1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::events;
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
96 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 impl HTLCFailReason {
291 pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
292 Self::Reason { failure_code, data }
295 pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
296 Self::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }
300 struct ReceiveError {
306 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
307 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
309 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
314 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
316 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
317 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
318 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
319 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
320 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
322 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
323 err: msgs::LightningError,
324 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
325 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
327 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
329 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
331 err: LightningError {
333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
334 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 shutdown_finish: None,
345 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
347 err: LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
352 shutdown_finish: None,
356 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
357 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
360 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
362 err: LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
372 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
376 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
382 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
386 log_level: Level::Warn,
389 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
391 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
393 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
395 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
396 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
404 shutdown_finish: None,
409 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
410 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
411 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
412 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
413 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
415 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
416 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
417 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
418 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
419 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
420 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
421 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
423 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
427 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
428 struct ClaimingPayment {
430 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
431 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
433 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
434 (0, amount_msat, required),
435 (2, payment_purpose, required),
436 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
439 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
440 struct ClaimablePayments {
441 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
442 /// failed/claimed by the user.
444 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
445 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
447 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
448 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
449 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
451 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
452 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
453 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
454 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
457 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
458 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
459 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
460 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
461 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
462 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
465 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
466 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
467 /// quite some time lag.
468 enum BackgroundEvent {
469 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
470 /// commitment transaction.
471 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
474 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
475 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
477 latest_features: InitFeatures,
480 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
481 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
483 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
486 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
487 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
488 struct PendingInboundPayment {
489 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
490 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
491 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
492 /// this payment being removed.
494 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
495 user_payment_id: u64,
496 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
497 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
498 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
501 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
502 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
503 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
505 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
508 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
509 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
510 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
511 pending_amt_msat: u64,
512 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
513 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
514 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
516 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
517 starting_block_height: u32,
519 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
520 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
521 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
523 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
524 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
525 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
527 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
528 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
529 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
530 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
531 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
533 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
535 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
536 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
540 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
541 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
543 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
547 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
553 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
560 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
563 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
569 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
570 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
571 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
572 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
578 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
579 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
582 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
583 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
584 let our_payment_hash;
585 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
586 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
587 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
591 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
595 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
599 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
600 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
601 let remove_res = match self {
602 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
603 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
604 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
605 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
606 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
610 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
611 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
612 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
613 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
614 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
615 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
622 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
623 let insert_res = match self {
624 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
625 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
626 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
628 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
629 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
632 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
633 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
634 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
635 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
636 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
643 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
645 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
646 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
647 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
648 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
655 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
656 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
657 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
658 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
659 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
660 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
661 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
663 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
664 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
666 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
667 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
668 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
669 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
670 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
671 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
672 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
673 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
675 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
676 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
678 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
679 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
681 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
682 /// to individual Channels.
684 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
685 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
686 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
687 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
689 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
690 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
691 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
692 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
693 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
694 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
695 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
697 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
698 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
699 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
700 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
703 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
704 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
705 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
706 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
707 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
709 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
710 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
711 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
712 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
713 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
716 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
717 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
718 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
719 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
720 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
724 // `total_consistency_lock`
726 // |__`forward_htlcs`
728 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
730 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
732 // | |__`claimable_payments`
734 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
736 // | |__`channel_state`
740 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
742 // | |__`per_peer_state`
744 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
748 // | |__`pending_events`
750 // | |__`pending_background_events`
752 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
753 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
754 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
755 K::Target: KeysInterface,
756 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
759 default_configuration: UserConfig,
760 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
761 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
765 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
767 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
769 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
770 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
772 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
773 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
774 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
775 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
776 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
778 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
779 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
780 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
781 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
783 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
784 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
786 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
787 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
788 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
789 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
790 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
791 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
792 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
793 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
795 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
797 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
798 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
800 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
802 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
803 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
804 /// and via the classic SCID.
806 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
807 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
809 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
811 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
813 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
814 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
815 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
817 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
818 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
820 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
821 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
823 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
824 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
826 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
827 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
828 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
829 /// active channel list on load.
831 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
832 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
834 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
836 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
837 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
838 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
840 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
841 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
842 /// the handling of the events.
845 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
846 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
847 /// would break backwards compatability.
848 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
849 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
850 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
852 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
853 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
855 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
857 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
858 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
859 /// confirmation depth.
861 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
862 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
863 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
865 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
867 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
869 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
871 our_network_key: SecretKey,
872 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
874 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
876 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
877 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
878 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
880 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
881 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
883 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
884 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
885 /// keeping additional state.
886 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
888 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
889 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
890 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
891 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
893 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
894 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
895 /// are currently open with that peer.
896 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
897 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
900 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
901 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
903 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
904 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
905 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
906 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
907 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
908 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
909 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
910 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
911 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
912 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
913 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
915 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
922 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
924 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
925 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
926 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
927 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
928 pub struct ChainParameters {
929 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
930 pub network: Network,
932 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
934 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
935 pub best_block: BestBlock,
938 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
944 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
945 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
946 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
947 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
948 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
949 /// updates are ready for persistence).
951 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
952 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
953 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
954 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
955 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
957 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
958 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
961 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
962 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
963 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
966 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
967 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
969 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
970 persistence_notifier: notifier,
971 should_persist: persist_check,
972 _read_guard: read_guard,
977 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
979 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
980 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
985 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
986 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
988 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
990 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
991 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
992 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
993 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
994 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
996 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
997 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
999 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1001 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1002 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1003 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1004 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1005 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1006 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1007 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1008 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1009 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1010 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1011 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1012 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1013 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1015 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1016 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1018 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1019 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1020 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1021 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1023 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1024 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1025 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1026 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1027 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1028 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1031 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1033 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1034 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1037 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1039 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1040 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1042 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1043 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1044 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1045 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1047 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1048 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1049 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1050 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1051 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1052 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1053 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1054 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1055 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1056 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1057 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1060 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1061 /// to better separate parameters.
1062 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1063 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1064 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1065 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1066 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1067 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1068 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1069 pub features: InitFeatures,
1070 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1071 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1072 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1074 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1076 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1077 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1078 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1079 /// payments to us through this channel.
1080 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1081 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1082 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1083 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1084 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1085 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1086 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1089 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1090 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1091 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1092 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1093 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1094 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1095 /// lifetime of the channel.
1096 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1097 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1098 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1099 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1100 /// our counterparty already.
1102 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1103 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1104 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1105 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1107 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1108 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1109 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1110 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1112 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1113 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1115 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1116 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1118 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1119 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1120 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1121 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1122 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1123 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1124 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1125 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1126 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1129 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1131 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1132 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1133 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1134 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1135 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1136 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1137 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1139 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1140 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1142 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1143 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1144 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1145 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1146 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1147 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1148 /// this value on chain.
1150 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1152 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1154 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1155 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1156 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1157 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1159 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1160 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1161 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1162 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1164 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1165 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1166 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1167 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1169 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1170 pub balance_msat: u64,
1171 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1172 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1173 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1174 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1176 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1178 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1179 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1180 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1181 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1182 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1183 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1184 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1185 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1187 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1188 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1189 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1190 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1191 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1192 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1193 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1195 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1196 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1197 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1198 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1199 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1200 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1201 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1202 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1203 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1205 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1207 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1208 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1209 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1210 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1211 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1213 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1214 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1215 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1216 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1217 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1218 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1219 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1221 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1222 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1223 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1224 pub is_outbound: bool,
1225 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1226 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1227 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1228 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1229 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1231 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1232 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1233 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1234 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1236 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1237 pub is_usable: bool,
1238 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1239 pub is_public: bool,
1240 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1241 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1242 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1243 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1244 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1245 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1247 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1248 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1251 impl ChannelDetails {
1252 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1253 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1254 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1256 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1257 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1258 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1259 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1262 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1263 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1264 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1266 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1267 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1268 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1269 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1273 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1274 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1275 /// states for more.
1276 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1277 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1278 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1279 /// send the payment at all.
1281 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1283 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1284 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1285 /// for this payment.
1286 ParameterError(APIError),
1287 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1288 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1290 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1292 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1295 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1296 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1297 /// for this payment.
1298 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1299 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1300 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1301 /// paths than the ones selected).
1303 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1304 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1305 /// for this payment.
1306 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1307 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1308 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1309 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1311 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1313 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1314 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1315 /// in over-/re-payment.
1317 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1318 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1319 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1321 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1322 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1323 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1324 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1326 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1327 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1328 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1329 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1330 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1331 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1332 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1333 payment_id: PaymentId,
1337 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1339 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1341 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1342 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1343 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1344 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1346 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1347 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1348 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1351 macro_rules! handle_error {
1352 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1355 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1356 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1358 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1359 // entering the macro.
1360 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1361 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1364 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1366 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1367 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1368 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1369 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1373 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1374 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1375 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1376 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1381 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1382 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1384 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1385 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1386 action: err.action.clone()
1390 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1391 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1394 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1401 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1402 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1403 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1404 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1405 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1406 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1408 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1409 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1410 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1411 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1412 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1414 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1415 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1417 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1421 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1422 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1423 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1425 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1426 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1428 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1429 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1431 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1432 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1433 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1434 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1435 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1436 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1442 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1443 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1447 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1449 $entry.remove_entry();
1457 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1458 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1462 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1464 $entry.remove_entry();
1472 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1473 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1475 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1476 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1482 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1483 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1485 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1486 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1487 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1488 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1489 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1490 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1491 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1492 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1493 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1494 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1495 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1496 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1497 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1498 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1501 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1502 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1503 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1504 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1505 match $action_type {
1506 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1507 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1509 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1510 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1512 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1513 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1514 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1515 if !$resend_commitment {
1516 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1519 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1521 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1522 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1524 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1529 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1530 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1532 $entry.remove_entry();
1536 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1537 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1538 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1540 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1541 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1543 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1544 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1546 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1547 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1549 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1550 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1554 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1555 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1556 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1557 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1558 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1560 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1561 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1562 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1563 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1564 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1565 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1566 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1567 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1568 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1569 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1574 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1575 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1576 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1578 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1579 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1580 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1581 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1582 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1583 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1586 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1591 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1592 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1593 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1594 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1595 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1598 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1600 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1601 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1603 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1605 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1606 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1607 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1608 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1609 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1610 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1611 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1612 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1614 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1615 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1616 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1620 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1622 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1623 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1624 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1626 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1627 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1628 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1629 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1630 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1631 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1632 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1633 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1635 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1636 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1639 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1640 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1642 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1644 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1646 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1648 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1649 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1650 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1651 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1659 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1660 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1661 &self.default_configuration
1664 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1665 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1666 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1669 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1670 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1672 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1674 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1678 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1683 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1685 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1686 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1687 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1688 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1689 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1691 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1692 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1694 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1695 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1696 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1698 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1699 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1700 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1701 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1702 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1703 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1705 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1706 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1707 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1708 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1709 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1710 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1714 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1715 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1716 Some(peer_state) => {
1717 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1718 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1719 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1720 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1721 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1722 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1723 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1727 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1732 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1735 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1738 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1739 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1741 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1742 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1743 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1746 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1748 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1753 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1754 node_id: their_network_key,
1757 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1760 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1761 let mut res = Vec::new();
1763 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1764 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1765 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1766 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1767 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1768 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1769 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1770 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1771 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1772 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1773 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1774 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1775 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1776 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1777 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1778 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1779 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1780 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1781 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1782 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1783 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1784 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1786 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1787 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1788 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1789 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1790 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1791 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1792 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1793 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1794 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1795 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1796 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1797 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1798 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1799 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1800 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1801 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1802 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1803 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1804 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1805 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1806 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1807 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1808 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1809 config: Some(channel.config()),
1813 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1814 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1815 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1816 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1822 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1823 /// more information.
1824 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1825 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1828 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1829 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1831 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1832 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1835 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1836 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1837 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1838 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1839 // really wanted anyway.
1840 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1843 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1844 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1845 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1846 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1847 Some(transaction) => {
1848 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1852 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1853 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1854 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1855 reason: closure_reason
1859 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1862 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1863 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1864 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1865 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1868 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1869 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1871 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1873 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1874 Some(peer_state) => {
1875 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1876 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1877 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1879 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1882 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1884 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1885 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1886 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1887 let (result, is_permanent) =
1888 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1890 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1896 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1900 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1901 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1902 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1903 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1907 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1915 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1916 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1917 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1921 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1925 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1926 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1927 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1929 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1930 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1932 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1933 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1934 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1935 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1937 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1939 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1940 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1941 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1942 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1943 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1946 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1947 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1948 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1950 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1951 /// the channel being closed or not:
1952 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1953 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1955 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1956 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1957 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1958 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1960 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1963 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1964 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1965 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1966 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1970 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1971 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1972 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1973 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1974 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1975 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1976 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1977 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1979 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1980 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1981 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1982 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1983 // ignore the result here.
1984 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1988 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1989 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1990 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1991 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1993 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1995 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1996 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1997 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1999 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2000 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2002 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2004 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2006 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2009 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2010 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2011 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2012 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2013 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2018 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2021 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2023 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2024 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2025 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2026 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2027 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2028 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2029 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2039 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2040 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2041 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2043 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2044 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2045 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2048 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2049 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2050 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2052 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2053 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2054 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2055 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2056 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2059 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2060 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2061 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2062 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2063 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2067 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2068 /// local transaction(s).
2069 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2070 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2071 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2075 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2076 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2078 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2079 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2080 return Err(ReceiveError {
2081 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2083 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2086 // final_expiry_too_soon
2087 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2088 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2089 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2090 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2091 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2092 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2093 return Err(ReceiveError {
2095 err_data: Vec::new(),
2096 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2099 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2100 return Err(ReceiveError {
2102 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2103 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2107 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2108 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2109 return Err(ReceiveError {
2110 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2111 err_data: Vec::new(),
2112 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2115 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2116 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2117 return Err(ReceiveError {
2118 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2119 err_data: Vec::new(),
2120 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2122 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2123 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2125 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2126 phantom_shared_secret,
2128 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2129 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2130 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2131 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2132 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2133 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2134 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2135 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2136 return Err(ReceiveError {
2137 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2138 err_data: Vec::new(),
2139 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2143 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2145 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2148 return Err(ReceiveError {
2149 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2150 err_data: Vec::new(),
2151 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2156 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2159 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2160 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2161 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2162 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2166 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2167 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2168 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2170 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2171 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2172 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2173 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2174 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2175 failure_code: $err_code,
2181 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2182 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2185 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2187 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2188 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2189 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2190 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2191 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2192 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2193 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2194 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2196 macro_rules! return_err {
2197 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2199 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2200 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2201 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2202 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2203 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2209 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2211 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2212 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2214 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2215 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2219 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2220 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2222 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2224 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2225 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2226 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2227 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2228 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2230 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2233 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2234 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2235 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2237 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2238 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2239 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2242 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2243 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2244 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2245 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2249 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2250 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2251 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2254 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2255 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2256 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2257 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2258 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2263 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2264 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2265 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2266 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2267 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2268 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2269 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2270 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2271 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2272 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2273 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2274 // phantom or an intercept.
2275 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2276 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2277 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2281 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2284 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2286 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2287 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2289 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2290 // no consistency guarantees.
2291 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2295 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2296 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2297 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2298 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2299 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2301 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2302 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2303 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2304 // we don't have the channel here.
2305 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2307 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2309 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2310 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2311 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2312 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2313 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2314 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2315 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2317 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2318 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2320 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2321 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2325 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2327 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2334 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2335 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2336 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2337 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2338 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2339 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2341 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2342 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2344 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2345 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2346 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2347 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2348 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2349 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2350 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2351 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2352 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2353 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2359 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2360 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2361 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2362 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2364 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2365 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2367 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2368 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2369 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2371 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2372 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2373 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2375 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2380 pending_forward_info
2383 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2384 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2385 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2387 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2388 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2389 if !chan.should_announce() {
2390 return Err(LightningError {
2391 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2395 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2396 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2398 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2399 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2402 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2403 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2404 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2405 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2406 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2407 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2409 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2410 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2414 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2416 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2418 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2420 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2421 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2423 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2424 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2425 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2426 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2427 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2428 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2429 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2430 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2433 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2434 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2436 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2442 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2443 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2444 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2445 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2446 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2448 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2449 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2450 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2451 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2452 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2454 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2458 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2459 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2460 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2461 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2464 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2465 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2466 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2468 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2469 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2471 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2472 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2474 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2475 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2477 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2478 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2480 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2481 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2482 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2485 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2486 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2487 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2489 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2490 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2492 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2493 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2494 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2495 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2496 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2497 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2498 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2499 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2500 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2501 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2503 _ => unreachable!(),
2506 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2507 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2508 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2509 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2510 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2511 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2512 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2513 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2522 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2523 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2524 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2525 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2530 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2531 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2533 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2538 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2540 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2541 /// fields for more info.
2543 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2544 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2545 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2546 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2549 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2550 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2551 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2552 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2553 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2555 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2556 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2558 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2559 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2560 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2562 /// In general, a path may raise:
2563 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2564 /// node public key) is specified.
2565 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2566 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2568 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2569 /// relevant updates.
2571 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2572 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2573 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2575 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2576 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2577 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2578 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2581 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2582 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2583 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2585 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2586 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2587 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2588 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2589 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2593 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2594 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2597 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2598 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2599 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2600 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2603 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2604 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2606 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2607 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2608 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2609 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2610 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2613 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2614 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2617 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2618 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2621 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2626 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2627 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2628 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2630 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2631 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2633 let mut total_value = 0;
2634 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2635 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2636 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2637 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2638 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2639 continue 'path_check;
2641 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2642 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2643 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2644 continue 'path_check;
2647 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2648 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2650 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2651 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2653 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2654 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2655 total_value = amt_msat;
2658 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2659 let mut results = Vec::new();
2660 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2661 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2662 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2665 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2666 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2667 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2668 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2671 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2672 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2673 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2674 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2676 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2677 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2681 results.push(path_res);
2683 let mut has_ok = false;
2684 let mut has_err = false;
2685 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2686 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2687 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2688 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2689 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2690 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2691 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2695 } else if res.is_err() {
2696 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2697 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2700 if has_err && has_ok {
2701 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2704 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2705 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2706 Some(RouteParameters {
2707 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2708 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2709 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2715 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2716 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2717 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2718 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2719 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2725 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2727 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2728 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2729 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2730 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2731 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2733 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2734 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2735 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2736 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2737 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2738 if path.len() == 0 {
2739 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2740 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2745 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2746 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2747 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2750 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2751 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2752 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2754 let res = match payment {
2755 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2756 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2758 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2759 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2760 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2761 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2764 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2766 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2767 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2768 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2771 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2772 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2773 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2776 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2777 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2778 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2782 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2783 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2788 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2789 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2793 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2796 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2798 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2799 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2800 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2801 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2803 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2804 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2805 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2807 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2808 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2809 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2810 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2811 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2813 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2814 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2815 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2816 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2817 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2819 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2827 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2828 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2829 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2830 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2831 /// never reach the recipient.
2833 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2834 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2836 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2837 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2839 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2841 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2842 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2843 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2845 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2847 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2848 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2850 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2851 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2856 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2857 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2858 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2859 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2860 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2862 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2865 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2866 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2870 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2871 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2873 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2874 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2879 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2881 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2882 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2883 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2886 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2887 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2888 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2889 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2890 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2891 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2894 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2895 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2896 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2897 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2898 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2900 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2902 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2904 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2905 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2906 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2907 } else { unreachable!(); })
2910 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2912 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2913 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2916 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2917 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2922 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2923 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2924 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2927 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2928 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2929 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2932 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2933 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2934 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2943 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2944 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2945 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2949 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2951 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2952 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2954 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2955 /// across the p2p network.
2957 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2958 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2960 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2961 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2962 /// keys per-channel).
2964 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2965 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2966 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2968 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2969 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2970 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2972 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2973 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2974 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2975 /// for more details.
2977 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2978 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2979 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2982 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2983 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2984 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2985 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2990 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2991 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2992 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2993 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2994 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2995 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2996 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3000 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3001 let mut output_index = None;
3002 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3003 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3004 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3005 if output_index.is_some() {
3006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3007 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3010 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3011 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3012 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3015 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3018 if output_index.is_none() {
3019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3020 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3023 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3027 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3029 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3030 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3031 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3032 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3034 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3035 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3037 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3038 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3040 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3042 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3043 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3044 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3045 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3046 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3047 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3048 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3049 pub fn update_channel_config(
3050 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3051 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3052 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3053 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3054 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3059 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3062 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3063 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3064 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3065 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3066 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3067 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3069 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3070 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3071 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3072 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3076 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3077 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3078 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3081 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3082 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3083 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3084 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3085 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3094 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3095 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3097 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3098 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3100 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3101 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3102 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3103 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3104 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3106 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3107 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3109 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3112 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3113 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3114 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3115 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3116 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3117 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3119 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3121 if !chan.is_usable() {
3122 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3123 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3126 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3128 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3129 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3133 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3134 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3135 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3138 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3139 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3140 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3142 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3144 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3145 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3148 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3149 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3150 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3151 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3152 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3154 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3158 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3159 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3161 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3164 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3165 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3168 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3169 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3170 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3173 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3174 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3175 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3176 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3177 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3178 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3179 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3182 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3183 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3184 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3185 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3190 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3192 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3193 /// Will likely generate further events.
3194 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3195 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3197 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3198 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3199 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3200 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3202 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3203 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3205 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3206 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3207 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3209 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3210 match forward_info {
3211 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3212 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3213 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3214 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3215 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3218 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3219 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3220 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3222 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3223 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3224 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3225 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3226 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3227 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3230 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3231 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3233 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3236 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3237 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3243 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3244 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3246 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3250 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3251 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3253 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3257 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3258 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3259 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3260 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3261 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3263 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3264 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3265 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3266 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3267 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3269 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3271 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3272 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3276 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3277 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3278 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3279 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3285 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3288 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3291 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3292 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3293 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3294 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3295 // problem, not ours.
3301 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3302 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3304 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3308 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3309 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3310 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3312 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3316 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3317 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3318 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3319 match forward_info {
3320 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3321 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3322 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3323 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3324 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3328 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3329 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3330 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3331 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3332 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3333 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3334 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3336 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3338 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3341 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3343 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3344 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3345 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3346 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3352 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3354 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3355 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3356 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3357 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3358 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3359 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3360 // this channel currently :/.
3366 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3367 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3369 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3371 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3373 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3376 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3378 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3379 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3380 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3383 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3385 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3386 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3387 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3388 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3389 // messages when we can.
3390 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3391 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3392 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3399 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3400 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3403 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3404 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3405 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3406 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3407 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3408 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3410 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3412 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3413 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3414 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3417 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3421 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3422 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3424 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3428 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3429 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3430 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3431 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3432 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3433 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3434 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3435 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3436 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3438 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3445 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3446 match forward_info {
3447 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3448 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3449 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3450 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3453 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3454 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3455 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3456 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3458 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3459 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3461 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3464 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3465 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3466 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3467 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3468 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3469 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3470 phantom_shared_secret,
3472 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3474 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3479 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3480 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3481 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3482 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3483 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3485 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3486 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3487 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3488 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3489 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3490 phantom_shared_secret,
3492 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3493 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3497 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3498 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3499 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3500 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3501 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3504 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3505 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3506 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3508 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3509 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3510 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3513 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3514 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3515 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3518 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3519 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3520 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3521 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3523 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3527 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3528 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3529 total_value += htlc.value;
3530 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3531 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3532 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3533 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3534 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3535 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3537 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3539 _ => unreachable!(),
3542 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3544 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3545 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3546 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3547 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3548 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3549 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3550 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3553 amount_msat: total_value,
3554 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3555 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3557 payment_received_generated = true;
3559 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3560 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3562 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3564 payment_received_generated
3568 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3569 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3570 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3571 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3572 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3573 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3574 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3575 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3577 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3578 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3579 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3580 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3581 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3583 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3587 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3589 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3590 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3591 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3592 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3595 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3597 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3598 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3599 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3600 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3601 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3603 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3605 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3606 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3611 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3618 if payment_data.is_none() {
3619 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3620 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3623 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3624 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3626 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3627 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3628 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3629 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3630 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3632 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3633 if payment_received_generated {
3634 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3640 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3641 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3649 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3650 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3652 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3654 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3655 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3658 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3659 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3660 events.append(&mut new_events);
3663 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3665 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3666 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3668 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3669 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3670 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3671 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3672 if background_events.is_empty() {
3676 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3678 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3679 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3680 // monitor updating completing.
3681 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3688 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3689 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3690 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3691 self.process_background_events();
3694 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3695 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3696 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3697 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3699 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3700 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3702 if !chan.is_live() {
3703 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3704 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3705 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3707 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3708 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3710 let mut retain_channel = true;
3711 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3714 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3715 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3719 let ret_err = match res {
3720 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3721 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3722 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3723 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3724 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3725 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3726 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3727 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3728 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3729 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3730 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3737 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3738 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3746 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3750 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3751 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3752 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3753 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3754 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3755 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3756 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3758 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3760 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3762 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3763 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3764 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3765 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3766 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3767 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3769 handle_errors.push(err);
3779 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3780 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3781 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3782 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3783 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3784 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3785 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3787 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3788 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3789 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3790 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3791 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3792 if no_remaining_entries {
3793 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3795 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3796 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3797 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3798 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3799 no_remaining_entries = false;
3807 if no_remaining_entries {
3808 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3809 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3811 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3818 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3820 /// This currently includes:
3821 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3822 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3823 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3825 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3826 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3828 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3829 /// estimate fetches.
3830 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3831 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3832 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3833 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3835 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3837 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3838 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3841 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3842 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3843 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3844 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3845 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3846 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3848 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3850 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3852 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3853 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3854 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3855 if needs_close { return false; }
3858 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3859 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3860 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3861 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3862 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3863 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3864 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3865 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3869 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3870 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3872 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3873 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3874 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3878 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3879 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3884 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3890 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3891 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3892 // This should be unreachable
3893 debug_assert!(false);
3896 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3897 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3898 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3899 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3901 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3902 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3903 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3905 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3912 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3913 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3914 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3915 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3916 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3919 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3920 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3923 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3929 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3930 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3931 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3933 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3934 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3935 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3936 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3938 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3939 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3940 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3941 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3942 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3943 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3945 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3946 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3947 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3948 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3949 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3950 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3951 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3952 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3953 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3958 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3959 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3961 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3963 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3964 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3965 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3966 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3967 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3968 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3969 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3971 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3973 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3974 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3976 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3981 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3982 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3983 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3984 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3985 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3986 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3987 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3988 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3989 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3990 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3992 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3993 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3994 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3995 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3997 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3998 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3999 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4000 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4001 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4005 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4006 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4007 // be surfaced to the user.
4008 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4009 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4010 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4012 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
4013 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4015 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4017 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4020 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4021 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4022 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4023 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4027 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4028 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4029 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4030 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4032 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
4033 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
4034 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
4035 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
4036 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
4039 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4040 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4041 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4044 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4045 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4046 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4048 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
4049 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4050 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4051 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4052 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
4053 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
4054 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
4055 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4059 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4060 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4063 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4064 all_paths_failed = true;
4065 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4066 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4067 payment_id: *payment_id,
4068 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4077 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4078 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4079 Some(RouteParameters {
4080 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4081 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4082 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4085 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4087 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4088 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4090 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4092 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4094 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4095 if !payment_retryable {
4096 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4097 payment_id: *payment_id,
4098 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4102 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4103 payment_id: *payment_id,
4104 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4110 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4111 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4112 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4113 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4114 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4116 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4117 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4118 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4119 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4126 error_code: onion_error_code,
4128 error_data: onion_error_data
4132 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4138 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4139 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4140 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4141 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4143 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4144 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4145 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4146 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4148 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4149 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4150 payment_id: *payment_id,
4151 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4153 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4156 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4157 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4158 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4159 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4160 network_update: None,
4163 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4166 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4168 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4173 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4174 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4175 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4177 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4178 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4179 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4180 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4181 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4182 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(phantom_ss, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4183 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4184 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4186 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4187 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4190 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4192 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4196 let mut forward_event = None;
4197 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4198 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4199 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4201 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4203 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4206 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4209 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4210 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4211 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4212 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4213 time_forwardable: time
4216 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4217 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4218 failed_next_destination: destination,
4224 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4225 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4227 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4228 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4229 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4231 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4232 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4233 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4234 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4236 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4237 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4238 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4239 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4240 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4241 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4242 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4243 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4248 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4249 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
4250 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4251 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4252 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4253 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4254 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4255 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4260 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4261 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4262 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
4264 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4265 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4266 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4267 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4272 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4274 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4275 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4276 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4277 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4279 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4280 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4281 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4282 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4283 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4285 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4286 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4287 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4288 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4289 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4290 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4291 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4292 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4293 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4294 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4301 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4306 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4307 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4308 debug_assert!(false);
4312 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4313 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4314 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4315 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4316 if sources.len() != 1 {
4317 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4318 debug_assert!(false);
4324 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4326 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4327 mem::drop(channel_state);
4328 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4329 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4332 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4333 mem::drop(channel_state);
4334 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4335 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4336 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4340 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4341 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4342 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4343 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4344 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4345 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4346 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4347 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4348 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4350 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4351 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4352 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4353 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4354 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4355 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4357 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4361 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4363 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4364 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4365 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4366 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4367 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4368 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4369 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4373 let ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id } =
4374 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash).unwrap();
4375 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4376 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4377 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4381 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4382 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4383 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4384 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4388 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4389 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4391 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4392 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4393 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4394 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4395 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4396 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4397 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4398 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4400 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4401 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4402 payment_preimage, e);
4403 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4404 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4405 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4406 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4410 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4411 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4412 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4413 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4414 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4415 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4416 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4417 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4418 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4419 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4425 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4427 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4430 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4431 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4432 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4434 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4435 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4436 payment_preimage, e);
4439 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4440 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4442 chan.remove_entry();
4444 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4447 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4450 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4451 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4452 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4453 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4454 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4455 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4456 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4457 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4458 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4459 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4460 pending_events.push(
4461 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4463 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4473 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4475 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4476 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4477 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4478 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4479 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4480 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4481 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4482 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4483 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4484 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4485 pending_events.push(
4486 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4487 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4493 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4497 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4498 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4499 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4501 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4502 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4503 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4504 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4505 pending_events.push(
4506 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4515 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4518 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4519 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4520 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4521 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4522 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4523 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4524 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4527 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4528 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4529 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4530 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4531 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4534 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4535 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4536 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4537 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4538 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4539 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4540 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4541 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4542 // again on restart.
4543 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4544 payment_preimage, update_res);
4546 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4547 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4548 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4549 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4552 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4553 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4554 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4555 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4559 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4560 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4561 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4564 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4565 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4566 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4568 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4570 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4580 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4581 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4582 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4585 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4586 /// update completion.
4587 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4588 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4589 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4590 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4591 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4592 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4593 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4595 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4596 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4597 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4598 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4601 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4602 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4604 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4605 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4606 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4611 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4613 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4614 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4615 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4616 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4621 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4622 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4623 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4624 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4625 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4630 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4634 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4640 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4641 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4642 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4648 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4652 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4653 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4654 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4655 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4659 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4663 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4664 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4665 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4666 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4667 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4668 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4669 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4671 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4672 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4673 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4678 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4679 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4680 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4683 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4685 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4686 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4688 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4689 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4690 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4691 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4695 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4697 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4698 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4701 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4702 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4703 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4705 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4706 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4707 /// used to accept such channels.
4709 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4710 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4711 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4712 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4715 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4716 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4718 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4719 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4720 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4722 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4723 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4725 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4726 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4728 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4729 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4731 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4732 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4733 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4734 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4737 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4740 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4741 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4742 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4743 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4744 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4745 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4747 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4748 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4751 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4752 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4753 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4754 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4755 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4756 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4759 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4760 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4761 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4764 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4765 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4766 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4769 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4770 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4776 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4777 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4778 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4781 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4782 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4785 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4786 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4787 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4789 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4790 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4791 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4792 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4795 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4796 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4800 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4801 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4802 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4803 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4804 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4808 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4809 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4810 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4812 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4813 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4814 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4817 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4818 pending_events.push(
4819 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4820 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4821 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4822 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4823 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4824 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4829 entry.insert(channel);
4835 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4836 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4837 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4838 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4839 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4841 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4842 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4844 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4845 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4850 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4851 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4852 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4853 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4854 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4856 user_channel_id: user_id,
4861 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4862 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4863 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4864 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4865 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4866 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4867 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4868 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4869 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4871 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4876 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4877 // lock before watch_channel
4878 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4879 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4880 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4881 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4882 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4883 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4884 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4885 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4886 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4887 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4888 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4889 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4892 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4893 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4894 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4895 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4896 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4897 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4898 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4901 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4902 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4903 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4905 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4907 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4908 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4909 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4912 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4913 funding_msg.channel_id))
4915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4916 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4920 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4923 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4924 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4932 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4934 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4935 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4936 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4937 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4939 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4940 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4942 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4943 Ok(update) => update,
4944 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4946 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4947 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4949 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4950 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4951 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4952 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4953 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4954 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4955 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4961 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4962 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4969 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4970 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4974 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4975 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4976 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4977 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4979 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4980 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4982 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4983 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4984 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4985 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4987 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4988 msg: announcement_sigs,
4990 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4991 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4992 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4993 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4994 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4995 // announcement_signatures.
4996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4997 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4998 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4999 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5005 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
5009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5013 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5014 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5015 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5016 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5019 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5021 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5022 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5025 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5026 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5027 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5028 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5031 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5032 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5034 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5035 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
5036 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5037 let (result, is_permanent) =
5038 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
5040 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5045 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5046 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5047 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5057 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5058 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5059 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5060 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5063 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
5067 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5068 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5069 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5070 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5071 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5073 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5074 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5076 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5077 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5079 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5084 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5085 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5086 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5087 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5088 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5089 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5090 } else { (tx, None) }
5092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5095 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5096 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5097 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5099 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5100 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5101 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5102 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5106 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5111 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5112 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5113 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5114 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5116 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5117 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5118 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5119 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5121 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5122 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5123 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5125 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5127 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5128 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5131 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5132 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5133 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5134 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5135 match pending_forward_info {
5136 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5137 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5138 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5139 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5141 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5143 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5144 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5145 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5148 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5150 _ => pending_forward_info
5153 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5160 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5161 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5162 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5163 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5164 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5166 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5167 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5169 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5174 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5178 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5179 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5180 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5181 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5183 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5184 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5186 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5193 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5194 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5196 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5198 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5199 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5201 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5202 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5203 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5205 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
5208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5212 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5213 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5214 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5215 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5217 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5220 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5221 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5222 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5223 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5224 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5225 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5226 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5231 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5232 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5237 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5238 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5240 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5241 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5242 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5243 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5244 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5245 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5246 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5247 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5249 commitment_signed: msg,
5255 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5260 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5261 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5262 let mut forward_event = None;
5263 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5264 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5265 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5266 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5267 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5268 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5269 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5270 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5272 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5273 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5275 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5276 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5277 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5278 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5279 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5280 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5283 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5284 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5286 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5287 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5288 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5290 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5291 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5292 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5293 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5294 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5297 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5298 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5301 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5302 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5303 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5304 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5305 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5306 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5307 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5310 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5311 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5312 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5317 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5318 // payments are being processed.
5319 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5320 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5322 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5323 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5330 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5331 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5334 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5335 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5336 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5339 match forward_event {
5341 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5342 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5343 time_forwardable: time
5351 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5352 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5354 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5355 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5356 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5358 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5359 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5361 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5362 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5363 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5364 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5365 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5366 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5367 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5368 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5369 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5370 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5371 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5372 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5374 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5375 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5376 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5377 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5378 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5379 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5381 } else { unreachable!(); }
5383 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5384 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5385 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5389 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5390 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5391 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5392 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5393 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5394 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5399 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5401 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5402 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5404 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5405 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5406 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5408 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5409 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5416 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5417 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5418 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5419 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5420 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5421 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5424 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5431 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5432 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5433 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5435 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5437 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5440 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5444 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5445 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5446 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5447 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5448 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5449 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5457 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5458 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5459 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5460 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5462 // It's not a local channel
5463 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5466 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5467 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5468 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5470 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5471 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5472 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5473 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5474 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5475 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5477 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5479 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5480 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5481 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5482 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5484 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5485 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5488 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5490 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5493 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5495 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5496 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5497 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5499 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5501 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5502 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5504 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5505 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5506 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5507 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5508 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5509 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5510 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5511 let mut channel_update = None;
5512 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5513 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5514 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5517 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5518 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5519 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5520 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5521 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5522 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5523 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5528 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5529 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5530 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5531 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5532 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5533 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5537 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5541 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5542 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5545 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5546 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5551 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5552 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5553 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5554 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5555 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5556 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5557 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5558 match monitor_event {
5559 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5560 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5562 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5564 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5565 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5566 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5567 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5570 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5571 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5572 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5573 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5574 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5575 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5576 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5577 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5578 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5579 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5584 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5585 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5587 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5589 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5590 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5591 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5592 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5593 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5598 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5599 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5605 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5606 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5609 has_pending_monitor_events
5612 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5613 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5614 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5616 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5617 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5620 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5621 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5622 /// update was applied.
5624 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5625 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5626 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5627 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5628 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5629 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5630 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5631 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5633 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5634 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5635 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5636 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5638 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5639 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5640 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5641 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5643 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5645 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5648 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5649 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5650 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5651 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5652 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5653 updates: commitment_update,
5657 has_monitor_update = true;
5658 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5659 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5660 if close_channel { return false; }
5667 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5668 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5669 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5676 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5677 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5678 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5681 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5682 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5688 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5689 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5690 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5691 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5692 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5693 let mut has_update = false;
5695 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5696 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5697 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5698 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5700 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5701 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5702 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5703 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5705 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5706 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5709 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5710 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5711 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5712 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5713 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5718 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5720 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5721 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5722 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5728 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5729 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5736 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5737 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5743 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5744 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5746 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5747 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5748 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5749 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5750 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5751 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5752 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5753 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5754 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5755 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5756 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5757 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5758 assert!(should_broadcast);
5759 } else { unreachable!(); }
5760 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5762 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5766 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5767 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5769 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5773 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5776 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5777 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5779 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5780 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5781 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5782 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5783 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5784 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5785 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5786 // never fail a payment too early.
5787 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5789 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5797 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5800 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5801 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5803 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5804 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5805 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5807 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5809 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5810 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5814 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5815 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5817 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5819 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5820 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5821 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5822 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5823 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5824 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5827 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5828 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5830 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5833 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5835 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5837 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5838 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5839 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5840 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5841 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5844 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5845 /// stored external to LDK.
5847 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5848 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5849 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5851 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5852 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5855 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5856 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5857 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5858 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5860 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5861 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5862 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5863 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5864 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5866 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5867 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5868 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5869 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5870 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5872 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5873 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5875 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5876 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5880 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5881 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5883 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5885 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5886 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5887 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5888 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5891 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5892 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5894 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5897 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5899 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5901 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5902 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5905 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5906 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5908 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5909 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5910 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5913 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5914 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5916 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5917 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5918 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5919 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5921 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5922 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5923 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5924 Some(_) => continue,
5925 None => return scid_candidate
5930 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5932 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5933 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5935 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5936 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5937 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5941 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5942 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5943 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5945 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5946 /// times to get a unique scid.
5947 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5948 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5949 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5951 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5952 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5953 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5954 return scid_candidate
5958 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5959 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5960 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5961 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5963 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5964 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5965 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5966 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5974 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5975 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5976 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5977 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5978 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5983 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5984 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5985 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5989 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5990 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5994 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5995 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5998 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5999 /// using the given event handler.
6001 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6002 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6005 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
6006 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
6007 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
6009 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6011 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6012 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6013 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6014 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6017 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6018 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6019 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6022 for event in pending_events {
6023 handler(event).await;
6026 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
6027 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
6032 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6033 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6034 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6035 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6036 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6039 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6040 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6041 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6042 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6044 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6045 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6046 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6047 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6050 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6051 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6053 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6054 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6057 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6058 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6059 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
6061 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6062 events.replace(pending_events);
6071 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6073 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6074 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6075 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6076 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6079 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6081 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6082 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6083 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6084 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6085 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6087 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6088 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6089 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6090 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6093 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6094 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6095 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6098 for event in pending_events {
6099 handler.handle_event(event);
6107 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6109 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6110 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6111 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6112 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6115 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6117 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6118 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6119 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6120 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6121 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6124 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6125 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6128 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6130 let new_height = height - 1;
6132 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6133 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6134 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6135 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6136 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6137 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6140 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6144 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6146 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6147 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6148 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6149 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6152 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6153 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6154 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6155 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6157 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6158 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6160 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6161 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6162 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6164 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6165 if height < last_best_block_height {
6166 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6167 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6171 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6172 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6173 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6174 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6176 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6177 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6181 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6183 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6185 macro_rules! max_time {
6186 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6188 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6189 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6190 // having an explicit local time source.
6191 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6192 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6193 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6194 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6195 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6201 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6202 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6203 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6204 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6208 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6209 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6210 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6211 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6212 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6213 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6219 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6220 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6221 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6222 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6223 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6224 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6225 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6226 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6231 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6233 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6234 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6235 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6236 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6239 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6240 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6242 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6243 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6244 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6245 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6246 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6248 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6249 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6251 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6252 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6253 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6254 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6255 let res = f(channel);
6256 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6257 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6258 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6259 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6260 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6262 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6263 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6264 if channel.is_usable() {
6265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6266 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6267 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6268 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6273 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6277 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6279 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6281 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6282 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6283 msg: announcement_sigs,
6285 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6286 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6287 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6289 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6290 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6291 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6296 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6297 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6298 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6299 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6300 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6301 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6302 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6303 // is always consistent.
6304 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6305 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6306 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6307 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6308 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6311 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6312 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6313 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6314 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6315 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6316 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6321 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6322 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6324 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6325 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6326 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6327 data: reason_message,
6336 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6337 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6338 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6339 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6340 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6341 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6342 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6343 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6344 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6345 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6347 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6348 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6349 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6353 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6356 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6357 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6358 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6359 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6360 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6361 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6362 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6363 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6364 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6367 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6368 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6369 _ => unreachable!(),
6371 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6372 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6373 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6380 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6382 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6383 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6387 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6388 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6389 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6390 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6392 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6394 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6395 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6396 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6397 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6398 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6399 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6402 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6403 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6404 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6406 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6407 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6408 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6409 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6412 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6413 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6414 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6415 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6416 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6419 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6420 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6421 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6424 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6425 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6426 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6427 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6431 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6432 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6433 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6434 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6435 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6436 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6439 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6440 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6441 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6444 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6446 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6449 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6451 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6454 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6455 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6456 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6459 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6461 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6464 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6466 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6469 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6471 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6474 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6475 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6476 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6479 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6481 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6484 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6486 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6489 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6491 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6494 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6496 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6499 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6501 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6504 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6506 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6509 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6511 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6514 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6515 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6516 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6519 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6524 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6526 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6529 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6531 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6532 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6534 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6535 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6536 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6537 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6538 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6539 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6540 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6541 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6542 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6543 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6544 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6547 no_channels_remain = false;
6552 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6554 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6555 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6556 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6557 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6558 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6559 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6560 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6561 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6562 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6563 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6564 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6565 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6566 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6567 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6568 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6569 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6570 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6571 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6572 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6573 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6577 if no_channels_remain {
6578 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6581 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6582 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6586 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6587 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6588 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6592 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6597 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6598 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6599 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6600 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6601 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6604 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6605 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6610 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6611 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6612 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6613 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6614 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6615 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6616 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6617 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6618 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6622 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6623 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6624 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6629 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6630 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6631 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6632 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6633 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6641 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6645 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6648 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6649 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6650 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6651 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6652 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6657 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6658 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6659 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6660 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6663 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6664 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6665 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6673 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6674 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6678 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6679 provided_node_features()
6682 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6683 provided_init_features()
6687 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6688 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6689 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6690 provided_init_features().to_context()
6693 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6694 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6696 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6697 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6698 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6699 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6700 provided_init_features().to_context()
6703 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6704 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6705 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6706 provided_init_features().to_context()
6709 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6710 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6711 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6712 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6713 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6714 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6715 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6716 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6717 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6718 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6719 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6720 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6721 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6722 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6723 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6724 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6725 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6726 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6730 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6731 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6733 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6734 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6735 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6736 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6739 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6740 (2, node_id, required),
6741 (4, features, required),
6742 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6743 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6744 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6745 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6748 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6749 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6750 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6751 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6752 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6753 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6754 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6755 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6756 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6757 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6758 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6759 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6760 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6761 (7, self.config, option),
6762 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6763 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6764 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6765 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6766 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6767 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6768 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6769 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6770 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6771 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6772 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6773 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6774 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6775 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6776 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6777 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6778 (32, self.is_public, required),
6779 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6780 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6781 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6787 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6788 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6789 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6790 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6791 (2, channel_id, required),
6792 (3, channel_type, option),
6793 (4, counterparty, required),
6794 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6795 (6, funding_txo, option),
6796 (7, config, option),
6797 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6798 (9, confirmations, option),
6799 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6800 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6801 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6802 (16, balance_msat, required),
6803 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6804 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6805 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6806 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6807 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6808 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6809 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6810 (26, is_outbound, required),
6811 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6812 (30, is_usable, required),
6813 (32, is_public, required),
6814 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6815 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6816 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6819 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6820 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6821 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6822 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6823 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6827 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6829 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6830 outbound_scid_alias,
6834 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6835 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6837 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6838 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6839 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6840 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6841 confirmations_required,
6843 force_close_spend_delay,
6844 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6845 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6846 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6847 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6848 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6849 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6854 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6855 (2, channels, vec_type),
6856 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6857 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6860 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6862 (0, onion_packet, required),
6863 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6866 (0, payment_data, required),
6867 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6868 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6870 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6871 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6872 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6876 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6877 (0, routing, required),
6878 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6879 (4, payment_hash, required),
6880 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6881 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6882 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6886 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6887 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6889 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6891 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6892 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6893 reason.write(writer)?;
6895 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6896 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6899 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6900 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6901 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6902 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6909 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6910 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6911 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6914 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6915 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6916 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6917 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6921 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6922 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6923 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6924 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6925 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6928 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6929 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6930 // messages contained in the variants.
6931 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6932 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6933 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6935 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6937 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6938 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6939 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6942 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6943 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6944 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6945 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6946 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6948 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6953 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6958 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6959 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6960 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6961 (2, outpoint, required),
6962 (4, htlc_id, required),
6963 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6966 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6967 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6968 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6969 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6970 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6972 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6973 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6974 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6975 (2, self.value, required),
6976 (4, payment_data, option),
6977 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6978 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6984 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6985 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6986 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6988 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6989 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6990 let mut total_msat = None;
6991 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6992 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6993 (0, prev_hop, required),
6994 (1, total_msat, option),
6995 (2, value, required),
6996 (4, payment_data, option),
6997 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6998 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7000 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7002 if payment_data.is_some() {
7003 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7005 if total_msat.is_none() {
7006 total_msat = Some(value);
7008 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7011 if total_msat.is_none() {
7012 if payment_data.is_none() {
7013 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7015 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7017 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7021 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7024 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7031 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7032 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7033 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
7037 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7038 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
7039 let mut payment_id = None;
7040 let mut payment_secret = None;
7041 let mut payment_params = None;
7042 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7043 (0, session_priv, required),
7044 (1, payment_id, option),
7045 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7046 (3, payment_secret, option),
7047 (4, path, vec_type),
7048 (5, payment_params, option),
7050 if payment_id.is_none() {
7051 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7053 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7055 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7056 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7057 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7058 path: path.unwrap(),
7059 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7064 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7065 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7070 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7071 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7073 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
7075 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7076 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7077 (0, session_priv, required),
7078 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7079 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7080 (3, payment_secret, option),
7081 (4, *path, vec_type),
7082 (5, payment_params, option),
7085 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7087 field.write(writer)?;
7094 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
7095 (0, LightningError) => {
7099 (0, failure_code, required),
7100 (2, data, vec_type),
7104 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7105 (0, forward_info, required),
7106 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7107 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7108 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7109 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7112 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7114 (0, htlc_id, required),
7115 (2, err_packet, required),
7120 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7121 (0, payment_secret, required),
7122 (2, expiry_time, required),
7123 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7124 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7125 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7128 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
7130 (0, session_privs, required),
7133 (0, session_privs, required),
7134 (1, payment_hash, option),
7135 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
7138 (0, session_privs, required),
7139 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
7140 (2, payment_hash, required),
7141 (4, payment_secret, option),
7142 (6, total_msat, required),
7143 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
7144 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7147 (0, session_privs, required),
7148 (2, payment_hash, required),
7152 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7153 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7154 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7155 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7156 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7159 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7160 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7162 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7164 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7166 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7167 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7168 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7172 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7173 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7174 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7175 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7176 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7177 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7178 unfunded_channels += 1;
7181 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7182 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7183 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7184 channel.write(writer)?;
7190 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7191 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7192 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7193 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7194 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7195 for forward in pending_forwards {
7196 forward.write(writer)?;
7201 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7202 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7203 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7205 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7206 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7207 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7208 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7209 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7210 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7211 htlc.write(writer)?;
7213 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7216 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7217 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7218 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7219 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7220 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7221 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7224 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7225 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7226 for event in events.iter() {
7227 event.write(writer)?;
7230 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7231 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7232 for event in background_events.iter() {
7234 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7236 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7237 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7242 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7243 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7244 // likely to be identical.
7245 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7246 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7248 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7249 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7250 hash.write(writer)?;
7251 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7254 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7255 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7256 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7257 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7258 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7261 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7262 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7264 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7265 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7266 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7267 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7270 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7271 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7275 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7276 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7277 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7279 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7280 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7281 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7287 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7288 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7289 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7290 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7293 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7294 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7295 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7296 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7297 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7299 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7302 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7303 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7304 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7305 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7306 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7307 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7308 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7309 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7310 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7317 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7319 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7321 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7322 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7323 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7324 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7325 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7326 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7327 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7328 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7329 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7330 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7331 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7332 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7333 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7335 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7336 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7338 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7339 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7341 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7342 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7343 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7344 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7345 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7346 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7348 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7349 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7350 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7351 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7352 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7353 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7356 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7357 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7359 pub keys_manager: K,
7361 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7363 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7364 pub fee_estimator: F,
7365 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7367 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7368 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7369 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7370 pub chain_monitor: M,
7372 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7373 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7374 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7375 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7376 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7377 /// deserialization.
7379 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7380 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7381 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7383 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7384 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7386 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7387 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7388 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7389 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7391 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7394 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7395 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7398 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7399 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7400 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7401 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7402 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7403 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7406 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7407 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7408 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7409 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7410 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7412 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7413 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7418 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7419 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7420 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7421 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7422 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7423 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7424 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7425 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7428 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7429 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7430 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7434 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7435 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7436 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7437 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7438 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7439 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7442 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7443 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7445 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7446 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7447 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7449 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7451 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7453 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7454 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7455 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7456 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7457 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7458 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7459 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7460 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7461 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7462 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7463 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7464 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7465 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7466 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7467 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7468 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7469 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7470 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7471 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7472 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7473 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7474 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7475 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7476 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7477 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7478 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7479 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7480 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7481 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7482 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7483 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7484 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7485 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7486 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7487 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7488 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7489 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7490 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7492 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7493 let mut found_htlc = false;
7494 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7495 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7498 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7499 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7500 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7501 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7502 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7503 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7504 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7505 log_info!(args.logger,
7506 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7507 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7508 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7512 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7513 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7514 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7516 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7517 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7519 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7521 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7522 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7523 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7524 // safely discard the channel.
7525 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7526 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7527 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7528 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7529 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7532 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7533 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7534 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7535 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7536 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7537 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7541 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7542 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7543 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7544 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7548 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7549 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7550 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7551 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7552 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7553 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7554 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7555 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7556 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7558 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7561 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7562 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7563 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7564 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7565 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7566 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7567 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7568 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7570 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7573 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7574 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7575 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7576 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7577 let peer_state = PeerState {
7578 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7580 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7583 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7584 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7585 for _ in 0..event_count {
7586 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7587 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7592 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7593 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7594 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7595 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7596 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7597 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7601 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7602 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7604 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7605 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7606 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7607 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7608 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7612 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7613 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7614 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7615 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7616 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7617 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7618 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7620 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7621 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7625 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7626 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7627 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7628 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7629 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7630 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7631 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7632 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7633 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7634 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7635 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7636 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7637 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7638 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7639 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7640 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7641 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7642 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7644 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7645 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7648 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7649 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7652 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7653 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7654 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7655 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7656 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7657 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7659 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7661 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7662 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7663 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7664 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7665 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7666 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7667 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7669 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7670 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7671 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7672 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7673 if path.is_empty() {
7674 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7675 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7677 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7678 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7679 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7680 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7681 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7682 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7683 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7684 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7686 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7687 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7688 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7689 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7690 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7692 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7693 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7694 total_msat: path_amt,
7695 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7697 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7698 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7703 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7704 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7705 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7706 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7707 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs`, we were
7708 // apparently not persisted after the monitor was when forwarding
7710 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7711 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7712 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7713 if htlc_info.prev_short_channel_id == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
7714 htlc_info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7716 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7717 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7722 !forwards.is_empty()
7730 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7731 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7732 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7733 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7734 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7735 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7736 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7737 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7741 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7742 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7744 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7745 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7746 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7747 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7749 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7750 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7753 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7754 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7755 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7756 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7757 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7759 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7760 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7761 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7762 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7763 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7764 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7765 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7766 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7768 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7769 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7773 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7775 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7777 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7778 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7780 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7784 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7785 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7787 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7788 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7791 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7793 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7795 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7796 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7797 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7798 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7803 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7804 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7805 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7806 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7808 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7809 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7810 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7812 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7813 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7814 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7815 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7816 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7817 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7819 if chan.is_usable() {
7820 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7821 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7822 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7823 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7824 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7829 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7831 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7832 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7833 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7834 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7835 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7836 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7837 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7838 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7839 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7840 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7841 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7843 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7844 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7846 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7847 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7848 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7849 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7851 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7852 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7853 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7854 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7856 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7857 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7858 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7859 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7861 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7862 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7863 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7865 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7866 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7869 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7872 purpose: payment_purpose,
7873 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7879 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7881 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7882 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7883 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7885 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7887 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7889 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7891 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7892 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7893 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7894 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7896 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7897 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7898 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7899 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7900 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7901 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7903 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7909 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7911 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7913 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7914 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7915 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7916 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7918 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7919 logger: args.logger,
7920 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7923 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7924 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7925 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7926 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7927 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7930 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7931 //connection or two.
7933 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7939 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7940 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7941 use core::time::Duration;
7942 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7943 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7944 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7945 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7946 use crate::ln::msgs;
7947 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7948 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7949 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7950 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7951 use crate::util::test_utils;
7952 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7955 fn test_notify_limits() {
7956 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7957 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7961 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7963 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7964 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7965 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7966 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7967 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7969 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7971 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7972 // to connect messages with new values
7973 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7974 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7975 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7976 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7978 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7979 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7980 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7981 // ... but the last node should not.
7982 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7983 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7984 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7985 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7987 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7988 // about the channel.
7989 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7990 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7991 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7993 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7995 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7996 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7997 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7998 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7999 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8000 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8002 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8003 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8004 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8006 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8007 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8008 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8009 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8010 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8011 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8013 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8014 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8015 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8016 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8017 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8018 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8019 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8020 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8022 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8023 // the channel info has updated.
8024 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8025 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8026 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8027 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8028 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8029 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8033 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8034 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8036 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8037 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8038 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8039 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8040 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8042 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8043 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8044 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8045 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8047 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8048 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8049 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8050 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8051 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8052 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8054 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8056 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8058 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8059 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8061 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8063 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8064 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8065 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8067 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8068 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8071 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8072 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8073 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8074 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8075 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8076 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8077 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8078 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8079 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8081 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8082 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8086 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8088 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8089 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8090 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8091 // lightning messages manually.
8092 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8093 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8096 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8097 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8098 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8100 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8101 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8103 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8104 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8106 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8107 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8108 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8110 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8111 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8112 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8114 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8116 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8118 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8122 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8123 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8124 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8127 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8128 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8129 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8130 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8135 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8136 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8137 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8138 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8143 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8144 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8145 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8146 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8148 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8153 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8154 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8155 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8156 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8157 // fails as expected.
8158 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8159 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8160 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8161 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8162 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8163 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8164 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8166 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8167 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8168 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8170 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8171 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8172 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8173 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8174 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8176 let route = find_route(
8177 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8178 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8180 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8182 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8183 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8184 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8185 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8188 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8189 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8190 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8192 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8194 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8195 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8196 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8197 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8198 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8199 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8200 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8201 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8202 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8204 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8205 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8207 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8208 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8209 let route = find_route(
8210 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8211 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8213 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8215 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8216 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8217 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8218 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8219 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8221 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8222 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8223 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8225 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8227 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8228 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8229 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8232 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8233 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8235 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8236 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8237 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8238 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8239 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8240 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8241 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8243 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8245 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8246 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8250 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8251 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8252 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8258 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8259 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8260 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8261 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8263 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8264 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8265 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8266 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8267 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8269 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8270 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8271 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8272 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8273 let route = find_route(
8274 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8275 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8278 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8279 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8280 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8281 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8284 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8285 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8286 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8287 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8288 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8289 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8290 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8292 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8296 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8297 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8298 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8300 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8301 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8303 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8304 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8305 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8306 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8308 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8309 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8310 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8311 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8312 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8314 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8315 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8316 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8317 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8318 let route = find_route(
8319 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8320 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8323 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8324 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8325 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8326 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8327 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8330 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8331 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8332 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8333 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8334 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8335 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8336 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8338 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8342 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8346 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8348 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8349 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8350 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8351 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8353 // Marshall an MPP route.
8354 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8355 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8356 route.paths.push(path);
8357 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8358 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8359 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8360 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8361 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8362 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8364 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8365 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8366 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8367 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8372 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8373 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8377 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8379 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8380 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8382 total_msat: 100_000,
8385 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8386 // payment verification fails as expected.
8387 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8388 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8389 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8390 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8392 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8396 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8397 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8401 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8402 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8403 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8404 // the channel is successfully closed.
8405 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8406 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8407 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8408 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8410 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8411 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8412 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8413 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8414 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8416 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8417 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8419 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8420 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8421 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8422 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8425 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8427 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8428 // as it has the funding transaction.
8429 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8430 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8431 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8433 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8436 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8438 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8440 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8441 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8442 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8444 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8445 // as it has the funding transaction.
8446 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8447 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8448 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8451 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8452 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8454 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8455 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8456 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8458 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8459 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8460 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8461 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8463 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8464 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8466 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8467 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8468 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8469 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8470 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8471 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8472 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8474 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8475 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8476 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8477 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8478 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8479 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8480 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8483 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8485 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8486 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8487 // closing transaction).
8488 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8489 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8490 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8492 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8493 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8494 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8495 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8496 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8499 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8501 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8503 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8504 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8505 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8507 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8509 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8510 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8514 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8516 use crate::chain::Listen;
8517 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8518 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8519 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8520 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8521 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8522 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8523 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8524 use crate::util::test_utils;
8525 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8526 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8528 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8529 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8530 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8532 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8536 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8537 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8538 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8539 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8540 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8541 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8542 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8547 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8548 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8551 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8552 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8553 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8555 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8556 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8558 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8559 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8561 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8562 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8564 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8565 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8566 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8567 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8568 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8570 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8572 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8574 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8575 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8576 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8577 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8578 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8580 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8582 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8584 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8585 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8586 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8587 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8588 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8591 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8592 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8593 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8595 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8596 } else { panic!(); }
8598 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8599 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8601 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8604 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8607 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8608 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8610 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8611 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8612 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8613 match msg_events[0] {
8614 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8615 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8616 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8620 match msg_events[1] {
8621 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8625 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8626 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8628 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8629 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8631 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8634 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8635 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8637 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8638 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8643 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8645 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8646 macro_rules! send_payment {
8647 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8648 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8649 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8650 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8651 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8652 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8653 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8654 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8655 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8656 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8658 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8659 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8661 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8662 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8664 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8665 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8666 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8667 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8668 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8669 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8670 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8671 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8673 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8674 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8675 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8676 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8678 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8679 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8680 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8681 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8682 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8684 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8687 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8688 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8689 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8690 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8692 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8697 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8698 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);