1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
291 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
292 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
293 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
297 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
303 payment_id.hash(hasher);
304 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
309 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
312 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
315 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
316 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
317 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
322 struct ReceiveError {
328 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
329 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
331 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
332 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
333 pub enum FailureCode {
334 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
335 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
336 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
337 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
338 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
339 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
340 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
341 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
342 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
343 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
344 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
347 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
349 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
350 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
351 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
352 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
353 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
355 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
356 err: msgs::LightningError,
357 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
358 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
360 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
362 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
364 err: LightningError {
366 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
367 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 shutdown_finish: None,
378 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
379 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
382 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
393 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
394 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
398 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
401 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
404 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
408 log_level: Level::Warn,
411 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
413 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
415 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
418 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
426 shutdown_finish: None,
431 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
432 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
433 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
434 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
435 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
437 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
438 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
439 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
440 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
441 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
442 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
443 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
445 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
449 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
450 struct ClaimingPayment {
452 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
453 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
455 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
456 (0, amount_msat, required),
457 (2, payment_purpose, required),
458 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
461 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
462 struct ClaimablePayments {
463 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
464 /// failed/claimed by the user.
466 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
467 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
469 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
470 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
471 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
473 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
474 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
475 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
476 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
479 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
480 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
481 /// quite some time lag.
482 enum BackgroundEvent {
483 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
484 /// commitment transaction.
485 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
489 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
490 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
491 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
492 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
493 /// event can be generated.
494 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
495 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
496 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
499 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
500 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
501 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
504 /// State we hold per-peer.
505 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
506 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
508 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
509 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
511 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
512 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
513 latest_features: InitFeatures,
514 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
515 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
516 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
517 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
518 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
520 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
521 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
522 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
523 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
525 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
526 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
527 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
528 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
529 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
530 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
531 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
532 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
533 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
534 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
538 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
539 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
540 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
541 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
542 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
543 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
546 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
550 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
551 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
553 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
556 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
557 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
558 struct PendingInboundPayment {
559 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
560 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
561 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
562 /// this payment being removed.
564 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
565 user_payment_id: u64,
566 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
567 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
568 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
571 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
572 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
573 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
574 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
575 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
576 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
577 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
578 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
580 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
581 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
589 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
591 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
596 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
597 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
598 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
599 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
600 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
601 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
602 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
603 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
604 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
606 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
607 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
609 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
610 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
612 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
613 /// to individual Channels.
615 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
616 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
617 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
618 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
620 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
621 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
622 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
623 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
624 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
625 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
626 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
628 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
629 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
630 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
632 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
633 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
634 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
635 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
636 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
638 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
639 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
640 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
641 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
643 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
644 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
645 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
647 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
648 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
649 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
650 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
651 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
653 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
654 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
655 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
656 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
657 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
658 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
659 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
660 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
663 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
664 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
665 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
666 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
667 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
671 // `total_consistency_lock`
673 // |__`forward_htlcs`
675 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
677 // |__`per_peer_state`
679 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
681 // | |__`claimable_payments`
683 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
689 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
691 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
695 // | |__`pending_events`
697 // | |__`pending_background_events`
699 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
701 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
702 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
703 ES::Target: EntropySource,
704 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
705 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
710 default_configuration: UserConfig,
711 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
712 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
718 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
720 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
722 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
723 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
725 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
726 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
727 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
728 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
730 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
731 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
733 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
734 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
735 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
736 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
737 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
738 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
739 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
740 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
742 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
744 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
745 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
747 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
749 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
750 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
751 /// and via the classic SCID.
753 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
754 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
756 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
758 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
760 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
761 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
762 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
767 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
768 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
770 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
771 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
773 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
774 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
775 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
776 /// active channel list on load.
778 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
779 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
781 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
783 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
784 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
785 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
787 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
788 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
789 /// the handling of the events.
791 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
792 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
795 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
796 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
797 /// would break backwards compatability.
798 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
799 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
800 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
802 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
803 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
805 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
807 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
808 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
809 /// confirmation depth.
811 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
812 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
813 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
815 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
817 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
819 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
821 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
823 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
825 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
826 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
827 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
829 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
830 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
832 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
833 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
834 /// keeping additional state.
835 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
837 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
838 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
839 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
840 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
842 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
843 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
845 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
846 /// are currently open with that peer.
848 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
849 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
852 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
854 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
855 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
856 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
857 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
858 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
860 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
861 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
862 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
863 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
864 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
865 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
866 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
867 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
868 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
869 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
870 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
872 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
881 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
883 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
884 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
885 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
886 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
887 pub struct ChainParameters {
888 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
889 pub network: Network,
891 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
893 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
894 pub best_block: BestBlock,
897 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
903 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
904 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
905 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
906 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
907 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
908 /// updates are ready for persistence).
910 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
911 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
912 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
913 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
914 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
916 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
917 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
920 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
921 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
922 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
925 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
926 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
928 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
929 persistence_notifier: notifier,
930 should_persist: persist_check,
931 _read_guard: read_guard,
936 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
938 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
939 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
944 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
945 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
947 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
949 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
950 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
951 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
952 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
953 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
955 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
956 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
958 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
960 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
961 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
962 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
963 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
964 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
965 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
966 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
967 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
968 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
969 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
970 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
971 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
972 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
974 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
975 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
977 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
978 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
979 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
980 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
982 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
983 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
984 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
985 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
986 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
987 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
990 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
992 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
993 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
996 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
998 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
999 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1001 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1002 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1003 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1004 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1006 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1007 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1008 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1009 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1011 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1012 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1013 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1015 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1016 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1017 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1019 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1020 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1021 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1022 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1023 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1024 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1025 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1026 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1027 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1028 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1029 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1032 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1033 /// to better separate parameters.
1034 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1035 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1036 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1037 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1038 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1039 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1040 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1041 pub features: InitFeatures,
1042 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1043 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1044 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1046 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1048 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1049 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1050 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1051 /// payments to us through this channel.
1052 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1053 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1054 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1055 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1056 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1057 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1058 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1061 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1062 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1063 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1064 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1065 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1066 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1067 /// lifetime of the channel.
1068 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1069 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1070 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1071 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1072 /// our counterparty already.
1074 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1075 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1076 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1077 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1079 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1080 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1081 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1082 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1084 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1085 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1087 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1088 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1090 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1091 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1092 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1093 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1094 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1095 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1096 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1097 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1098 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1101 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1103 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1104 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1105 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1106 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1107 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1108 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1109 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1111 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1112 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1114 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1115 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1116 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1117 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1118 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1119 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1120 /// this value on chain.
1122 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1124 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1126 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1127 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1128 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1129 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1131 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1132 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1133 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1135 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1136 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1137 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1138 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1139 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1141 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1142 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1143 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1144 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1146 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1147 pub balance_msat: u64,
1148 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1149 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1150 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1151 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1153 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1155 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1156 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1157 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1158 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1159 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1160 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1161 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1162 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1164 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1165 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1166 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1167 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1168 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1169 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1170 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1172 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1173 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1174 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1175 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1176 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1177 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1178 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1179 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1180 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1182 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1184 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1185 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1186 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1187 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1188 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1190 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1191 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1192 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1193 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1194 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1195 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1196 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1198 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1199 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1200 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1201 pub is_outbound: bool,
1202 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1203 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1204 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1205 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1206 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1208 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1209 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1210 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1211 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1213 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1214 pub is_usable: bool,
1215 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1216 pub is_public: bool,
1217 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1218 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1219 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1220 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1221 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1222 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1224 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1225 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1228 impl ChannelDetails {
1229 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1230 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1231 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1233 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1234 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1235 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1236 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1239 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1240 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1241 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1243 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1244 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1245 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1246 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1249 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1250 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1252 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1253 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1254 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1256 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1257 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1258 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1259 features: latest_features,
1260 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1261 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1262 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1263 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1264 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1265 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1266 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1267 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1268 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1269 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1271 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1272 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1273 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1274 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1275 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1276 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1277 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1278 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1279 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1280 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1281 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1282 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1283 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1284 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1285 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1286 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1287 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1288 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1289 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1290 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1291 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1292 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1293 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1294 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1295 config: Some(channel.config()),
1300 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1301 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1302 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1303 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1304 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1306 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1308 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1309 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1310 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1313 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1314 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1315 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1317 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1318 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1319 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1321 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1322 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1323 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1325 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1326 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1330 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1332 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1334 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1335 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1336 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1337 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1339 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1340 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1341 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1344 macro_rules! handle_error {
1345 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1348 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1349 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1350 // entering the macro.
1351 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1352 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1354 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1356 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1357 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1358 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1359 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1363 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1364 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1365 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1366 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1371 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1372 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1374 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1375 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1376 action: err.action.clone()
1380 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1381 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1382 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1383 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1384 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1388 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1395 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1396 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1397 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1398 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1399 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1400 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1402 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1403 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1404 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1405 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1406 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1408 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1409 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1411 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1415 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1416 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1417 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1419 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1420 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1422 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1423 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1425 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1426 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1427 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1428 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1429 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1430 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1436 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1437 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1441 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1443 $entry.remove_entry();
1451 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1452 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1456 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1458 $entry.remove_entry();
1466 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1467 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1469 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1470 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1476 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1477 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1478 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1479 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1480 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1482 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1483 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1484 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1485 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1486 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1487 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1488 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1489 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1490 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1491 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1496 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1497 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1498 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1499 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1500 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1501 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1502 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1503 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1504 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1506 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1511 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1512 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1513 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1514 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1515 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1516 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1517 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1518 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1519 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1521 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1526 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1527 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1528 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1529 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1530 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1531 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1532 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1533 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1534 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1535 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1536 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1538 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1539 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1540 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1546 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1547 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1549 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1550 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1551 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1552 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1553 updates.announcement_sigs);
1554 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1555 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1558 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1559 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1560 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1562 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1564 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1565 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1567 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1568 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1569 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1570 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1575 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1576 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1577 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1578 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1579 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1581 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1582 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1583 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1586 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1587 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1588 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1589 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1590 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1591 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1592 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1593 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1597 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1598 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1599 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1600 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1601 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1603 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1609 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1610 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1614 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1616 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1617 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1618 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1619 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1620 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1621 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1625 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1627 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1628 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1630 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1632 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1633 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1634 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1637 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1638 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1639 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1640 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1641 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1642 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1643 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1644 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1646 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1647 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1648 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1653 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1655 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1656 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1657 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1658 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1659 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1660 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1661 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1662 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1664 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1667 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1668 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1670 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1672 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1674 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1676 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1677 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1678 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1679 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1689 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1690 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1691 &self.default_configuration
1694 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1695 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1696 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1699 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1700 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1702 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1704 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1708 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1713 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1715 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1716 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1717 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1718 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1719 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1721 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1722 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1724 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1725 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1726 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1728 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1729 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1730 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1731 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1732 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1733 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1735 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1736 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1737 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1738 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1739 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1740 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1744 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1745 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1749 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1750 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1752 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1754 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1755 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1756 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1757 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1758 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1759 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1763 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1768 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1770 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1771 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1774 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1776 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1782 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1783 node_id: their_network_key,
1786 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1789 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1790 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1791 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1792 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1793 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1794 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1795 // the same channel.
1796 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1798 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1800 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1803 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1804 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1805 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1813 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1814 /// more information.
1815 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1816 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1819 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1820 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1822 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1823 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1825 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1826 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1827 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1828 // really wanted anyway.
1829 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1832 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1833 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1834 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1837 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1838 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1839 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1840 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1841 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1844 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1850 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1851 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1853 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1854 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1855 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1857 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1858 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1859 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1860 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1861 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1862 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1863 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1864 total_msat: *total_msat,
1867 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1868 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1870 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1871 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1873 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1878 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1879 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1880 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1881 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1882 Some(transaction) => {
1883 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1887 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1888 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1889 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1890 reason: closure_reason
1894 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1897 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1898 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1901 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1902 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1906 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1908 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1909 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1910 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1911 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1912 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1914 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1915 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1916 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1917 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1918 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1922 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1923 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1924 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1925 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1926 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1929 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1930 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1931 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1932 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1936 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1944 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1945 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1946 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1947 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1950 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1954 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1955 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1956 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1958 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1959 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1961 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1962 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1963 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1964 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1966 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1968 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1969 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1970 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1971 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1972 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1973 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1976 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1977 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1978 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1980 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1981 /// the channel being closed or not:
1982 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1983 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1984 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1985 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1986 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1987 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1988 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1990 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1992 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1993 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1994 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1995 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1996 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1997 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2001 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2002 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2003 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2004 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2005 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2006 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2007 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2008 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2010 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2011 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2012 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2013 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2014 // ignore the result here.
2015 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2019 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2020 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2021 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2022 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2024 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2025 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2029 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2030 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2031 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2033 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2035 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2037 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2040 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2041 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2042 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2043 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2044 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2049 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2052 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2053 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2054 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2055 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2056 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2057 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2058 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2059 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2060 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2061 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2062 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2063 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2074 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2075 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2076 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2078 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2079 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2080 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2083 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2084 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2085 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2087 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2088 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2089 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2090 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2091 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2094 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2095 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2096 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2097 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2098 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2102 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2103 /// local transaction(s).
2104 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2105 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2106 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2110 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2111 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2113 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2114 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2115 return Err(ReceiveError {
2116 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2118 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2121 // final_expiry_too_soon
2122 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2123 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2125 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2126 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2127 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2128 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2129 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2130 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2131 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2132 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2133 return Err(ReceiveError {
2134 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2135 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2138 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2139 return Err(ReceiveError {
2141 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2142 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2146 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2147 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2148 return Err(ReceiveError {
2149 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2150 err_data: Vec::new(),
2151 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2154 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2155 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2157 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2158 err_data: Vec::new(),
2159 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2161 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2162 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2164 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2165 phantom_shared_secret,
2167 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2168 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2169 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2170 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2171 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2172 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2173 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2174 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2175 return Err(ReceiveError {
2176 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2177 err_data: Vec::new(),
2178 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2182 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2184 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2187 return Err(ReceiveError {
2188 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2189 err_data: Vec::new(),
2190 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2195 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2198 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2199 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2200 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2201 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2205 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2206 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2207 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2209 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2210 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2211 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2212 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2213 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2214 failure_code: $err_code,
2220 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2221 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2224 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2225 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2226 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2228 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2229 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2230 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2231 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2232 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2233 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2234 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2235 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2237 macro_rules! return_err {
2238 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2240 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2241 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2242 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2243 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2244 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2245 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2251 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2253 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2254 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2256 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2257 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2261 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2262 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2264 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2266 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2267 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2268 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2269 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2270 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2272 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2275 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2276 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2277 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2279 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2280 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2281 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2284 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2285 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2286 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2287 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2291 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2292 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2293 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2296 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2297 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2298 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2299 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2300 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2305 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2306 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2307 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2308 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2309 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2310 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2311 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2312 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2313 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2314 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2315 // phantom or an intercept.
2316 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2317 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2318 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2322 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2325 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2327 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2329 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2330 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2331 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2333 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2334 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2335 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2337 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2338 // have no consistency guarantees.
2339 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2343 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2344 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2345 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2346 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2347 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2349 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2350 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2351 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2352 // we don't have the channel here.
2353 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2355 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2357 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2358 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2359 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2360 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2361 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2362 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2363 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2365 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2366 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2368 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2369 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2373 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2374 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2375 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2376 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2378 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2385 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2386 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2387 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2388 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2389 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2390 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2392 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2393 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2395 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2396 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2397 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2398 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2399 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2400 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2401 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2402 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2403 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2404 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2410 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2411 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2412 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2413 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2415 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2416 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2418 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2419 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2420 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2422 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2423 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2424 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2425 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2426 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2427 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2428 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2432 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2437 pending_forward_info
2440 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2441 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2442 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2444 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2445 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2446 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2448 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2449 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2450 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2451 if !chan.should_announce() {
2452 return Err(LightningError {
2453 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2454 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2457 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2458 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2461 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2464 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2465 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2466 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2467 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2469 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2470 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2471 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2473 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2474 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2475 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2477 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2478 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2482 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2484 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2486 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2488 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2489 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2491 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2492 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2493 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2494 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2495 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2496 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2497 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2498 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2500 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2501 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2502 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2504 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2506 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2513 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2514 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2515 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2518 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2519 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2520 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2523 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2524 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2526 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2527 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2528 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2529 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2530 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2532 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2534 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2535 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2536 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2537 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2540 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2541 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2542 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2545 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2546 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2547 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2549 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2550 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2551 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2553 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2554 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2556 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2557 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2558 Some(monitor_update) => {
2559 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2560 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2561 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2564 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2565 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2566 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2567 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2568 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2569 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2570 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2571 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2577 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2578 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2579 // `channel_by_id` map.
2580 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2581 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2586 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2587 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2589 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2594 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2596 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2597 /// fields for more info.
2599 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2600 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2602 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2604 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2605 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2606 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2607 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2608 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2610 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2611 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2612 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2613 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2614 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2616 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2617 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2618 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2619 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2621 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2623 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2624 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2625 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2627 /// In general, a path may raise:
2628 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2629 /// node public key) is specified.
2630 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2631 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2633 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2634 /// relevant updates.
2636 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2637 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2638 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2640 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2641 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2642 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2643 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2644 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2645 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2646 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2648 self.pending_outbound_payments
2649 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2650 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2651 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2654 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2655 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2656 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2659 self.pending_outbound_payments
2660 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2661 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2662 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2663 &self.pending_events,
2664 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2665 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2669 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2670 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2672 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2673 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2674 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2678 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2679 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2680 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2684 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2685 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2686 /// retries are exhausted.
2688 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2689 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2691 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2692 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2693 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2695 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2696 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2698 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2699 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2700 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2702 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2705 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2706 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2707 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2708 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2709 /// never reach the recipient.
2711 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2712 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2714 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2715 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2717 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2719 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2720 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2721 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2723 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2724 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2725 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2726 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2727 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2730 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2731 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2733 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2736 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2737 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2738 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2740 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2741 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2742 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2743 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2744 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2745 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2748 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2749 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2750 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2751 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2752 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2754 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2755 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2756 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2759 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2762 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2763 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2766 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2767 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2768 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2769 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2770 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2772 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2773 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2779 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2781 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2783 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2784 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2785 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2786 } else { unreachable!(); })
2789 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2792 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2793 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2796 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2797 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2803 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2808 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2811 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2812 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2813 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2822 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2823 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2824 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2828 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2830 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2831 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2833 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2834 /// across the p2p network.
2836 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2837 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2839 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2840 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2841 /// keys per-channel).
2843 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2844 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2845 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2847 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2848 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2849 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2851 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2852 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2853 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2854 /// for more details.
2856 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2857 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2858 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2861 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2862 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2863 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2864 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2869 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2870 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2871 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2872 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2873 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2874 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2875 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2879 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2880 let mut output_index = None;
2881 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2882 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2883 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2884 if output_index.is_some() {
2885 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2886 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2889 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2890 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2891 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2894 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2897 if output_index.is_none() {
2898 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2899 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2902 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2906 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2908 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2909 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2910 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2911 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2913 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2914 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2916 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2917 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2919 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2921 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2922 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2923 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2924 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2925 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2926 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2927 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2928 pub fn update_channel_config(
2929 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2930 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2931 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2933 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2938 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2941 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2942 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2945 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2946 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2947 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2948 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2952 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2953 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2954 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2957 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2958 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2959 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2960 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2961 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2969 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2970 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2972 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2973 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2975 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2976 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2977 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2978 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2979 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2981 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2982 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2984 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2987 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2988 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2989 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2990 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2991 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2994 let next_hop_scid = {
2995 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2996 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2997 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2998 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2999 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3000 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3002 if !chan.is_usable() {
3003 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3004 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3007 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3009 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3010 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3015 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3016 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3017 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3020 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3021 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3022 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3024 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3026 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3027 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3030 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3031 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3032 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3033 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3034 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3036 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3040 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3041 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3043 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3046 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3047 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3048 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3050 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3051 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3052 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3055 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3056 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3057 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3058 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3059 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3060 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3061 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3064 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3065 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3066 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3067 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3072 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3074 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3075 /// Will likely generate further events.
3076 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3079 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3080 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3081 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3083 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3084 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3086 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3087 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3088 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3090 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3091 match forward_info {
3092 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3093 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3094 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3095 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3096 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3099 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3100 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3101 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3103 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3104 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3105 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3106 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3107 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3108 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3111 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3112 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3114 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3117 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3118 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3124 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3125 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3127 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3131 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3132 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3134 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3138 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3139 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3140 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3141 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3142 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3144 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3145 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3146 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3147 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3148 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3150 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3152 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3153 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3157 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3158 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3159 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3160 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3166 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3169 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3172 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3173 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3174 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3175 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3176 // problem, not ours.
3182 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3183 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3185 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3190 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3191 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3192 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3195 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3197 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3199 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3203 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3204 match forward_info {
3205 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3206 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3207 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3208 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3209 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3213 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3214 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3215 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3216 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3217 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3218 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3219 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3221 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3222 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3223 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3225 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3226 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3228 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3230 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3231 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3232 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3233 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3238 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3239 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3241 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3243 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3244 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3246 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3249 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3251 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3252 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3253 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3262 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3263 match forward_info {
3264 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3265 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3266 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3267 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3270 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3271 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3272 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3273 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3275 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3276 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3278 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3281 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3282 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3283 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3284 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3285 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3286 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3287 phantom_shared_secret,
3289 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3290 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3291 // if routing nodes overpay
3292 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3293 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3295 total_value_received: None,
3296 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3301 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3302 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3303 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3304 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3305 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3307 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3308 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3309 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3310 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3311 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3312 phantom_shared_secret,
3314 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3315 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3319 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3320 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3321 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3322 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3323 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3326 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3327 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3328 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3330 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3331 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3332 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3335 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3336 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3337 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3340 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3341 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3342 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3343 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3345 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3349 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3350 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3351 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3352 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3353 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3354 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3356 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3357 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3359 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3361 _ => unreachable!(),
3364 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3365 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3366 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3367 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3368 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3370 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3371 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3372 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3373 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3374 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3375 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3376 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3377 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3378 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3382 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3383 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3385 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3387 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3388 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3390 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3392 payment_claimable_generated
3396 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3397 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3398 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3399 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3400 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3401 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3402 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3403 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3404 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3405 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3406 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3407 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3408 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3409 Ok(result) => result,
3411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3412 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3416 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3417 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3418 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3420 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3421 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3425 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3427 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3428 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3429 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3430 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3433 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3434 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3435 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3436 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3437 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3438 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3439 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3440 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3441 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3445 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3446 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3449 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3450 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3451 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3458 if payment_data.is_none() {
3459 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3460 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3463 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3464 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3466 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3467 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3469 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3472 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3473 if payment_claimable_generated {
3474 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3480 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3481 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3489 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3490 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3491 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3492 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3493 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3494 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3496 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3497 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3499 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3501 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3502 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3503 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3505 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3507 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3508 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3509 events.append(&mut new_events);
3512 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3514 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3515 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3517 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3518 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3519 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3520 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3521 if background_events.is_empty() {
3525 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3527 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3528 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3529 // monitor updating completing.
3530 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3537 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3538 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3539 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3540 self.process_background_events();
3543 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3544 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3545 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3546 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3548 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3549 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3551 if !chan.is_live() {
3552 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3553 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3554 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3557 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3559 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3560 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3564 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3565 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3566 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3567 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3568 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3569 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3570 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3572 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3575 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3576 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3577 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3578 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3579 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3580 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3588 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3590 /// This currently includes:
3591 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3592 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3593 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3595 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3596 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3597 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3599 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3600 /// estimate fetches.
3602 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3603 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3604 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3605 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3606 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3607 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3609 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3611 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3612 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3613 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3615 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3616 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3619 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3620 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3621 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3622 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3623 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3625 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3626 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3627 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3628 if needs_close { return false; }
3631 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3632 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3633 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3634 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3635 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3636 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3637 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3638 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3642 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3643 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3645 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3646 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3651 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3652 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3657 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3661 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3662 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3667 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3668 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3669 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3670 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3671 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3672 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3673 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3674 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3675 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3676 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3677 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3679 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3680 // have no channels to the peer.
3681 let remove_entry = {
3682 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3683 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3686 entry.remove_entry();
3689 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3694 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3695 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3696 // This should be unreachable
3697 debug_assert!(false);
3700 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3701 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3702 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3703 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3704 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3705 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3707 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3708 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3709 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3711 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3718 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3719 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3720 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3721 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3722 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3725 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3726 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3729 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3731 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3732 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3733 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3734 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3735 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3742 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3743 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3744 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3746 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3747 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3748 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3749 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3751 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3752 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3753 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3754 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3755 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3756 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3759 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3760 /// reason for the failure.
3762 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3763 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3766 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3767 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3768 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3769 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3770 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3771 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3772 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3777 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3778 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3779 match failure_code {
3780 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3781 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3782 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3783 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3784 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3785 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3790 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3791 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3793 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3795 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3796 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3797 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3798 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3799 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3800 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3801 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3803 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3805 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3806 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3808 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3813 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3814 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3815 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3816 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3817 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3818 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3819 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3820 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3821 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3822 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3824 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3825 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3826 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3827 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3829 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3830 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3831 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3832 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3833 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3837 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3838 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3839 // be surfaced to the user.
3840 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3841 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3842 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3844 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3845 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3846 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3847 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3849 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3851 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3855 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3858 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3859 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3860 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3861 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3865 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3866 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3867 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3868 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3869 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3870 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3871 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3872 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3873 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3876 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3877 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3878 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3881 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3882 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3883 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3885 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3886 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3887 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3888 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3889 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3891 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3892 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3893 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3895 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3896 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3897 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3898 push_forward_ev = true;
3900 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3902 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3905 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3908 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3909 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3910 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3911 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3912 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3913 failed_next_destination: destination,
3919 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3920 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3922 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3923 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3924 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3926 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3927 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3928 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3929 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3931 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3932 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3933 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3934 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3935 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3936 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3937 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3942 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3943 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3944 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3945 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3946 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3947 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3948 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3949 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3954 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3955 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3956 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3958 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3959 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3960 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3961 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3966 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3968 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3969 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3970 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3971 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3972 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3974 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3975 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3977 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3978 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3979 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3980 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3981 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3983 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3984 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
3985 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3986 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3987 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3989 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3990 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3991 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3998 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3999 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4007 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
4012 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4013 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4014 debug_assert!(false);
4018 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4020 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4021 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4022 debug_assert!(false);
4026 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4028 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4029 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4030 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4031 if sources.len() != 1 {
4032 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4033 debug_assert!(false);
4039 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4041 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4042 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4043 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4044 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4047 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4048 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4049 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4050 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4054 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4055 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4056 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4057 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4059 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4060 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4061 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4062 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4063 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4068 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4069 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4070 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4071 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4072 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4073 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4074 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4076 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4079 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4080 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4081 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4082 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4086 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4087 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4088 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4089 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4091 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4092 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4093 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4094 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4098 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4099 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4100 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4104 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4105 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4106 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4107 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4108 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4109 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4111 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4112 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4113 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4114 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4115 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4117 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4118 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4119 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4120 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4121 if let Err(e) = res {
4122 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4123 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4124 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4125 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4126 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4132 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4133 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4134 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4138 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4139 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4140 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4141 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4142 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4143 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4144 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4145 // again on restart.
4146 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4147 payment_preimage, update_res);
4149 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4150 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4151 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4152 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4153 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4154 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4158 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4159 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4162 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4164 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4165 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4167 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4168 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4169 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4170 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4171 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4172 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4173 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4176 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4177 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4179 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4181 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4184 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4188 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4189 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4190 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4196 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4197 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4198 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4201 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4202 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4204 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4205 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4206 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4207 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4208 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4212 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4213 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4219 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4220 /// update completion.
4221 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4222 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4223 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4224 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4225 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4226 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4228 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4229 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4230 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4231 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4232 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4233 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4235 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4237 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4238 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4239 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4240 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4243 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4244 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4246 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4247 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4248 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4253 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4254 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4255 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4256 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4261 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4262 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4263 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4264 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4265 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4270 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4274 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4280 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4281 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4282 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4286 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4287 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4288 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4294 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4295 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4297 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4298 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4300 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4301 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4302 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4303 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4304 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4310 let mut peer_state_lock;
4311 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4312 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4313 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4316 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4318 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4321 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4322 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4323 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4326 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4329 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4331 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4332 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4335 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4336 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4337 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4339 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4340 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4341 /// used to accept such channels.
4343 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4344 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4345 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4346 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4349 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4350 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4352 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4353 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4354 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4356 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4357 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4359 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4360 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4362 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4363 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4365 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4366 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4367 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4368 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4371 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4372 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4374 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4375 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4376 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4377 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4378 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4379 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4380 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4381 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4383 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4384 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4387 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4388 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4389 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4390 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4391 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4392 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4395 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4396 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4397 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4399 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4400 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4401 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4402 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4403 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4404 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4405 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4406 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4409 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4410 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4411 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4415 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4416 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4417 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4421 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4427 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4428 /// or 0-conf channels.
4430 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4431 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4432 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4433 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4434 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4435 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4437 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4438 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4439 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4440 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4441 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4442 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4443 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4447 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4450 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4451 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4453 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4454 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4455 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4456 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4458 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4461 num_unfunded_channels
4464 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4465 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4466 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4469 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4470 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4473 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4474 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4475 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4476 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4478 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4479 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4480 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4481 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4483 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4484 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4486 debug_assert!(false);
4487 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4489 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4490 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4492 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4493 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4494 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4495 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4496 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4497 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4499 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4500 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4501 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4504 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4505 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4507 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4508 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4511 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4512 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4513 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4516 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4517 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4521 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4522 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4523 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4524 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4526 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4527 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4528 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4531 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4532 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4533 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4536 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4537 pending_events.push(
4538 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4539 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4540 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4541 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4542 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4543 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4548 entry.insert(channel);
4554 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4555 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4556 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4557 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4559 debug_assert!(false);
4560 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4564 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4566 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4567 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4572 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4573 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4574 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4575 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4576 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4578 user_channel_id: user_id,
4583 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4584 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4586 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4587 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4589 debug_assert!(false);
4590 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4593 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4594 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4595 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4596 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4598 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4600 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4603 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4604 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4605 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4607 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4608 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4610 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4611 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4612 funding_msg.channel_id))
4614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4615 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4619 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4620 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4621 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4622 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4623 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4624 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4625 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4629 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4631 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4632 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4633 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4635 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4636 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4637 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4638 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4639 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4640 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4641 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4642 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4650 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4651 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4653 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4655 debug_assert!(false);
4656 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4661 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4663 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4664 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4665 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4666 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4667 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4668 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4669 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4670 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4671 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4672 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4681 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4683 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4685 debug_assert!(false);
4686 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4690 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4692 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4693 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4694 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4695 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4696 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4697 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4698 msg: announcement_sigs,
4700 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4701 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4702 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4703 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4704 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4705 // announcement_signatures.
4706 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4707 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4708 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4709 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4716 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4717 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4726 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4727 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4728 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4730 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4732 debug_assert!(false);
4733 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4737 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4740 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4741 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4742 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4743 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4746 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4747 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4748 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4749 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4751 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4752 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4753 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4754 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4755 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4756 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4761 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4762 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4763 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4764 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4765 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4772 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4773 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4774 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4775 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4781 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4783 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4785 debug_assert!(false);
4786 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4788 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4793 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4794 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4795 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4796 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4801 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4802 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4803 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4804 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4805 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4806 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4807 } else { (tx, None) }
4809 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4812 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4813 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4814 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4816 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4817 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4820 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4824 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4829 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4830 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4831 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4832 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4834 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4835 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4836 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4837 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4839 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4840 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4841 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4843 debug_assert!(false);
4844 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4846 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4848 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4851 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4852 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4853 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4854 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4855 match pending_forward_info {
4856 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4857 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4858 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4859 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4861 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4862 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4863 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4864 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4865 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4868 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4870 _ => pending_forward_info
4873 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4880 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4881 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4885 debug_assert!(false);
4886 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4890 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4892 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4897 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4901 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4903 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4905 debug_assert!(false);
4906 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4908 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4909 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4910 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4911 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4912 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4919 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4921 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4923 debug_assert!(false);
4924 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4926 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4927 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4928 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4929 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4930 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4931 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4932 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4934 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4941 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4943 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4945 debug_assert!(false);
4946 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4950 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4952 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4953 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4954 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4955 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4956 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4957 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4964 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4965 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4966 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4967 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4968 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4969 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4970 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4971 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4972 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4973 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4974 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4976 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4977 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4979 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4980 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4981 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4983 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4984 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4987 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4988 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4990 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4991 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4992 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4993 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4994 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4995 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4996 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4997 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4998 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5001 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5002 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5005 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5006 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5007 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5008 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5009 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5010 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5011 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5014 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5015 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5016 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5021 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5022 // payments are being processed.
5023 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5024 push_forward_event = true;
5026 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5027 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5034 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5035 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5038 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5039 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5040 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5042 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5046 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5047 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5048 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5049 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5050 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5052 if !forward_ev_exists {
5053 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5055 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5060 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5061 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5063 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5065 debug_assert!(false);
5066 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5067 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5068 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5069 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5070 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5071 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5072 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5073 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5074 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5075 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5076 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5077 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5082 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5086 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5087 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5088 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5090 debug_assert!(false);
5091 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5093 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5094 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5095 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5096 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5097 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5099 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5104 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5105 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5106 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5108 debug_assert!(false);
5109 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5111 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5112 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5113 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5115 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5119 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5120 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5121 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5122 msg, &self.default_configuration
5124 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5125 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5126 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5129 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5134 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5135 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5136 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5137 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5139 // It's not a local channel
5140 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5143 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5144 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5145 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5146 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5148 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5149 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5150 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5151 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5152 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5153 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5154 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5155 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5156 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5157 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5161 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5162 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5163 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5164 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5166 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5167 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5170 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5172 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5175 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5177 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5178 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5180 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5182 debug_assert!(false);
5183 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5185 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5186 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5187 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5189 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5190 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5191 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5192 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5193 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5194 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5195 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5196 let mut channel_update = None;
5197 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5198 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5199 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5202 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5203 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5204 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5205 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5206 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5207 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5208 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5213 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5214 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5215 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5216 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5217 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5218 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5222 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5226 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5227 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5230 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5231 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5236 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5237 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5238 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5240 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5241 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5242 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5243 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5244 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5245 match monitor_event {
5246 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5247 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5249 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5252 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5253 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5254 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5257 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5258 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5259 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5260 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5262 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5263 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5264 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5265 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5268 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5270 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5273 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5274 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5275 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5276 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5277 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5278 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5282 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5283 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5285 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5287 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5288 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5289 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5290 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5291 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5298 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5299 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5305 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5306 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5309 has_pending_monitor_events
5312 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5313 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5314 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5316 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5317 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5318 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5319 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5321 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5326 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5327 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5328 /// update was applied.
5329 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5330 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5331 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5332 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5334 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5335 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5336 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5337 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5340 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5343 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5344 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5345 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5346 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5347 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5348 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5349 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5350 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5352 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5353 has_monitor_update = true;
5355 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5356 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5357 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5358 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5359 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5360 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5361 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5363 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5365 continue 'peer_loop;
5374 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5375 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5376 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5379 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5380 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5386 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5387 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5388 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5389 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5390 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5391 let mut has_update = false;
5393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5395 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5398 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5399 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5400 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5401 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5402 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5404 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5405 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5408 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5409 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5410 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5411 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5417 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5419 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5420 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5421 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5427 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5428 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5436 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5437 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5443 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5444 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5446 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5447 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5448 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5449 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5450 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5451 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5452 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5453 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5454 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5455 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5456 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5457 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5458 assert!(should_broadcast);
5459 } else { unreachable!(); }
5460 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5462 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5466 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5467 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5469 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5473 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5476 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5477 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5479 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5480 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5481 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5482 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5483 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5484 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5485 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5486 // never fail a payment too early.
5487 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5489 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5492 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5497 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5500 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5501 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5503 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5504 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5505 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5506 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5508 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5510 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5511 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5515 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5516 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5518 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5520 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5521 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5523 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5524 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5525 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5526 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5527 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5528 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5529 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5530 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5531 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5532 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5533 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5536 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5537 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5539 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5542 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5544 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5546 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5547 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5548 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5549 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5550 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5553 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5554 /// stored external to LDK.
5556 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5557 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5558 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5560 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5561 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5564 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5565 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5566 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5567 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5569 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5570 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5571 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5572 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5573 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5575 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5576 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5577 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5578 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5579 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5581 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5582 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5584 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5585 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5589 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5590 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5592 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5594 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5595 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5597 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5598 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5599 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5600 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5601 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5602 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5603 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5606 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5607 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5609 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5612 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5614 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5616 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5617 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5620 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5621 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5623 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5624 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5625 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5628 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5629 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5631 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5632 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5633 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5634 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5636 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5637 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5638 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5639 Some(_) => continue,
5640 None => return scid_candidate
5645 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5647 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5648 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5650 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5651 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5652 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5656 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5657 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5658 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5660 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5661 /// times to get a unique scid.
5662 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5663 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5664 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5666 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5667 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5668 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5669 return scid_candidate
5673 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5674 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5675 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5676 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5679 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5680 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5681 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5682 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5683 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5684 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5685 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5695 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5696 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5697 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5698 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5702 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5703 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5704 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5709 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5710 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5711 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5715 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5716 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5720 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5721 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5724 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5725 /// using the given event handler.
5727 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5728 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5731 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5732 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5733 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5735 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5737 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5738 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5739 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5740 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5743 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5744 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5745 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5748 for event in pending_events {
5749 handler(event).await;
5752 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5753 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5758 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5760 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5761 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5762 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5763 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5764 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5765 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5769 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5770 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5771 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5772 /// is always placed next to each other.
5774 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5775 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5776 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5777 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5779 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5780 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5781 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5782 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5783 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5784 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5785 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5787 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5788 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5789 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5790 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5793 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5794 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5796 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5797 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5800 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5801 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5802 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5803 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5805 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5806 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5810 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5811 events.replace(pending_events);
5820 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5822 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5823 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5824 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5825 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5826 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5827 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5831 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5833 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5834 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5835 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5836 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5837 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5839 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5840 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5841 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5842 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5845 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5846 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5847 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5850 for event in pending_events {
5851 handler.handle_event(event);
5859 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5861 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5862 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5863 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5864 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5865 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5866 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5870 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5872 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5873 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5874 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5875 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5876 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5879 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5880 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5883 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5885 let new_height = height - 1;
5887 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5888 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5889 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5890 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5891 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5892 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5895 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5899 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5901 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5902 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5903 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5904 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5905 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5906 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5910 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5911 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5912 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5913 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5915 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5916 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5919 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5920 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5922 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5923 if height < last_best_block_height {
5924 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5925 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5929 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5930 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5931 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5932 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5934 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5935 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5937 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5939 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5941 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5943 macro_rules! max_time {
5944 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5946 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5947 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5948 // having an explicit local time source.
5949 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5950 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5951 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5952 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5953 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5959 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5960 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5961 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5962 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5966 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5967 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5968 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5969 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5970 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5971 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5972 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5973 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5980 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5982 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5983 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5984 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5985 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5986 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5987 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5992 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5994 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5995 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5996 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5997 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5998 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5999 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6003 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6004 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6006 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6007 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6008 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6009 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6010 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6012 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6013 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6015 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6016 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6017 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6018 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6019 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6020 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6021 let res = f(channel);
6022 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6023 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6024 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6025 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6026 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6028 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6029 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6030 if channel.is_usable() {
6031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6032 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6033 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6034 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6044 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6045 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6048 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6049 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6050 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6051 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6052 msg: announcement_sigs,
6054 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6055 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6056 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6058 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6059 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6060 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6065 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6066 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6067 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6068 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6069 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6070 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6071 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6072 // is always consistent.
6073 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6074 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6075 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6076 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6077 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6080 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6081 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6082 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6083 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6084 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6085 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6086 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6090 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6091 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6092 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6093 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6094 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6095 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6096 data: reason_message,
6106 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6107 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6108 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6109 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6110 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6111 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6112 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6113 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6114 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6115 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6117 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6118 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6119 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6123 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6126 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6127 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6128 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6129 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6130 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6131 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6132 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6133 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6134 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6137 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6138 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6139 _ => unreachable!(),
6141 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6142 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6143 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6150 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6152 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6153 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6157 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6159 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6160 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6162 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6163 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6166 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6167 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6168 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6171 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6172 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6173 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6174 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6177 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6178 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6179 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6180 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6183 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6184 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6186 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6187 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6188 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6189 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6190 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6193 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6194 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6195 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6196 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6199 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6200 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6201 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6202 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6205 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6206 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6207 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6208 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6212 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6213 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6215 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6216 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6217 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6218 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6219 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6220 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6224 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6225 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6226 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6229 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6230 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6231 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6234 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6236 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6239 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6244 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6249 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6254 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6256 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6259 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6261 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6264 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6269 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6274 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6279 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6284 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6289 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6294 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6299 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6300 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6301 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6304 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6309 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6314 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6316 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6317 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6319 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6320 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6321 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6322 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6323 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6324 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6325 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6326 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6327 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6328 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6329 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6334 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6336 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6337 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6338 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6339 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6340 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6341 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6342 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6343 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6344 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6345 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6346 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6347 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6348 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6349 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6350 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6352 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6359 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6360 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6361 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6362 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6365 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6367 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6369 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6370 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6374 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6375 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6376 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6382 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6383 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6384 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6385 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6386 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6387 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6390 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6391 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6393 if inbound_peer_limited {
6396 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6397 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6398 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6399 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6400 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6405 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6406 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6408 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6409 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6410 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6411 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6416 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6417 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6422 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6424 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6425 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6426 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6427 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6428 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6429 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6430 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6431 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6432 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6433 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6434 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6438 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6439 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6440 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6445 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6446 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6447 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6448 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6449 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6458 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6462 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6463 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6465 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6466 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6467 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6468 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6469 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6472 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6474 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6475 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6476 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6480 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6482 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6483 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6484 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6485 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6486 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6487 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6488 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6489 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6497 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6498 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6502 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6503 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6506 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6507 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6511 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6512 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6513 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6514 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6517 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6518 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6520 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6521 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6522 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6523 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6524 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6527 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6528 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6529 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6530 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6533 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6534 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6535 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6536 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6539 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6540 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6541 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6542 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6543 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6544 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6545 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6546 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6547 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6548 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6549 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6550 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6551 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6552 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6553 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6554 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6555 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6556 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6558 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6559 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6560 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6566 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6567 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6569 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6570 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6571 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6572 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6575 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6576 (2, node_id, required),
6577 (4, features, required),
6578 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6579 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6580 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6581 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6584 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6585 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6586 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6587 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6588 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6589 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6590 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6591 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6592 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6593 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6594 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6595 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6596 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6597 (7, self.config, option),
6598 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6599 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6600 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6601 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6602 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6603 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6604 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6605 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6606 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6607 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6608 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6609 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6610 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6611 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6612 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6613 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6614 (32, self.is_public, required),
6615 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6616 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6617 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6618 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6624 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6625 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6626 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6627 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6628 (2, channel_id, required),
6629 (3, channel_type, option),
6630 (4, counterparty, required),
6631 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6632 (6, funding_txo, option),
6633 (7, config, option),
6634 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6635 (9, confirmations, option),
6636 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6637 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6638 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6639 (16, balance_msat, required),
6640 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6641 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6642 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6643 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6644 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6645 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6646 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6647 (26, is_outbound, required),
6648 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6649 (30, is_usable, required),
6650 (32, is_public, required),
6651 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6652 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6653 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6654 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6657 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6658 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6659 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6660 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6661 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6665 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6667 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6668 outbound_scid_alias,
6672 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6673 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6675 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6676 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6677 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6678 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6679 confirmations_required,
6681 force_close_spend_delay,
6682 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6683 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6684 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6685 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6686 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6687 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6688 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6693 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6694 (2, channels, vec_type),
6695 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6696 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6699 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6701 (0, onion_packet, required),
6702 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6705 (0, payment_data, required),
6706 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6707 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6709 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6710 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6711 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6715 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6716 (0, routing, required),
6717 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6718 (4, payment_hash, required),
6719 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6720 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6721 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6725 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6726 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6728 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6730 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6731 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6732 reason.write(writer)?;
6734 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6735 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6738 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6739 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6740 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6741 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6748 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6749 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6750 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6753 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6754 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6755 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6756 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6760 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6761 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6762 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6763 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6764 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6767 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6768 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6769 // messages contained in the variants.
6770 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6771 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6772 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6774 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6776 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6777 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6778 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6781 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6782 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6783 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6784 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6785 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6787 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6792 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6797 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6798 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6799 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6800 (2, outpoint, required),
6801 (4, htlc_id, required),
6802 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6805 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6806 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6807 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6808 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6809 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6811 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6812 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6813 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6814 (2, self.value, required),
6815 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6816 (4, payment_data, option),
6817 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6818 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6819 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6825 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6826 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6827 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6829 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6830 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6831 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6832 let mut total_value_received = None;
6833 let mut total_msat = None;
6834 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6835 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6836 (0, prev_hop, required),
6837 (1, total_msat, option),
6838 (2, value, required),
6839 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6840 (4, payment_data, option),
6841 (5, total_value_received, option),
6842 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6843 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6845 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6847 if payment_data.is_some() {
6848 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6850 if total_msat.is_none() {
6851 total_msat = Some(value);
6853 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6856 if total_msat.is_none() {
6857 if payment_data.is_none() {
6858 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6860 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6862 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6866 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6869 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6870 total_value_received,
6871 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6878 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6879 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6880 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6884 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6885 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6886 let mut payment_id = None;
6887 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6888 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6889 (0, session_priv, required),
6890 (1, payment_id, option),
6891 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6892 (4, path, vec_type),
6893 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6895 if payment_id.is_none() {
6896 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6898 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6900 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6901 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6903 let path = path.unwrap();
6904 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6905 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6906 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6909 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6910 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6911 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6913 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6916 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6917 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6922 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6923 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6925 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6927 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6928 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6929 (0, session_priv, required),
6930 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6931 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6932 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6933 (4, *path, vec_type),
6934 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6937 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6939 field.write(writer)?;
6946 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6947 (0, forward_info, required),
6948 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6949 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6950 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6951 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6954 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6956 (0, htlc_id, required),
6957 (2, err_packet, required),
6962 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6963 (0, payment_secret, required),
6964 (2, expiry_time, required),
6965 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6966 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6967 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6970 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6972 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6973 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6974 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6975 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6976 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6977 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6981 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6982 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6984 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6986 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6988 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6989 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6990 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6993 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6995 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6996 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6997 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6998 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7001 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7002 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7004 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7005 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7006 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7007 unfunded_channels += 1;
7012 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7014 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7017 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7018 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7019 channel.write(writer)?;
7026 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7027 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7028 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7029 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7030 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7031 for forward in pending_forwards {
7032 forward.write(writer)?;
7037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7039 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7040 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7041 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7043 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7044 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7045 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7046 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7047 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7048 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7049 htlc.write(writer)?;
7051 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7054 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7055 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7056 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7057 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7058 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7059 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7060 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7063 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7064 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7065 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7066 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7067 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7069 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7070 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7071 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7072 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7073 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7074 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7075 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7080 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7081 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7082 for event in events.iter() {
7083 event.write(writer)?;
7086 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7087 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7088 for event in background_events.iter() {
7090 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7092 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7093 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7098 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7099 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7100 // likely to be identical.
7101 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7102 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7104 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7105 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7106 hash.write(writer)?;
7107 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7110 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7111 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7112 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7113 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7114 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7117 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7118 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7120 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7121 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7122 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7123 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7126 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7127 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7131 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7132 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7133 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7135 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7136 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7137 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7143 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7144 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7145 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7146 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7149 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7150 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7151 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7152 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7153 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7156 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7157 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7158 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7159 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7160 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7161 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7162 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7163 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7164 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7165 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7172 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7174 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7176 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7177 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7178 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7179 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7180 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7181 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7182 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7183 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7184 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7185 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7186 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7187 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7188 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7190 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7191 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7193 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7194 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7196 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7197 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7198 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7199 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7200 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7201 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7203 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7204 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7206 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7207 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7208 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7209 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7210 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7211 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7215 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7216 pub entropy_source: ES,
7218 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7219 pub node_signer: NS,
7221 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7222 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7224 pub signer_provider: SP,
7226 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7228 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7229 pub fee_estimator: F,
7230 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7232 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7233 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7234 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7235 pub chain_monitor: M,
7237 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7238 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7239 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7240 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7241 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7242 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7244 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7246 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7247 /// deserialization.
7249 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7250 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7251 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7253 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7254 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7256 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7257 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7258 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7259 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7261 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7264 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7265 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7268 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7269 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7271 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7272 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7273 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7274 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7275 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7276 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7280 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7281 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7282 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7283 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7284 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7286 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7287 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7292 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7293 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7294 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7295 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7297 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7298 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7299 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7300 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7301 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7302 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7306 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7307 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7308 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7312 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7313 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7315 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7316 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7317 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7318 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7319 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7320 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7324 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7325 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7327 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7329 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7333 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7334 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7335 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7336 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7337 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7338 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7339 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7340 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7341 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7342 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7344 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7345 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7346 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7347 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7348 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7349 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7350 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7351 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7352 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7353 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7354 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7355 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7356 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7357 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7358 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7359 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7360 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7361 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7362 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7363 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7364 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7365 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7366 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7367 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7368 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7369 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7370 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7371 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7373 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7374 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7375 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7376 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7377 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7379 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7380 let mut found_htlc = false;
7381 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7382 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7385 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7386 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7387 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7388 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7389 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7390 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7391 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7392 log_info!(args.logger,
7393 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7394 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7395 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7399 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7400 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7401 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7403 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7404 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7406 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7408 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7409 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7412 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7413 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7414 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7418 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7419 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7420 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7421 // safely discard the channel.
7422 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7423 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7424 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7425 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7426 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7429 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7430 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7431 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7432 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7433 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7434 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7438 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7439 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7440 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7441 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7442 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7444 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7448 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7449 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7451 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7452 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7455 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7456 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7458 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7461 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7463 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7464 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7467 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7468 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7470 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7473 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7475 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7476 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let peer_state = PeerState {
7478 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7479 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7480 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7481 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7482 is_connected: false,
7484 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7487 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7488 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7489 for _ in 0..event_count {
7490 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7491 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7496 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7497 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7498 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7500 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7501 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7502 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7503 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7505 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7508 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7512 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7513 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7517 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7518 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7519 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7523 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7524 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7525 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7526 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7527 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7528 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7529 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7531 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7532 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7536 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7537 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7538 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7539 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7540 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7541 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7542 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7543 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7544 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7545 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7546 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7547 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7548 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7549 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7550 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7551 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7552 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7553 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7554 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7555 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7557 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7558 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7561 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7562 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7565 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7566 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7569 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7570 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7571 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7572 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7573 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7574 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7576 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7578 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7579 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7580 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7584 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7585 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7586 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7587 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7588 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7589 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7590 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7592 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7593 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7594 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7595 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7596 if path.is_empty() {
7597 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7601 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7602 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7603 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7604 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7606 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7607 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7608 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7611 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7612 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7613 retry_strategy: None,
7614 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7615 payment_params: None,
7616 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7617 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7618 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7619 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7620 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7621 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7622 total_msat: path_amt,
7623 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7625 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7626 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7631 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7633 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7634 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7635 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7636 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7638 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7639 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7640 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7641 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7642 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7643 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7644 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7645 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7646 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7647 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7648 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7653 !forwards.is_empty()
7655 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7656 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7657 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7658 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7659 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7660 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7661 intercepted_id != ev_id
7668 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7669 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7670 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7671 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7672 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7673 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7674 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7675 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7676 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7677 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7678 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7679 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7680 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7689 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7690 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7691 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7692 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7693 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7694 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7695 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7696 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7700 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7701 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7703 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7704 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7705 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7706 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7708 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7709 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7712 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7713 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7714 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7715 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7716 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7718 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7719 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7720 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7721 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7722 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7723 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7724 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7725 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7727 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7732 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7734 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7736 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7737 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7739 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7743 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7744 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7746 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7748 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7750 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7751 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7752 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7753 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7757 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7758 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7759 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7761 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7762 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7763 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7765 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7766 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7767 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7769 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7770 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7771 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7772 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7773 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7774 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7776 if chan.is_usable() {
7777 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7778 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7779 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7780 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7781 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7787 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7789 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7790 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7791 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7792 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7793 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7794 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7795 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7796 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7797 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7798 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7799 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7801 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7802 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7804 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7805 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7806 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7807 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7809 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7810 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7811 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7812 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7814 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7815 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7816 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7817 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7819 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7820 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7821 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7824 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7825 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7828 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7829 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7832 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7835 purpose: payment_purpose,
7836 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7842 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7843 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7844 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7846 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7847 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7851 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7853 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7854 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7855 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7856 router: args.router,
7858 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7860 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7861 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7862 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7863 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7865 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7866 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7867 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7868 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7869 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7870 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7872 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7877 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7879 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7881 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7882 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7883 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7884 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7886 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7887 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7888 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7890 logger: args.logger,
7891 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7894 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7895 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7896 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7897 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7898 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7901 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7902 //connection or two.
7904 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7910 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7911 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7912 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7913 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7914 use core::time::Duration;
7915 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7916 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7917 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7918 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7919 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7920 use crate::ln::msgs;
7921 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7922 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7923 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7924 use crate::util::test_utils;
7925 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7926 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7929 fn test_notify_limits() {
7930 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7931 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7935 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7937 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7938 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7939 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7940 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7941 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7943 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7945 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7946 // to connect messages with new values
7947 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7948 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7949 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7950 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7951 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7952 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7954 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7955 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7956 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7957 // ... but the last node should not.
7958 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7959 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7960 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7961 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7963 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7964 // about the channel.
7965 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7966 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7967 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7969 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7971 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7972 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7973 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7974 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7975 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7976 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7978 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7979 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7980 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7982 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7983 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7984 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7985 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7986 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7987 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7989 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7990 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7991 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7992 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7993 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7994 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7995 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7996 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7998 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7999 // the channel info has updated.
8000 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8001 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8002 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8003 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8004 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8005 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8009 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8010 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8012 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8013 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8014 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8015 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8016 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8018 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8019 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8020 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8021 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8023 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8024 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8025 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8026 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8027 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8028 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8029 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8030 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8032 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8033 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8034 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8036 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8037 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8038 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8040 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8041 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8042 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8043 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8044 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8046 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8050 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8051 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8052 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8053 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8054 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8055 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8056 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8058 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8060 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8061 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8062 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8064 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8065 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8066 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8068 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8069 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8070 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8071 // lightning messages manually.
8072 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8073 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8076 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8077 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8078 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8080 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8081 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8083 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8084 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8086 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8087 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8088 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8090 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8091 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8092 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8094 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8096 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8098 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8099 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8102 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8103 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8104 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8107 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8108 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8109 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8110 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8115 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8116 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8117 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8118 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8120 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8123 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8124 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8125 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8126 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8133 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8134 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8135 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8136 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8137 // fails as expected.
8138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8141 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8142 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8143 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8144 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8146 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8147 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8148 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8150 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8151 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8152 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8153 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8155 let route = find_route(
8156 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8157 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8159 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8160 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8162 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8163 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8164 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8165 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8166 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8169 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8170 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8171 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8172 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8174 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8175 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8176 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8177 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8178 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8179 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8181 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8182 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8184 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8185 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8187 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8188 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8189 let route = find_route(
8190 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8191 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8193 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8194 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8196 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8198 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8199 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8200 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8202 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8203 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8204 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8205 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8207 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8208 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8209 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8210 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8211 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8213 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8214 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8217 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8218 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8219 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8220 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8221 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8222 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8223 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8225 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8227 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8228 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8232 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8233 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8234 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8235 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8238 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8240 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8241 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8243 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8244 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8245 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8246 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8248 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8249 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8250 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8251 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8252 let route = find_route(
8253 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8254 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8257 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8258 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8259 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8260 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8261 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8262 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8265 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8266 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8267 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8268 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8269 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8270 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8271 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8273 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8277 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8278 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8282 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8284 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8285 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8287 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8288 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8289 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8290 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8292 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8293 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8294 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8295 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8296 let route = find_route(
8297 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8298 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8301 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8302 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8303 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8304 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8305 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8306 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8307 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8308 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8311 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8312 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8313 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8314 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8315 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8316 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8317 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8319 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8323 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8327 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8329 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8330 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8331 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8332 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8334 // Marshall an MPP route.
8335 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8336 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8337 route.paths.push(path);
8338 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8339 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8340 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8341 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8342 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8343 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8345 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8346 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8348 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8349 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8351 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8356 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8362 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8364 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8365 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8367 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8368 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8370 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8373 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8374 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8375 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8376 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8377 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8378 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8381 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8384 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8385 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8390 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8391 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8397 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8398 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8400 total_msat: 100_000,
8403 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8404 // payment verification fails as expected.
8405 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8406 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8407 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8408 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8410 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8414 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8415 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8419 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8420 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8421 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8422 // the channel is successfully closed.
8423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8428 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8429 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8431 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8432 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8434 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8435 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8437 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8438 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8439 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8440 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8443 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8445 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8446 // as it has the funding transaction.
8447 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8448 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8449 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8452 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8454 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8456 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8458 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8459 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8460 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8462 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8465 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8466 // as it has the funding transaction.
8467 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8468 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8469 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8472 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8473 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8475 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8476 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8477 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8478 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8480 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8481 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8482 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8483 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8485 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8486 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8488 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8489 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8490 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8491 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8492 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8493 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8494 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8498 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8499 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8500 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8501 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8502 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8503 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8504 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8507 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8509 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8510 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8511 // closing transaction).
8512 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8513 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8514 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8516 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8517 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8518 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8519 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8520 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8523 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8525 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8527 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8528 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8529 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8531 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8533 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8537 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8538 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8539 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8542 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8543 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8544 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8547 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8549 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8550 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8552 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8553 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8555 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8556 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8561 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8562 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8563 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8564 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8565 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8566 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8567 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8568 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8571 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8572 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8573 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8575 // Test the API functions.
8576 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8578 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8580 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8582 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8584 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8586 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8588 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8592 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8593 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8594 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8595 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8596 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8597 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8599 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8601 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8602 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8604 let mut funding_tx = None;
8605 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8606 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8607 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8610 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8611 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8612 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8613 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8614 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8616 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8618 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8620 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8622 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8624 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8629 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8630 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8631 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8632 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8633 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8635 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8636 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8638 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8639 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8640 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8641 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8642 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8643 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8644 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8646 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8647 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8648 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8649 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8651 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8652 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8653 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8654 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8655 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8656 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8657 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8659 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8660 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8661 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8662 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8664 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8665 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8666 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8667 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8669 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8670 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8672 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8673 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8674 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8675 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8676 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8678 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8679 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8680 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8682 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8683 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8684 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8686 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8687 // "protected" and can connect again.
8688 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8689 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8690 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8691 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8693 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8695 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8696 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8700 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8701 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8705 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8707 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8709 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8710 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8712 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8713 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8714 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8715 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8718 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8720 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8721 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8722 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8724 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8725 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8726 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8728 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8730 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8731 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8735 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8736 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8737 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8740 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8741 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8742 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8743 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8745 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8747 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8748 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8750 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8751 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8752 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8753 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8754 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8755 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8757 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8758 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8760 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8761 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8765 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8766 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8769 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8770 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8771 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8772 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8773 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8774 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8775 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8777 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8778 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8779 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8780 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8786 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8787 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8789 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8790 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8791 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8793 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8794 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8798 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8803 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8804 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8805 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8806 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8809 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8810 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8811 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8813 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8815 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8816 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8817 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8819 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8820 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8822 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8823 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8825 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8828 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8829 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8831 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8832 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8834 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8838 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8840 use crate::chain::Listen;
8841 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8842 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8843 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8844 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8845 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8846 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8847 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8848 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8849 use crate::util::test_utils;
8850 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8852 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8853 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8854 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8856 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8860 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8861 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8862 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8863 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8864 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8865 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8866 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8867 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8872 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8873 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8876 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8877 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8878 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8880 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8882 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8883 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8884 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8885 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8886 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8888 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8889 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8891 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8892 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8893 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8894 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8896 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8898 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8900 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8901 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8902 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8903 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8904 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8906 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8908 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8910 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8911 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8912 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8913 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8914 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8917 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8918 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8919 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8921 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8922 } else { panic!(); }
8924 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8925 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8926 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8928 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8929 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8934 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8935 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8936 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8938 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8939 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8944 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8947 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8950 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8951 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8953 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8954 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8955 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8956 match msg_events[0] {
8957 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8958 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8959 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8963 match msg_events[1] {
8964 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8968 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8969 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8971 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8972 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8977 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8978 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8980 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8981 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8986 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8987 macro_rules! send_payment {
8988 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8989 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8990 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8991 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8992 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8994 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8995 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8997 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
8998 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
8999 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9000 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9001 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9002 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9003 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9004 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9005 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9006 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9007 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9010 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9011 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9012 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9014 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9015 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9016 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9017 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9018 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9020 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9023 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9024 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9025 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9026 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9028 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9033 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9034 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);