1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use util::crypto::sign;
75 use alloc::string::ToString;
76 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
77 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
78 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
79 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
80 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
81 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
82 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
84 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
85 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
86 use util::crypto::hkdf_extract_expand_thrice;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 let (metadata_key, ldk_pmt_hash_key, user_pmt_hash_key) =
119 hkdf_extract_expand_thrice(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material.0);
134 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
136 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
137 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
138 unknown => Err(unknown),
143 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
144 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
146 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
148 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
149 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
150 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
152 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
153 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
154 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
155 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
157 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
158 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
159 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
162 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
163 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
165 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
166 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
167 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
168 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
170 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
171 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
173 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
176 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
177 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
181 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
182 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
183 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
185 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
187 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
188 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
189 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
190 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
191 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
192 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
194 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
195 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
196 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
201 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
202 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
203 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
204 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
206 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
207 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
208 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
210 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
213 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
215 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
216 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
219 /// The metadata is constructed as:
220 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
221 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
223 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
224 /// match what was constructed.
226 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
227 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
228 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
229 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
231 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
232 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
233 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
236 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
237 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
238 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
240 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
242 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
243 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
244 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
245 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
246 where L::Target: Logger
248 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
250 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
251 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
252 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
253 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
254 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
255 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
256 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
258 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
260 let mut payment_preimage = None;
261 match payment_type_res {
262 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
263 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
264 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
265 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
266 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
267 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
271 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
272 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
273 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
274 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
280 Err(unknown_bits) => {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
286 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
287 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
291 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
292 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
299 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
300 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
302 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
303 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
304 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
305 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
306 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
309 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
310 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
312 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
316 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
317 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
318 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
319 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
321 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
322 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
323 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
324 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
327 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
330 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
332 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
333 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
334 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
335 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
336 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
337 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
338 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
340 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
344 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
346 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
347 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
348 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
350 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
351 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
352 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
353 // before we forward it.
355 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
356 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
357 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
358 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
359 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
361 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
362 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
364 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
365 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
368 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
369 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
370 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
373 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
374 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
378 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
379 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
380 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
381 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
382 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
383 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
384 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
387 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
388 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
389 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
390 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
393 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
394 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
395 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
396 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
397 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
400 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
402 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
404 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
405 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
406 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
408 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
410 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
414 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
418 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
419 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
420 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
421 short_channel_id: u64,
423 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
424 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
426 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
427 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
432 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
433 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
434 /// are part of the same payment.
435 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
436 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
437 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
440 struct ClaimableHTLC {
441 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
444 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
448 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
449 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
450 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
451 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
453 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
454 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
459 impl Readable for PaymentId {
460 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
461 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
465 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
466 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
467 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
468 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
469 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
472 session_priv: SecretKey,
473 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
474 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
475 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
476 payment_id: PaymentId,
477 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
478 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
481 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
482 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
483 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
485 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
487 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
489 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
492 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
493 payment_id.hash(hasher);
494 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
495 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
496 payment_params.hash(hasher);
501 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
504 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
505 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
507 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
508 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
509 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
510 payment_secret: None,
511 payment_params: None,
516 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
517 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
519 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
527 struct ReceiveError {
533 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
534 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
536 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
541 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
543 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
544 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
545 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
546 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
547 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
549 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
550 err: msgs::LightningError,
551 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
552 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
554 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
556 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
558 err: LightningError {
560 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
561 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
568 shutdown_finish: None,
572 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
574 err: LightningError {
576 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
579 shutdown_finish: None,
583 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
584 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
587 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
589 err: LightningError {
591 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
592 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
598 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
599 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
603 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
606 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
608 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
609 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
613 log_level: Level::Warn,
616 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
618 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
620 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
622 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
623 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
629 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
631 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
632 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
640 shutdown_finish: None,
645 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
646 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
647 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
648 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
649 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
651 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
652 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
653 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
654 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
655 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
656 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
657 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
659 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
663 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
664 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
665 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
666 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
667 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
668 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
669 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
670 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
672 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
673 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
674 /// and via the classic SCID.
676 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
677 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
678 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
679 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
680 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
681 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
682 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
684 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
685 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
686 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
687 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
690 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
691 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
692 /// quite some time lag.
693 enum BackgroundEvent {
694 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
695 /// commitment transaction.
696 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
699 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
700 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
702 latest_features: InitFeatures,
705 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
706 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
708 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
711 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
712 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
713 struct PendingInboundPayment {
714 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
715 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
716 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
717 /// this payment being removed.
719 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
720 user_payment_id: u64,
721 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
722 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
723 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
726 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
727 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
728 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
730 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
733 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
734 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
735 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
736 pending_amt_msat: u64,
737 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
738 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
739 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
741 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
742 starting_block_height: u32,
744 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
745 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
746 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
748 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
749 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
751 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
752 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
753 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
754 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
755 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
757 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
759 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
760 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
764 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
765 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
767 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
771 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
773 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
777 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
779 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
783 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
785 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
790 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
792 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
793 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
794 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
795 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
799 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
800 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
801 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
802 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
803 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
804 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
805 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
808 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
809 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
812 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
813 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
814 let our_payment_hash;
815 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
816 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
817 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
819 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
820 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
821 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
825 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
829 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
830 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
831 let remove_res = match self {
832 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
833 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
834 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
835 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
836 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
840 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
841 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
842 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
843 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
844 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
845 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
852 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
853 let insert_res = match self {
854 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
855 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
856 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
858 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
859 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
862 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
863 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
864 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
865 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
866 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
873 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
875 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
876 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
877 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
878 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
885 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
886 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
887 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
888 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
889 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
890 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
891 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
893 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
894 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
896 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
897 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
898 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
899 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
900 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
901 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
902 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
903 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
905 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
906 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
908 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
909 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
911 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
912 /// to individual Channels.
914 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
915 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
916 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
917 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
919 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
920 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
921 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
922 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
923 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
924 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
925 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
927 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
928 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
929 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
930 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
933 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
934 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
935 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
936 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
937 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
939 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
940 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
941 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
942 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
943 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
944 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
945 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
946 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
947 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
948 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
951 default_configuration: UserConfig,
952 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
958 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
960 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
961 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
963 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
964 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
965 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
966 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
968 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
969 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
970 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
971 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
972 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
973 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
975 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
976 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
977 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
978 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
979 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
980 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
981 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
982 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
984 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
986 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
987 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
989 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
990 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
991 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
992 /// active channel list on load.
993 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
995 our_network_key: SecretKey,
996 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
998 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1000 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1001 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1002 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1004 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1005 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1007 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
1008 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
1009 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
1011 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1012 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1013 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1014 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1016 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1017 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1018 /// are currently open with that peer.
1019 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1020 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1023 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1024 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1026 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1027 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1028 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1029 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1030 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1031 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1032 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1033 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1034 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1036 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1043 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1045 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1046 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1047 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1048 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1049 pub struct ChainParameters {
1050 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1051 pub network: Network,
1053 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1055 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1056 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1059 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1065 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1066 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1067 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1068 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1069 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1070 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1072 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1073 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1074 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1075 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1076 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1078 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1079 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1082 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1083 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1084 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1087 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1088 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1090 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1091 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1092 should_persist: persist_check,
1093 _read_guard: read_guard,
1098 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1099 fn drop(&mut self) {
1100 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1101 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1106 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1107 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1109 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1111 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1112 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1113 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1114 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1115 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1117 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1118 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1120 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1122 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1123 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1124 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1125 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1126 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1127 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1128 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1130 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1131 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1133 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1134 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1135 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1136 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1138 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1139 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1140 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1141 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1142 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1143 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1146 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1148 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1149 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1152 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1154 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1155 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1156 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1158 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1159 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1161 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1163 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1164 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1165 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1166 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1167 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1168 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1169 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1170 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1171 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1174 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1175 /// to better separate parameters.
1176 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1177 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1178 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1179 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1180 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1181 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1182 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1183 pub features: InitFeatures,
1184 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1185 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1186 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1188 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1190 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1191 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1192 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1193 /// payments to us through this channel.
1194 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1197 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1198 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1199 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1200 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1201 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1202 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1203 /// lifetime of the channel.
1204 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1205 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1206 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1207 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1208 /// our counterparty already.
1210 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1211 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1212 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1213 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1215 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1216 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1217 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1218 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1220 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1221 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1223 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1224 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1225 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1226 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1227 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1228 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1229 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1231 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1232 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1234 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1235 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1236 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1237 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1238 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1239 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1240 /// this value on chain.
1242 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1244 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1246 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1247 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1248 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1249 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1250 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1251 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1252 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1254 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1255 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1256 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1257 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1259 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1260 pub balance_msat: u64,
1261 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1262 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1263 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1264 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1266 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1268 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1269 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1270 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1271 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1272 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1273 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1274 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1275 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1276 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1278 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1279 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1280 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1281 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1282 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1283 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1284 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1285 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1286 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1288 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1290 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1291 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1292 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1293 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1294 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1295 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1296 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1297 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1298 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1300 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1301 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1302 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1303 pub is_outbound: bool,
1304 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1305 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1306 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1307 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1308 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1310 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1311 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1312 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1313 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1315 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1316 pub is_usable: bool,
1317 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1318 pub is_public: bool,
1321 impl ChannelDetails {
1322 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1323 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1324 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1326 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1327 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1328 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1329 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1333 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1334 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1335 /// states for more.
1336 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1337 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1338 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1339 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1340 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1341 ParameterError(APIError),
1342 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1343 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1344 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1345 /// payment in full.
1347 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1349 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1350 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1351 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1352 /// paths than the ones selected).
1353 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1354 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1355 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1356 /// in over-/re-payment.
1358 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1359 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1360 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1362 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1363 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1364 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1365 /// with the latest update_id.
1367 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1368 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1369 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1370 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1371 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1372 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1373 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1374 payment_id: PaymentId,
1378 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1380 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1382 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1383 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1384 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1385 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1387 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1388 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1389 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1392 macro_rules! handle_error {
1393 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1396 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1397 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1399 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1400 // entering the macro.
1401 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1402 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1405 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1407 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1408 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1409 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1410 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1414 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1415 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1416 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1417 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1422 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1423 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1425 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1426 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1427 action: err.action.clone()
1431 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1432 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1435 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1442 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1443 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1444 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1445 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1447 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1448 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1449 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1450 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1451 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1453 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1454 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1456 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1460 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1461 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1462 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1464 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1465 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1467 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1468 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1470 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1471 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1472 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1473 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1474 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1475 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1477 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1478 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1479 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1480 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1481 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1482 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1488 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1489 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1493 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1495 $entry.remove_entry();
1503 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1504 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1508 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1510 $entry.remove_entry();
1518 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1519 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1521 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1522 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1528 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1529 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1531 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1532 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1533 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1534 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1535 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1536 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1537 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1538 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1539 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1540 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1541 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1542 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1543 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1544 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1547 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1548 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1549 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1550 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1551 match $action_type {
1552 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1553 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1555 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1556 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1558 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1559 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1560 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1561 if !$resend_commitment {
1562 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1565 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1567 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1568 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1572 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1573 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1575 $entry.remove_entry();
1579 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1580 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1581 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1583 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1584 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1586 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1587 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1589 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1590 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1594 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1595 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1596 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1598 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1599 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1603 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1604 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1605 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1606 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1607 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1610 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1615 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1616 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1617 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1618 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1619 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1621 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1622 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1623 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1624 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1625 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1626 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1627 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1628 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1629 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1634 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1635 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1636 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1637 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1638 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1640 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1641 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1642 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1644 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1645 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1646 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1647 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1650 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1651 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1652 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1653 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1654 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1655 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1656 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1657 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1658 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1659 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1660 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1661 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1664 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1665 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1666 // before it should be allowed to.
1667 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1668 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1670 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1671 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1672 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1677 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1678 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1679 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1680 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1681 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1682 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1683 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1684 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1685 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1686 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1687 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1688 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1689 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1690 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1691 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1692 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1693 let mut order = $order;
1695 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1697 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1701 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1702 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1703 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1704 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1709 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1710 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1711 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1712 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1713 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1718 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1722 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1727 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1728 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1729 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1734 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1735 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1736 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1737 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1738 assert!(res.is_ok());
1741 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1745 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1746 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1747 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1749 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1751 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1752 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1757 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1758 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1759 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1760 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1761 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1764 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1766 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1767 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1769 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1771 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1773 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1774 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1775 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1776 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1777 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1778 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1779 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1780 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1782 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1783 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1784 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1788 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1790 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1791 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1792 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1793 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1794 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1795 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1797 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1798 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1799 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1801 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1802 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1805 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1806 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1808 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1809 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1811 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1813 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1814 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1815 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1816 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1824 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1825 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1826 &self.default_configuration
1829 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1830 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1831 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1834 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1835 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1837 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1839 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1843 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1848 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1850 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1851 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1852 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1853 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1854 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1857 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1858 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1860 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1861 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1862 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1864 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1865 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1866 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1867 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1868 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1869 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1871 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1872 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1873 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1874 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1875 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1876 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1880 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1881 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1882 Some(peer_state) => {
1883 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1884 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1885 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1886 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1887 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1888 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1889 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1893 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1898 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1901 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1904 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1905 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1907 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1908 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1909 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1912 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1914 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1917 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1920 node_id: their_network_key,
1923 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1926 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1927 let mut res = Vec::new();
1929 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1930 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1931 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1932 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1933 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1934 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1935 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1936 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1937 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1938 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1939 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1940 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1941 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1942 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1944 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1945 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1946 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1947 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1948 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1949 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1950 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1951 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1953 inbound_capacity_msat,
1954 outbound_capacity_msat,
1955 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1956 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1957 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1958 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1959 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1960 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1961 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1965 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1966 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1967 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1968 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1974 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1975 /// more information.
1976 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1977 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1980 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1981 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1983 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1984 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1986 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1987 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1988 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1989 // really wanted anyway.
1990 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1993 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1994 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1995 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1996 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1997 Some(transaction) => {
1998 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
2002 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2003 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2004 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2005 reason: closure_reason
2009 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2010 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2012 let counterparty_node_id;
2013 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2014 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2015 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2017 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2019 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2020 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2021 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2022 Some(peer_state) => {
2023 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
2024 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2025 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
2027 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
2029 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2031 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2032 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
2033 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2034 let (result, is_permanent) =
2035 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
2037 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2044 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2048 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2049 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
2050 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2051 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2055 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
2063 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2064 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2067 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
2071 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2072 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2073 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2075 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2076 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2078 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2079 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2080 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2081 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2083 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2085 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2086 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2087 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2088 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2089 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
2092 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2093 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2094 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2096 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2097 /// the channel being closed or not:
2098 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2099 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2100 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2101 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2102 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2103 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2104 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2106 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
2108 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2109 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2110 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2111 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2112 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2116 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2117 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2118 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2119 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2120 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2122 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2123 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2124 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2125 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2126 // ignore the result here.
2127 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2131 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2132 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2133 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2135 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2136 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2137 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2138 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2139 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2140 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2143 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2144 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2145 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2148 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2150 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
2152 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2155 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2156 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2157 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2158 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2159 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2164 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2167 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2168 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2169 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2171 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2172 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2173 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2174 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2175 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2176 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2177 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2187 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2188 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2189 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2190 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2191 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2195 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2196 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2198 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2199 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2200 return Err(ReceiveError {
2201 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2203 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2206 // final_expiry_too_soon
2207 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2208 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2209 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2210 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2211 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2212 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2213 return Err(ReceiveError {
2215 err_data: Vec::new(),
2216 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2219 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2220 return Err(ReceiveError {
2222 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2223 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2227 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2228 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2229 return Err(ReceiveError {
2230 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2231 err_data: Vec::new(),
2232 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2235 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2236 return Err(ReceiveError {
2237 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2238 err_data: Vec::new(),
2239 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2242 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2243 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2244 return Err(ReceiveError {
2245 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2246 err_data: Vec::new(),
2247 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2249 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2250 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2252 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2253 phantom_shared_secret,
2255 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2256 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2257 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2258 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2259 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2260 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2261 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2262 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2263 return Err(ReceiveError {
2264 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2265 err_data: Vec::new(),
2266 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2270 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2272 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2275 return Err(ReceiveError {
2276 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2277 err_data: Vec::new(),
2278 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2283 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2286 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2287 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2288 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2292 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2293 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2294 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2296 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2297 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2298 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2299 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2300 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2301 failure_code: $err_code,
2302 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2307 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2308 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2311 let shared_secret = {
2312 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2313 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2317 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2318 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2319 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2320 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2321 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2322 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2323 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2324 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2327 let mut channel_state = None;
2328 macro_rules! return_err {
2329 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2331 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2332 if channel_state.is_none() {
2333 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2335 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2336 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2337 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2338 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2339 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2344 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2346 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2347 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2349 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2350 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2354 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2355 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2357 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2359 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2360 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2361 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2362 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2363 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2365 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2368 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2369 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2371 let blinding_factor = {
2372 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2373 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2374 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2375 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2378 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2380 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2382 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2385 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2386 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2389 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2390 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2391 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2392 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2393 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2397 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2398 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2399 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2402 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2403 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2404 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2405 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2410 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2411 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2412 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2413 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2414 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2415 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2416 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2417 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2418 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2419 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2420 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2422 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2425 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2428 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2430 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2431 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2432 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2433 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2434 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2435 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2436 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2438 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2439 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2440 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2441 // we don't have the channel here.
2442 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2444 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2446 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2447 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2448 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2449 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2450 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2451 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2452 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2454 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2455 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2457 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2458 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2459 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2460 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2461 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2463 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2464 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2466 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2467 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2469 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2470 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2471 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2472 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2473 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2474 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2476 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2477 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2479 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2480 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2481 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2482 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2483 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2484 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2485 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2486 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2487 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2488 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2494 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
2495 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2496 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2497 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2499 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2500 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2502 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2503 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2504 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2506 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2507 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2509 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2514 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2517 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2518 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2519 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2521 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2522 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2523 if !chan.should_announce() {
2524 return Err(LightningError {
2525 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2526 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2529 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2530 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2533 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2534 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2535 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2536 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2537 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2538 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2540 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2541 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2545 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2547 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2548 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2549 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2551 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2552 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2554 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2555 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2556 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2557 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2558 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2559 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2560 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2561 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2564 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2565 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2567 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2573 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2574 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2575 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2576 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2577 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2578 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2580 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2581 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2582 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2583 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2584 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2586 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2590 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2591 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2593 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2594 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2595 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2596 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2597 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2598 err: "Payment already completed"
2603 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2604 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2605 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2608 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2610 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2611 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2612 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2613 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2614 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2615 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2616 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2617 total_msat: total_value,
2619 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2623 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2624 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2626 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2627 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2629 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2630 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2632 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2633 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2635 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2636 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2638 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2639 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2640 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2641 channel_state, chan)
2643 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2644 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2645 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2646 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2647 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2648 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2649 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2650 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2651 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2652 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2654 insert_outbound_payment!();
2656 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2657 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2658 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2659 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2660 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2661 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2662 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2663 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2669 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2671 } else { unreachable!(); }
2675 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2676 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2678 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2683 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2685 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2686 /// fields for more info.
2688 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2689 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2690 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2691 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2692 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2693 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2695 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2697 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2698 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2699 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2701 /// In general, a path may raise:
2702 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2703 /// node public key) is specified.
2704 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2705 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2707 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2708 /// relevant updates.
2710 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2711 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2712 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2714 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2715 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2716 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2717 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2719 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2720 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2721 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2722 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2723 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2726 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2727 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2728 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2730 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2731 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2732 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2733 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2734 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2736 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2737 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2739 let mut total_value = 0;
2740 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2741 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2742 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2743 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2744 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2745 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2746 continue 'path_check;
2748 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2749 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2750 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2751 continue 'path_check;
2754 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2755 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2757 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2758 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2760 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2761 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2762 total_value = amt_msat;
2765 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2766 let mut results = Vec::new();
2767 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2768 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2770 let mut has_ok = false;
2771 let mut has_err = false;
2772 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2773 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2774 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2775 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2776 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2777 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2778 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2782 } else if res.is_err() {
2783 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2784 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2787 if has_err && has_ok {
2788 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2791 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2792 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2793 Some(RouteParameters {
2794 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2795 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2796 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2802 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2803 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2804 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2805 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2811 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2813 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2814 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2815 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2816 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2817 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2819 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2820 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2821 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2822 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2823 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2824 if path.len() == 0 {
2825 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2826 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2831 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2832 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2833 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2835 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2836 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2838 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2839 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2840 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2841 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2844 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2846 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2847 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2848 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2851 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2852 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2853 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2856 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2857 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2858 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2863 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2864 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2868 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2871 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2873 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2874 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2875 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2876 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2878 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2879 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2880 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2882 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2883 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2884 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2885 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2888 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2889 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2890 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2891 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2892 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2894 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2902 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2903 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2904 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2905 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2906 /// never reach the recipient.
2908 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2910 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2911 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2913 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2915 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2916 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2917 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2919 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2921 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2922 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2923 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2928 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2929 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2930 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2931 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2933 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2935 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2937 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2938 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2939 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2940 } else { unreachable!(); })
2943 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2945 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2946 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2949 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2950 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2955 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2956 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2957 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2960 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2962 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2964 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2972 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2973 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2974 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2978 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2980 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2981 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2983 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2984 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2986 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2987 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2988 /// keys per-channel).
2990 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2991 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2992 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2994 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2995 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2996 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2998 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2999 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3000 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3003 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3004 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3006 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3010 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3011 let mut output_index = None;
3012 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3013 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3014 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3015 if output_index.is_some() {
3016 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3017 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3020 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3021 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3022 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3025 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3028 if output_index.is_none() {
3029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3030 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3033 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3038 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
3039 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
3040 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
3042 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
3045 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
3046 // smaller than 500:
3047 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
3049 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
3050 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
3051 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
3052 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
3053 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
3054 /// our network addresses.
3056 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
3057 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
3059 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
3060 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
3061 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
3062 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
3064 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
3066 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3067 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
3068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3070 if addresses.len() > 500 {
3071 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
3074 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
3075 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
3076 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
3078 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
3079 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
3080 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
3081 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
3082 rgb, alias, addresses,
3083 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
3084 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3086 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3087 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3089 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3090 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3092 let mut announced_chans = false;
3093 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3094 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
3095 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3097 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
3102 announced_chans = true;
3104 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
3105 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
3106 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
3110 if announced_chans {
3111 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
3112 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3113 signature: node_announce_sig,
3114 contents: announcement
3120 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3122 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3123 /// Will likely generate further events.
3124 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3127 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3128 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3129 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3130 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3132 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3133 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3135 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3136 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3137 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3138 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3140 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3141 match forward_info {
3142 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3143 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3144 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3145 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3146 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3148 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3149 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3150 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3151 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3152 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3154 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3156 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3157 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3163 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3164 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3165 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3166 let phantom_shared_secret = {
3167 let mut arr = [0; 32];
3168 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
3171 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3173 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3174 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3175 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3176 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3177 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3179 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3181 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3182 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3186 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3187 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3188 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3189 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3195 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3198 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3201 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3202 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3203 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3204 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3205 // problem, not ours.
3212 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3213 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3214 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3215 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3216 match forward_info {
3217 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3218 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3220 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3221 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3222 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3223 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3224 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3225 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3226 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3227 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3228 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3229 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3231 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3233 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3236 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3238 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3239 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3240 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3246 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3248 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3249 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3250 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3251 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3252 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3253 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3254 // this channel currently :/.
3260 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3261 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3263 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3265 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3267 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3268 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3270 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3272 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3273 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3274 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3277 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3279 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3280 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3281 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3282 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3283 // messages when we can.
3284 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3285 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3286 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3293 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3294 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3297 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3298 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3299 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3300 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3301 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3302 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3304 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3306 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3307 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3308 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3310 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3312 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3316 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3317 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3320 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3321 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3322 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3323 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3324 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3325 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3326 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3327 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3328 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3330 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3338 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3339 match forward_info {
3340 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3341 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3342 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3343 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3344 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3345 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3346 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3347 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3349 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3352 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3353 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3354 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3355 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3356 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3357 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3358 phantom_shared_secret,
3360 value: amt_to_forward,
3366 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3368 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3369 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3370 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3372 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3373 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3374 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3375 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3376 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3377 phantom_shared_secret,
3379 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3384 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3385 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3386 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3387 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3388 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3389 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3390 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3396 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3397 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3398 total_value += htlc.value;
3399 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3400 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3401 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3403 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3404 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3406 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3408 _ => unreachable!(),
3411 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3412 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3413 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3414 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3415 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3416 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3417 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3419 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3420 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3421 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3425 payment_received_generated = true;
3427 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3428 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3430 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3432 payment_received_generated
3436 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3437 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3438 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3439 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3440 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3441 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3442 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3443 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3445 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3446 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3447 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3448 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3450 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3454 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3455 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3456 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3458 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3459 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3460 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3461 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3462 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3464 amt: amt_to_forward,
3465 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3478 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3481 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3482 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3485 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3487 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3488 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3489 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3490 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3491 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3493 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3494 if payment_received_generated {
3495 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3501 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3502 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3510 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3511 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3513 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3515 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3516 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3519 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3520 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3521 events.append(&mut new_events);
3524 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3526 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3527 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3529 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3530 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3531 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3532 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3533 if background_events.is_empty() {
3537 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3539 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3540 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3541 // monitor updating completing.
3542 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3549 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3550 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3551 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3552 self.process_background_events();
3555 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3556 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3557 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3558 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3559 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3560 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3561 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3563 if !chan.is_live() {
3564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3565 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3566 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3569 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3571 let mut retain_channel = true;
3572 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3575 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3576 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3580 let ret_err = match res {
3581 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3582 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3583 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3584 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3587 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3588 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3589 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3590 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3591 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3592 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3593 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3594 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3604 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3608 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3609 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3610 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3611 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3612 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3613 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3614 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3616 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3618 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3620 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3621 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3622 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3623 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3624 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3625 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3626 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3628 handle_errors.push(err);
3638 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3640 /// This currently includes:
3641 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3642 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3643 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3646 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3647 /// estimate fetches.
3648 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3649 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3650 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3651 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3653 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3655 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3656 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3658 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3659 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3660 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3661 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3662 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3663 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3664 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3665 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3667 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3669 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3671 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3672 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3673 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3674 if needs_close { return false; }
3677 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3678 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3679 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3680 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3681 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3682 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3683 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3684 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3688 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3689 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3691 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3692 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3693 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3697 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3698 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3706 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3707 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3708 // This should be unreachable
3709 debug_assert!(false);
3712 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3713 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3714 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3715 if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3717 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3718 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3719 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3721 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3729 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3730 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3733 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3734 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3740 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3741 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3742 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3743 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3744 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3745 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3748 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3749 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3750 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3751 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3752 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3753 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3754 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3755 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3756 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3757 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3758 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3764 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3765 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3767 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3769 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3770 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3771 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3772 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3773 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3774 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3775 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3777 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3779 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3780 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3782 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3787 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3788 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3789 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3790 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3791 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3792 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
3793 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3794 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3795 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3797 (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3798 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3799 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3801 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3802 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3803 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3804 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3805 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3809 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3810 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3811 // be surfaced to the user.
3812 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3813 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3815 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3816 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3817 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3818 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3819 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3821 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3823 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3824 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3825 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3827 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3828 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3829 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3830 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3831 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3832 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3833 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3834 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3835 Some(RouteParameters {
3836 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3837 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3838 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3841 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3842 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3843 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3845 rejected_by_dest: false,
3846 network_update: None,
3847 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3849 short_channel_id: None,
3856 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3857 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3859 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3865 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3872 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3873 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3874 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3875 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3876 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3877 /// still-available channels.
3878 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3879 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3880 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3881 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3884 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3885 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3886 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3888 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3889 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3890 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3891 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3892 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3893 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3894 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3895 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3899 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3903 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3904 all_paths_failed = true;
3905 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3906 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3908 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3917 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3918 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3919 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3920 Some(RouteParameters {
3921 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3922 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3923 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3928 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3929 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3931 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3933 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3934 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3935 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3936 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3937 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3938 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3939 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3940 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3947 error_code: onion_error_code,
3949 error_data: onion_error_data
3952 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3958 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3959 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3960 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3961 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3963 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3964 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3965 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3966 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3967 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3968 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3969 network_update: None,
3972 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3975 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3977 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3981 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3982 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3983 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3985 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3986 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3987 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3988 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3989 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3990 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3991 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3992 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3994 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3995 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3998 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4000 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4004 let mut forward_event = None;
4005 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4006 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4008 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4010 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4013 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4016 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4017 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4018 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4019 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4020 time_forwardable: time
4027 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4028 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4030 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4031 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4032 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4033 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4035 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
4036 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
4038 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4039 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4040 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4041 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4042 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
4043 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4047 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4048 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4049 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
4050 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4052 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4053 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4054 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4055 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4057 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4058 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4059 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4060 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4061 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4063 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4064 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4065 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4071 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4072 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4073 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4075 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4076 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4077 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4078 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4079 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4080 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4081 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4083 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4084 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4085 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4086 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4087 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4088 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4089 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4090 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4092 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4093 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4094 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4095 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4096 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4097 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4099 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4104 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4105 // which were generated.
4106 channel_state.take();
4108 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4109 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4110 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4117 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4118 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4119 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4120 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4121 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4123 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4127 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4128 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4129 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4130 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4131 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4132 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4133 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4134 payment_preimage, e);
4135 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4136 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4137 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4138 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4141 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4142 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4143 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4144 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4145 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4146 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4147 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4148 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4149 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4150 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4156 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4158 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4161 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4162 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4163 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4164 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4165 payment_preimage, e);
4167 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4168 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4170 chan.remove_entry();
4172 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4175 } else { unreachable!(); }
4178 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4179 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4180 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4181 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4182 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4183 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4184 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4185 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4186 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4187 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4188 pending_events.push(
4189 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4191 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4196 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4204 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
4206 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4207 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4208 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4209 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4210 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4211 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4212 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4213 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4214 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4215 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4216 pending_events.push(
4217 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4218 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4224 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4228 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4229 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4230 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4232 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4233 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4234 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4235 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4236 pending_events.push(
4237 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4245 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4253 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4254 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4255 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4256 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4257 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4258 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4259 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4262 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4263 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4264 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4265 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4266 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4269 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4270 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4271 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4272 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4273 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4274 payment_preimage, e);
4276 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4277 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4278 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4279 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4282 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4283 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4284 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4285 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4289 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4290 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4291 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4294 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4295 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4297 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4305 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4306 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4307 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4310 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4313 let chan_restoration_res;
4314 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4315 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4316 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4317 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4319 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4321 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4325 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4326 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4327 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4328 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4329 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4330 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4332 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4333 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4334 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4339 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4340 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4341 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4343 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4345 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4346 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4347 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4348 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4352 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4355 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4357 /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4358 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4359 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
4361 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4362 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4363 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4364 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4366 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4367 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4368 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4370 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4371 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4374 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4375 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4379 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4385 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4386 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4390 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4394 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4395 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4396 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4397 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4400 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4405 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4407 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4409 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4410 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4413 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4414 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4415 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4416 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4419 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4420 pending_events.push(
4421 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4422 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4423 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4424 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4425 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4426 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4431 entry.insert(channel);
4437 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4438 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4439 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4440 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4443 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4446 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4447 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4452 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4453 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4454 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4455 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4457 user_channel_id: user_id,
4462 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4463 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4464 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4465 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4466 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4467 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4468 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4469 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4470 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4472 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4477 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4478 // lock before watch_channel
4479 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4481 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4482 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4483 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4484 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4485 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4486 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4487 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4488 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4489 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4490 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4491 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4493 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4494 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4495 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4496 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4497 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4498 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4502 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4504 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4509 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4510 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4519 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4521 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4522 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4523 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4524 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4525 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4526 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4527 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4529 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4530 Ok(update) => update,
4531 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4533 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4534 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4535 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4536 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4537 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4538 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4539 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4540 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4550 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4551 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4555 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4556 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4557 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4558 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4560 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4563 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4564 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4565 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4566 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4567 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4568 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4569 msg: announcement_sigs,
4571 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4572 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4573 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4574 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4575 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4576 // announcement_signatures.
4577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4578 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4579 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4580 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4587 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4591 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4592 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4593 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4594 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4597 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4598 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4599 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4600 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4603 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4604 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4605 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4606 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4609 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4610 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4612 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4613 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4614 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4615 let (result, is_permanent) =
4616 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4618 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4624 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4625 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4626 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4636 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4637 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4640 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4644 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4645 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4646 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4647 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4648 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4649 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4650 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4651 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4653 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4654 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4655 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4656 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4661 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4662 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4663 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4664 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4665 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4666 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4667 } else { (tx, None) }
4669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4672 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4673 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4674 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4676 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4677 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4678 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4679 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4683 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4688 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4689 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4690 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4691 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4693 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4694 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4695 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4696 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4698 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4699 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4701 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4703 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4704 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4707 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4708 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4709 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4710 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4711 match pending_forward_info {
4712 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4713 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4714 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4715 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4717 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4719 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4720 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4721 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4724 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4726 _ => pending_forward_info
4729 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4736 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4737 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4738 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4740 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4742 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4743 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4745 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4747 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4750 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4754 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4755 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4756 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4757 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4758 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4759 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4760 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4762 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4769 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4770 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4771 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4774 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4775 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4777 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4778 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4779 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4781 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4788 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4789 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4790 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4791 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4793 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4796 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4797 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4798 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4799 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4800 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4801 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4802 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4807 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4808 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4810 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4811 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4812 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4814 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4815 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4816 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4817 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4818 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4819 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4820 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4821 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4823 commitment_signed: msg,
4829 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4834 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4835 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4836 let mut forward_event = None;
4837 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4838 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4839 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4840 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4842 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4843 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4844 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4845 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4846 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4849 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4850 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4853 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4854 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4859 match forward_event {
4861 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4862 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4863 time_forwardable: time
4871 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4872 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4874 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4875 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4876 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4878 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4879 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4881 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4882 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4883 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4884 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4885 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4886 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4887 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4888 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4889 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4890 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4891 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4893 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4894 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4895 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4896 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4897 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4899 } else { unreachable!(); }
4902 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4903 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4904 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4908 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4909 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4910 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4911 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4912 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4917 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4919 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4920 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4922 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4923 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4925 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4926 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4933 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4934 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4935 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4936 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4937 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4938 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4939 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4941 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4948 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4949 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4950 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4952 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4954 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4955 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4957 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4958 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4961 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4962 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4963 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4964 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4965 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4966 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4974 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4975 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4976 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4977 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4978 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4979 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4981 // It's not a local channel
4982 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4985 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4986 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4987 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4988 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4989 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4990 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4991 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4992 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4994 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4996 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4997 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4998 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4999 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5001 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5006 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5009 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5010 let chan_restoration_res;
5011 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5012 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5013 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5015 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5017 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5018 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5020 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5021 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5022 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5023 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5024 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5025 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5026 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5027 let mut channel_update = None;
5028 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5029 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5030 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5033 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5034 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5035 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5036 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5037 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5038 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5039 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5044 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5045 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5046 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5047 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
5048 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5049 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5051 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5053 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5056 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5057 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
5059 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5060 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
5065 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5066 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5067 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5068 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5069 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5070 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5071 match monitor_event {
5072 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5073 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5075 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
5077 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5081 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5082 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5083 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5084 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5085 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5086 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5087 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5088 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5089 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5090 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5091 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5095 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5096 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5098 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5100 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5101 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5102 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5103 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5104 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5109 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5110 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5115 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5116 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5119 has_pending_monitor_events
5122 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5123 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5124 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5126 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5127 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5130 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5131 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5132 /// update was applied.
5134 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5135 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5136 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5137 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5138 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5139 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5140 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5141 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5143 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5144 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5145 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5146 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5147 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5149 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5150 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5151 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5152 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5153 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
5155 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5156 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5157 has_monitor_update = true;
5158 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5159 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5160 if close_channel { return false; }
5162 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5163 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5164 updates: commitment_update,
5171 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5172 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5173 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5180 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5181 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5182 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5185 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5186 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5192 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5193 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5194 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5195 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5196 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5197 let mut has_update = false;
5199 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5200 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5201 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5202 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5203 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5205 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5206 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5207 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5208 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5210 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5211 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5214 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5215 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5216 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5217 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5218 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5223 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5225 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5226 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5227 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5233 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5234 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5241 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5242 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5248 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5249 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5251 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5252 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5253 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5254 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5255 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5256 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5257 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5258 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5259 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5260 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5261 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5262 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5263 assert!(should_broadcast);
5264 } else { unreachable!(); }
5265 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5267 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5271 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5272 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5274 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5275 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5278 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5281 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5282 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5284 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5285 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5286 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5287 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5288 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5289 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5290 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5291 // never fail a payment too early.
5292 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5294 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5302 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5305 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5306 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5308 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5309 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5310 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5312 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5314 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5315 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5319 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5320 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5322 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5324 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5325 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5326 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5327 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5328 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5329 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5332 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5333 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5335 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5338 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5340 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5342 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5343 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5344 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5345 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5346 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5349 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5350 /// stored external to LDK.
5352 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5353 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5354 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5356 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5357 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5360 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5361 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5362 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5363 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5365 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5366 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5367 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5368 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5369 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5371 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5372 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5373 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5374 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5375 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5377 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5378 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5380 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5381 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5385 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5386 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5388 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5390 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5391 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5392 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5393 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5396 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5397 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5399 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5402 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5404 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5406 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5407 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5410 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5411 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5413 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5414 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5415 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5418 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5419 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5421 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5422 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5423 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5424 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5426 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5427 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5428 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5430 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5435 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5437 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5438 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5440 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5441 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5442 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5447 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5448 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5449 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5450 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5455 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5456 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5460 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5461 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5465 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5466 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5467 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5468 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5469 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5472 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5473 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5474 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5475 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5477 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5478 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5479 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5480 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5483 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5484 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5486 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5487 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5490 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5491 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5492 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5494 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5495 events.replace(pending_events);
5504 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5506 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5507 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5508 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5509 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5512 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5514 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5515 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5517 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5518 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5519 /// restarting from an old state.
5520 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5521 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5522 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5524 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5525 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5526 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5527 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5530 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5531 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5532 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5535 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5536 handler.handle_event(&event);
5544 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5546 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5547 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5548 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5549 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5552 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5554 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5555 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5556 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5557 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5558 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5561 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5562 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5563 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5566 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5568 let new_height = height - 1;
5570 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5571 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5572 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5573 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5574 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5575 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5578 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5582 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5584 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5585 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5586 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5587 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5590 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5591 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5592 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5593 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5595 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5596 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5599 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5600 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5602 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5603 if height < last_best_block_height {
5604 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5605 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5609 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5610 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5611 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5612 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5614 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5615 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5617 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5619 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5621 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5623 macro_rules! max_time {
5624 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5626 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5627 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5628 // having an explicit local time source.
5629 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5630 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5631 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5632 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5633 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5639 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5640 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5641 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5642 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5643 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5646 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5647 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5648 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5649 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5650 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5651 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5652 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5653 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5654 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5662 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5663 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5664 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5665 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5666 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5667 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5673 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5675 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5676 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5677 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5678 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5679 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5680 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5685 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5687 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5689 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5690 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5693 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5694 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5696 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5697 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5698 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5699 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5700 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5702 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5703 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5705 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5706 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5707 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5708 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5709 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5710 let res = f(channel);
5711 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5712 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5713 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5714 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5718 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5719 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5720 if channel.is_usable() {
5721 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5722 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5723 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5724 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5729 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5732 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5733 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5734 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5735 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5736 msg: announcement_sigs,
5738 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5739 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5740 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5742 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5743 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5744 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5749 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5750 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5751 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5752 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5753 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5754 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5755 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5759 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5760 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5761 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5762 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5763 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5764 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5765 data: reason_message,
5773 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5774 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5775 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5776 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5777 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5778 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5779 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5780 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5781 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5782 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5783 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5784 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5785 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5790 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5795 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5797 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5798 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5802 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5803 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5804 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5807 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5808 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5809 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5810 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5813 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5814 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5816 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5817 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5820 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5821 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5822 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5823 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5824 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5828 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5829 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5830 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5831 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5835 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5836 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5837 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5838 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5839 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5843 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5845 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5848 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5850 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5853 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5855 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5858 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5860 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5863 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5865 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5868 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5870 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5873 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5875 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5878 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5880 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5883 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5885 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5888 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5889 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5890 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5893 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5895 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5898 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5900 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5903 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5904 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5905 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5908 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5909 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5910 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5913 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5914 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5915 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5918 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5919 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5920 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5923 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5928 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5929 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5930 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5933 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5935 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5936 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5938 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5939 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5940 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5941 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5942 if no_connection_possible {
5943 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5944 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5945 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5946 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5947 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5948 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5949 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5953 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5960 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5961 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5962 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5963 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5964 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5965 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5966 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5969 no_channels_remain = false;
5975 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5977 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5978 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5979 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5980 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5981 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5982 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5983 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5984 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5985 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5986 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5987 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5988 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5989 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5990 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5991 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5992 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5993 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5994 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5995 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5996 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6000 if no_channels_remain {
6001 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6004 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6005 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6009 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6010 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6012 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6015 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6016 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6018 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6019 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6023 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6028 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6029 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6030 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6031 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6032 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6033 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6034 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6035 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6036 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6040 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6041 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6042 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6048 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6051 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6054 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6055 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6056 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6057 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6058 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6063 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6064 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6065 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6066 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6069 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6071 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6079 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6080 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
6085 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6086 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6087 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6088 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6089 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6090 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6093 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6096 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6102 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6103 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6108 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6109 let result = *guard;
6117 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6118 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6119 let current_time = Instant::now();
6121 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6122 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6127 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6128 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6129 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6130 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6131 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6133 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6134 let result = *guard;
6135 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6139 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6140 None => return result,
6146 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6148 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6149 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6150 *persistence_lock = true;
6151 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6156 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6157 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6159 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6160 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6161 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6162 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6165 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6166 (2, node_id, required),
6167 (4, features, required),
6168 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6169 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6172 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6173 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6174 (2, channel_id, required),
6175 (3, channel_type, option),
6176 (4, counterparty, required),
6177 (6, funding_txo, option),
6178 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6179 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6180 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6181 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6182 (16, balance_msat, required),
6183 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6184 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6185 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6186 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6187 (26, is_outbound, required),
6188 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
6189 (30, is_usable, required),
6190 (32, is_public, required),
6193 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6194 (2, channels, vec_type),
6195 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6196 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6199 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6201 (0, onion_packet, required),
6202 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6205 (0, payment_data, required),
6206 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6207 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6209 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6210 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6211 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6215 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6216 (0, routing, required),
6217 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6218 (4, payment_hash, required),
6219 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6220 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6224 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6225 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6227 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6229 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6230 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6231 reason.write(writer)?;
6233 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6234 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6237 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6238 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6239 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6240 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6247 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6248 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6249 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6252 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6253 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6254 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6255 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6259 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6260 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6261 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6262 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6263 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6266 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6267 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6268 // messages contained in the variants.
6269 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6270 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6271 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6273 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6274 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6275 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6276 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6277 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6280 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6281 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6282 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6283 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6284 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6286 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6291 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6296 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6297 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6298 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6299 (2, outpoint, required),
6300 (4, htlc_id, required),
6301 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6304 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6305 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6306 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6307 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6310 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6311 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6312 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6317 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6318 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6319 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6325 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6326 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6327 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6329 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6330 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6331 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6335 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6336 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6337 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6339 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6341 if payment_data.is_some() {
6342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6344 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6347 if payment_data.is_none() {
6348 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6350 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6354 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6363 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6364 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6365 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6368 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6369 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6370 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6371 let mut payment_id = None;
6372 let mut payment_secret = None;
6373 let mut payment_params = None;
6374 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6375 (0, session_priv, required),
6376 (1, payment_id, option),
6377 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6378 (3, payment_secret, option),
6379 (4, path, vec_type),
6380 (5, payment_params, option),
6382 if payment_id.is_none() {
6383 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6385 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6387 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6388 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6389 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6390 path: path.unwrap(),
6391 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6396 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6397 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6402 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6403 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6405 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6407 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6408 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6409 (0, session_priv, required),
6410 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6411 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6412 (3, payment_secret, option),
6413 (4, path, vec_type),
6414 (5, payment_params, option),
6417 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6419 field.write(writer)?;
6426 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6427 (0, LightningError) => {
6431 (0, failure_code, required),
6432 (2, data, vec_type),
6436 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6438 (0, forward_info, required),
6439 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6440 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6441 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6444 (0, htlc_id, required),
6445 (2, err_packet, required),
6449 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6450 (0, payment_secret, required),
6451 (2, expiry_time, required),
6452 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6453 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6454 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6457 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6459 (0, session_privs, required),
6462 (0, session_privs, required),
6463 (1, payment_hash, option),
6466 (0, session_privs, required),
6467 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6468 (2, payment_hash, required),
6469 (4, payment_secret, option),
6470 (6, total_msat, required),
6471 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6472 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6475 (0, session_privs, required),
6476 (2, payment_hash, required),
6480 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6481 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6482 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6483 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6484 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6487 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6488 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6490 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6492 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6494 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6495 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6496 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6499 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6500 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6501 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6502 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6503 unfunded_channels += 1;
6506 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6507 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6508 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6509 channel.write(writer)?;
6513 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6514 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6515 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6516 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6517 for forward in pending_forwards {
6518 forward.write(writer)?;
6522 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6523 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6524 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6525 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6526 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6527 htlc.write(writer)?;
6531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6532 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6533 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6534 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6535 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6536 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6539 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6540 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6541 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6542 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6543 for event in events.iter() {
6544 event.write(writer)?;
6547 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6548 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6549 for event in background_events.iter() {
6551 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6553 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6554 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6559 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6560 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6562 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6563 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6564 hash.write(writer)?;
6565 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6568 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6569 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6570 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6571 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6572 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6575 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6576 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6578 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6579 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6580 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6581 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6584 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6585 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6589 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6590 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6591 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6593 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6594 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6595 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6600 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6601 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6602 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6603 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6604 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6611 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6613 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6615 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6616 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6617 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6618 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6619 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6620 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6621 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6622 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6623 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6624 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6625 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6626 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6627 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6629 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6630 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6632 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6633 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6635 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6636 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6637 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6638 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6639 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6640 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6642 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6643 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6644 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6645 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6646 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6647 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6650 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6651 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6653 pub keys_manager: K,
6655 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6657 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6658 pub fee_estimator: F,
6659 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6661 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6662 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6663 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6664 pub chain_monitor: M,
6666 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6667 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6668 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6669 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6670 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6671 /// deserialization.
6673 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6674 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6675 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6677 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6678 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6680 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6681 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6682 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6683 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6685 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6688 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6689 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6692 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6693 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6694 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6695 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6696 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6700 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6701 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6702 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6703 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6704 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6706 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6707 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6712 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6713 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6714 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6715 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6716 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6717 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6718 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6719 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6722 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6723 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6724 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6728 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6729 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6730 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6731 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6732 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6733 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6736 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6737 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6739 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6740 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6743 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6745 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6746 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6747 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6748 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6749 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6750 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6751 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6752 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6753 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6754 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6755 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6756 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6757 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6758 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6759 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6760 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6761 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6762 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6763 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6764 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6765 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6766 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6767 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6768 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6769 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6770 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6771 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6772 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6773 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6774 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6775 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6776 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6777 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6778 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6779 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6780 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6781 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6782 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6783 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6786 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6787 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6788 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6790 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6793 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6794 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6795 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6796 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6797 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6802 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6803 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6804 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6805 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6809 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6810 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6812 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6813 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6814 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6815 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6816 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6817 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6819 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6822 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6823 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6824 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6825 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6826 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6827 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6828 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6829 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6831 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6834 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6835 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6836 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6837 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6838 let peer_state = PeerState {
6839 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6841 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6844 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6846 for _ in 0..event_count {
6847 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6848 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6852 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6853 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6854 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6855 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6856 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6857 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6858 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6859 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6863 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6865 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6866 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6867 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6868 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6872 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6876 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6877 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6878 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6879 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6883 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6885 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6886 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6887 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6889 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6891 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6892 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6896 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6897 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6898 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6899 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6900 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6901 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6902 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6903 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6904 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6905 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6907 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6908 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6911 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6912 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6913 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6914 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6915 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6916 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6918 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6920 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6921 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6922 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6923 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6924 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6925 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6926 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6928 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6929 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6930 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6931 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6932 if path.is_empty() {
6933 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6934 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6936 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6937 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6938 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6939 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6941 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6942 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6943 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6946 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6947 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6948 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6949 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6951 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6952 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6953 total_msat: path_amt,
6954 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6956 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6957 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6966 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6967 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6969 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6970 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6973 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6975 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6977 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6978 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6979 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6980 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6981 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6985 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6986 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6987 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6988 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6990 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6991 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6992 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6994 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6995 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6996 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6997 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6998 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6999 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7001 if chan.is_usable() {
7002 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
7003 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7004 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7005 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7006 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7011 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7012 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7013 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7015 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7016 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7017 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7019 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7021 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7026 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7028 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7029 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7030 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7032 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7033 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7039 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7040 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7042 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7044 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7045 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7046 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7047 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7049 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7050 logger: args.logger,
7051 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7054 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7055 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7058 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7059 //connection or two.
7061 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7067 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7068 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7069 use core::time::Duration;
7070 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7071 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7072 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7073 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7074 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7075 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7077 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7078 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7079 use util::errors::APIError;
7080 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7081 use util::test_utils;
7082 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7084 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7086 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7087 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7089 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7092 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7093 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7095 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7096 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7097 thread::spawn(move || {
7099 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7100 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7101 *persistence_lock = true;
7104 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7110 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7111 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7113 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7116 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7121 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7123 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7126 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7133 fn test_notify_limits() {
7134 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7135 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7136 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7137 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7138 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7139 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7141 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7142 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7143 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7144 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7145 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7147 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7149 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7150 // to connect messages with new values
7151 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7152 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7153 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7154 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7156 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7157 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7158 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7159 // ... but the last node should not.
7160 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7161 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7162 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7163 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7165 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7166 // about the channel.
7167 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7168 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7169 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7171 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7173 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7174 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7175 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7176 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7177 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7178 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7180 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7181 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7182 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7184 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7185 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7186 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7187 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7188 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7189 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7191 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7192 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7193 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7194 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7195 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7196 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7197 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7198 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7200 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7201 // the channel info has updated.
7202 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7203 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7204 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7205 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7206 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7207 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7211 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7212 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7217 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7218 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7220 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7221 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7222 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7223 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7224 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7225 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7226 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7228 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7230 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7232 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7233 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7235 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7236 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7237 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7238 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7239 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7241 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7242 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7243 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7245 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7246 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7247 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7248 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7249 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7250 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7251 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7252 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7253 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7255 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7256 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7258 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7259 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7260 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7262 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7263 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7264 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7265 // lightning messages manually.
7266 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7268 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7269 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7270 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7272 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7273 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7275 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7276 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7278 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7280 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7282 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7283 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7284 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7286 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7288 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7290 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7291 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7294 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7295 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7296 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7299 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7300 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7301 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7302 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7307 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7308 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7309 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7310 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7315 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7316 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7317 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7318 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7325 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7326 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7327 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7328 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7329 // fails as expected.
7330 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7333 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7334 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7335 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7336 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7338 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7339 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7340 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7342 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7343 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7344 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7345 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7346 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7348 let route = find_route(
7349 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7350 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7352 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7354 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7355 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7356 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7357 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7358 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7360 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7361 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7362 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7364 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7365 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7366 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7367 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7368 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7369 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7371 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7372 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7374 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7375 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7377 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7378 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7379 let route = find_route(
7380 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7381 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7383 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7385 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7387 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7388 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7389 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7391 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7392 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7393 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7395 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7397 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7398 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7399 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7401 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7402 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7403 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7405 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7406 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7407 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7408 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7409 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7410 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7411 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7412 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7413 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7415 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7416 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7420 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7421 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7422 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7428 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7429 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7430 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7431 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7433 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7434 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7435 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7436 final_value_msat: 10000,
7437 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7439 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7440 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7441 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7442 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7443 let route = find_route(
7444 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7445 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7448 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7449 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7450 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7453 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7454 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7455 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7456 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7457 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7458 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7459 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7461 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7465 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7466 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7467 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7468 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7470 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7472 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7473 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7474 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7475 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7477 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7478 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7479 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7480 final_value_msat: 10000,
7481 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7483 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7484 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7485 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7486 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7487 let route = find_route(
7488 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7489 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7492 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7493 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7494 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7495 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7498 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7499 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7500 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7501 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7502 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7503 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7504 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7506 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7510 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7514 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7516 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7517 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7518 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7519 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7521 // Marshall an MPP route.
7522 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7523 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7524 route.paths.push(path);
7525 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7526 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7527 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7528 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7529 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7530 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7532 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7533 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7534 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7535 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7540 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7541 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7542 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7543 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7544 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7545 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7547 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7548 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7550 total_msat: 100_000,
7553 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7554 // payment verification fails as expected.
7555 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7556 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7557 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7558 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7560 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7564 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7565 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7569 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7572 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7573 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7574 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7575 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7576 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7577 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7578 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7579 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7580 use util::test_utils;
7581 use util::config::UserConfig;
7582 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7584 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7585 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7586 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7588 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7592 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7593 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7594 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7595 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7596 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7597 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7598 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7603 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7604 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7607 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7608 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7609 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7611 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7612 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7614 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7615 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7617 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7618 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7620 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7621 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7622 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7623 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7624 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7626 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7628 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7630 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7631 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7632 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7633 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7634 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7636 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7638 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7640 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7641 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7642 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7643 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7644 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7647 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7648 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7649 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7651 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7652 } else { panic!(); }
7654 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7655 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7657 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7660 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7663 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7664 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7666 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7667 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7668 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7669 match msg_events[0] {
7670 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7671 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7672 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7676 match msg_events[1] {
7677 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7681 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7683 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7684 macro_rules! send_payment {
7685 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7686 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7687 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7688 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7689 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7690 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7691 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7692 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7693 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7694 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7696 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7697 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7699 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7700 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7702 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7703 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7704 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7705 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7706 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7707 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7708 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7709 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7711 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7712 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7713 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7715 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7716 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7717 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7718 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7719 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7721 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7724 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7725 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7726 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7727 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7729 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7734 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7735 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);