1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
74 use util::crypto::sign;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
98 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
99 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
102 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
107 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
136 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
138 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
143 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
146 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
155 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 short_channel_id: u64,
160 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
161 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
163 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
164 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
169 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
171 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
172 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
173 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
175 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
176 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
179 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
180 struct ClaimableHTLC {
181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
183 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
185 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
187 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
191 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
196 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
197 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
202 impl Readable for PaymentId {
203 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
204 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
208 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
212 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
215 session_priv: SecretKey,
216 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
217 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
218 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
219 payment_id: PaymentId,
220 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
221 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
224 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
225 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
226 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
230 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
235 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
236 payment_id.hash(hasher);
237 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
238 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
239 payment_params.hash(hasher);
244 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
247 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
248 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
250 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
251 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
252 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
253 payment_secret: None,
254 payment_params: None,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
262 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
270 struct ReceiveError {
276 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
277 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
279 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
284 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
286 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
287 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
288 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
289 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
290 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
292 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
293 err: msgs::LightningError,
294 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
295 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
297 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
299 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
301 err: LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
304 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
311 shutdown_finish: None,
315 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
317 err: LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
322 shutdown_finish: None,
326 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
327 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
330 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
342 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
346 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
349 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
351 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
352 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
356 log_level: Level::Warn,
359 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
363 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 shutdown_finish: None,
379 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
380 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
381 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
382 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
383 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
385 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
386 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
387 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
388 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
389 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
390 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
391 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
393 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
397 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
398 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
399 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
400 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
401 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
402 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
403 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
404 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
406 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
407 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
408 /// and via the classic SCID.
410 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
411 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
412 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
413 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
414 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
415 /// failed/claimed by the user.
417 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
418 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
420 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
421 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
422 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
423 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
426 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
427 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
428 /// quite some time lag.
429 enum BackgroundEvent {
430 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
431 /// commitment transaction.
432 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
435 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
436 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
438 latest_features: InitFeatures,
441 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
442 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
444 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
447 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
448 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
449 struct PendingInboundPayment {
450 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
451 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
452 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
453 /// this payment being removed.
455 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
456 user_payment_id: u64,
457 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
458 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
459 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
463 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
464 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
466 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
470 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
471 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
472 pending_amt_msat: u64,
473 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
474 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
475 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
477 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
478 starting_block_height: u32,
480 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
481 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
482 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
484 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
485 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
507 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
513 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
519 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
526 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
535 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
536 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
537 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
544 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
545 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
548 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
549 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
550 let our_payment_hash;
551 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
557 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
561 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
565 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
566 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
567 let remove_res = match self {
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
572 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
576 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
577 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
578 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
579 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
580 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
581 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
588 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
589 let insert_res = match self {
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
592 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
598 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
599 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
600 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
601 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
602 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
609 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
622 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
623 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
624 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
625 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
626 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
627 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
629 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
630 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
632 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
633 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
634 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
635 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
636 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
637 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
638 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
639 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
641 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
644 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
645 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
647 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
648 /// to individual Channels.
650 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
651 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
652 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
653 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
655 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
656 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
657 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
658 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
659 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
660 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
661 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
663 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
664 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
665 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
666 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
669 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
670 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
671 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
672 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
673 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
675 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
676 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
677 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
678 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
679 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
680 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
687 default_configuration: UserConfig,
688 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
694 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
696 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
697 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
700 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
701 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
702 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
704 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
705 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
706 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
707 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
708 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
711 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
712 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
713 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
714 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
715 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
716 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
717 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
718 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
720 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
722 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
723 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
729 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
731 our_network_key: SecretKey,
732 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
734 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
736 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
737 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
738 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
740 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
741 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
743 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
744 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
745 /// keeping additional state.
746 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
748 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
749 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
750 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
752 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
753 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
754 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
755 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
757 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
758 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
759 /// are currently open with that peer.
760 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
761 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
764 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
765 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
767 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
768 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
769 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
770 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
771 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
772 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
773 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
774 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
775 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
777 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
784 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
786 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
787 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
788 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
789 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
790 pub struct ChainParameters {
791 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
792 pub network: Network,
794 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
796 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
797 pub best_block: BestBlock,
800 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
806 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
807 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
808 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
809 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
810 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
811 /// updates are ready for persistence).
813 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
814 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
815 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
816 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
817 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
819 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
820 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
823 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
824 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
825 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
828 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
829 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
831 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
832 persistence_notifier: notifier,
833 should_persist: persist_check,
834 _read_guard: read_guard,
839 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
841 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
842 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
847 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
848 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
850 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
852 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
853 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
854 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
855 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
856 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
858 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
859 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
861 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
863 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
864 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
865 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
866 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
867 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
868 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
869 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
870 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
871 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
872 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
873 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
874 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
875 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
877 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
878 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
880 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
881 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
882 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
883 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
885 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
886 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
887 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
888 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
889 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
890 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
893 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
895 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
896 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
899 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
901 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
902 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
903 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
905 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
906 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
908 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
909 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
910 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
911 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
912 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
913 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
914 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
915 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
916 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
917 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
918 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
921 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
922 /// to better separate parameters.
923 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
924 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
925 /// The node_id of our counterparty
926 pub node_id: PublicKey,
927 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
928 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
929 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
930 pub features: InitFeatures,
931 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
932 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
933 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
935 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
937 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
938 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
939 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
940 /// payments to us through this channel.
941 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
942 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
943 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
944 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
945 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
946 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
947 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
950 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
951 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
952 pub struct ChannelDetails {
953 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
954 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
955 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
956 /// lifetime of the channel.
957 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
958 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
959 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
960 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
961 /// our counterparty already.
963 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
964 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
965 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
966 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
968 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
969 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
970 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
971 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
973 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
974 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
976 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
977 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
979 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
980 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
981 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
982 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
983 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
984 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
985 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
986 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
987 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
990 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
992 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
993 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
994 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
995 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
996 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
997 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
998 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1000 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1001 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1003 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1004 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1005 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1006 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1007 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1008 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1009 /// this value on chain.
1011 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1013 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1015 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1016 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1017 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1018 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1019 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1020 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1021 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1023 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1024 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1025 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1026 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1028 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1029 pub balance_msat: u64,
1030 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1031 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1032 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1033 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1035 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1037 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1038 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1039 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1040 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1041 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1042 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1043 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1044 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1046 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1047 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1048 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1049 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1050 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1051 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1052 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1054 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1055 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1056 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1057 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1058 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1059 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1060 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1061 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1062 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1064 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1066 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1067 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1068 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1069 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1070 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1071 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1072 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1073 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1074 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1076 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1077 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1078 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1079 pub is_outbound: bool,
1080 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1081 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1082 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1083 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1084 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1086 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1087 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1088 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1089 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1091 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1092 pub is_usable: bool,
1093 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1094 pub is_public: bool,
1095 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1096 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1097 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1098 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1099 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1100 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1102 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1103 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1106 impl ChannelDetails {
1107 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1108 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1109 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1111 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1112 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1113 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1114 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1117 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1118 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1119 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1121 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1122 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1123 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1124 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1128 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1129 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1130 /// states for more.
1131 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1132 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1133 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1134 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1135 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1136 ParameterError(APIError),
1137 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1138 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1139 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1140 /// payment in full.
1142 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1144 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1145 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1146 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1147 /// paths than the ones selected).
1148 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1149 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1150 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1151 /// in over-/re-payment.
1153 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1154 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1155 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1157 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1158 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1159 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1160 /// with the latest update_id.
1162 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1163 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1164 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1165 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1166 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1167 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1168 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1169 payment_id: PaymentId,
1173 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1175 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1177 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1178 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1179 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1180 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1182 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1183 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1184 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1187 macro_rules! handle_error {
1188 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1191 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1192 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1194 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1195 // entering the macro.
1196 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1197 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1200 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1202 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1203 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1204 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1205 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1209 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1210 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1211 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1212 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1217 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1218 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1220 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1221 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1222 action: err.action.clone()
1226 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1227 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1230 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1237 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1238 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1239 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1240 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1242 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1243 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1244 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1245 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1246 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1248 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1249 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1251 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1255 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1256 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1257 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1259 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1260 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1262 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1263 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1265 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1266 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1267 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1268 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1269 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1270 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1276 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1277 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1281 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1283 $entry.remove_entry();
1291 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1292 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1296 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1298 $entry.remove_entry();
1306 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1307 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1309 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1310 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1316 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1317 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1319 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1320 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1321 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1322 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1323 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1324 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1325 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1326 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1327 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1328 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1329 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1330 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1331 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1332 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1335 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1336 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1337 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1338 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1339 match $action_type {
1340 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1341 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1343 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1344 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1346 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1347 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1348 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1349 if !$resend_commitment {
1350 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1353 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1355 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1356 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1360 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1361 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1363 $entry.remove_entry();
1367 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1368 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1369 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1371 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1372 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1374 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1375 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1377 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1378 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1380 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1381 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1385 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1386 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1387 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1389 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1390 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1394 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1395 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1396 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1397 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1398 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1401 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1406 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1407 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1408 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1409 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1410 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1412 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1413 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1414 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1415 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1416 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1417 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1418 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1419 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1420 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1425 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1426 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1427 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1428 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1429 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1431 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1432 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1433 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1435 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1436 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1437 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1438 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1441 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1442 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1443 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1444 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1445 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1446 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1447 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1448 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1449 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1450 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1451 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1452 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1455 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1456 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1457 // before it should be allowed to.
1458 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1459 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1461 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1462 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1463 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1468 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1469 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1470 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1471 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1472 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1473 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1474 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1475 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1476 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1477 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1478 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1479 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1480 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1481 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1482 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1483 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1484 let mut order = $order;
1486 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1488 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1492 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1493 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1494 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1495 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1500 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1501 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1502 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1503 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1504 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1509 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1513 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1518 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1519 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1520 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1525 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1526 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1527 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1528 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1529 assert!(res.is_ok());
1532 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1536 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1537 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1538 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1540 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1542 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1543 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1548 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1549 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1550 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1551 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1552 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1555 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1557 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1558 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1560 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1562 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1563 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1564 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1565 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1566 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1567 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1568 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1569 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1571 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1572 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1573 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1577 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1579 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1580 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1581 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1582 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1583 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1584 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1586 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1587 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1588 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1590 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1591 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1594 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1595 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1597 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1599 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1600 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1602 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1604 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1605 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1606 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1607 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1615 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1616 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1617 &self.default_configuration
1620 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1621 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1622 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1625 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1626 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1628 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1630 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1634 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1639 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1641 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1642 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1643 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1644 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1645 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1648 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1649 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1651 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1652 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1653 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1655 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1656 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1657 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1658 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1659 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1660 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1662 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1663 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1664 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1665 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1666 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1667 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1671 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1672 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1673 Some(peer_state) => {
1674 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1675 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1676 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1677 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1678 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1679 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1680 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1684 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1689 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1692 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1695 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1696 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1698 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1699 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1700 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1703 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1705 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1710 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1711 node_id: their_network_key,
1714 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1717 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1718 let mut res = Vec::new();
1720 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1721 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1722 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1723 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1724 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1725 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1726 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1727 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1728 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1729 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1730 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1731 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1732 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1733 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1734 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1735 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1736 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1737 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1738 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1739 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1740 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1742 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1743 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1744 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1745 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1746 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1747 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1748 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1749 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1750 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1751 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1752 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1753 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1754 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1755 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1756 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1757 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1758 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1759 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1760 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1761 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1762 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1763 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1764 config: Some(channel.config()),
1768 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1769 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1770 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1771 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1777 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1778 /// more information.
1779 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1780 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1783 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1784 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1786 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1787 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1790 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1791 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1792 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1793 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1794 // really wanted anyway.
1795 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1798 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1799 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1800 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1801 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1802 Some(transaction) => {
1803 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1807 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1808 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1809 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1810 reason: closure_reason
1814 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1817 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1818 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1819 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1820 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1821 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1822 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1823 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1824 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1826 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1827 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1828 Some(peer_state) => {
1829 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1830 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1831 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1833 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1835 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1837 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1838 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1839 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1840 let (result, is_permanent) =
1841 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1843 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1849 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1850 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1854 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1855 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1856 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1857 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1861 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1869 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1870 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1873 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1877 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1878 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1879 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1881 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1882 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1884 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1885 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1886 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1887 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1889 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1891 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1892 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1893 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1894 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1895 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1898 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1899 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1900 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1902 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1903 /// the channel being closed or not:
1904 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1905 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1906 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1907 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1908 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1909 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1910 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1912 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1914 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1915 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1916 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1917 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1918 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1922 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1923 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1924 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1925 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1926 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1928 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1929 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1930 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1931 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1932 // ignore the result here.
1933 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1937 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1938 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1939 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1940 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1942 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1943 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1944 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1945 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1946 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1948 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1949 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1951 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1953 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1955 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1958 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1959 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1960 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1961 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1962 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1967 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1970 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1972 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1973 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1974 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1975 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1976 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1977 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1978 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1988 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1989 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1990 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1992 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1993 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1994 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1997 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1998 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1999 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2001 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2002 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2003 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2004 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2005 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2008 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2009 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2010 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2011 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2012 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2016 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2017 /// local transaction(s).
2018 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2019 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2020 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2024 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2025 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2027 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2028 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2029 return Err(ReceiveError {
2030 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2032 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2035 // final_expiry_too_soon
2036 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2037 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2038 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2039 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2040 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2041 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2042 return Err(ReceiveError {
2044 err_data: Vec::new(),
2045 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2048 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2049 return Err(ReceiveError {
2051 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2052 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2056 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2057 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2058 return Err(ReceiveError {
2059 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2060 err_data: Vec::new(),
2061 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2064 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2065 return Err(ReceiveError {
2066 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2067 err_data: Vec::new(),
2068 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2071 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2072 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2073 return Err(ReceiveError {
2074 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2075 err_data: Vec::new(),
2076 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2078 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2079 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2081 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2082 phantom_shared_secret,
2084 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2085 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2086 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2087 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2088 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2089 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2090 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2091 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2092 return Err(ReceiveError {
2093 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2094 err_data: Vec::new(),
2095 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2099 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2101 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2104 return Err(ReceiveError {
2105 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2106 err_data: Vec::new(),
2107 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2112 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2115 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2116 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2117 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2121 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2122 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2123 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2125 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2126 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2127 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2128 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2129 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2130 failure_code: $err_code,
2131 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2136 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2137 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2140 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2142 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2143 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2144 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2145 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2146 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2147 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2148 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2149 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2152 let mut channel_state = None;
2153 macro_rules! return_err {
2154 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2156 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2157 if channel_state.is_none() {
2158 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2160 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2161 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2162 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2163 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2164 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2169 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2171 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2172 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2174 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2175 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2179 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2180 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2182 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2184 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2185 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2186 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2187 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2188 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2190 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2193 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2194 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2195 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2197 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2198 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2199 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2202 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2203 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2204 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2205 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2206 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2210 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2211 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2212 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2215 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2216 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2217 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2218 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2223 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2224 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2225 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2226 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2227 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2228 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2229 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2230 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2231 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2232 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2233 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2235 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2238 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2241 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2243 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2244 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2245 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2246 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2247 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2248 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2249 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2251 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2252 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2253 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2254 // we don't have the channel here.
2255 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2257 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2259 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2260 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2261 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2262 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2263 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2264 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2265 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2267 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2268 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2270 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2271 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2275 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2277 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2284 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2285 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2286 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2287 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2288 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2289 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2291 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2292 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2294 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2295 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2296 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2297 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2298 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2299 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2300 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2301 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2302 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2303 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2309 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2310 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2311 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2312 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2314 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2315 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2317 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2318 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2319 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2321 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2322 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2323 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2325 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2330 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2333 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2334 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2335 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2337 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2338 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2339 if !chan.should_announce() {
2340 return Err(LightningError {
2341 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2342 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2345 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2346 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2349 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2352 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2353 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2354 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2355 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2356 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2357 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2359 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2360 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2364 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2366 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2368 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2370 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2371 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2373 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2374 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2375 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2376 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2377 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2378 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2379 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2380 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2383 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2384 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2386 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2392 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2393 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2395 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2396 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2397 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2399 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2400 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2401 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2402 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2403 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2405 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2407 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2409 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2410 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2412 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2413 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2414 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2415 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2416 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2417 err: "Payment already completed"
2422 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2423 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2424 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2427 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2429 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2430 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2431 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2432 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2433 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2434 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2435 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2436 total_msat: total_value,
2438 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2442 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2443 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2445 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2446 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2448 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2449 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2451 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2452 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2454 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2455 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2457 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2458 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2459 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2460 channel_state, chan)
2462 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2463 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2464 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2465 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2466 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2467 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2468 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2469 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2470 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2471 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2473 insert_outbound_payment!();
2475 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2476 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2477 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2478 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2479 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2480 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2481 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2482 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2488 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2490 } else { unreachable!(); }
2494 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2495 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2497 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2502 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2504 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2505 /// fields for more info.
2507 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2508 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2509 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2510 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2511 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2512 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2514 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2516 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2517 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2518 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2520 /// In general, a path may raise:
2521 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2522 /// node public key) is specified.
2523 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2524 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2526 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2527 /// relevant updates.
2529 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2530 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2531 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2533 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2534 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2535 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2536 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2538 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2539 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2540 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2541 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2542 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2545 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2546 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2547 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2549 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2550 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2552 let mut total_value = 0;
2553 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2554 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2555 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2556 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2557 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2558 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2559 continue 'path_check;
2561 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2562 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2563 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2564 continue 'path_check;
2567 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2568 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2570 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2571 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2573 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2574 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2575 total_value = amt_msat;
2578 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2579 let mut results = Vec::new();
2580 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2581 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2583 let mut has_ok = false;
2584 let mut has_err = false;
2585 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2586 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2587 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2588 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2589 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2590 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2591 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2595 } else if res.is_err() {
2596 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2597 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2600 if has_err && has_ok {
2601 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2604 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2605 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2606 Some(RouteParameters {
2607 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2608 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2609 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2615 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2616 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2617 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2618 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2624 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2626 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2627 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2628 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2629 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2630 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2632 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2633 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2634 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2635 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2636 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2637 if path.len() == 0 {
2638 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2639 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2644 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2645 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2646 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2648 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2649 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2651 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2652 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2653 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2654 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2657 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2659 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2660 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2661 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2664 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2665 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2666 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2669 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2670 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2671 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2676 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2677 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2681 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2684 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2686 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2687 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2688 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2689 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2691 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2692 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2693 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2695 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2696 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2697 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2698 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2701 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2702 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2703 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2704 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2705 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2707 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2715 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2716 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2717 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2718 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2719 /// never reach the recipient.
2721 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2723 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2724 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2726 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2728 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2729 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2730 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2732 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2734 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2735 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2736 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2741 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2742 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2743 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2744 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2745 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2747 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2750 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2751 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2755 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2757 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2758 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2763 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2765 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2766 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2767 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2770 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2771 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2772 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2773 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2774 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2775 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2778 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2779 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2780 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2781 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2782 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2784 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2786 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2788 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2789 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2790 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2791 } else { unreachable!(); })
2794 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2796 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2797 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2800 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2801 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2806 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2807 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2808 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2811 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2812 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2813 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2815 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2823 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2824 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2825 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2829 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2831 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2832 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2834 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2835 /// across the p2p network.
2837 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2838 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2840 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2841 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2842 /// keys per-channel).
2844 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2845 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2846 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2848 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2849 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2850 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2852 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2853 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2854 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2855 /// for more details.
2857 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2858 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2859 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2862 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2863 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2864 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2865 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2870 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2871 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2872 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2873 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2874 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2875 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == 0xffffffff) && funding_transaction.lock_time < 500_000_000 && funding_transaction.lock_time > height + 2 {
2876 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2877 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2881 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2882 let mut output_index = None;
2883 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2884 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2885 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2886 if output_index.is_some() {
2887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2888 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2891 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2892 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2893 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2896 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2899 if output_index.is_none() {
2900 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2901 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2904 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2909 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2910 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 100 (our stated public contract on when
2911 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2913 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2916 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2917 // smaller than 100:
2918 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 100;
2920 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2921 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2922 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2923 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2924 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2925 /// our network addresses.
2927 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2928 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2930 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2931 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2932 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2933 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2935 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100).
2937 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2938 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2941 if addresses.len() > 100 {
2942 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2945 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2946 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2947 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2949 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2950 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2951 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2952 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2953 rgb, alias, addresses,
2954 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2955 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2957 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2958 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2963 let mut announced_chans = false;
2964 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2965 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2966 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2968 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2973 announced_chans = true;
2975 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2976 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2977 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2981 if announced_chans {
2982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2983 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2984 signature: node_announce_sig,
2985 contents: announcement
2991 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2993 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2994 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2995 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2996 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2998 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2999 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3001 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3002 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3004 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3006 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3007 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3008 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3009 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3010 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3011 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3012 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3013 pub fn update_channel_config(
3014 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3015 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3016 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3017 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3018 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3023 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3026 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3027 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3028 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3029 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3030 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3031 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3033 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3034 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3035 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3036 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3040 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3041 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3042 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3045 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3046 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3047 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3048 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3049 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3058 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3060 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3061 /// Will likely generate further events.
3062 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3065 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3066 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3067 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3068 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3070 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3071 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3073 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3074 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3075 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3076 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3078 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3079 match forward_info {
3080 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3081 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3082 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3083 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3084 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3086 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3087 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3088 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3089 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3090 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3091 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3092 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3094 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3095 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3101 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3102 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3103 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3104 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3105 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3107 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3108 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3109 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3110 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3111 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3113 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3115 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3116 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3120 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3121 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3122 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3123 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3129 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3132 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3135 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3136 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3137 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3138 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3139 // problem, not ours.
3146 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3147 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3148 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3149 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3150 match forward_info {
3151 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3152 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3154 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3155 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3156 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3157 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3158 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3159 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3160 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3161 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3162 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3163 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3165 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3167 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3168 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3170 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3172 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3173 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3174 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3180 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3182 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3183 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3184 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3185 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3186 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3187 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3188 // this channel currently :/.
3194 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3195 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3197 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3198 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3199 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3201 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3202 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3204 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3206 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3207 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3208 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3211 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3213 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3214 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3215 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3216 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3217 // messages when we can.
3218 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3219 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3220 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3227 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3228 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3231 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3232 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3233 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3234 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3235 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3236 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3238 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3240 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3241 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3242 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3245 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3249 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3250 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3253 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3254 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3255 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3256 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3257 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3258 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3259 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3260 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3261 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3263 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3271 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3272 match forward_info {
3273 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3274 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3275 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3276 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3277 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3278 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3279 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3281 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3282 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3284 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3287 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3288 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3289 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3290 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3291 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3292 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3293 phantom_shared_secret,
3295 value: amt_to_forward,
3297 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3302 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3304 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3305 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3306 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3308 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3309 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3310 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3311 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3312 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3313 phantom_shared_secret,
3315 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3320 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3321 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3322 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3324 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3325 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3326 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3329 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3330 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3331 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3332 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3333 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3334 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3338 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3339 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3340 total_value += htlc.value;
3341 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3342 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3343 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3345 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3346 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3348 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3350 _ => unreachable!(),
3353 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3355 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3356 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3357 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3358 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3359 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3362 amount_msat: total_value,
3364 payment_received_generated = true;
3366 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3367 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3369 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3371 payment_received_generated
3375 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3376 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3377 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3378 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3379 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3380 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3381 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3382 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3384 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3385 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3386 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3387 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3388 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3390 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3394 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3396 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3397 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3399 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3400 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3401 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3403 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3409 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3416 if payment_data.is_none() {
3417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3418 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3421 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3422 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3424 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3425 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3427 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3428 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3430 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3431 if payment_received_generated {
3432 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3438 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3439 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3447 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3448 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3450 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3452 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3453 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3456 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3457 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3458 events.append(&mut new_events);
3461 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3463 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3464 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3466 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3467 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3468 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3469 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3470 if background_events.is_empty() {
3474 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3476 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3477 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3478 // monitor updating completing.
3479 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3486 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3487 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3488 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3489 self.process_background_events();
3492 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3493 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3494 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3495 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3496 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3497 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3498 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3500 if !chan.is_live() {
3501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3502 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3503 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3505 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3506 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3508 let mut retain_channel = true;
3509 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3512 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3513 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3517 let ret_err = match res {
3518 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3519 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3520 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3521 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3524 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3525 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3526 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3527 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3528 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3529 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3530 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3531 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3541 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3545 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3546 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3547 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3548 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3549 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3550 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3551 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3553 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3555 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3557 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3558 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3559 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3560 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3561 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3562 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3563 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3565 handle_errors.push(err);
3575 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3577 /// This currently includes:
3578 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3579 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3580 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3582 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3583 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3585 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3586 /// estimate fetches.
3587 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3588 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3589 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3590 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3592 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3594 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3595 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3597 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3598 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3599 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3600 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3601 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3602 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3603 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3604 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3606 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3608 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3610 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3611 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3612 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3613 if needs_close { return false; }
3616 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3617 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3618 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3619 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3620 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3621 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3622 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3623 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3627 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3628 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3630 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3631 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3632 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3636 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3637 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3642 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3647 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3648 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3649 // This should be unreachable
3650 debug_assert!(false);
3653 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3654 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3655 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3656 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3658 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3659 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3660 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3662 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3670 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3671 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3674 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3675 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3681 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3682 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3683 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3685 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3686 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3687 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3688 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3690 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3691 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3692 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3693 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3694 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3697 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3698 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3699 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3700 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3701 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3702 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3703 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3704 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3705 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3706 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3707 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3712 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3713 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3715 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3717 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3718 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3719 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3720 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3721 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3722 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3723 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3725 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3727 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3728 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3730 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3735 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3736 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3737 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3738 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3739 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3740 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3741 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3742 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3743 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3745 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3746 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3747 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3748 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3750 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3751 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3752 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3753 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3754 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3758 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3759 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3760 // be surfaced to the user.
3761 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3762 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3763 _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3765 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3767 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3768 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3769 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3771 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3773 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3775 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3776 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3777 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3779 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3780 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3781 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3782 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3783 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3784 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3785 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3786 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3787 Some(RouteParameters {
3788 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3789 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3790 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3793 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3794 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3795 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3797 rejected_by_dest: false,
3798 network_update: None,
3799 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3801 short_channel_id: None,
3808 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3809 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3811 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3817 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3824 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3825 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3826 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3827 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3828 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3829 /// still-available channels.
3830 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3831 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3832 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3833 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3836 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3837 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3838 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3840 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3841 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3842 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3843 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3844 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3845 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3846 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3847 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3848 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3851 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3852 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3855 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3856 all_paths_failed = true;
3857 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3858 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3860 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3866 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3869 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3870 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3871 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3872 Some(RouteParameters {
3873 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3874 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3875 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3878 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3880 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3881 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3883 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3885 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3887 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3888 if !payment_retryable {
3889 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3891 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3895 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3896 payment_id: payment_id,
3897 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3903 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3904 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3905 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3906 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3907 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3908 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3909 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3916 error_code: onion_error_code,
3918 error_data: onion_error_data
3922 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3928 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3929 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3930 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3931 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3933 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3934 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3935 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3936 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3937 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3938 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3939 network_update: None,
3942 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3945 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3947 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3951 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3952 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3953 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3955 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3956 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3957 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3959 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3960 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3961 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3962 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3964 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3965 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3968 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3969 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3970 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3974 let mut forward_event = None;
3975 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3976 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3978 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3979 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3980 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3982 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3983 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3986 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3987 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3988 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3989 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3990 time_forwardable: time
3997 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3998 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4000 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4001 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4002 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4004 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4005 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4006 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4007 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4009 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4010 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4011 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4012 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4013 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4014 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4015 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4016 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4020 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4021 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4022 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4023 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4025 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4026 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4027 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4028 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4030 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4031 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4032 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4033 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4034 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4036 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4037 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4038 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4039 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4040 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4044 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4045 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4046 debug_assert!(false);
4050 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4051 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4052 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4053 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4054 if sources.len() != 1 {
4055 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4056 debug_assert!(false);
4062 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4064 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4065 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4068 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4069 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4070 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4074 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4075 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4076 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4078 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4079 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4080 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4081 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4082 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4083 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4084 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4086 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4087 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4088 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4089 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4090 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4091 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4092 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4093 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4095 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4096 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4097 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4098 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4099 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4100 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4102 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4107 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4108 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4110 purpose: payment_purpose,
4111 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4115 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4116 // which were generated.
4117 channel_state.take();
4119 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4120 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4121 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4126 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4127 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4128 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4129 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4130 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4132 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4136 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4137 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4138 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4139 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4140 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4141 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4142 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4143 payment_preimage, e);
4144 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4145 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4146 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4147 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4150 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4151 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4152 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4153 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4154 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4155 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4156 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4157 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4158 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4159 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4165 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4167 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4170 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4171 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4172 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4173 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4174 payment_preimage, e);
4176 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4177 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4179 chan.remove_entry();
4181 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4184 } else { unreachable!(); }
4187 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4188 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4189 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4190 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4191 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4192 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4193 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4194 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4195 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4196 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4197 pending_events.push(
4198 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4200 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4205 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4213 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4215 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4216 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4217 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4218 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4219 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4220 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4221 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4222 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4223 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4224 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4225 pending_events.push(
4226 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4227 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4233 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4237 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4238 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4239 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4241 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4242 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4243 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4244 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4245 pending_events.push(
4246 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4254 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4262 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4263 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4264 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4265 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4266 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4267 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4268 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4271 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4272 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4273 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4274 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4275 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4278 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4279 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4280 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4281 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4282 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4283 payment_preimage, e);
4285 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4286 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4287 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4288 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4291 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4292 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4293 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4294 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4298 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4299 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4300 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4303 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4304 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4305 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4307 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4309 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4319 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4320 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4321 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4324 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4327 let chan_restoration_res;
4328 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4329 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4330 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4331 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4335 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4339 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4340 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4341 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4342 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4343 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4344 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4346 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4347 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4348 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4353 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4354 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4355 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4357 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4359 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4360 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4361 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4362 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4366 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4368 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4369 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4372 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4373 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4374 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4376 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4377 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4378 /// used to accept such channels.
4380 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4381 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4382 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4383 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4386 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4387 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4389 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4390 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4391 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4393 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4394 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4396 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4397 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4399 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4400 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4402 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4403 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4404 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4405 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4408 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4411 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4412 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4413 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4415 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4416 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4418 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4419 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4422 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4423 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4424 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4425 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4427 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4431 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4432 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4435 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4436 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4437 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4441 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4447 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4448 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4449 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4452 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4453 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4456 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4457 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4458 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4459 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4462 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4463 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4467 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4468 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4471 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4474 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4475 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4476 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4479 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4480 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4481 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4484 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4485 pending_events.push(
4486 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4487 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4488 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4489 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4490 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4491 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4496 entry.insert(channel);
4502 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4503 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4504 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4505 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4506 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4508 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4511 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4512 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4514 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4517 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4518 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4519 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4520 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4521 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4523 user_channel_id: user_id,
4528 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4529 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4530 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4531 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4532 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4533 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4535 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4536 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4538 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4543 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4544 // lock before watch_channel
4545 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4547 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4548 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4549 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4550 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4551 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4552 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4553 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4554 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4555 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4556 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4557 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4559 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4560 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4561 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4562 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4563 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4564 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4565 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4569 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4570 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4573 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4575 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4576 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4577 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4580 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4581 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4589 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4591 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4592 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4593 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4594 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4595 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4596 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4597 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4599 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4600 Ok(update) => update,
4601 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4603 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4604 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4605 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4606 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4607 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4608 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4609 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4610 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4615 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4616 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4623 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4624 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4628 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4629 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4630 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4631 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4632 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4633 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4634 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4636 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4637 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4638 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4639 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4640 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4641 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4642 msg: announcement_sigs,
4644 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4645 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4646 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4647 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4648 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4649 // announcement_signatures.
4650 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4651 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4652 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4653 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4664 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4665 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4666 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4667 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4668 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4670 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4671 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4672 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4673 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4676 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4677 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4678 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4679 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4682 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4683 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4685 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4686 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4687 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4688 let (result, is_permanent) =
4689 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4691 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4697 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4699 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4709 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4710 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4713 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4717 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4718 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4719 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4720 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4721 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4723 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4724 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4726 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4727 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4728 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4729 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4734 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4735 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4736 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4737 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4738 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4739 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4740 } else { (tx, None) }
4742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4745 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4746 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4747 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4749 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4750 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4751 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4752 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4756 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4761 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4762 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4763 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4764 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4766 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4767 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4768 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4769 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4771 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4772 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4774 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4776 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4777 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4780 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4781 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4782 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4783 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4784 match pending_forward_info {
4785 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4786 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4787 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4788 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4790 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4792 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4793 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4794 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4797 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4799 _ => pending_forward_info
4802 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4809 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4810 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4811 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4812 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4813 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4815 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4816 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4818 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4823 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4827 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4828 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4832 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4835 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4842 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4843 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4845 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4847 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4848 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4850 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4851 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4852 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4854 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4861 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4862 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4863 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4864 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4866 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4867 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4869 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4870 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4871 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4872 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4873 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4874 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4875 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4880 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4881 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4883 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4884 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4885 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4887 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4888 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4889 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4890 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4891 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4892 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4893 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4894 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4896 commitment_signed: msg,
4902 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4907 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4908 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4909 let mut forward_event = None;
4910 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4911 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4912 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4913 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4915 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4916 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4917 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4918 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4919 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4922 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4923 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4926 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4927 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4932 match forward_event {
4934 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4935 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4936 time_forwardable: time
4944 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4945 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4947 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4948 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4949 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4951 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4952 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4954 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4955 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4956 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4957 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4958 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4959 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4960 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4961 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4962 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4963 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4964 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4966 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4967 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4968 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4969 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4970 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4972 } else { unreachable!(); }
4975 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4976 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4977 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4981 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4982 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4983 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4984 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4985 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4987 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4990 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4992 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4993 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4995 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4996 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4998 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4999 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5006 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5007 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5008 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5009 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5011 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5012 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5014 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
5016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5021 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5022 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5023 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5025 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5027 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5028 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5030 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5031 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5034 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5035 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5036 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
5037 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5038 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5039 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5047 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5048 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5049 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5050 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5051 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5052 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
5054 // It's not a local channel
5055 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5058 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5059 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5060 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5061 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5062 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5063 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5064 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5065 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5067 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5069 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5070 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5071 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5072 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5074 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5079 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5082 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5083 let chan_restoration_res;
5084 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5085 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5086 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5088 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5090 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5091 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5093 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5094 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5095 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5096 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5097 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5098 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5099 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5100 let mut channel_update = None;
5101 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5102 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5103 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5106 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5107 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5108 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5109 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5110 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5111 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5112 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5117 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5118 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5119 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5120 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5121 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5122 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5124 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5129 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5130 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5132 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5133 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5138 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5139 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5140 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5141 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5142 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5143 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5144 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5145 match monitor_event {
5146 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5147 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5149 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5152 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5155 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5156 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5157 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5158 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5159 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5160 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5161 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5162 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5163 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5164 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5165 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5169 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5170 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5172 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5174 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5175 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5176 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5177 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5178 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5183 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5184 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5190 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5191 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5194 has_pending_monitor_events
5197 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5198 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5199 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5201 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5202 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5205 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5206 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5207 /// update was applied.
5209 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5210 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5211 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5212 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5213 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5214 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5215 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5216 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5218 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5219 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5220 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5221 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5222 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5224 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5225 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5226 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5227 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5229 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5231 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5234 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5235 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5236 has_monitor_update = true;
5237 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5238 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5239 if close_channel { return false; }
5241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5242 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5243 updates: commitment_update,
5250 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5251 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5252 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5259 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5260 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5261 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5264 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5265 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5271 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5272 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5273 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5274 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5275 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5276 let mut has_update = false;
5278 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5279 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5280 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5281 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5282 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5284 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5285 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5286 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5287 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5289 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5290 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5293 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5294 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5295 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5296 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5297 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5302 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5304 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5305 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5306 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5312 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5313 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5320 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5321 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5327 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5328 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5330 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5331 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5332 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5333 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5334 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5335 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5336 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5337 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5338 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5339 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5340 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5341 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5342 assert!(should_broadcast);
5343 } else { unreachable!(); }
5344 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5346 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5350 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5351 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5353 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5354 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5357 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5359 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5360 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5361 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5362 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5363 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5364 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5365 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5366 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5367 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5368 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5369 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5370 // never fail a payment too early.
5371 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5373 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5376 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5381 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5384 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5385 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5387 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5388 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5389 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5391 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5393 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5394 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5398 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5399 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5401 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5403 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5404 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5405 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5406 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5407 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5408 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5411 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5412 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5414 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5417 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5419 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5421 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5422 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5423 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5424 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5425 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5428 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5429 /// stored external to LDK.
5431 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5432 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5433 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5435 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5436 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5439 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5440 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5441 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5442 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5444 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5445 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5446 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5447 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5448 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5450 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5451 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5452 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5453 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5454 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5456 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5457 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5459 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5460 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5464 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5465 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5467 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5469 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5470 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5471 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5472 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5475 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5476 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5478 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5481 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5483 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5485 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5486 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5489 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5490 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5492 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5493 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5494 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5497 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5498 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5500 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5501 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5502 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5503 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5505 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5506 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5507 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5514 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5516 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5517 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5519 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5520 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5521 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5525 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5526 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5527 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5528 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5529 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5534 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5535 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5539 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5540 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5544 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5545 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5546 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5547 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5548 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5551 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5552 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5553 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5554 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5556 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5557 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5558 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5559 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5562 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5563 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5565 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5566 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5569 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5570 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5571 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5573 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5574 events.replace(pending_events);
5583 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5585 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5586 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5587 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5588 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5591 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5593 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5594 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5596 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5597 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5598 /// restarting from an old state.
5599 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5600 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5601 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5603 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5604 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5605 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5606 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5609 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5610 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5611 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5614 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5615 handler.handle_event(&event);
5623 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5625 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5626 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5627 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5628 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5631 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5633 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5634 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5635 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5636 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5637 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5640 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5641 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5644 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5646 let new_height = height - 1;
5648 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5649 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5650 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5651 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5652 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5653 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5656 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5660 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5662 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5663 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5664 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5665 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5668 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5669 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5670 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5671 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5673 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5674 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5677 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5678 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5680 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5681 if height < last_best_block_height {
5682 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5683 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5687 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5688 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5689 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5690 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5692 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5693 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5697 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5699 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5701 macro_rules! max_time {
5702 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5704 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5705 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5706 // having an explicit local time source.
5707 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5708 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5709 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5710 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5711 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5717 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5718 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5719 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5720 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5721 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5724 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5725 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5726 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5727 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5728 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5729 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5730 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5731 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5732 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5740 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5741 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5742 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5743 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5744 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5745 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5751 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5752 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5753 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5754 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5755 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5756 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5757 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5758 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5763 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5765 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5766 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5767 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5768 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5771 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5772 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5774 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5775 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5776 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5777 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5778 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5780 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5781 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5783 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5784 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5785 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5786 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5787 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5788 let res = f(channel);
5789 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5790 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5791 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5792 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5796 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5797 send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5798 if channel.is_usable() {
5799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5800 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5801 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5802 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5810 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5811 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5812 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5813 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5814 msg: announcement_sigs,
5816 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5817 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5818 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5820 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5821 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5822 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5827 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5828 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5829 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5830 // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5831 // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5832 // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5833 // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5834 let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5835 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5836 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5837 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5840 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5841 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5842 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5843 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5844 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5845 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5846 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5850 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5851 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5852 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5853 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5854 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5855 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5856 data: reason_message,
5864 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5865 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5866 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5867 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5868 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5869 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5870 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5871 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5872 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5873 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5874 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5875 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5876 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5881 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5886 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5888 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5889 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5893 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5894 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5895 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5898 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5899 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5900 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5901 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5904 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5905 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5907 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5908 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5911 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5912 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5913 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5914 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5915 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5919 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5920 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5921 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5922 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5926 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5927 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5928 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5929 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5930 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5931 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5934 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5935 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5936 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5939 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5941 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5944 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5946 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5949 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5950 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5951 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5954 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5956 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5959 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5961 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5964 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5966 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5969 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5971 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5974 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5976 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5979 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5981 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5984 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5985 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5986 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5989 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5991 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5994 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5996 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5999 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6000 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6001 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6004 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6005 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6006 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6009 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6010 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6011 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6014 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6019 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6021 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6024 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6026 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6027 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6029 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6030 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6031 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6032 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
6033 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6034 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6035 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6036 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6037 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6038 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6039 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
6040 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6043 no_channels_remain = false;
6048 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6050 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6051 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6052 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6053 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6054 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6055 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6056 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6057 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6058 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6059 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6060 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6061 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6062 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6063 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6064 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6065 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6066 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6067 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6068 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6069 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6073 if no_channels_remain {
6074 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6077 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6078 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6082 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6083 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6088 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6089 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6090 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6091 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6092 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6096 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6101 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6102 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6103 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6104 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6105 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6106 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6107 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6108 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6109 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6113 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6114 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6115 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6121 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6124 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6127 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6128 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6129 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6130 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6131 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6136 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6137 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6138 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6139 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6142 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6143 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6144 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6152 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6153 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6158 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6159 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6160 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6161 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6162 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6163 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6166 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6169 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6175 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6176 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6181 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6182 let result = *guard;
6190 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6191 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6192 let current_time = Instant::now();
6194 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6195 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6200 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6201 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6202 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6203 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6204 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6206 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6207 let result = *guard;
6208 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6212 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6213 None => return result,
6219 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6221 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6222 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6223 *persistence_lock = true;
6224 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6229 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6230 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6232 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6233 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6234 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6235 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6238 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6239 (2, node_id, required),
6240 (4, features, required),
6241 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6242 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6243 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6244 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6247 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6248 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6249 (2, channel_id, required),
6250 (3, channel_type, option),
6251 (4, counterparty, required),
6252 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6253 (6, funding_txo, option),
6254 (7, config, option),
6255 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6256 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6257 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6258 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6259 (16, balance_msat, required),
6260 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6261 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6262 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6263 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6264 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6265 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6266 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6267 (26, is_outbound, required),
6268 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6269 (30, is_usable, required),
6270 (32, is_public, required),
6271 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6272 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6275 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6276 (2, channels, vec_type),
6277 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6278 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6281 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6283 (0, onion_packet, required),
6284 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6287 (0, payment_data, required),
6288 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6289 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6291 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6292 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6293 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6297 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6298 (0, routing, required),
6299 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6300 (4, payment_hash, required),
6301 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6302 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6306 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6307 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6309 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6311 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6312 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6313 reason.write(writer)?;
6315 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6316 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6319 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6320 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6321 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6322 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6329 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6330 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6331 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6334 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6335 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6336 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6337 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6341 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6342 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6343 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6344 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6345 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6348 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6349 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6350 // messages contained in the variants.
6351 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6352 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6353 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6355 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6356 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6357 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6358 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6359 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6362 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6363 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6364 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6365 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6366 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6368 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6373 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6378 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6379 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6380 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6381 (2, outpoint, required),
6382 (4, htlc_id, required),
6383 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6386 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6387 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6388 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6389 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6390 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6392 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6393 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6394 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6395 (2, self.value, required),
6396 (4, payment_data, option),
6397 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6398 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6404 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6405 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6406 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6408 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6409 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6410 let mut total_msat = None;
6411 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6412 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6413 (0, prev_hop, required),
6414 (1, total_msat, option),
6415 (2, value, required),
6416 (4, payment_data, option),
6417 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6418 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6420 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6422 if payment_data.is_some() {
6423 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6425 if total_msat.is_none() {
6426 total_msat = Some(value);
6428 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6431 if total_msat.is_none() {
6432 if payment_data.is_none() {
6433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6435 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6437 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6441 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6444 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6451 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6452 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6453 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6456 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6457 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6458 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6459 let mut payment_id = None;
6460 let mut payment_secret = None;
6461 let mut payment_params = None;
6462 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6463 (0, session_priv, required),
6464 (1, payment_id, option),
6465 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6466 (3, payment_secret, option),
6467 (4, path, vec_type),
6468 (5, payment_params, option),
6470 if payment_id.is_none() {
6471 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6473 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6475 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6476 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6477 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6478 path: path.unwrap(),
6479 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6484 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6485 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6490 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6491 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6493 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6495 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6496 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6497 (0, session_priv, required),
6498 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6499 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6500 (3, payment_secret, option),
6501 (4, path, vec_type),
6502 (5, payment_params, option),
6505 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6507 field.write(writer)?;
6514 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6515 (0, LightningError) => {
6519 (0, failure_code, required),
6520 (2, data, vec_type),
6524 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6526 (0, forward_info, required),
6527 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6528 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6529 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6532 (0, htlc_id, required),
6533 (2, err_packet, required),
6537 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6538 (0, payment_secret, required),
6539 (2, expiry_time, required),
6540 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6541 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6542 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6545 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6547 (0, session_privs, required),
6550 (0, session_privs, required),
6551 (1, payment_hash, option),
6554 (0, session_privs, required),
6555 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6556 (2, payment_hash, required),
6557 (4, payment_secret, option),
6558 (6, total_msat, required),
6559 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6560 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6563 (0, session_privs, required),
6564 (2, payment_hash, required),
6568 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6569 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6570 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6571 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6572 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6575 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6576 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6578 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6580 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6582 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6583 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6584 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6587 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6588 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6589 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6590 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6591 unfunded_channels += 1;
6594 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6595 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6596 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6597 channel.write(writer)?;
6601 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6602 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6603 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6604 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6605 for forward in pending_forwards {
6606 forward.write(writer)?;
6610 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6611 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6612 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6613 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6614 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6615 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6616 htlc.write(writer)?;
6618 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6621 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6622 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6623 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6624 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6625 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6626 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6629 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6630 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6631 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6632 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6633 for event in events.iter() {
6634 event.write(writer)?;
6637 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6638 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6639 for event in background_events.iter() {
6641 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6643 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6644 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6649 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6650 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6652 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6653 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6654 hash.write(writer)?;
6655 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6658 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6659 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6660 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6661 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6662 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6665 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6666 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6668 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6669 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6670 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6671 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6674 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6675 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6679 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6680 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6681 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6683 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6684 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6685 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6690 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6691 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6692 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6693 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6694 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6695 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6696 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6703 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6705 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6707 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6708 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6709 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6710 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6711 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6712 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6713 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6714 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6715 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6716 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6717 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6718 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6719 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6721 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6722 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6724 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6725 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6727 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6728 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6729 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6730 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6731 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6732 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6734 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6735 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6736 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6737 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6738 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6742 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6743 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6745 pub keys_manager: K,
6747 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6749 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6750 pub fee_estimator: F,
6751 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6753 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6754 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6755 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6756 pub chain_monitor: M,
6758 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6759 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6760 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6761 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6762 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6763 /// deserialization.
6765 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6766 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6767 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6769 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6770 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6772 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6773 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6774 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6775 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6777 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6780 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6781 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6784 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6785 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6786 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6787 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6788 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6789 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6792 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6793 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6794 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6795 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6796 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6798 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6799 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6804 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6805 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6806 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6807 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6808 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6809 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6810 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6811 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6814 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6815 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6816 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6820 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6821 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6822 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6823 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6824 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6825 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6828 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6829 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6831 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6832 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6835 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6837 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6838 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6839 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6840 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6841 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6842 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6843 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6844 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6845 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6846 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6847 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6848 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6849 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6850 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6851 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6852 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6853 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6854 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6855 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6856 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6857 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6858 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6859 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6860 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6861 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6862 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6863 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6864 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6865 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6866 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6867 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6868 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6869 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6870 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6871 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6872 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6873 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6874 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6875 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6878 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6879 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6880 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6882 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6885 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6886 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6887 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6888 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6889 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6890 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6894 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6895 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6896 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6897 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6901 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6902 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6903 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6904 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6905 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6907 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6908 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6909 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6911 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6914 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6916 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6917 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6918 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6919 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6920 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6921 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6923 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6926 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6927 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6928 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6929 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6930 let peer_state = PeerState {
6931 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6933 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6936 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6938 for _ in 0..event_count {
6939 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6940 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6944 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6945 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6946 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6947 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6948 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6949 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6950 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6951 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6955 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6957 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6958 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6959 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6960 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6964 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6965 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6969 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6970 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6971 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6975 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6976 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6977 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6978 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6979 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6980 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6981 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6983 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6984 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6988 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6989 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6990 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6991 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6992 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6993 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6994 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6995 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6996 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6997 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6998 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6999 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7000 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7001 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7003 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7004 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7007 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7008 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7011 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7012 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7013 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7014 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7015 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7016 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7018 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7020 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7021 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7022 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7023 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7024 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7025 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7026 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7028 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7029 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7030 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7031 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7032 if path.is_empty() {
7033 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7034 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7036 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7037 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7038 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7039 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7041 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7042 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7043 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7046 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7047 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7048 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7049 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7051 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7052 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7053 total_msat: path_amt,
7054 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7056 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7057 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7066 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7067 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7069 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7070 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7071 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7072 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7074 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7075 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7078 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7079 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7080 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7081 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7082 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7084 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7085 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7086 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7087 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7088 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7089 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7090 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7091 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7093 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7094 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7098 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7100 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7102 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7103 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7105 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7109 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7110 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7112 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7113 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7116 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7118 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7120 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7121 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7122 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7123 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7124 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7128 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7129 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7130 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7131 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7133 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7134 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7135 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7137 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7138 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7139 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7140 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7141 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7142 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7144 if chan.is_usable() {
7145 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
7146 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7147 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7148 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7154 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7155 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7156 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7157 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7158 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7159 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7160 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7162 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7163 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7164 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7165 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7167 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7168 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7169 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7170 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7172 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7173 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7174 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7175 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7177 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7178 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7179 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7181 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7182 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7185 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7187 purpose: payment_purpose,
7188 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7194 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7196 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7197 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7198 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7200 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7202 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7207 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7209 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7210 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7211 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7213 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7214 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7216 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7222 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7223 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7225 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7227 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7228 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7229 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7230 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7232 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7233 logger: args.logger,
7234 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7237 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7238 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7241 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7242 //connection or two.
7244 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7250 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7251 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7252 use core::time::Duration;
7253 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7254 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7255 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7256 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7257 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7258 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7260 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7261 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7262 use util::errors::APIError;
7263 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7264 use util::test_utils;
7265 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7267 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7269 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7270 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7272 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7275 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7276 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7278 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7279 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7280 thread::spawn(move || {
7282 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7283 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7284 *persistence_lock = true;
7287 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7293 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7294 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7296 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7299 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7304 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7306 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7309 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7316 fn test_notify_limits() {
7317 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7318 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7322 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7324 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7325 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7326 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7327 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7328 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7330 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7332 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7333 // to connect messages with new values
7334 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7335 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7336 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7337 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7339 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7340 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7341 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7342 // ... but the last node should not.
7343 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7344 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7345 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7346 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7348 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7349 // about the channel.
7350 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7351 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7352 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7354 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7356 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7357 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7358 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7359 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7360 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7361 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7363 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7364 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7365 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7367 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7368 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7369 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7370 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7371 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7372 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7374 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7375 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7376 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7377 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7378 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7379 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7380 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7381 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7383 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7384 // the channel info has updated.
7385 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7386 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7387 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7388 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7389 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7390 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7394 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7395 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7397 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7400 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7401 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7403 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7404 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7405 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7406 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7407 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7408 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7409 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7411 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7412 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7413 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7415 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7416 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7418 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7419 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7420 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7421 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7422 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7424 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7425 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7426 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7428 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7429 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7430 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7431 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7432 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7433 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7434 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7436 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7438 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7439 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7441 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7442 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7443 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7445 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7446 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7447 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7448 // lightning messages manually.
7449 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7450 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7453 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7454 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7455 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7457 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7458 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7460 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7463 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7464 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7465 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7467 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7468 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7469 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7473 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7475 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7476 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7479 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7480 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7481 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7484 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7485 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7486 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7487 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7492 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7493 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7494 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7495 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7497 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7500 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7501 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7502 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7503 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7505 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7510 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7511 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7512 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7513 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7514 // fails as expected.
7515 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7518 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7519 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7520 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7521 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7523 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7524 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7525 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7527 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7528 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7529 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7530 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7531 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7533 let route = find_route(
7534 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7535 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7537 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7539 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7540 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7541 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7542 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7543 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7545 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7546 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7547 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7549 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7550 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7551 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7552 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7553 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7554 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7555 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7556 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7557 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7559 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7560 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7562 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7563 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7564 let route = find_route(
7565 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7566 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7568 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7570 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7571 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7572 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7573 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7574 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7576 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7577 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7578 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7580 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7581 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7582 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7583 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7584 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7586 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7587 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7588 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7590 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7591 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7592 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7593 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7594 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7595 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7596 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7597 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7598 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7600 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7601 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7605 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7606 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7607 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7608 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7609 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7610 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7611 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7613 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7614 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7615 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7616 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7618 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7619 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7620 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7621 final_value_msat: 10000,
7622 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7624 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7625 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7626 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7627 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7628 let route = find_route(
7629 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7630 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7633 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7634 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7635 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7638 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7639 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7640 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7641 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7642 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7643 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7646 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7650 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7651 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7655 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7657 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7658 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7659 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7660 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7662 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7663 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7664 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7665 final_value_msat: 10000,
7666 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7668 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7669 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7670 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7671 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7672 let route = find_route(
7673 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7674 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7677 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7678 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7679 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7680 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7683 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7684 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7685 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7686 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7687 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7688 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7689 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7691 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7695 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7699 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7701 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7702 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7703 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7704 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7706 // Marshall an MPP route.
7707 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7708 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7709 route.paths.push(path);
7710 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7711 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7712 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7713 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7714 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7715 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7717 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7718 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7719 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7720 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7725 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7726 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7727 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7728 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7732 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7733 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7735 total_msat: 100_000,
7738 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7739 // payment verification fails as expected.
7740 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7741 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7742 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7743 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7745 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7749 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7750 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7754 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7757 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7758 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7759 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7760 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7761 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7762 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7763 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7764 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7765 use util::test_utils;
7766 use util::config::UserConfig;
7767 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7769 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7770 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7771 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7773 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7777 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7778 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7779 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7780 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7781 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7782 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7783 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7788 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7789 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7792 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7793 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7794 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7796 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7797 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7799 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7800 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7802 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7803 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7805 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7806 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7807 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7808 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7809 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7811 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7813 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7815 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7816 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7817 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7818 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7819 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7821 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7823 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7825 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7826 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7827 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7828 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7829 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7832 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7833 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7834 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7836 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7837 } else { panic!(); }
7839 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7840 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7842 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7845 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7848 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7849 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7851 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7852 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7853 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7854 match msg_events[0] {
7855 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7856 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7857 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7861 match msg_events[1] {
7862 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7866 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7868 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7869 macro_rules! send_payment {
7870 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7871 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7872 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7873 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7874 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7875 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7876 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7877 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7878 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7879 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7881 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7882 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7884 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7885 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7887 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7888 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7889 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7890 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7891 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7892 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7893 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7894 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7896 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7897 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7898 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7899 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7901 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7902 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7903 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7904 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7905 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7907 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7910 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7911 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7912 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7913 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7915 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7920 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7921 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);