1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
138 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
139 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
142 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
145 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
146 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
149 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
150 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
152 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
153 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
154 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
160 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
161 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
164 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
165 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
168 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
172 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
173 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
174 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
175 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
176 short_channel_id: u64,
178 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
179 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
181 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
182 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
187 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
189 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
190 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
191 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
194 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
197 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
198 struct ClaimableHTLC {
199 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
201 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
203 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
204 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
205 sender_intended_value: u64,
206 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
208 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
209 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
210 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
211 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
215 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
217 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
218 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
219 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
221 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
222 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
227 impl Readable for PaymentId {
228 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
229 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
234 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
236 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
237 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
238 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
240 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
241 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
246 impl Readable for InterceptId {
247 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
248 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
253 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
254 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
255 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
256 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
257 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
260 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
262 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
263 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
264 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
266 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
267 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
271 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
272 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
273 (0, short_channel_id, required),
274 (2, htlc_id, required),
276 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
277 (0, session_priv, required),
282 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
283 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
284 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
285 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
286 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
289 session_priv: SecretKey,
290 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
291 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
292 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
293 payment_id: PaymentId,
296 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
297 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
298 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
300 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
302 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
307 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
308 payment_id.hash(hasher);
309 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
315 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
317 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
318 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
319 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
320 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
321 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
322 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
326 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
327 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
328 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
329 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
330 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
331 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
333 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
339 struct ReceiveError {
345 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
346 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
348 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
349 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
350 pub enum FailureCode {
351 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
352 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
353 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
354 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
355 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
356 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
357 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
358 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
359 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
360 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
361 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
501 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
502 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
503 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
504 enum BackgroundEvent {
505 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
506 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
507 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
508 /// need the counterparty node_id.
510 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
511 /// are regenerated on startup.
512 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
513 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
514 /// channel to continue normal operation.
516 /// In general this should be used rather than
517 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
518 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
519 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
521 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
522 /// are regenerated on startup.
523 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
524 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
525 funding_txo: OutPoint,
526 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
531 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
532 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
533 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
534 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
535 /// event can be generated.
536 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
537 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
538 /// operation of another channel.
540 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
541 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
542 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
543 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
545 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
546 event: events::Event,
547 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
551 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
552 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
553 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
554 (0, event, upgradable_required),
555 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
556 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
557 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
558 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
559 // downgrades to prior versions.
560 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
564 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
565 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
566 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
567 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
568 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
571 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
572 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
573 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
574 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
578 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
579 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
580 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
581 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
582 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
583 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
585 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
586 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
587 channel_id: [u8; 32],
588 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
593 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
595 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
596 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
597 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
598 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
603 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
604 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
608 /// State we hold per-peer.
609 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
610 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
612 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
613 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
614 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
616 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
617 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
619 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
620 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
622 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
623 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
625 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
626 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
627 latest_features: InitFeatures,
628 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
629 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
630 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
631 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
632 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
634 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
635 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
636 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
637 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
639 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
640 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
641 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
642 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
643 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
644 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
645 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
646 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
647 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
648 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
649 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
650 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
651 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
652 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
653 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
657 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
658 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
659 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
660 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
661 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
662 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
665 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
668 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
669 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
670 self.channel_by_id.len() +
671 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
672 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
675 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
676 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
677 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
678 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
679 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
683 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
684 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
686 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
689 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
690 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
691 struct PendingInboundPayment {
692 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
693 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
694 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
695 /// this payment being removed.
697 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
698 user_payment_id: u64,
699 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
700 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
701 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
704 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
705 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
706 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
707 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
708 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
709 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
710 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
711 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
713 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
714 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
722 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
724 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
725 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
726 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
731 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
732 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
733 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
734 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
735 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
736 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
737 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
738 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
739 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
741 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
742 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters, ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>, &'g L>;
744 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
745 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
746 $vis trait AChannelManager {
747 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
748 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
749 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
750 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
751 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
752 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
753 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
754 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
755 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
756 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
757 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
758 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
759 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
760 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
761 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
762 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
763 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
764 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
767 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
768 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
769 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
770 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
771 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
772 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
774 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
775 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
776 ES::Target: EntropySource,
777 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
778 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
779 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
783 type Watch = M::Target;
785 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
787 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
789 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
791 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
792 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
794 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
796 type Router = R::Target;
798 type Logger = L::Target;
800 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
803 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
804 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
806 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
807 /// to individual Channels.
809 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
810 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
811 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
812 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
814 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
815 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
816 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
817 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
818 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
819 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
820 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
822 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
823 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
824 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
826 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
827 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
828 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
829 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
830 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
832 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
833 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
834 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
835 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
837 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
838 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
839 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
841 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
842 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
843 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
844 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
845 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
847 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
848 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
849 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
850 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
851 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
852 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
853 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
854 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
857 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
858 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
859 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
860 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
861 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
865 // `total_consistency_lock`
867 // |__`forward_htlcs`
869 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
871 // |__`per_peer_state`
873 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
875 // | |__`claimable_payments`
877 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
883 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
885 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
889 // | |__`pending_events`
891 // | |__`pending_background_events`
893 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
895 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
896 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
897 ES::Target: EntropySource,
898 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
899 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
904 default_configuration: UserConfig,
905 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
906 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
912 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
914 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
916 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
917 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
919 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
920 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
921 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
922 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
924 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
925 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
927 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
928 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
929 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
930 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
931 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
932 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
933 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
934 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
936 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
938 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
939 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
941 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
943 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
944 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
945 /// and via the classic SCID.
947 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
948 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
950 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
952 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
954 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
955 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
956 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
958 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
959 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
961 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
962 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
964 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
965 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
967 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
968 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
969 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
970 /// active channel list on load.
972 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
973 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
975 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
977 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
978 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
979 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
981 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
982 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
983 /// the handling of the events.
985 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
986 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
989 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
990 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
991 /// would break backwards compatability.
992 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
993 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
994 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
996 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
997 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
999 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1001 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1002 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1003 /// confirmation depth.
1005 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1006 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1007 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1009 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1011 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1013 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1015 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1017 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1019 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1020 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1021 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1023 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1024 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1026 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1027 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1028 /// keeping additional state.
1029 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1031 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1032 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1033 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1034 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1036 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1037 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1039 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1040 /// are currently open with that peer.
1042 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1043 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1046 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1048 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1049 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1050 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1051 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1052 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1054 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1055 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1056 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1057 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1058 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1060 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1061 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1063 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1064 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1065 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1066 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1068 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1069 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1070 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1071 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1072 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1074 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1076 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1079 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1080 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1081 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1082 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1083 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1084 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1085 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1086 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1088 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1089 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1091 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1095 signer_provider: SP,
1100 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1102 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1103 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1104 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1105 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1106 pub struct ChainParameters {
1107 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1108 pub network: Network,
1110 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1112 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1113 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1116 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1123 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1124 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1125 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1126 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1127 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1128 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1130 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1131 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1132 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1133 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1134 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1136 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1137 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1140 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1141 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1142 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1143 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1145 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1146 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1147 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1148 _read_guard: read_guard,
1153 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1154 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1155 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1156 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1158 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1159 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1160 should_persist: persist_check,
1161 _read_guard: read_guard,
1166 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1167 fn drop(&mut self) {
1168 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1169 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1174 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1175 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1177 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1179 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1180 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1181 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1182 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1183 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1185 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1186 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1188 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1190 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1191 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1192 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1193 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1194 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1195 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1196 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1197 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1198 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1199 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1200 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1201 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1202 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1204 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1205 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1207 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1208 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1209 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1210 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1212 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1213 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1214 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1215 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1216 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1217 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1220 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1222 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1223 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1226 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1228 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1229 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1231 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1232 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1233 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1234 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1236 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1237 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1238 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1240 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1241 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1242 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1244 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1245 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1246 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1247 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1249 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1250 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1251 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1253 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1254 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1255 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1257 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1258 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1259 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1260 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1261 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1262 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1263 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1264 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1265 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1266 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1267 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1270 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1271 /// to better separate parameters.
1272 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1273 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1274 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1275 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1276 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1277 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1278 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1279 pub features: InitFeatures,
1280 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1281 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1282 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1284 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1286 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1287 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1288 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1289 /// payments to us through this channel.
1290 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1291 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1292 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1293 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1294 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1295 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1296 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1299 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1300 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1301 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1302 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1303 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1304 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1305 /// lifetime of the channel.
1306 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1307 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1308 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1309 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1310 /// our counterparty already.
1312 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1313 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1314 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1315 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1317 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1318 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1319 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1320 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1322 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1323 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1325 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1326 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1328 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1329 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1330 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1331 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1332 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1333 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1334 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1335 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1336 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1339 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1341 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1342 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1343 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1344 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1345 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1346 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1347 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1349 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1350 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1352 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1353 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1354 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1355 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1356 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1357 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1358 /// this value on chain.
1360 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1362 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1364 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1365 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1366 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1367 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1369 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1370 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1371 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1373 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1374 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1375 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1376 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1377 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1379 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1380 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1381 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1382 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1384 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1385 pub balance_msat: u64,
1386 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1387 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1388 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1389 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1391 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1393 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1394 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1395 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1396 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1397 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1398 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1399 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1400 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1402 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1403 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1404 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1405 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1406 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1407 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1408 /// route which is valid.
1409 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1410 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1411 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1412 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1413 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1414 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1416 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1417 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1418 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1419 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1420 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1421 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1422 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1423 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1424 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1426 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1428 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1429 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1430 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1431 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1432 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1434 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1435 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1436 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1437 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1438 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1439 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1440 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1442 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1443 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1444 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1445 pub is_outbound: bool,
1446 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1447 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1448 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1449 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1450 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1452 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1453 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1454 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1455 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1457 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1458 pub is_usable: bool,
1459 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1460 pub is_public: bool,
1461 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1462 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1463 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1464 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1465 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1466 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1468 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1469 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1472 impl ChannelDetails {
1473 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1474 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1475 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1477 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1478 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1479 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1480 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1483 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1484 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1485 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1487 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1488 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1489 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1490 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1493 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1494 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1496 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1497 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1498 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1500 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1501 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1502 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1503 features: latest_features,
1504 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1505 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1506 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1507 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1508 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1509 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1510 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1511 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1512 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1513 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1515 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1516 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1517 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1518 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1519 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1520 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1521 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1522 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1523 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1524 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1525 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1526 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1527 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1528 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1529 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1530 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1531 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1532 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1533 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1534 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1535 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1536 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1537 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1538 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1539 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1540 config: Some(context.config()),
1545 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1546 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1547 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1548 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1549 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1551 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1553 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1554 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1555 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1558 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1559 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1560 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1562 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1563 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1564 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1566 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1567 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1568 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1570 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1571 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1575 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1577 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1579 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1580 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1581 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1582 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1584 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1585 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1586 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1589 macro_rules! handle_error {
1590 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1591 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1592 // entering the macro.
1593 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1594 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1598 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1599 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1601 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1602 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1603 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1604 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1608 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1609 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1610 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1611 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1616 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1617 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1619 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1620 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1621 action: err.action.clone()
1625 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1626 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1627 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1628 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1629 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1633 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1638 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1641 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1642 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1643 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1649 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1650 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1651 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1652 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1653 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1654 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1656 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1657 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1658 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1659 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1660 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1662 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1663 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1665 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1669 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1670 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1671 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1673 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1674 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1676 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1677 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1679 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1680 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1681 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1682 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1683 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1684 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1688 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1690 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1691 // In any case, just close the channel.
1692 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1693 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1694 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1695 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1696 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1697 shutdown_res, None))
1703 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1704 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1708 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1710 $entry.remove_entry();
1718 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1719 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1723 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1725 $entry.remove_entry();
1733 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1734 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1738 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1740 $entry.remove_entry();
1748 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1749 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1751 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1752 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1758 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1759 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1760 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1761 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1762 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1764 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1765 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1766 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1767 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1768 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1769 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1770 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1771 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1772 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1773 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1778 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1779 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1780 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1781 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1782 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1783 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1784 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1785 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1786 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1788 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1793 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1794 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1795 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1796 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1797 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1798 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1799 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1800 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1801 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1803 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1808 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1809 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1810 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1811 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1812 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1813 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1814 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1815 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1816 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1817 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1818 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1820 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1821 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1822 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1828 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1829 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1831 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1832 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1833 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1834 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1835 updates.announcement_sigs);
1836 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1837 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1840 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1841 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1842 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1844 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1846 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1847 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1849 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1850 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1851 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1852 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1857 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1858 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1859 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1860 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1861 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1862 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1863 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1866 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1867 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1868 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1871 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1872 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1873 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1874 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1875 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1876 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1877 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1878 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1882 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1883 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1884 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1885 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1891 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1892 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1896 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1897 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1898 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1899 while !processed_all_events {
1900 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1904 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1907 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1908 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1909 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1911 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1912 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1913 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1915 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1916 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1917 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1918 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1922 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1923 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1924 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1925 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1928 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1930 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1931 $event_to_handle = event;
1933 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1934 post_event_actions.push(action);
1939 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1940 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1941 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1942 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1945 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1946 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1947 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1948 processed_all_events = false;
1951 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1952 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1958 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1960 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1961 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1962 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1963 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1964 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1965 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1969 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1971 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1972 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1974 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1976 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1977 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1978 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1981 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1982 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1983 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1984 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1985 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1986 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1987 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1988 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1990 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1991 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1992 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1997 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1999 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2000 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2001 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2002 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2003 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2004 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2005 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2006 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2008 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2011 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2012 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2014 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2016 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
2018 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2020 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2021 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2022 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2023 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2024 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2025 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2026 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2036 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2037 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2038 &self.default_configuration
2041 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2042 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2043 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2046 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2047 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2049 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2051 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2055 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2060 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2062 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2063 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2064 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2065 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2066 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2068 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2069 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2071 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2072 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2073 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2075 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2076 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2077 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2079 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2080 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2081 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2082 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2083 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2084 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2086 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2087 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2088 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2089 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2090 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2091 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2095 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2096 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2100 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2101 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2103 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2105 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2106 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2107 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2108 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2109 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2110 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2114 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2119 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2121 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2122 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2125 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2127 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2130 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2133 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2134 node_id: their_network_key,
2137 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2140 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2141 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2142 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2143 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2144 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2145 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2146 // the same channel.
2147 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2149 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2151 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2152 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2154 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2155 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2156 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2164 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2165 /// more information.
2166 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2167 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2168 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2169 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2170 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2171 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2172 // the same channel.
2173 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2175 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2177 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2180 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2181 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2182 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2185 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2186 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2187 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2190 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2191 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2192 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2200 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2201 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2203 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2204 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2206 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2207 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2208 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2209 // really wanted anyway.
2210 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2213 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2214 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2215 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2216 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2218 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2219 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2220 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2221 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2222 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2225 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2231 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2232 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2234 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2235 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2236 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2238 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2239 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2240 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2241 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2242 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2243 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2244 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2245 total_msat: *total_msat,
2248 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2249 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2251 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2252 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2254 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2259 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2260 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2261 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2262 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2263 Some(transaction) => {
2264 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2265 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2270 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2271 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2272 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2273 reason: closure_reason
2277 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2278 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2280 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2281 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2282 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2284 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2285 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2287 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2288 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2289 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2291 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2292 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2293 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2294 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2295 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2297 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2298 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2299 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2300 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2301 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2305 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2306 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2307 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2308 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2309 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2312 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2313 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2314 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2315 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2319 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2323 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2327 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2328 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2329 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2330 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2333 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2337 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2338 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2339 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2341 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2342 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2344 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2345 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2346 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2347 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2349 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2351 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2352 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2353 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2356 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2357 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2358 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2359 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2360 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2361 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2364 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2365 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2366 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2368 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2369 /// the channel being closed or not:
2370 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2371 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2372 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2373 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2374 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2375 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2376 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2378 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2379 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2380 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2381 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2383 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2385 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2386 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2387 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2390 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2391 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2392 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2393 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2394 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2395 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2399 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2400 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2401 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2402 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2403 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2404 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2405 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2406 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2408 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2409 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2410 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2411 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2412 // ignore the result here.
2413 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2417 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2418 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2419 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2420 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2422 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2423 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2424 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2427 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2428 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2430 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2432 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2433 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2434 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2435 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2436 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2437 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2438 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2439 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2440 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2441 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2442 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2443 // Prefunded channel has no update
2444 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2445 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2446 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2447 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2448 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2449 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2450 // Prefunded channel has no update
2451 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2453 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2456 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2457 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2458 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2463 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2466 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2467 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2468 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2469 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2471 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2472 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2473 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2474 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2475 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2476 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2477 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2488 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2489 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2490 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2492 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2493 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2494 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2497 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2498 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2499 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2501 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2502 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2503 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2504 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2505 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2508 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2509 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2510 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2511 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2512 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2516 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2517 /// local transaction(s).
2518 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2519 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2520 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2524 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2525 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2527 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2528 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2529 return Err(ReceiveError {
2530 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2532 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2535 // final_expiry_too_soon
2536 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2537 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2539 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2540 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2541 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2542 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2543 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2544 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2545 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2546 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2547 return Err(ReceiveError {
2548 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2549 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2552 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2553 return Err(ReceiveError {
2555 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2556 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2560 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2561 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2562 return Err(ReceiveError {
2563 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2564 err_data: Vec::new(),
2565 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2568 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2569 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2570 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2571 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2572 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2573 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2574 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2575 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2576 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2577 return Err(ReceiveError {
2578 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2579 err_data: Vec::new(),
2580 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2583 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2584 return Err(ReceiveError {
2585 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2586 err_data: Vec::new(),
2587 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2590 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2594 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2596 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2597 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2600 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2601 phantom_shared_secret,
2604 return Err(ReceiveError {
2605 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2606 err_data: Vec::new(),
2607 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2612 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2615 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2616 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2617 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2618 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2622 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2623 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2624 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2626 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2627 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2628 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2629 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2630 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2631 failure_code: $err_code,
2637 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2638 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2641 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2642 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2643 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2645 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2646 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2647 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2648 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2649 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2650 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2651 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2652 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2654 macro_rules! return_err {
2655 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2657 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2658 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2659 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2660 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2661 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2662 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2668 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2670 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2671 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2673 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2674 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2678 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2679 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2681 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2683 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2684 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2685 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2686 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2687 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2689 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2692 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2693 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2694 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2696 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2697 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2698 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2701 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2702 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2703 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2704 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2708 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2709 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2710 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2713 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2714 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2715 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2716 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2717 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2722 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2723 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2724 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2725 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2726 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2727 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2728 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2729 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2730 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2731 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2732 // phantom or an intercept.
2733 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2734 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2735 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2739 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2742 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2744 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2746 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2747 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2748 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2752 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2754 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2755 // have no consistency guarantees.
2756 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2760 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2761 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2762 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2763 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2764 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2766 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2767 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2768 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2769 // we don't have the channel here.
2770 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2772 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2774 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2775 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2776 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2777 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2778 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2779 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2780 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2781 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2782 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2783 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2784 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2786 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2789 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2790 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2792 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2793 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2797 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2798 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2799 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2800 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2802 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2809 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2810 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2811 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2812 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2813 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2814 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2816 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2817 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2819 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2820 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2821 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2822 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2823 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2824 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2825 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2826 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2827 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2828 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2834 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2835 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2836 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2837 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2839 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2840 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2842 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2843 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2844 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2846 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2847 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2848 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2849 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2850 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2851 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2852 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2856 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2861 pending_forward_info
2864 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2865 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2866 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2868 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2869 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2870 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2872 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2873 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2874 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2875 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2876 return Err(LightningError {
2877 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2878 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2881 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2882 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2884 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2885 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2888 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2889 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2890 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2891 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2893 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2894 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2895 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2897 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2898 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2899 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2901 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2902 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2906 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2909 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2911 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2913 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2914 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2915 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2916 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2917 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2920 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2921 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2923 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
2924 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2925 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2926 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2927 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2928 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2929 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2930 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2932 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2933 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2934 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2936 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2938 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2945 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2946 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2947 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2950 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2951 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2952 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2954 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2955 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2956 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2958 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2959 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2960 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2962 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2963 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2965 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2966 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2967 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2968 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2972 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2973 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2976 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2977 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
2978 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2980 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2981 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2982 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2984 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2985 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2987 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2988 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2989 Some(monitor_update) => {
2990 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2991 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2992 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2995 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2996 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2997 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2998 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2999 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3000 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3001 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3002 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3008 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3009 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3010 // `channel_by_id` map.
3011 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3012 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3017 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3018 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3020 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3025 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3027 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3028 /// fields for more info.
3030 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3031 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3033 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3035 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3036 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3037 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3038 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3039 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3041 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3042 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3043 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3044 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3045 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3047 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3048 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3049 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3050 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3052 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3054 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3055 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3056 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3058 /// In general, a path may raise:
3059 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3060 /// node public key) is specified.
3061 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3062 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3064 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3065 /// relevant updates.
3067 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3068 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3069 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3071 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3072 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3073 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3074 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3075 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3076 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3077 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3078 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3079 self.pending_outbound_payments
3080 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3081 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3082 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3085 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3086 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3087 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3088 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3090 self.pending_outbound_payments
3091 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3092 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3093 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3094 &self.pending_events,
3095 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3096 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3100 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3101 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3102 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3103 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3104 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3105 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3109 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3110 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3111 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3115 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3116 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3120 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3121 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3122 /// retries are exhausted.
3124 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3125 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3127 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3128 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3129 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3131 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3132 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3134 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3135 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3136 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3138 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3141 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3142 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3143 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3144 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3145 /// never reach the recipient.
3147 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3148 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3150 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3151 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3153 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3154 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3155 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3157 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3158 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3159 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3160 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3161 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3164 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3165 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3167 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3170 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3171 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3172 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3174 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3175 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3176 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3177 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3178 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3179 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3182 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3183 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3184 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3185 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3186 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3188 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3189 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3190 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3193 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3196 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3197 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3200 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3201 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3202 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3203 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3204 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3205 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3206 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3207 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3209 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3210 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3211 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3213 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3215 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3216 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3217 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3218 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3219 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3220 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3221 } else { unreachable!(); });
3223 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3224 Err((chan, err)) => {
3225 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3226 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3228 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3229 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3230 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3236 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3238 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3239 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3244 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3245 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3248 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3249 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3250 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3253 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3254 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3255 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3264 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3265 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3266 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3270 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3272 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3273 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3275 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3276 /// across the p2p network.
3278 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3279 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3281 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3282 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3283 /// keys per-channel).
3285 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3286 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3287 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3289 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3290 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3291 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3293 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3294 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3295 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3296 /// for more details.
3298 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3299 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3300 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3303 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3304 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3305 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3306 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3311 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3312 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3313 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3314 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3315 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3316 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3317 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3318 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3322 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3323 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3324 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3325 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3329 let mut output_index = None;
3330 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3331 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3332 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3333 if output_index.is_some() {
3334 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3335 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3338 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3341 if output_index.is_none() {
3342 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3343 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3346 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3350 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3352 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3353 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3354 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3355 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3357 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3358 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3360 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3361 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3363 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3365 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3366 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3367 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3368 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3369 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3370 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3371 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3372 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3373 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3374 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3375 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3376 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3377 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3382 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3383 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3384 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3385 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3386 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3387 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3388 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3389 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3390 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3394 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3395 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3396 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3397 config.apply(config_update);
3398 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3401 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3402 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3403 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3404 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3405 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3413 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3415 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3416 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3417 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3418 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3420 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3421 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3423 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3424 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3426 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3428 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3429 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3430 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3431 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3432 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3433 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3434 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3435 pub fn update_channel_config(
3436 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3437 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3438 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3441 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3442 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3444 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3445 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3447 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3448 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3449 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3450 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3451 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3453 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3454 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3456 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3459 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3460 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3461 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3462 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3463 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3464 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3466 let next_hop_scid = {
3467 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3468 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3469 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3472 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3474 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3475 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3476 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3479 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3481 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3482 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3483 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3488 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3489 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3490 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3493 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3494 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3495 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3497 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3499 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3500 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3503 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3504 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3505 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3506 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3507 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3509 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3513 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3514 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3516 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3519 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3520 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3521 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3523 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3524 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3525 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3528 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3529 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3530 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3531 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3532 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3533 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3534 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3537 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3538 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3539 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3540 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3545 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3547 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3548 /// Will likely generate further events.
3549 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3552 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3553 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3554 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3556 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3557 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3559 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3560 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3561 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3563 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3564 match forward_info {
3565 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3566 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3567 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3568 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3569 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3572 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3573 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3574 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3576 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3577 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3578 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3579 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3580 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3581 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3584 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3585 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3587 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3590 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3591 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3597 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3598 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3600 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3604 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3605 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3607 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3611 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3612 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3613 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3614 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3615 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3617 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3618 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3619 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3620 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3621 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3623 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3625 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3626 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3630 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3631 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3632 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3633 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3639 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3642 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3645 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3646 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3647 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3648 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3649 // problem, not ours.
3655 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3656 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3658 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3663 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3664 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3665 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3668 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3669 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3670 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3672 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3675 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3676 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3677 match forward_info {
3678 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3679 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3680 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3681 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3682 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3685 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3686 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3687 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3688 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3689 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3690 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3691 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3692 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3694 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3695 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3696 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3698 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3699 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3701 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3703 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3704 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3705 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3706 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3711 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3712 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3714 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3715 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3716 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3717 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3719 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3722 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3724 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3725 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3726 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3735 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3736 match forward_info {
3737 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3738 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3739 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3740 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3743 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3744 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3745 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3747 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3748 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3749 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3751 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3752 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3753 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3756 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3757 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3760 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3763 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3764 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3765 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3766 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3767 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3768 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3769 phantom_shared_secret,
3771 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3772 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3773 // if routing nodes overpay
3774 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3775 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3777 total_value_received: None,
3778 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3783 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3785 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3786 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3787 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3788 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3789 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3790 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3792 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3793 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3794 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3795 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3796 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3797 phantom_shared_secret,
3799 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3800 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3802 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3805 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3806 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3807 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3808 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3809 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3812 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3813 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3814 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3815 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3816 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3817 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3819 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3820 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3821 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3823 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3824 .entry(payment_hash)
3825 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3826 .or_insert_with(|| {
3827 committed_to_claimable = true;
3829 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3832 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3833 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3834 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3835 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3837 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3838 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3839 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3841 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3842 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3843 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3846 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3848 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3849 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3850 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3851 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3852 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3853 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3854 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3855 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3856 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3857 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3859 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3861 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3862 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3863 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3864 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3865 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3866 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3867 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3868 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3869 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3870 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3871 committed_to_claimable = true;
3873 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3874 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3875 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3876 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3877 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3878 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3882 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3883 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3884 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3885 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3887 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3889 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3890 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3892 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3893 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3894 committed_to_claimable = true;
3897 payment_claimable_generated
3901 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3902 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3903 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3904 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3905 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3906 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3907 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3908 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3910 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3911 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3912 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3913 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3914 Ok(result) => result,
3916 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3917 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3920 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3921 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3922 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3924 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3925 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3928 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3929 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3930 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3932 check_total_value!(purpose);
3934 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3935 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3936 check_total_value!(purpose);
3940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3941 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3942 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3943 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3945 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3946 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3947 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3948 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3949 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3950 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3951 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3952 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3954 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3955 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
3956 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3958 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
3959 if payment_claimable_generated {
3960 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3966 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3967 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3975 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3976 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3977 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3978 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3979 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3980 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3982 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3983 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3985 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3987 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3988 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3989 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3991 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3993 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3994 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3995 events.append(&mut new_events);
3998 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4000 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4001 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4002 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4004 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4005 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4007 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4008 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4009 if background_events.is_empty() {
4010 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4013 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4015 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4016 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4017 // monitor updating completing.
4018 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4020 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4021 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4025 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4028 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4029 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4030 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update.update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4032 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4036 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4037 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4038 // however, ensure that.
4040 log_error!(self.logger,
4041 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4043 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4047 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4050 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4051 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4052 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4053 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4054 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4057 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4058 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4059 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4060 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4061 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4062 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4063 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4065 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4066 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4067 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4068 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4071 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4073 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
4074 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4078 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4079 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4080 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4081 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4082 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4083 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4084 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4086 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4088 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4089 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4090 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4091 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4092 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4093 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4094 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4102 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4104 /// This currently includes:
4105 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4106 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4107 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4109 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4110 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4111 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4113 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4114 /// estimate fetches.
4116 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4117 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4118 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4119 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4120 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4122 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4124 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4125 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4126 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4128 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4129 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4130 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4131 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4132 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4133 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4134 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4135 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4136 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4138 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4139 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4140 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4141 if needs_close { return false; }
4144 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4145 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4146 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4147 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4148 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4149 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4150 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4151 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4153 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4154 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4155 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4156 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4160 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4162 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4165 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4167 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4168 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4169 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4170 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4174 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4176 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4182 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4184 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4185 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4186 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4187 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4188 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4189 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4190 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4191 channel_id: *chan_id,
4192 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4200 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4201 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4206 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4207 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4208 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4209 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4210 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4211 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4212 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4213 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4214 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4215 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4216 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4217 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4218 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4219 // have no channels to the peer.
4220 let remove_entry = {
4221 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4222 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4225 entry.remove_entry();
4228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4233 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4234 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4235 // This should be unreachable
4236 debug_assert!(false);
4239 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4240 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4241 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4242 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4243 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4244 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4245 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4248 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4249 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4250 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4252 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4253 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4260 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4261 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4262 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4263 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4264 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4267 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4268 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4271 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4273 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4274 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4275 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4276 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4277 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4284 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4285 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4286 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4288 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4289 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4290 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4291 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4293 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4294 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4295 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4296 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4297 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4298 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4301 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4302 /// reason for the failure.
4304 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4305 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4308 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4309 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4310 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4311 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4312 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4313 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4314 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4319 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4320 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4321 match failure_code {
4322 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4323 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4324 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4325 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4326 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4327 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4332 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4333 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4335 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4337 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4338 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4339 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4340 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4341 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4342 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4343 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4345 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4347 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4348 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4350 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4355 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4356 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4357 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4358 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4359 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4360 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4361 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4362 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4363 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4364 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4366 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4367 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4368 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4369 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4371 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4372 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4373 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4374 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4375 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4379 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4380 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4381 // be surfaced to the user.
4382 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4383 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4384 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4386 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4388 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4391 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4393 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4397 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4400 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4401 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4402 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4403 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4407 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4408 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4409 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4410 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4411 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4412 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4413 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4414 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4415 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4418 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4419 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4420 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4423 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4424 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4425 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4427 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4428 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4429 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4430 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4431 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4433 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4435 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4437 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4438 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4439 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4440 push_forward_ev = true;
4442 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4443 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4444 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4447 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4450 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4451 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4452 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4453 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4454 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4455 failed_next_destination: destination,
4461 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4462 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4464 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4465 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4466 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4467 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4469 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4470 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4471 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4472 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4474 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4475 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4476 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4477 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4478 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4479 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4480 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4481 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4486 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4487 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4488 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4489 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4490 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4491 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4492 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4493 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4498 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4499 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4500 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4502 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4503 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4504 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4505 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4510 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4512 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4513 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4514 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4515 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4516 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4517 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4518 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4519 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4520 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4522 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4523 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4524 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4525 debug_assert!(false);
4529 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4531 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4532 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4533 debug_assert!(false);
4537 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4538 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4540 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4541 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4542 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4543 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4546 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4547 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4548 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4549 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4553 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4554 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4555 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4556 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4558 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4559 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4560 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4561 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4562 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4567 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4568 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4569 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4570 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4571 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4572 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4573 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4575 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4578 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4579 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4580 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4581 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4585 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4586 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4587 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4588 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4592 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4593 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4594 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4598 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4599 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4600 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4603 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4606 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4607 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4608 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4610 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4611 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4612 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4613 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4614 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4616 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4617 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4618 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4619 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4620 if let Err(e) = res {
4621 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4622 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4623 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4624 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4625 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4632 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4633 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4634 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4638 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4639 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4640 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4641 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4642 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4643 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4644 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4645 // again on restart.
4646 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4647 payment_preimage, update_res);
4649 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4650 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4651 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4652 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4653 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4654 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4658 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4659 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4662 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4664 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4665 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4667 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4668 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4669 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4670 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4671 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4672 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4673 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4676 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4677 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4679 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4680 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4681 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4682 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4684 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4688 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4689 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4690 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4696 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4697 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4698 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4701 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4702 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4704 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4705 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4706 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4707 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4708 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4712 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4713 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4715 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4716 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4717 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4724 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4725 /// update completion.
4726 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4727 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4728 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4729 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4730 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4731 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4732 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4733 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4734 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4735 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4736 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4737 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4738 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4740 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4742 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4743 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4744 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4745 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4748 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4749 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4751 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4752 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4753 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4758 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4759 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4760 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4761 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4766 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4767 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4769 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4770 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4775 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4779 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4785 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4786 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4787 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4791 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4792 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4793 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4799 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4800 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4802 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4803 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4805 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4806 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4807 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4808 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4809 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4815 let mut peer_state_lock;
4816 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4817 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4818 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4821 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4826 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4827 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4828 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4831 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4834 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4836 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4837 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4840 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4841 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4842 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4844 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4845 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4846 /// used to accept such channels.
4848 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4849 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4850 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4851 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4854 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4855 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4857 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4858 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4859 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4861 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4862 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4864 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4865 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4867 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4868 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4870 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4871 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4872 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4873 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4876 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4877 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4879 let peers_without_funded_channels =
4880 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
4881 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4882 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4883 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4884 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4885 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4886 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
4887 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4889 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
4890 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4893 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4894 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4895 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4896 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4897 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4898 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4901 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4902 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4903 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4905 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4906 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4907 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4908 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4909 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4910 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4911 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4912 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4915 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4916 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4921 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4922 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4923 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4927 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4933 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4934 /// or 0-conf channels.
4936 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4937 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4938 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4939 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4940 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4941 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4943 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4944 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4945 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4946 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4947 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4948 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
4949 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4953 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4956 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4957 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4959 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4960 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4961 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
4962 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
4963 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4964 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4966 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4969 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
4970 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
4971 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4974 num_unfunded_channels
4977 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4978 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4979 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4982 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4983 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4986 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4987 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4988 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4989 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4991 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4992 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4993 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4994 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
4995 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
4997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4998 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5000 debug_assert!(false);
5001 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5003 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5004 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5006 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5007 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5008 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5009 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5010 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5011 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5013 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5014 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5015 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5018 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5019 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5021 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5022 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5025 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5026 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5027 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5030 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5031 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5035 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5036 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5038 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5039 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5041 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5042 if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5043 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5045 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5046 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5047 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5050 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5051 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5052 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5053 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5054 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5055 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5056 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5059 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5064 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5065 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5067 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5069 debug_assert!(false);
5070 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5072 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5073 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5074 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5076 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5077 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5082 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5083 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5084 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5085 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5086 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5088 user_channel_id: user_id,
5093 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5094 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5097 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5099 debug_assert!(false);
5100 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5105 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5106 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5107 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5108 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5110 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5111 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5112 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5113 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5114 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5115 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5116 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5117 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5118 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5122 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5125 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5127 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5130 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5131 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5133 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5134 funding_msg.channel_id))
5136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5137 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5141 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5142 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5143 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5144 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5145 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5146 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5147 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5151 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5153 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5154 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5155 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5157 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5158 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5159 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5160 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5161 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5162 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5163 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5164 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5172 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5173 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5175 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5177 debug_assert!(false);
5178 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5181 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5182 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5183 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5185 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5186 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5187 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5188 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5189 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5190 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5191 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5192 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5193 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5194 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5199 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5203 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5204 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5205 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5207 debug_assert!(false);
5208 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5212 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5214 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5215 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5216 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5217 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5218 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5219 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5220 msg: announcement_sigs,
5222 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5223 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5224 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5225 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5226 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5227 // announcement_signatures.
5228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5229 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5230 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5231 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5238 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5239 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5248 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5249 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5250 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5254 debug_assert!(false);
5255 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5259 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5260 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5262 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5263 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5264 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5265 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5268 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5269 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5270 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5271 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5273 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5274 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5275 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5276 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5277 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5278 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5283 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5284 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5285 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5286 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5287 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5294 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5295 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5296 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5297 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5303 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5304 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5305 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5307 debug_assert!(false);
5308 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5310 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5313 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5315 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5316 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5317 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5318 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5323 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5324 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5325 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5326 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5327 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5328 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5329 } else { (tx, None) }
5331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5334 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5335 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5336 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5338 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5339 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5342 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5346 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5351 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5352 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5353 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5354 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5356 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5357 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5358 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5359 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5361 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5362 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5363 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5365 debug_assert!(false);
5366 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5368 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5369 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5370 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5373 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5374 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5375 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5376 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5377 match pending_forward_info {
5378 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5379 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5380 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5381 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5383 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5384 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5385 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5386 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5387 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5390 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5392 _ => pending_forward_info
5395 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5397 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5402 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5403 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5405 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5407 debug_assert!(false);
5408 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5410 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5411 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5412 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5413 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5414 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5419 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5423 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5424 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5425 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5427 debug_assert!(false);
5428 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5430 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5431 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5432 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5434 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5436 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5441 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5442 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5443 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5445 debug_assert!(false);
5446 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5450 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5451 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5452 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5453 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5454 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5456 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5463 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5465 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5467 debug_assert!(false);
5468 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5472 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5474 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5475 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5476 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5477 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5478 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5479 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5480 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5488 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5489 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5490 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5491 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5492 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5493 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5494 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5495 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5496 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5497 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5498 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5500 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5501 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5503 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5504 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5505 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5507 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5508 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5511 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5512 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5514 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5515 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5516 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5518 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5519 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5520 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5521 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5522 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5525 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5526 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5529 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5530 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5531 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5532 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5533 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5534 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5535 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5538 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5539 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5540 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5545 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5546 // payments are being processed.
5547 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5548 push_forward_event = true;
5550 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5551 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5558 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5559 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5562 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5563 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5564 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5566 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5570 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5571 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5572 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5573 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5574 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5576 if !forward_ev_exists {
5577 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5579 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5584 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5585 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5586 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5587 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5588 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5589 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5590 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5592 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5593 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5594 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5595 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5596 channel_funding_outpoint,
5597 counterparty_node_id,
5602 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5603 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5605 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5607 debug_assert!(false);
5608 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5609 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5610 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5613 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5614 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5615 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5616 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5617 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5618 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5619 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5621 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5626 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5630 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5632 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5634 debug_assert!(false);
5635 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5639 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5641 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5643 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5648 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5649 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5650 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5652 debug_assert!(false);
5653 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5655 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5656 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5657 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5659 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5660 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5663 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5664 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5665 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5666 msg, &self.default_configuration
5668 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5669 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5670 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5678 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5679 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5680 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5681 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5683 // It's not a local channel
5684 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5687 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5688 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5689 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5690 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5692 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5693 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5694 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5695 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5696 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5697 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5698 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5699 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5700 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5701 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5703 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5705 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5706 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5707 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5708 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5710 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5711 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5714 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5716 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5719 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5721 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5722 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5724 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5726 debug_assert!(false);
5727 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5729 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5730 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5731 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5733 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5734 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5735 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5736 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5737 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5738 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5739 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5740 let mut channel_update = None;
5741 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5742 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5743 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5746 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5747 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5748 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5749 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5750 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5751 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5752 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5757 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5758 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5759 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5760 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5761 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5762 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5770 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5771 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5774 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5775 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5780 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5781 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5782 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5784 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5785 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5786 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5787 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5788 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5789 match monitor_event {
5790 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5791 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5792 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5793 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5796 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5797 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5798 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5801 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5802 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5803 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5804 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5806 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5807 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5808 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5809 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5812 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5814 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5815 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5816 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5817 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5818 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5819 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5820 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5821 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5822 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5826 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5827 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5829 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5831 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5832 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5833 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5834 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5835 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5842 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5843 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5849 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5850 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5853 has_pending_monitor_events
5856 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5857 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5858 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5860 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5862 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5865 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5866 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5867 /// update was applied.
5868 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5869 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5870 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5871 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5873 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5874 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5875 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5876 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5878 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5879 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5881 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5882 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5883 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5884 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5885 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5886 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5887 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5888 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5889 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5891 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5892 has_monitor_update = true;
5894 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5895 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5896 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5897 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5898 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5899 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5900 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5902 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5904 continue 'peer_loop;
5913 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5914 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5915 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5918 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5919 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5925 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5926 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5927 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5928 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5929 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5930 let mut has_update = false;
5932 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5934 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5937 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5938 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5939 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5940 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5941 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5943 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5944 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5947 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5948 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5949 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5950 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5951 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5956 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5958 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5959 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5960 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
5966 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5967 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5975 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5976 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5982 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5983 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5985 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5986 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5987 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5988 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5989 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5990 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5991 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5992 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5993 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5994 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5995 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5996 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5997 assert!(should_broadcast);
5998 } else { unreachable!(); }
5999 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6000 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6001 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6004 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6008 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6011 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6012 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6014 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6015 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6016 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6017 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6019 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6021 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6022 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6026 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6027 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6029 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6031 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6032 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6034 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6035 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6036 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6037 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6038 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6039 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6040 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6041 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6042 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6043 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6044 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6047 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6048 /// stored external to LDK.
6050 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6051 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6052 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6054 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6055 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6058 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6059 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6060 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6061 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6063 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6064 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6065 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6066 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6067 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6069 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6070 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6071 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6072 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6073 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6075 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6076 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6078 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6079 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6083 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6084 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6086 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6088 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6089 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6091 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6092 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6093 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6094 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6095 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6096 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6097 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6100 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6101 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6103 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6104 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6105 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6108 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6109 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6111 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6112 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6113 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6114 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6116 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6117 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6118 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6119 Some(_) => continue,
6120 None => return scid_candidate
6125 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6127 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6128 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6130 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6131 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6132 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6136 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6137 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6138 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6140 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6141 /// times to get a unique scid.
6142 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6143 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6144 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6146 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6147 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6148 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6149 return scid_candidate
6153 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6154 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6155 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6156 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6159 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6162 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6163 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6164 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6165 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6174 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6175 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6176 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6177 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6178 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6182 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6183 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6184 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6185 events.push_back((event, None));
6189 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6190 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6191 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6195 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6196 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6200 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6201 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6204 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6205 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6206 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6207 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6208 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6209 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6212 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6213 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6216 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6217 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6218 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6219 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6221 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6225 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6226 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6227 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6228 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6229 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6231 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6235 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6236 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6237 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6238 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6239 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6240 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
6241 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
6242 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
6243 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6245 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6247 if further_update_exists {
6248 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6253 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6254 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6258 log_debug!(self.logger,
6259 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6260 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6264 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6265 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6266 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6270 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6271 for action in actions {
6273 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6274 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6276 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6282 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6283 /// using the given event handler.
6285 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6286 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6290 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6294 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6296 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6297 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6298 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6299 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6300 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6301 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6305 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6306 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6307 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6308 /// is always placed next to each other.
6310 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6311 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6312 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6313 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6315 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6316 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6317 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6318 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6319 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6320 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6321 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6323 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6324 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6325 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6326 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6329 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6330 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6332 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6333 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6336 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6337 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6338 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6339 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6340 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6341 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6342 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6346 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6347 events.replace(pending_events);
6356 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6358 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6359 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6360 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6361 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6362 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6367 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6369 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6370 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6371 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6373 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6377 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6379 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6380 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6381 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6382 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6383 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6384 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6388 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6390 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6391 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6392 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6393 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6394 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6397 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6398 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6401 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6402 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6403 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6404 let new_height = height - 1;
6406 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6407 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6408 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6409 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6410 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6411 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6414 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6418 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6420 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6421 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6422 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6423 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6424 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6425 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6429 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6430 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6431 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6432 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6434 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6435 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6438 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6439 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6440 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6442 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6443 if height < last_best_block_height {
6444 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6445 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6449 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6450 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6451 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6452 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6454 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6455 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6458 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6459 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6461 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6463 macro_rules! max_time {
6464 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6466 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6467 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6468 // having an explicit local time source.
6469 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6470 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6471 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6472 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6473 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6479 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6480 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6481 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6482 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6486 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6487 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6488 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6489 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6490 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6491 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6492 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6493 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6500 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6502 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6503 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6504 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6505 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6506 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6507 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6508 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6513 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6515 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6516 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6517 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6518 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6519 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6520 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6524 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6525 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6527 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6528 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6529 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6530 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6531 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6533 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6534 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6537 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6538 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6539 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6540 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6541 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6542 let res = f(channel);
6543 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6544 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6545 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6546 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6547 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6549 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6550 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6551 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6552 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6553 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6554 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6555 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6560 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6565 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6566 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6569 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6570 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6571 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6572 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6573 msg: announcement_sigs,
6575 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6576 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6577 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6579 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6580 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6581 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6586 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6587 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6588 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6589 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6590 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6591 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6592 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6593 // is always consistent.
6594 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6595 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6596 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6597 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6598 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6601 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6602 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6603 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6604 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6605 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6606 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6607 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6611 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6612 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6613 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6614 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6615 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6616 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6617 data: reason_message,
6627 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6628 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6629 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6630 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6631 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6632 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6633 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6634 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6635 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6636 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6638 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6639 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6640 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6644 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6647 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6648 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6649 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6650 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6651 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6652 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6653 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6654 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6655 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6658 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6659 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6660 _ => unreachable!(),
6662 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6663 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6664 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6671 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6673 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6674 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6678 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6680 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6681 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6683 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6684 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6687 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6688 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6689 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6692 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6693 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6694 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6695 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6698 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6699 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6700 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6701 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6704 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6705 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6707 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6708 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6709 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6710 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6711 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6714 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6715 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6716 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6717 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6720 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6721 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6722 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6723 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6726 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6727 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6728 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6729 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6733 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6734 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6736 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6737 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6738 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6739 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6740 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6741 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6745 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6747 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6750 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6751 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6752 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6753 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6756 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6758 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6761 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6762 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6763 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6764 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6767 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6769 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6772 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6774 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6777 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6779 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6782 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6783 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6784 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6787 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6788 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6789 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6792 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6793 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6794 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6797 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6799 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6802 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6804 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6807 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6809 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6812 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6814 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6817 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6819 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6822 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6823 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6824 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6827 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6828 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6829 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6832 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6833 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6834 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6835 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6836 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6838 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6843 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6845 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6848 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6850 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6851 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6853 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6854 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6855 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6856 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6857 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6858 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6859 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6860 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6861 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6862 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6863 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6868 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6869 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6870 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6873 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6874 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6875 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6878 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6880 // V1 Channel Establishment
6881 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6882 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6883 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6884 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6885 // V2 Channel Establishment
6886 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6887 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6888 // Common Channel Establishment
6889 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6890 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6891 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6892 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6894 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6895 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6896 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6898 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6900 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6901 // Channel Operations
6902 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6903 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6904 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6906 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6907 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6909 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6910 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6911 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6912 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6914 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6915 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6916 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6917 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6920 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6921 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6922 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6923 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6926 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6928 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6930 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6931 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6935 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6936 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6937 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6943 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6944 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6945 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6946 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6947 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6948 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6951 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6952 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6954 if inbound_peer_limited {
6957 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6958 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6959 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6960 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6961 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6962 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6963 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6964 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
6968 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6969 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6970 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6972 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6973 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6974 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6975 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6980 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6981 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6986 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6989 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6990 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6991 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6992 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6993 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6994 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6995 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
6996 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6997 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6998 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7002 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7003 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7004 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7009 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7010 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7011 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7012 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7013 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7022 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7026 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7029 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7030 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7031 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7032 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7033 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7036 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7037 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7038 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7040 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7041 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7042 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7046 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7048 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7049 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7052 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7053 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7055 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7063 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7064 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7068 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7069 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7072 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7073 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7076 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7077 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7080 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7081 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7082 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7083 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7086 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7087 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7088 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7089 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7092 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7093 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7094 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7095 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7098 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7099 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7100 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7101 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7104 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7105 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7106 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7107 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7110 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7111 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7112 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7113 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7116 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7117 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7118 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7119 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7122 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7123 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7124 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7125 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7128 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7129 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7130 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7131 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7135 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7136 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7137 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7138 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7141 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7142 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7144 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7145 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7146 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7147 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7148 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7151 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7152 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7153 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7154 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7157 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7158 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7159 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7160 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7163 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7164 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7165 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7166 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7167 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7168 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7169 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7170 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7171 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7172 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7173 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7174 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7175 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7176 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7177 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7178 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7179 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7180 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7182 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
7183 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7184 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7190 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7191 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7193 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7194 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7195 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7196 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7199 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7200 (2, node_id, required),
7201 (4, features, required),
7202 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7203 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7204 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7205 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7208 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7209 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7210 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7211 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7212 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7213 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7214 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7215 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7216 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7217 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7218 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7219 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7220 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7221 (7, self.config, option),
7222 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7223 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7224 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7225 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7226 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7227 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7228 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7229 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7230 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7231 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7232 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7233 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7234 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7235 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7236 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7237 (32, self.is_public, required),
7238 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7239 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7240 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7241 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7247 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7248 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7249 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7250 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7251 (2, channel_id, required),
7252 (3, channel_type, option),
7253 (4, counterparty, required),
7254 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7255 (6, funding_txo, option),
7256 (7, config, option),
7257 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7258 (9, confirmations, option),
7259 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7260 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7261 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7262 (16, balance_msat, required),
7263 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7264 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7265 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7266 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7267 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7268 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7269 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7270 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7271 (26, is_outbound, required),
7272 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7273 (30, is_usable, required),
7274 (32, is_public, required),
7275 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7276 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7277 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7278 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7281 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7282 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7283 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7284 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7285 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7289 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7291 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7292 outbound_scid_alias,
7296 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7297 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7299 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7300 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7301 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7302 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7303 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7304 confirmations_required,
7306 force_close_spend_delay,
7307 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7308 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7309 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7310 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7311 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7312 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7313 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7318 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7319 (2, channels, vec_type),
7320 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7321 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7324 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7326 (0, onion_packet, required),
7327 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7330 (0, payment_data, required),
7331 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7332 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7333 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7335 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7336 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7337 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7338 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7339 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7343 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7344 (0, routing, required),
7345 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7346 (4, payment_hash, required),
7347 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7348 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7349 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7353 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7354 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7356 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7358 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7359 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7360 reason.write(writer)?;
7362 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7363 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7366 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7367 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7368 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7369 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7376 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7377 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7378 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7381 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7382 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7383 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7384 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7388 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7389 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7390 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7391 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7392 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7395 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7396 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7397 // messages contained in the variants.
7398 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7399 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7400 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7402 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7403 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7404 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7405 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7406 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7409 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7410 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7411 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7412 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7413 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7415 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7420 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7425 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7426 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7427 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7428 (2, outpoint, required),
7429 (4, htlc_id, required),
7430 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7433 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7434 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7435 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7436 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7437 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7439 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7440 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7441 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7442 (2, self.value, required),
7443 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7444 (4, payment_data, option),
7445 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7446 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7447 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7453 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7454 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7455 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7457 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7458 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7459 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7460 let mut total_value_received = None;
7461 let mut total_msat = None;
7462 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7463 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7464 (0, prev_hop, required),
7465 (1, total_msat, option),
7466 (2, value, required),
7467 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7468 (4, payment_data, option),
7469 (5, total_value_received, option),
7470 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7471 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7473 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7475 if payment_data.is_some() {
7476 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7478 if total_msat.is_none() {
7479 total_msat = Some(value);
7481 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7484 if total_msat.is_none() {
7485 if payment_data.is_none() {
7486 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7488 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7490 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7494 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7497 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7498 total_value_received,
7499 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7506 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7507 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7508 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7511 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7512 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7513 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7514 let mut payment_id = None;
7515 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7516 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7517 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7518 (0, session_priv, required),
7519 (1, payment_id, option),
7520 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7521 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7522 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7523 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7525 if payment_id.is_none() {
7526 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7528 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7530 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7531 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7532 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7534 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7535 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7536 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7537 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7541 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7542 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7543 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7545 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7548 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7549 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7554 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7557 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7559 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7560 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7561 (0, session_priv, required),
7562 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7563 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7564 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7565 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7566 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7567 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7570 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7572 field.write(writer)?;
7579 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7580 (0, forward_info, required),
7581 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7582 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7583 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7584 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7587 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7589 (0, htlc_id, required),
7590 (2, err_packet, required),
7595 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7596 (0, payment_secret, required),
7597 (2, expiry_time, required),
7598 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7599 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7600 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7603 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7605 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7606 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7607 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7608 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7609 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7610 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7614 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7615 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7617 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7619 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7621 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7622 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7623 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7626 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7629 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7630 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7631 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7632 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7633 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7634 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7635 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7637 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7638 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7639 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7640 unfunded_channels += 1;
7645 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7647 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7649 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7650 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7651 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7652 channel.write(writer)?;
7659 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7660 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7661 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7662 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7663 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7664 for forward in pending_forwards {
7665 forward.write(writer)?;
7670 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7672 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7673 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7674 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7676 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7677 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7678 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7679 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7680 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7681 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7682 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7683 htlc.write(writer)?;
7685 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7686 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7689 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7690 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7691 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7692 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7693 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7694 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7695 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7698 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7699 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7700 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7701 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7702 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7704 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7705 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7706 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7707 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7708 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7709 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7710 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7715 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7716 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7717 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7718 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7719 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7720 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7721 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7722 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7723 0u64.write(writer)?;
7725 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7726 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7727 event.write(writer)?;
7731 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7732 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7733 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7734 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7735 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7736 0u64.write(writer)?;
7738 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7739 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7740 // likely to be identical.
7741 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7742 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7744 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7745 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7746 hash.write(writer)?;
7747 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7750 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7751 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7752 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7753 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7754 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7757 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7758 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7760 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7761 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7762 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7763 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7766 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7767 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7771 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7772 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7773 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7775 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7776 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7777 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7783 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7784 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7785 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7786 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7789 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7790 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7791 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7792 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7793 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7796 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7797 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7798 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7799 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7800 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7801 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7802 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7803 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7804 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7805 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7806 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7807 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7814 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7815 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7816 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7817 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7820 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7821 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7822 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7823 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7824 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7825 // check that the event is sane here.
7826 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7827 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7828 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7829 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7835 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7836 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7837 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7838 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7839 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7840 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7843 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7844 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7845 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7846 events.push_back((ev, action));
7847 } else if action.is_some() {
7848 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7855 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7857 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7859 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7860 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7861 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7862 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7863 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7864 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7865 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7866 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7867 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7868 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7869 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7870 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7871 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7873 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7874 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7876 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7877 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7879 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7880 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7881 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7882 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7883 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7884 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7886 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7887 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7889 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7890 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7891 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7892 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7893 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7898 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7899 pub entropy_source: ES,
7901 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7902 pub node_signer: NS,
7904 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7905 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7907 pub signer_provider: SP,
7909 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7911 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7912 pub fee_estimator: F,
7913 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7915 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7916 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7917 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7918 pub chain_monitor: M,
7920 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7921 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7922 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7923 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7924 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7925 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7927 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7929 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7930 /// deserialization.
7932 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7933 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7934 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7936 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7937 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7939 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7940 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7941 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7942 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7944 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7947 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7948 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7951 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7952 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7954 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7955 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7956 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7957 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7958 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7959 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7963 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7964 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7965 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7966 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7967 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7969 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7970 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7975 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7976 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7977 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7978 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7980 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7981 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7982 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7983 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7984 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7985 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7989 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7990 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7991 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7995 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7996 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7998 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7999 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8000 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8001 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8002 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8003 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8007 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8008 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8010 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8011 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8012 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8014 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8016 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8017 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8018 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8019 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8020 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8021 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8022 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8023 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8024 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8025 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8027 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8028 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8029 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8030 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8031 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8032 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8033 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8034 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
8035 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8036 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8037 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8038 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8039 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8040 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8041 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8042 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8043 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8044 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8045 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8046 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8047 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8048 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8049 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8050 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8051 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8052 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8055 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8056 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8057 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8058 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8059 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8061 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8062 let mut found_htlc = false;
8063 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8064 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8067 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8068 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8069 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8070 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8071 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8072 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8073 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8074 log_info!(args.logger,
8075 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8076 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8077 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8081 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8082 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8083 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8084 channel.complete_all_mon_updates_through(monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8085 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8086 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8088 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8089 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8091 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8093 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8094 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8096 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8097 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8098 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8099 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8103 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8104 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8105 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8106 // safely discard the channel.
8107 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8108 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8109 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8110 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8111 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8114 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8115 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8116 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8117 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8118 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8119 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8123 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8124 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8125 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8126 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8127 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8128 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8129 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8131 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8135 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8136 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8137 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8138 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8139 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8140 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8141 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8142 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8143 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8145 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8148 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8149 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8150 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8151 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8152 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8153 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8154 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8155 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8157 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8160 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8161 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8162 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8163 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8164 let peer_state = PeerState {
8165 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
8166 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8167 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8168 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
8169 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8170 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8171 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8172 is_connected: false,
8174 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8177 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8178 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8179 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8180 for _ in 0..event_count {
8181 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8182 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8187 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8188 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8189 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8191 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8192 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8193 // on-startup monitor updates.
8194 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8195 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8197 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8201 for (node_id, peer_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8202 let peer_state = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8203 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8204 for update in chan.uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates() {
8205 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.context.get_funding_txo() {
8206 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for channel {}",
8207 update.update_id, log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8208 pending_background_events.push(
8209 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8210 counterparty_node_id: *node_id, funding_txo, update: update.clone(),
8213 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8219 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8220 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8222 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8223 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8224 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8225 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8226 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8230 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8231 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8232 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8233 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8234 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8235 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8236 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8238 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8239 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8243 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8244 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8245 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8246 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8247 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8248 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8249 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8250 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8251 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8252 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8253 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8254 let mut events_override = None;
8255 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8256 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8257 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8258 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8259 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8260 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8261 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8262 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8263 (8, events_override, option),
8264 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8265 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8266 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8268 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8269 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8272 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8273 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8276 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8277 pending_events_read = events;
8280 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8281 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8284 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8285 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8286 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8287 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8288 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8289 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8291 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8293 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8294 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8295 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8299 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8300 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8301 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8302 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8303 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8304 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8305 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8307 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8308 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8309 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8310 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8311 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8312 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8313 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8316 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8317 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8318 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8319 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8320 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8321 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8322 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8323 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8326 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8327 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8328 retry_strategy: None,
8329 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8330 payment_params: None,
8331 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8332 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8333 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8334 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8335 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8336 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8337 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8338 total_msat: path_amt,
8339 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8341 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8342 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8347 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8349 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8350 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8351 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8352 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8354 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8355 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8356 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8357 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8358 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8359 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8360 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8361 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8362 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8363 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8364 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8369 !forwards.is_empty()
8371 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8372 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8373 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8374 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8375 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8376 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8377 intercepted_id != ev_id
8384 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8385 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8386 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8387 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8388 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8389 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8390 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8391 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8392 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8393 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8394 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8395 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8396 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8405 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8406 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8407 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8408 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8409 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8410 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8411 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8412 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8416 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8417 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8419 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8420 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8421 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8422 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8424 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8425 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8426 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8428 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8429 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8431 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8432 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8434 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8437 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8438 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8439 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8441 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8445 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8446 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8447 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8448 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8449 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8451 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8452 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8453 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8454 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8455 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8456 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8457 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8458 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8460 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8461 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8465 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8467 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8469 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8470 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8472 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8473 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8478 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8479 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8481 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8483 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8485 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8486 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8487 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8488 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8492 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8493 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8494 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8495 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8496 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8497 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8498 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8500 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8501 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8502 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8504 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8505 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8506 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8507 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8508 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8509 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8511 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8512 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8513 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8514 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8515 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8516 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8522 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8524 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8525 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8526 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8527 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8528 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8529 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8530 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8531 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8532 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8533 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8534 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8536 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8537 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8539 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8540 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8541 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8542 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8544 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8545 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8546 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8547 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8549 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8550 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8551 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8552 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8554 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8555 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8556 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8557 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8558 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8559 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8560 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8563 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8564 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8567 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8570 purpose: payment.purpose,
8571 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8577 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8578 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8579 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8580 for action in actions.iter() {
8581 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8582 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8583 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8585 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8586 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8587 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8588 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8593 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8595 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8596 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8600 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8602 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8603 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8604 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8605 router: args.router,
8607 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8609 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8610 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8611 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8612 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8614 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8615 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8616 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8617 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8618 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8619 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8621 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8626 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8628 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8630 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8631 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8632 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8633 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8634 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8635 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8636 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8638 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8639 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8640 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8642 logger: args.logger,
8643 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8646 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8647 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8648 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8649 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8650 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8653 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8654 //connection or two.
8656 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8662 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8663 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8664 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8665 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8666 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8667 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8668 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8669 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8670 use crate::ln::msgs;
8671 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8672 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8673 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8674 use crate::util::test_utils;
8675 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8676 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8679 fn test_notify_limits() {
8680 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8681 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8682 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8683 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8685 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8687 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8688 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8689 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8690 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8691 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8693 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8695 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8696 // to connect messages with new values
8697 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8698 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8699 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8700 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8701 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8702 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8704 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8705 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8706 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8707 // ... but the last node should not.
8708 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8709 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8710 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8711 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8713 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8714 // about the channel.
8715 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8716 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8717 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8719 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8721 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8722 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8723 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8724 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8725 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8726 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8728 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8729 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8730 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8732 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8733 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8734 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8735 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8736 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8737 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8739 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8740 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8741 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8742 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8743 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8744 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8745 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8746 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8748 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8749 // the channel info has updated.
8750 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8751 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8752 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8753 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8754 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8755 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8759 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8760 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8764 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8765 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8766 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8768 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8769 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8770 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8771 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8773 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8774 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8775 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8776 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8777 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8778 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8779 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8780 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8782 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8784 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8786 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8787 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8788 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8790 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8792 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8793 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8794 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8796 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8797 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8798 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8800 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8801 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8802 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8803 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8804 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8805 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8806 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8807 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8808 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8810 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8811 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8812 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8814 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8815 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8816 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8818 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8819 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8820 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8821 // lightning messages manually.
8822 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8823 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8826 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8827 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8828 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8830 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8831 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8833 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8834 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8836 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8837 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8838 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8840 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8841 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8842 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8844 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8846 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8848 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8849 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8852 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8853 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8854 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8855 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8857 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8858 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8859 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8860 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8865 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8866 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8867 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8868 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8870 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8873 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8874 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8875 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8876 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8878 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8883 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8884 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
8885 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
8888 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
8889 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8890 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8891 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8892 // fails as expected.
8893 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
8894 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
8895 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
8896 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
8897 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
8898 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
8899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8901 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
8902 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
8903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
8904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8905 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8906 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8907 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8909 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8910 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8911 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8913 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8914 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8915 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
8916 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8918 let route = find_route(
8919 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8920 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8922 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8923 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8925 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8927 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8928 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8929 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8931 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8932 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8933 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8934 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8935 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8937 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8938 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8939 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8940 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8941 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8942 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8943 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8945 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8947 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8948 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8950 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8951 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8952 let route = find_route(
8953 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8954 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
8956 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8957 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8959 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8960 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8961 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8962 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8963 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8965 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8966 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8967 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8968 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8970 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8972 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8973 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8974 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8976 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8977 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8978 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8980 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8981 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8982 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8983 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8984 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8985 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8986 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8987 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8988 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8990 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8993 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8994 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
8995 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8996 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
8997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8998 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9000 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9001 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9002 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9004 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9005 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9006 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9007 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9009 let route = find_route(
9010 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9011 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9013 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9014 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9015 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9017 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9018 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9019 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9020 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9021 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9023 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9024 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9025 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9027 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9028 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9029 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9030 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9031 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9032 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9033 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9034 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9035 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9037 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9038 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9042 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9043 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9044 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9047 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9048 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9050 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9051 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9053 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9054 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9055 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9056 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9058 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9059 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9060 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9061 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9062 let route = find_route(
9063 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9064 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9067 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9068 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9069 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9070 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9071 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9072 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9075 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9076 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9077 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9078 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9079 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9080 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9083 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9087 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9088 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9089 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9090 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9091 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9092 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9095 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9097 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9098 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9100 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9101 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9102 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9103 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9105 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9106 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9107 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9108 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9109 let route = find_route(
9110 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9111 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9114 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9115 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9116 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9117 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9118 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9119 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9120 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9121 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9124 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9125 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9126 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9127 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9128 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9129 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9130 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9132 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9136 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9137 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9138 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9139 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9140 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9142 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9143 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9144 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9145 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9147 // Marshall an MPP route.
9148 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9149 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9150 route.paths.push(path);
9151 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9152 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9153 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9154 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9155 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9156 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9158 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9159 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9161 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9162 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9164 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9169 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9170 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9171 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9173 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9175 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9177 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9178 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9180 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9181 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9183 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9186 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9187 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9188 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9189 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9190 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9191 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9194 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9197 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9198 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9203 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9204 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9208 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9210 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9211 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9213 total_msat: 100_000,
9216 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9217 // payment verification fails as expected.
9218 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9219 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9220 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9221 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9223 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9227 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9228 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9232 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9233 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9234 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9235 // the channel is successfully closed.
9236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9241 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9242 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9243 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9244 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9245 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9247 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9248 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9250 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9251 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9252 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9253 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9256 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9258 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9259 // as it has the funding transaction.
9260 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9261 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9262 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9265 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9267 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9269 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9271 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9272 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9273 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9275 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9278 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9279 // as it has the funding transaction.
9280 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9281 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9282 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9285 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9286 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9288 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9289 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9290 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9291 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9293 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9294 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9295 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9296 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9298 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9299 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9301 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9302 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9303 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9304 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9305 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9306 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9307 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9311 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9312 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9313 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9314 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9315 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9316 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9317 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9320 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9322 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9323 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9324 // closing transaction).
9325 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9326 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9327 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9329 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9330 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9331 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9332 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9333 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9336 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9338 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9340 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9341 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9342 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9344 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9346 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9347 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9350 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9351 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9352 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9355 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9356 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9357 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9360 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9362 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9363 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9365 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9366 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9368 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9369 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9374 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9375 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9376 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9377 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9378 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9379 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9380 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9381 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9384 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9385 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9386 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9388 // Test the API functions.
9389 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9391 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9393 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9395 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9397 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9399 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9401 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9405 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9406 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9407 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9408 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9409 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9410 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9412 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9414 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9415 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9417 let mut funding_tx = None;
9418 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9419 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9420 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9423 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9424 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9425 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9426 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9427 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9429 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9431 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9433 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9435 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9437 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9439 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9442 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9443 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9444 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9445 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9446 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9448 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9449 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9451 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9452 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9453 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9454 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9455 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9456 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9457 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9460 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9461 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9462 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9463 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9464 }, true).unwrap_err();
9466 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9467 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9468 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9469 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9470 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9471 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9472 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9474 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9475 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9477 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9478 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9479 }, true).unwrap_err();
9481 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9482 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9483 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9485 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9487 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9488 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9490 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9491 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9492 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9493 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9494 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9496 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9497 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9498 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9500 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9501 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9502 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9504 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9505 // "protected" and can connect again.
9506 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9507 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9508 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9510 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9512 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9514 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9515 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9519 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9520 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9526 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9528 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9529 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9531 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9533 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9534 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9537 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9539 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9540 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9541 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9543 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9544 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9545 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9547 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9548 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9549 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9550 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9554 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9555 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9556 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9559 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9560 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9562 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9564 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9566 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9567 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9569 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9570 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9571 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9572 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9573 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9574 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9577 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9578 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9580 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9581 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9585 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9586 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9589 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9590 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9591 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9592 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9593 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9595 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9596 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9598 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9599 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9600 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9601 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9607 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9608 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9610 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9611 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9612 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9614 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9615 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9619 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9624 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9625 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9626 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9627 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9630 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9631 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9632 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9636 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9637 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9638 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9640 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9641 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9643 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9644 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9649 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9650 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9652 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9653 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9655 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9659 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9660 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9661 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9662 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9663 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9664 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9665 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9666 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9668 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9669 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9670 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9672 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9673 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9674 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9675 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9676 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9678 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9679 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9682 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9683 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9684 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9686 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9687 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9688 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9689 ..Default::default()
9691 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9692 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9693 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9695 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9696 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9699 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9700 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9701 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
9702 ..Default::default()
9704 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9705 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
9706 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9709 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9710 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9717 use crate::chain::Listen;
9718 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9719 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9720 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9721 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9722 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9723 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9724 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9725 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9726 use crate::util::test_utils;
9727 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9729 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9730 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9731 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9733 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9735 use criterion::Criterion;
9737 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9738 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9739 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9740 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9741 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9742 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9743 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9745 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9746 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9748 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9749 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9751 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9753 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9756 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
9757 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9760 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9761 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9762 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9764 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9766 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9767 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9768 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9769 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9770 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9772 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9773 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9775 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9776 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9777 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9778 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9780 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9782 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9784 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9785 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9786 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9787 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9788 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9790 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9792 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9794 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9795 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9797 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
9798 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9800 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9801 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9802 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9805 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9806 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9807 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9809 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9810 } else { panic!(); }
9812 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9813 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9814 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9816 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9817 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9819 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9822 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9823 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9824 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9826 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9827 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9832 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9834 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
9835 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9836 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9838 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9839 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9840 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9841 match msg_events[0] {
9842 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9843 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9844 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9848 match msg_events[1] {
9849 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9853 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9854 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9856 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9857 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9862 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9863 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9865 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9866 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9871 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9872 macro_rules! send_payment {
9873 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9874 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9875 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9876 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9877 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9879 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9880 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9882 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9883 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9884 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9885 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9886 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9887 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9888 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9889 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9890 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9891 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9892 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9894 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9895 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9896 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9897 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9899 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9900 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9901 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9902 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9903 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9905 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9908 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9909 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9910 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9911 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9913 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9917 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
9918 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9919 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);