9240 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9241 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9242 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9244 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9245 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9246 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9247 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9251 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9252 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9253 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9256 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9257 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9258 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9259 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9261 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9263 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9264 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9266 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9267 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9268 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9269 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9270 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9271 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9273 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9274 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9276 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9277 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9281 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9282 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9285 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9286 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9287 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9288 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9289 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9290 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9291 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9293 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9294 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9295 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9296 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9300 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9302 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9303 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9305 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9306 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9307 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9309 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9310 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9314 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9319 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9320 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9321 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9322 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9325 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9326 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9327 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9331 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9332 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9333 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9335 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9336 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9338 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9339 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9344 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9345 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9347 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9348 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9350 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9354 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9356 use crate::chain::Listen;
9357 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9358 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9359 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9360 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9361 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9362 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9363 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9364 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9365 use crate::util::test_utils;
9366 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9368 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9369 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9370 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9372 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9376 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9377 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9378 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9379 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9380 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9381 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9382 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9384 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9385 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9387 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9388 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9390 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9392 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9397 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9398 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9401 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9402 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9403 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9405 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9407 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9408 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9409 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9410 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9411 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9413 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9414 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9416 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9417 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9418 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9419 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9421 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9423 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9425 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9426 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9427 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9428 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9429 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9431 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9433 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9435 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9436 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9437 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9438 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9439 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9442 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9443 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9444 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9446 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9447 } else { panic!(); }
9449 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9450 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9451 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9453 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9454 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9456 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9459 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9460 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9461 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9463 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9464 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9469 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9472 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9475 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9476 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9478 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9479 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9480 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9481 match msg_events[0] {
9482 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9483 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9484 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9488 match msg_events[1] {
9489 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9493 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9494 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9496 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9497 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9502 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9503 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9505 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9506 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9508 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9511 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9512 macro_rules! send_payment {
9513 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9514 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9515 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9516 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9517 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9519 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9520 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9522 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9523 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9524 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9525 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9526 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9527 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9528 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9529 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9530 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9531 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9532 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9534 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9535 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9536 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9537 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9539 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9540 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9541 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9542 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9543 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9545 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9548 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9549 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9550 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9551 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9553 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9558 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9559 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);