1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
68 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry};
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
237 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
238 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
239 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
240 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
241 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
244 session_priv: SecretKey,
245 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
246 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
247 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
248 payment_id: PaymentId,
249 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
250 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
251 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
252 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
254 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
257 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
258 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
259 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
261 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
263 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
265 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
268 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
269 payment_id.hash(hasher);
270 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
271 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
272 payment_params.hash(hasher);
277 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
280 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
281 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
283 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
284 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
285 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
286 payment_secret: None,
287 payment_params: None,
292 struct ReceiveError {
298 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
299 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
301 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
302 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
303 pub enum FailureCode {
304 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
305 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
306 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
307 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
308 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
309 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
310 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
311 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
312 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
313 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
314 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
317 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
319 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
320 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
321 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
322 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
323 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
325 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
326 err: msgs::LightningError,
327 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
328 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
330 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
332 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
334 err: LightningError {
336 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
344 shutdown_finish: None,
348 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
350 err: LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
355 shutdown_finish: None,
359 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
360 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
363 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
365 err: LightningError {
367 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
368 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
375 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
379 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
382 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
384 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
385 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
389 log_level: Level::Warn,
392 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
394 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
396 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
407 shutdown_finish: None,
412 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
413 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
414 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
415 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
416 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
418 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
419 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
420 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
421 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
422 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
423 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
424 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
426 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
430 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
431 struct ClaimingPayment {
433 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
434 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
436 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
437 (0, amount_msat, required),
438 (2, payment_purpose, required),
439 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
442 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
443 struct ClaimablePayments {
444 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
445 /// failed/claimed by the user.
447 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
448 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
450 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
451 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
452 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
454 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
455 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
456 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
457 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
460 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
461 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
462 /// quite some time lag.
463 enum BackgroundEvent {
464 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
465 /// commitment transaction.
466 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
470 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
471 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
472 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
473 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
474 /// event can be generated.
475 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
476 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
477 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
480 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
481 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
482 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, ignorable) },
485 /// State we hold per-peer.
486 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
487 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
489 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
490 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
492 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
493 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
494 latest_features: InitFeatures,
495 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
496 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
497 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
498 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
499 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
501 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
502 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
503 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
504 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
506 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
507 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
508 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
509 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
510 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
511 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
512 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
513 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
514 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
515 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
519 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
520 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
521 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
522 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
523 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
524 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
527 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
531 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
532 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
534 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
537 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
538 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
539 struct PendingInboundPayment {
540 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
541 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
542 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
543 /// this payment being removed.
545 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
546 user_payment_id: u64,
547 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
548 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
549 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
552 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
553 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
554 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
555 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
556 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
557 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
558 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
560 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
561 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
569 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
571 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
576 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
577 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
578 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
579 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
580 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
581 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
582 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
583 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
585 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
586 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
588 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
589 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
591 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
592 /// to individual Channels.
594 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
595 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
596 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
597 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
599 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
600 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
601 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
602 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
603 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
604 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
605 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
607 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
608 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
609 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
610 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
613 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
614 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
615 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
616 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
617 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
619 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
620 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
621 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
622 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
623 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
626 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
627 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
628 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
629 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
630 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
634 // `total_consistency_lock`
636 // |__`forward_htlcs`
638 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
640 // |__`per_peer_state`
642 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
644 // | |__`claimable_payments`
646 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
652 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
654 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
658 // | |__`pending_events`
660 // | |__`pending_background_events`
662 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
664 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
665 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
666 ES::Target: EntropySource,
667 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
668 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
673 default_configuration: UserConfig,
674 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
675 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
681 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
683 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
685 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
686 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
688 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
689 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
690 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
691 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
693 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
694 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
696 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
697 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
698 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
699 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
700 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
701 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
702 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
703 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
705 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
707 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
708 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
710 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
712 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
713 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
714 /// and via the classic SCID.
716 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
717 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
719 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
721 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
723 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
724 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
725 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
727 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
728 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
730 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
731 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
736 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
737 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
738 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
739 /// active channel list on load.
741 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
742 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
744 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
746 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
747 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
748 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
750 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
751 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
752 /// the handling of the events.
754 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
755 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
758 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
759 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
760 /// would break backwards compatability.
761 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
762 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
763 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
765 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
766 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
768 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
770 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
771 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
772 /// confirmation depth.
774 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
775 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
776 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
778 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
780 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
782 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
784 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
786 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
788 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
789 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
790 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
792 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
793 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
795 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
796 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
797 /// keeping additional state.
798 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
800 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
801 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
802 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
803 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
805 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
806 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
808 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
809 /// are currently open with that peer.
811 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
812 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
815 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
817 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
818 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
819 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
820 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
821 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
823 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
824 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
825 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
826 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
827 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
828 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
829 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
830 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
831 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
832 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
833 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
835 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
844 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
846 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
847 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
848 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
849 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
850 pub struct ChainParameters {
851 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
852 pub network: Network,
854 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
856 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
857 pub best_block: BestBlock,
860 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
866 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
867 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
868 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
869 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
870 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
871 /// updates are ready for persistence).
873 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
874 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
875 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
876 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
877 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
879 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
880 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
883 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
884 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
885 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
888 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
889 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
891 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
892 persistence_notifier: notifier,
893 should_persist: persist_check,
894 _read_guard: read_guard,
899 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
901 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
902 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
907 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
908 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
910 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
912 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
913 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
914 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
915 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
916 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
918 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
919 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
921 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
923 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
924 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
925 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
926 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
927 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
928 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
929 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
930 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
931 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
932 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
933 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
934 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
935 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
937 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
938 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
940 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
941 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
942 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
943 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
945 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
946 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
947 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
948 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
949 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
950 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
953 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
955 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
956 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
959 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
961 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
962 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
964 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
965 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
966 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
967 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
969 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
970 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
971 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
972 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
973 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
974 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
975 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
976 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
977 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
978 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
979 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
982 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
983 /// to better separate parameters.
984 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
985 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
986 /// The node_id of our counterparty
987 pub node_id: PublicKey,
988 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
989 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
990 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
991 pub features: InitFeatures,
992 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
993 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
994 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
996 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
998 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
999 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1000 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1001 /// payments to us through this channel.
1002 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1003 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1004 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1005 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1006 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1007 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1008 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1011 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1012 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1013 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1014 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1015 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1016 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1017 /// lifetime of the channel.
1018 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1019 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1020 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1021 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1022 /// our counterparty already.
1024 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1025 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1026 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1027 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1029 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1030 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1031 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1032 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1034 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1035 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1037 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1038 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1040 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1041 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1042 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1043 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1044 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1045 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1046 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1047 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1048 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1051 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1053 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1054 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1055 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1056 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1057 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1058 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1059 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1061 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1062 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1064 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1065 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1066 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1067 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1068 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1069 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1070 /// this value on chain.
1072 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1074 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1076 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1077 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1078 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1079 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1081 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1082 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1083 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1084 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1086 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1087 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1088 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1089 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1091 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1092 pub balance_msat: u64,
1093 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1094 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1095 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1096 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1098 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1100 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1101 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1102 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1103 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1104 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1105 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1106 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1107 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1109 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1110 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1111 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1112 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1113 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1114 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1115 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1117 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1118 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1119 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1120 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1121 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1122 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1123 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1124 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1125 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1127 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1129 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1130 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1131 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1132 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1133 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1135 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1136 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1137 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1138 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1139 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1140 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1141 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1143 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1144 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1145 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1146 pub is_outbound: bool,
1147 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1148 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1149 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1150 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1151 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1153 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1154 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1155 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1156 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1158 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1159 pub is_usable: bool,
1160 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1161 pub is_public: bool,
1162 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1163 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1164 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1165 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1166 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1167 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1169 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1170 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1173 impl ChannelDetails {
1174 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1175 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1176 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1178 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1179 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1180 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1181 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1184 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1185 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1186 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1188 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1189 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1190 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1191 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1195 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1196 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1197 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1198 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1199 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1201 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1203 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1204 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1205 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1208 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1209 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1210 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1212 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1213 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1214 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1216 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1217 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1218 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1220 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1221 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1225 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1227 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1229 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1230 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1231 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1232 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1234 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1235 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1236 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1239 macro_rules! handle_error {
1240 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1243 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1244 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1245 // entering the macro.
1246 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1247 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1249 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1251 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1252 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1253 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1254 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1258 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1259 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1260 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1261 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1266 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1267 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1269 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1270 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1271 action: err.action.clone()
1275 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1276 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1277 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1278 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1279 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1283 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1290 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1291 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1292 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1293 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1294 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1295 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1297 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1298 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1299 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1300 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1301 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1303 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1304 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1306 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1310 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1311 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1312 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1314 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1315 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1317 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1318 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1320 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1321 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1322 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1323 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1324 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1325 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1331 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1332 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1336 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1338 $entry.remove_entry();
1346 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1347 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1351 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1353 $entry.remove_entry();
1361 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1362 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1364 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1365 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1371 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1372 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1374 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1375 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1376 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1377 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1378 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1379 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1380 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1381 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1382 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1383 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1384 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1385 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1386 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1387 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1390 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1391 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1392 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1393 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1394 match $action_type {
1395 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1396 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1398 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1399 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1401 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1402 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1403 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1404 if !$resend_commitment {
1405 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1408 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1410 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1411 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1413 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1418 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1419 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1421 $entry.remove_entry();
1425 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1426 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1427 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1429 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1430 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1432 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1433 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1435 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1436 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1438 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1439 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1443 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1444 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1445 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1446 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1447 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1449 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1450 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1451 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1452 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1453 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1454 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1455 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1456 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1457 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1458 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1463 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1464 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1465 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1467 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1468 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1469 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1470 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1471 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1472 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1475 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1480 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1481 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1482 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1483 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1484 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1485 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1486 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1487 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1488 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1489 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1490 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1492 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1493 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1494 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1500 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1501 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1503 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1504 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1505 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1506 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1507 updates.announcement_sigs);
1508 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1509 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1512 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1513 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1515 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1517 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1518 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1520 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1521 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1522 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1523 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1528 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1529 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1530 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1531 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1532 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1534 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1535 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1536 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1539 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1540 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1541 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1542 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1543 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1544 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1545 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1546 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1550 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1551 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1552 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1553 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1554 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1556 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan);
1562 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1563 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1567 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1569 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1570 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1571 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1572 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1573 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1574 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1578 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1580 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1581 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1583 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1585 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1586 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1587 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1588 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1589 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1590 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1591 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1592 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1594 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1595 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1596 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1601 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1603 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1604 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1605 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1606 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1607 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1608 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1609 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1610 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1612 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1615 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1616 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1618 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1620 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1622 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1624 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1625 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1626 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1627 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1637 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1638 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1639 &self.default_configuration
1642 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1643 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1644 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1647 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1648 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1650 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1652 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1656 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1661 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1663 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1664 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1665 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1666 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1667 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1669 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1670 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1672 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1673 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1674 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1676 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1677 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1678 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1679 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1680 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1681 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1683 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1684 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1685 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1686 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1687 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1688 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1691 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1692 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1693 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1695 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1697 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1698 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1700 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1702 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1703 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1704 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1705 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1706 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1707 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1711 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1716 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1718 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1719 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1722 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1724 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1730 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1731 node_id: their_network_key,
1734 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1737 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1738 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1739 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1740 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1741 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1742 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1743 // the same channel.
1744 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1746 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1748 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1751 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1752 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1753 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1754 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1755 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1756 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1757 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1758 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1759 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1760 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1761 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1762 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1763 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1764 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1765 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1766 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1767 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1768 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1769 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1771 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1772 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1773 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1774 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1775 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1776 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1777 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1778 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1779 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1780 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1781 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1782 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1783 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1784 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1785 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1786 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1787 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1788 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1789 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1790 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1791 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1792 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1793 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1794 config: Some(channel.config()),
1802 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1803 /// more information.
1804 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1805 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1808 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1809 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1811 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1812 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1815 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1816 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1817 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1818 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1819 // really wanted anyway.
1820 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1823 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1824 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1826 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1827 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1828 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1830 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1831 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1832 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1833 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1834 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1835 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1836 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1837 total_msat: *total_msat,
1840 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1841 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1843 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1844 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1846 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1851 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1852 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1853 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1854 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1855 Some(transaction) => {
1856 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1860 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1861 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1862 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1863 reason: closure_reason
1867 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1870 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1871 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1874 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1875 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1879 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1881 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1882 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1884 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1885 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1886 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
1887 let (result, is_permanent) =
1888 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1890 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1895 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1896 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1900 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1901 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1902 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1903 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1907 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1911 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1915 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1916 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1917 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1921 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1925 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1926 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1927 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1929 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1930 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1932 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1933 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1934 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1935 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1937 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1939 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1940 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1941 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1942 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1943 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1946 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1947 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1948 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1950 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1951 /// the channel being closed or not:
1952 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1953 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1954 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1955 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1956 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1957 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1958 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1960 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1963 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1964 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1965 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1966 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1970 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1971 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1972 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1973 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1974 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1975 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1976 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1977 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1979 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1980 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1981 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1982 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1983 // ignore the result here.
1984 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1988 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1989 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1990 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1991 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1992 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1993 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1994 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1998 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1999 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2000 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2002 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2004 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2006 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2009 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2010 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2011 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2012 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2013 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2018 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2021 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2022 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2023 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2024 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2026 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2027 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2029 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2030 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2031 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2032 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2043 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2044 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2045 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2047 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2048 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2049 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2052 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2053 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2054 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2056 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2057 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2058 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2059 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2060 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2063 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2064 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2065 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2066 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2067 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2071 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2072 /// local transaction(s).
2073 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2074 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2075 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2079 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2080 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2082 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2083 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2084 return Err(ReceiveError {
2085 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2087 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2090 // final_expiry_too_soon
2091 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2092 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2094 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2095 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2096 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2097 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2098 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2099 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2100 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2101 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2102 return Err(ReceiveError {
2103 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2104 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2107 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2108 return Err(ReceiveError {
2110 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2111 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2115 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2116 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2117 return Err(ReceiveError {
2118 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2119 err_data: Vec::new(),
2120 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2123 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2124 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2125 return Err(ReceiveError {
2126 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2127 err_data: Vec::new(),
2128 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2130 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2131 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2133 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2134 phantom_shared_secret,
2136 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2137 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2138 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2139 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2140 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2141 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2142 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2143 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2144 return Err(ReceiveError {
2145 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2146 err_data: Vec::new(),
2147 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2151 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2153 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2157 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2158 err_data: Vec::new(),
2159 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2164 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2167 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2168 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2169 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2170 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2174 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2175 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2176 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2178 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2179 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2180 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2181 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2182 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2183 failure_code: $err_code,
2189 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2190 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2193 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2194 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2195 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2197 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2198 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2199 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2200 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2201 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2202 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2203 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2204 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2206 macro_rules! return_err {
2207 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2209 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2210 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2211 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2212 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2213 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2214 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2220 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2222 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2223 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2225 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2226 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2230 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2231 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2233 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2235 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2236 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2237 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2238 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2239 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2241 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2244 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2245 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2246 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2248 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2249 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2250 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2253 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2254 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2255 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2256 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2260 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2261 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2262 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2265 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2266 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2267 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2268 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2269 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2274 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2275 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2276 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2277 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2278 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2279 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2280 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2281 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2282 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2283 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2284 // phantom or an intercept.
2285 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2286 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2287 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2291 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2294 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2296 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2297 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2298 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2299 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2300 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2304 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2306 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2307 // have no consistency guarantees.
2308 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2312 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2313 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2314 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2315 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2316 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2318 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2319 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2320 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2321 // we don't have the channel here.
2322 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2324 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2326 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2327 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2328 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2329 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2330 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2331 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2332 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2334 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2335 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2337 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2338 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2342 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2343 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2344 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2345 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2347 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2354 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2355 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2356 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2357 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2358 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2359 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2361 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2362 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2364 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2365 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2366 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2367 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2368 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2369 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2370 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2371 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2372 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2373 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2379 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2380 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2381 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2382 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2384 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2385 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2387 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2388 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2389 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2391 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2392 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2393 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2394 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2395 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2396 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2397 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2401 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2406 pending_forward_info
2409 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2410 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2411 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2413 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2414 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2415 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2416 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2417 if !chan.should_announce() {
2418 return Err(LightningError {
2419 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2423 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2424 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2426 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2427 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2430 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2431 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2432 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2433 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2435 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2436 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2437 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2438 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2439 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2440 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2441 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2445 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2447 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2449 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2451 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2452 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2454 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2455 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2456 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2457 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2458 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2459 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2460 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2461 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2463 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2464 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2465 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2467 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2469 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2475 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2476 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2477 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2478 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2479 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2481 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2482 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2483 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2484 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2485 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2487 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2491 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2492 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2493 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2494 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2499 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!" })?;
2500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2502 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2503 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2504 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2507 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2508 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2510 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2511 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2513 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2514 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2515 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2518 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2519 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
2520 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2522 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2523 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2525 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2526 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2527 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2528 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2529 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2530 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2531 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2532 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2533 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2534 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2536 _ => unreachable!(),
2539 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2540 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2541 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2542 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2543 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2544 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2545 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2546 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2555 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2556 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2557 // `channel_by_id` map.
2558 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2559 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2564 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2565 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2567 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2572 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2574 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2575 /// fields for more info.
2577 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2578 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2580 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2582 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2583 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2584 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2585 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2586 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2588 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2589 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2590 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2591 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2592 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2594 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2595 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2596 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2597 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2599 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2601 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2602 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2603 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2605 /// In general, a path may raise:
2606 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2607 /// node public key) is specified.
2608 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2609 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2611 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2612 /// relevant updates.
2614 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2615 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2616 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2618 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2620 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2621 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2622 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2623 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2624 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2626 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2627 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2628 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2630 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2631 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2632 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2633 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2634 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2635 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2636 self.pending_outbound_payments
2637 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2638 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2639 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2642 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2643 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2644 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2645 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2646 self.pending_outbound_payments
2647 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2648 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2649 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2650 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2651 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2655 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2656 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2657 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2658 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2659 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2663 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2664 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2665 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2669 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2670 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2671 /// retries are exhausted.
2673 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2674 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2676 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2677 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2678 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2680 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2681 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2683 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2684 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2685 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2687 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2690 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2691 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2692 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2693 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2694 /// never reach the recipient.
2696 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2697 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2699 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2700 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2702 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2704 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2705 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2706 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2707 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2708 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2710 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2711 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2714 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2715 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2717 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2720 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2721 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2722 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2723 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2724 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2725 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2727 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2728 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2731 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2732 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2733 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2734 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2735 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2736 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2737 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2738 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2741 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2744 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2745 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2748 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2749 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2750 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2751 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2752 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2754 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2755 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2761 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2763 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2765 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2766 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2767 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2768 } else { unreachable!(); })
2771 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2774 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2775 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2778 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2779 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2784 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2785 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2788 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2790 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2793 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2794 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2795 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2804 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2805 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2806 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2810 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2812 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2813 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2815 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2816 /// across the p2p network.
2818 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2819 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2821 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2822 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2823 /// keys per-channel).
2825 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2826 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2827 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2829 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2830 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2831 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2833 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2834 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2835 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2836 /// for more details.
2838 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2839 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2840 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2841 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2843 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2844 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2845 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2846 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2851 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2852 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2853 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2854 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2855 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2856 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2857 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2861 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2862 let mut output_index = None;
2863 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2864 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2865 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2866 if output_index.is_some() {
2867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2868 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2871 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2872 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2873 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2876 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2879 if output_index.is_none() {
2880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2881 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2884 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2888 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2890 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2891 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2892 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2893 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2895 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2896 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2898 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2899 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2901 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2903 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2904 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2905 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2906 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2907 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2908 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2909 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2910 pub fn update_channel_config(
2911 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2912 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2913 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2915 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2919 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2920 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2922 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2923 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2924 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2927 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2928 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2929 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2930 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2934 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2935 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2936 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2939 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2940 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2941 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2942 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2943 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2951 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2952 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2954 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2955 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2957 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2958 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2959 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2960 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2961 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2963 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2964 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2966 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2969 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2970 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2971 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2972 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2973 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2976 let next_hop_scid = {
2977 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2978 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2979 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2980 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2982 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2984 if !chan.is_usable() {
2985 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2986 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2989 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2991 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2992 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2997 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2998 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2999 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3002 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3003 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3004 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3006 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3008 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3009 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3012 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3013 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3014 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3015 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3016 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3018 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3022 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3023 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3025 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3028 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3029 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3032 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3033 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3034 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3037 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3038 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3039 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3040 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3041 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3042 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3043 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3046 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3047 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3048 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3049 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3054 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3056 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3057 /// Will likely generate further events.
3058 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3061 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3062 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3063 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3065 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3066 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3068 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3069 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3070 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3072 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3073 match forward_info {
3074 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3075 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3076 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3077 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3078 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3081 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3082 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3083 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3085 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3086 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3087 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3088 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3089 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3090 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3093 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3094 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3096 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3099 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3100 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3106 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3107 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3109 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3113 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3114 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3116 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3120 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3121 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3122 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3123 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3124 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3126 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3127 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3128 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3129 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3130 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3132 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3134 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3135 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3139 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3140 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3141 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3142 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3148 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3151 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3154 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3155 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3156 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3157 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3158 // problem, not ours.
3164 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3165 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3167 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3171 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3172 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3173 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3174 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3179 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3181 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3185 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3186 match forward_info {
3187 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3188 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3189 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3190 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3191 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3195 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3196 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3197 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3198 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3200 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3201 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3203 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3204 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3205 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3207 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3208 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3210 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3212 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3213 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3214 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3215 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3220 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3221 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3223 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3225 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3226 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3228 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3231 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3233 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3234 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3235 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3244 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3245 match forward_info {
3246 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3247 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3248 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3249 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3252 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3253 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3254 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3255 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3257 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3258 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3260 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3263 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3264 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3265 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3266 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3267 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3268 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3269 phantom_shared_secret,
3271 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3273 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3278 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3279 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3280 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3281 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3282 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3284 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3285 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3286 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3287 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3288 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3289 phantom_shared_secret,
3291 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3292 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3296 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3297 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3298 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3299 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3300 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3303 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3304 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3305 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3307 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3308 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3309 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3312 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3313 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3314 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3317 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3318 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3319 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3320 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3322 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3326 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3327 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3328 total_value += htlc.value;
3329 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3330 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3331 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3333 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3334 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3336 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3338 _ => unreachable!(),
3341 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3343 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3344 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3345 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3346 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3347 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3348 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3349 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3352 amount_msat: total_value,
3353 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3354 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3356 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3358 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3359 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3361 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3363 payment_claimable_generated
3367 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3368 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3369 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3370 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3371 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3372 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3373 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3374 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3376 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3377 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3378 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3379 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3380 Ok(result) => result,
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3383 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3387 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3388 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3389 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3391 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3392 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3396 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3398 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3399 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3400 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3404 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3406 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3407 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3408 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3409 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3410 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3412 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3414 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3415 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3418 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3420 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3427 if payment_data.is_none() {
3428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3429 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3432 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3433 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3434 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3435 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3436 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3438 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3439 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3441 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3442 if payment_claimable_generated {
3443 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3449 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3450 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3458 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3459 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3460 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3461 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3462 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3463 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3465 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3468 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3470 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3471 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3472 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3474 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3476 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3477 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3478 events.append(&mut new_events);
3481 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3483 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3484 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3486 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3487 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3488 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3489 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3490 if background_events.is_empty() {
3494 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3496 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3497 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3498 // monitor updating completing.
3499 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3506 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3507 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3508 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3509 self.process_background_events();
3512 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3513 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3514 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3515 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3516 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3517 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3518 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3520 if !chan.is_live() {
3521 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3522 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3523 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3526 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3528 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3529 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3533 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3534 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3535 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3536 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3537 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3538 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3539 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3541 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3544 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3545 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3546 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3547 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3548 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3549 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3557 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3559 /// This currently includes:
3560 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3561 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3562 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3564 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3565 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3566 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3568 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3569 /// estimate fetches.
3570 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3571 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3572 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3573 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3575 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3577 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3578 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3579 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3581 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3582 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3585 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3586 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3587 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3588 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3589 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3591 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3592 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3593 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3594 if needs_close { return false; }
3597 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3598 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3599 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3600 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3601 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3602 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3603 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3604 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3608 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3609 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3611 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3612 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3613 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3617 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3618 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3623 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3627 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3628 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3633 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3634 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3635 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3636 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3637 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3638 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3639 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3640 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3641 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3642 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3643 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3645 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3646 // have no channels to the peer.
3647 let remove_entry = {
3648 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3649 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3652 entry.remove_entry();
3655 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3660 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3661 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3662 // This should be unreachable
3663 debug_assert!(false);
3666 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3667 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3668 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3669 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3671 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3672 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3673 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3675 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3682 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3683 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3684 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3685 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3689 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3690 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3693 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3695 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3696 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3697 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3698 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3699 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3706 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3707 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3708 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3710 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3711 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3712 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3713 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3715 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3716 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3717 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3718 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3719 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3720 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, &FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3723 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3724 /// reason for the failure.
3726 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3727 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: &FailureCode) {
3728 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3730 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3731 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3732 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3733 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3734 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3735 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3741 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3742 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: &FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3743 match failure_code {
3744 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3745 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(*failure_code as u16),
3746 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3747 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3748 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3749 HTLCFailReason::reason(*failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3754 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3755 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3757 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3759 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3760 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3761 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3762 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3763 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3764 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3765 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3767 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3769 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3770 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3772 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3777 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3778 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3779 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3780 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3781 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3782 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3783 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3784 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3785 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3786 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3788 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3789 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3790 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3791 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3793 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3794 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3795 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3796 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3797 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3801 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3802 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3803 // be surfaced to the user.
3804 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3805 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3806 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3808 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3809 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3810 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3811 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3812 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3813 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3814 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3815 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3817 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3819 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3822 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3823 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3824 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3825 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3829 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3830 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3831 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3832 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3833 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3834 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3835 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3836 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3837 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3840 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3841 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3842 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3845 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3846 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3847 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3849 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3850 self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
3852 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3853 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3854 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3856 let mut forward_event = None;
3857 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3858 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3859 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3861 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3862 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3863 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3865 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3866 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3869 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3870 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3871 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3872 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3873 time_forwardable: time
3876 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3877 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3878 failed_next_destination: destination,
3884 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3885 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3887 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3888 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3889 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3891 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3892 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3893 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3894 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3896 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3897 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3898 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3899 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3900 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3901 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3902 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3904 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3907 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3908 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3909 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3910 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3911 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3912 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3913 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3914 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3919 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3920 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3921 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3923 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3924 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3925 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3926 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3931 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3933 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3934 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3935 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3936 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3937 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3939 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3940 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3942 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3943 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3944 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3945 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3946 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3948 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3949 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3950 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3951 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3952 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3953 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3954 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3955 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3962 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3963 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3971 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3976 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3977 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3978 debug_assert!(false);
3983 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3984 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3985 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3986 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3987 if sources.len() != 1 {
3988 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3989 debug_assert!(false);
3995 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3997 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3998 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3999 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4000 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4003 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4004 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4005 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4006 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4010 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4011 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4012 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4013 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4015 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4016 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4017 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4018 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4019 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4024 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4025 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4026 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4027 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4028 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4029 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4030 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4032 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4035 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4036 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4037 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4038 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4042 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4043 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4044 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4045 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4048 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4050 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4051 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4055 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4056 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4057 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4061 if let Some(hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan)) = peer_state_opt.as_mut().map(|peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id))
4063 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4064 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4065 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4066 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4067 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4068 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4070 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4071 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4072 payment_preimage, e);
4073 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
4074 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4075 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4076 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4077 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
4080 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4081 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4082 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4083 peer_state_opt.as_mut().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4084 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4085 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4086 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4087 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4088 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4089 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4095 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4096 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4097 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4103 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4104 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
4105 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4107 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4108 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4109 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same update and try
4110 // again on restart.
4111 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4112 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4113 payment_preimage, e);
4116 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4118 chan.remove_entry();
4120 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4121 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4122 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4123 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4127 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4128 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4129 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4133 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4134 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4135 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4136 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4137 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4138 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4139 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4140 // again on restart.
4141 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4142 payment_preimage, update_res);
4144 mem::drop(peer_state_opt);
4145 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4146 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4147 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4148 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4149 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4150 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4151 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4156 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4157 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4160 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4162 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4163 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4165 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4166 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4167 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4168 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4169 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4170 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4171 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4174 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4175 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4177 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4179 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4185 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4186 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4187 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4193 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4194 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4195 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4198 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4199 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4201 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4202 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4203 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4204 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4205 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4209 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4210 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4216 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4217 /// update completion.
4218 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4219 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4220 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4221 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4222 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4223 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4225 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4226 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4227 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4228 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4229 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4230 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4232 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4234 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4235 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4236 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4237 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4240 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4241 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4243 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4244 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4245 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4250 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4252 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4253 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4254 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4255 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4260 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4261 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4262 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4263 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4264 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4269 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4273 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4279 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4280 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4281 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4287 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4290 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4291 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4293 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4294 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4295 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4296 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4297 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4302 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4303 let mut peer_state_lock;
4304 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4305 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4306 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4307 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4309 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4310 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4314 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4315 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4316 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4319 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4322 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4324 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4325 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4328 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4329 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4330 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4332 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4333 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4334 /// used to accept such channels.
4336 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4337 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4338 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4339 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4342 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4343 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4345 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4346 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4347 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4349 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4350 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4352 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4353 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4355 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4356 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4358 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4359 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4360 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4361 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4364 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4368 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4369 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4371 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4372 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4373 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4374 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4375 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4378 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4379 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4380 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4381 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4382 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4383 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4386 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4387 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4388 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4391 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4392 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4393 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4397 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4403 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4404 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4405 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4408 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4412 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4413 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4414 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4416 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4418 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4420 debug_assert!(false);
4421 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4423 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4424 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4425 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4426 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4427 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4430 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4431 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4435 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4436 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4437 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4438 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4441 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4442 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4443 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4445 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4446 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4447 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4450 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4451 pending_events.push(
4452 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4453 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4454 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4455 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4456 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4457 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4462 entry.insert(channel);
4468 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4469 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4471 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4473 debug_assert!(false);
4474 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4476 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4477 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4478 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4479 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4480 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4481 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4483 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4486 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4487 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4488 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4489 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4490 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4492 user_channel_id: user_id,
4497 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4498 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4499 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4501 debug_assert!(false);
4502 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4504 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4505 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4508 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4509 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4510 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4512 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4515 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the peer_state
4516 // lock before watch_channel
4517 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4518 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4519 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4520 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4521 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4522 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4523 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4524 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4525 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4526 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4527 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4528 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4529 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4531 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4532 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4533 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4534 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4535 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4536 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4537 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4540 // It's safe to unwrap as we've held the `per_peer_state` read lock since checking that the
4541 // peer exists, despite the inner PeerState potentially having no channels after removing
4542 // the channel above.
4543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4545 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4547 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4550 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4551 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4552 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4553 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4554 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4555 funding_msg.channel_id))
4557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4558 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4561 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4562 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4565 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4566 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4574 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4576 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4577 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4578 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4580 debug_assert!(false);
4581 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4584 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4585 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4586 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4588 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
4589 Ok(update) => update,
4590 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4592 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4593 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4595 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4596 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4597 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4598 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4599 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4600 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4601 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4607 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4608 send_channel_ready!(self, peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4615 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4616 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4620 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4621 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4622 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4624 debug_assert!(false);
4625 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4627 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4628 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4629 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4630 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4631 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4632 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4633 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4634 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4635 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4636 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4637 msg: announcement_sigs,
4639 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4640 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4641 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4642 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4643 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4644 // announcement_signatures.
4645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4646 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4647 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4648 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4654 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4658 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4662 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4663 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4664 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4665 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4666 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4668 debug_assert!(false);
4669 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4673 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4676 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4677 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4678 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4679 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4682 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4683 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4685 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4686 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4687 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4688 let (result, is_permanent) =
4689 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4691 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4696 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4697 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4698 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4708 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4709 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4710 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4711 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4714 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4718 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4720 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4722 debug_assert!(false);
4723 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4725 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4728 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4729 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4730 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4731 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4732 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4733 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4738 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4739 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4740 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4741 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4742 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4743 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4744 } else { (tx, None) }
4746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4749 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4750 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4751 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4753 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4754 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4755 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4756 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4757 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4761 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4766 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4767 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4768 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4769 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4771 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4772 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4773 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4774 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4776 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4777 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4778 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4780 debug_assert!(false);
4781 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4783 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4784 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4785 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4788 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4789 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4790 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4791 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4792 match pending_forward_info {
4793 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4794 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4795 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4796 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4798 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4799 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4800 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4801 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4802 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4805 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4807 _ => pending_forward_info
4810 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4812 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4817 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4818 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4820 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4822 debug_assert!(false);
4823 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4829 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4834 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4838 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4839 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4840 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4842 debug_assert!(false);
4843 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4845 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4846 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4847 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4849 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4851 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4856 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4858 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4860 debug_assert!(false);
4861 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4865 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4867 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4868 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4869 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4871 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4878 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4880 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4882 debug_assert!(false);
4883 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4887 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4889 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4890 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4891 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4892 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4893 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4894 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &update);
4895 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
4900 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update);
4901 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
4905 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4906 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4907 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4909 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4910 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4911 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4912 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4913 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4914 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4915 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4916 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4918 commitment_signed: msg,
4924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4929 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4930 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4931 let mut forward_event = None;
4932 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4933 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4934 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4935 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4936 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4937 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4938 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4939 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4941 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4942 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4944 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4945 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4946 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4947 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4948 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4949 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4952 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4953 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4955 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4956 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4957 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4959 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4960 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4961 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4962 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4963 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4966 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4967 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4970 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4971 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4972 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4973 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4974 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4975 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4976 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4979 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4980 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4981 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4986 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4987 // payments are being processed.
4988 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4989 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4991 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4992 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4999 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5000 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5003 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5004 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5005 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5008 match forward_event {
5010 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5011 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5012 time_forwardable: time
5020 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5021 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5024 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5026 debug_assert!(false);
5027 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5029 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5031 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5033 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5034 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5035 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5036 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5037 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &raa_updates.monitor_update);
5038 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5039 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5040 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5041 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5042 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5043 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5044 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5046 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5047 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5048 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5049 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5050 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5051 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5053 } else { unreachable!(); }
5055 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5056 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5057 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5061 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5062 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5063 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5064 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5065 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5066 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5068 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5071 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5073 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5074 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5076 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5077 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5080 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5081 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5088 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5089 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5090 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5092 debug_assert!(false);
5093 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5095 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5096 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5097 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5099 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5101 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5106 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5107 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5108 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5110 debug_assert!(false);
5111 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5115 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5116 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5117 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5118 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5121 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5122 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5123 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5124 msg, &self.default_configuration
5126 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5127 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5128 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5131 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5136 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5137 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5138 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5139 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5141 // It's not a local channel
5142 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5145 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5146 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5147 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5148 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5150 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5151 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5152 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5154 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5155 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5156 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5157 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5158 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5159 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5161 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5163 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5164 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5165 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5166 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5168 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5169 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5174 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5177 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5179 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5180 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5182 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5184 debug_assert!(false);
5185 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5187 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5188 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5189 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5190 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5191 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5192 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5193 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5194 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5195 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5196 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5197 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5198 let mut channel_update = None;
5199 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5200 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5201 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5204 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5205 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5206 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5207 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5208 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5209 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5210 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5215 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5216 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5217 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5218 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5219 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5220 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5228 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5229 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5232 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5233 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5238 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5239 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5240 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5241 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5242 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5243 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5244 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5245 match monitor_event {
5246 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5247 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5249 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5252 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5253 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5254 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5257 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5258 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5259 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5260 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5262 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5263 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5264 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5265 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5268 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5270 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5273 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5274 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5275 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5276 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5277 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5278 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5282 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5283 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5285 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5287 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5288 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5289 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5290 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5291 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5298 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5299 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5305 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5306 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5309 has_pending_monitor_events
5312 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5313 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5314 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5316 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5317 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5320 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5321 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5322 /// update was applied.
5323 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5324 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5325 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5326 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5328 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5330 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5331 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5332 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5333 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5334 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5335 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5336 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5337 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5339 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5341 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5344 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5345 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), &monitor_update) {
5346 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5347 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5348 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5349 updates: commitment_update,
5353 has_monitor_update = true;
5354 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5355 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5356 if close_channel { return false; }
5363 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5364 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5365 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5373 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5374 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5375 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5378 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5379 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5385 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5386 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5387 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5388 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5389 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5390 let mut has_update = false;
5392 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5394 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5397 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5398 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5399 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5400 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5401 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5403 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5404 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5407 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5408 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5409 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5410 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5411 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5416 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5418 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5419 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5420 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5426 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5427 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5435 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5436 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5442 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5443 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5445 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5446 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5447 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5448 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5449 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5450 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5451 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5452 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5453 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5454 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5455 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5456 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5457 assert!(should_broadcast);
5458 } else { unreachable!(); }
5459 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5461 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5465 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5466 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5468 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5469 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5472 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5475 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5476 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5477 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5478 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5479 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5480 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5481 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5482 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5483 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5484 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5485 // never fail a payment too early.
5486 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5488 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5496 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5499 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5500 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5502 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5503 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5504 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5505 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5507 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5509 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5510 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5514 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5515 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5517 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5519 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5520 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5522 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5523 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5524 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5525 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5526 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5527 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5528 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5529 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5530 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5531 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5532 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5535 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5536 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5538 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5541 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5543 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5545 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5546 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5547 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5548 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5549 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5552 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5553 /// stored external to LDK.
5555 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5556 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5557 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5559 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5560 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5563 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5564 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5565 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5566 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5568 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5569 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5570 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5571 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5572 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5574 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5575 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5576 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5577 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5578 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5580 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5581 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5583 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5584 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5588 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5589 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5591 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5593 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5594 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5596 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5597 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5598 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5599 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5600 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5601 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5602 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5605 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5606 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5608 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5611 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5613 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5615 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5616 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5619 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5620 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5622 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5623 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5624 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5627 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5628 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5630 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5631 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5632 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5633 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5635 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5636 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5637 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5638 Some(_) => continue,
5639 None => return scid_candidate
5644 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5646 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5647 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5649 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5650 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5651 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5655 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5656 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5657 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5659 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5660 /// times to get a unique scid.
5661 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5663 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5665 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5666 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5667 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5668 return scid_candidate
5672 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5673 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5674 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5675 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5677 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5678 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5681 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5682 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5683 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5684 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5693 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5694 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5695 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5696 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5697 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5701 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5702 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5703 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5708 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5709 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5710 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5714 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5715 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5719 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5720 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5723 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5724 /// using the given event handler.
5726 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5727 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5730 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5731 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5732 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5734 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5736 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5737 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5738 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5739 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5742 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5743 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5744 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5747 for event in pending_events {
5748 handler(event).await;
5751 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5752 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5757 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5759 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5760 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5761 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5762 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5763 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5764 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5768 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5769 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5770 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5771 /// is always placed next to each other.
5773 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5774 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5775 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5776 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5778 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5779 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5780 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5781 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5782 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5783 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5784 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5786 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5787 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5788 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5789 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5792 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5793 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5795 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5796 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5799 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5800 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5801 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5802 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5803 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5804 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5805 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5809 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5810 events.replace(pending_events);
5819 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5821 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5823 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5824 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5825 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5826 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5830 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5832 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5833 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5834 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5835 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5836 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5838 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5839 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5840 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5841 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5844 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5845 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5846 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5849 for event in pending_events {
5850 handler.handle_event(event);
5858 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5860 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5861 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5862 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5863 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5864 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5865 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5869 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5871 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5872 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5873 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5874 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5875 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5878 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5879 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5882 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5884 let new_height = height - 1;
5886 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5887 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5888 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5889 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5890 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5891 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5894 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5898 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5900 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5901 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5902 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5903 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5904 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5905 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5909 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5910 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5911 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5912 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5914 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5915 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5918 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5919 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5921 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5922 if height < last_best_block_height {
5923 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5924 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5928 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5929 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5930 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5931 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5933 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5934 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5938 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5940 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5942 macro_rules! max_time {
5943 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5945 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5946 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5947 // having an explicit local time source.
5948 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5949 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5950 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5951 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5952 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5958 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5959 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5960 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5961 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5965 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5966 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5967 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5970 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5971 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5972 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5979 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5980 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5981 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5982 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5983 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5984 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5985 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5986 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5991 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5993 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5994 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5995 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5996 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5997 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5998 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6002 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6003 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6005 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6006 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6007 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6008 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6009 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6011 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6012 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6015 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6016 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6017 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6018 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6019 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6020 let res = f(channel);
6021 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6022 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6023 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6024 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6025 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6027 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6028 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6029 if channel.is_usable() {
6030 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6031 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6032 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6033 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6038 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6042 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6044 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6045 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6046 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6047 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6048 msg: announcement_sigs,
6050 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6051 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6052 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6054 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6055 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6056 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6061 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6062 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6063 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6064 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6065 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6066 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6067 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6068 // is always consistent.
6069 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6070 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6071 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6072 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6073 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6076 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6077 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6078 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6079 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6080 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6081 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6082 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6086 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6087 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6088 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6089 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6090 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6091 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6092 data: reason_message,
6102 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6103 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6104 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6105 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6106 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6107 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6108 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6109 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6110 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6111 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6113 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6114 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6115 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6119 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6122 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6123 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6124 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6125 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6126 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6127 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6128 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6129 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6130 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6133 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6134 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6135 _ => unreachable!(),
6137 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6138 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6139 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6146 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6148 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6149 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6153 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6154 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6155 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6156 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6158 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6160 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6161 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6162 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6163 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6164 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6165 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6168 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6169 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6170 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6172 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6173 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6174 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6175 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6178 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6179 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6180 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6181 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6182 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6185 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6186 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6187 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6190 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6191 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6192 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6193 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6196 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6197 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6198 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6199 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6202 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6203 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6205 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6206 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6207 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6208 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6209 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6212 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6213 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6214 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6215 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6218 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6219 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6220 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6221 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6224 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6225 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6226 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6227 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6231 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6232 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6234 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6235 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6236 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6237 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6238 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6239 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6243 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6245 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6248 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6249 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6250 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6253 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6254 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6255 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6258 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6259 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6260 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6263 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6265 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6268 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6270 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6273 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6275 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6278 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6279 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6280 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6283 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6284 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6285 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6288 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6290 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6293 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6295 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6298 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6299 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6300 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6303 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6304 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6305 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6308 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6309 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6310 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6313 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6314 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6315 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6318 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6319 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6320 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6323 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6328 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6329 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6330 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6333 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6334 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6335 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6336 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6338 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6339 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6340 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6341 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6342 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6343 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6344 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6345 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6346 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6347 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6348 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6353 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6360 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6361 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6367 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6368 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6369 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6370 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6371 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6372 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6373 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6374 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6375 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6378 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6379 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6380 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6384 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6386 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6388 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6389 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6393 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6394 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6395 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6399 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6401 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6404 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6405 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6406 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6407 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6408 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6409 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6410 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6411 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6416 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6417 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6418 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6419 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6424 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6426 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6427 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6428 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6429 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6430 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6431 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6432 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6433 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6434 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6435 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6439 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6440 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6441 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6446 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6447 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6448 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6449 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6450 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6459 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6463 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6464 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6466 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6467 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6470 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6471 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6472 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6473 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6475 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6476 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6477 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6481 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6483 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6484 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6485 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6486 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6487 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6488 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6489 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6490 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6498 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6499 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6503 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6504 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6507 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6508 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6512 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6513 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6514 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6515 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6518 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6519 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6521 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6522 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6523 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6524 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6525 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6528 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6529 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6530 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6531 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6534 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6535 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6536 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6537 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6540 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6541 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6542 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6543 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6544 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6545 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6546 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6547 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6548 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6549 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6550 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6551 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6552 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6553 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6554 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6555 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6556 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6557 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6559 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6560 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6561 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6567 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6568 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6570 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6571 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6572 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6573 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6576 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6577 (2, node_id, required),
6578 (4, features, required),
6579 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6580 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6581 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6582 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6585 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6586 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6587 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6588 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6589 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6590 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6591 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6592 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6593 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6594 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6595 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6596 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6597 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6598 (7, self.config, option),
6599 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6600 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6601 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6602 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6603 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6604 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6605 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6606 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6607 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6608 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6609 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6610 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6611 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6612 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6613 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6614 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6615 (32, self.is_public, required),
6616 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6617 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6618 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6624 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6625 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6626 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6627 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6628 (2, channel_id, required),
6629 (3, channel_type, option),
6630 (4, counterparty, required),
6631 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6632 (6, funding_txo, option),
6633 (7, config, option),
6634 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6635 (9, confirmations, option),
6636 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6637 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6638 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6639 (16, balance_msat, required),
6640 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6641 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6642 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6643 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6644 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6645 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6646 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6647 (26, is_outbound, required),
6648 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6649 (30, is_usable, required),
6650 (32, is_public, required),
6651 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6652 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6653 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6656 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6657 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6658 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6659 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6660 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6664 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6666 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6667 outbound_scid_alias,
6671 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6672 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6674 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6675 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6676 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6677 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6678 confirmations_required,
6680 force_close_spend_delay,
6681 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6682 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6683 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6684 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6685 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6686 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6691 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6692 (2, channels, vec_type),
6693 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6694 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6697 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6699 (0, onion_packet, required),
6700 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6703 (0, payment_data, required),
6704 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6705 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6707 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6708 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6709 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6713 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6714 (0, routing, required),
6715 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6716 (4, payment_hash, required),
6717 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6718 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6719 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6723 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6724 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6726 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6728 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6729 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6730 reason.write(writer)?;
6732 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6733 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6736 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6737 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6738 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6739 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6746 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6747 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6748 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6752 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6753 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6754 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6758 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6759 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6760 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6761 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6762 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6765 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6766 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6767 // messages contained in the variants.
6768 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6769 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6770 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6772 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6773 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6774 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6775 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6776 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6779 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6780 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6781 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6782 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6783 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6785 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6790 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6795 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6796 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6797 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6798 (2, outpoint, required),
6799 (4, htlc_id, required),
6800 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6803 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6804 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6805 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6806 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6807 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6809 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6810 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6811 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6812 (2, self.value, required),
6813 (4, payment_data, option),
6814 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6815 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6821 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6822 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6823 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6825 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6826 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6827 let mut total_msat = None;
6828 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6829 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6830 (0, prev_hop, required),
6831 (1, total_msat, option),
6832 (2, value, required),
6833 (4, payment_data, option),
6834 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6835 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6837 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6839 if payment_data.is_some() {
6840 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6842 if total_msat.is_none() {
6843 total_msat = Some(value);
6845 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6848 if total_msat.is_none() {
6849 if payment_data.is_none() {
6850 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6852 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6854 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6858 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6861 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6868 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6869 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6870 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6874 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6875 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6876 let mut payment_id = None;
6877 let mut payment_secret = None;
6878 let mut payment_params = None;
6879 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6880 (0, session_priv, required),
6881 (1, payment_id, option),
6882 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6883 (3, payment_secret, option),
6884 (4, path, vec_type),
6885 (5, payment_params, option),
6887 if payment_id.is_none() {
6888 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6890 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6892 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6893 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6894 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6895 path: path.unwrap(),
6896 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6901 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6902 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6907 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6908 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6910 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6912 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6913 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6914 (0, session_priv, required),
6915 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6916 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6917 (3, payment_secret, option),
6918 (4, *path, vec_type),
6919 (5, payment_params, option),
6922 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6924 field.write(writer)?;
6931 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6932 (0, forward_info, required),
6933 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6934 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6935 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6936 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6939 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6941 (0, htlc_id, required),
6942 (2, err_packet, required),
6947 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6948 (0, payment_secret, required),
6949 (2, expiry_time, required),
6950 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6951 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6952 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6955 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6957 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6958 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6959 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6960 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6961 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6962 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6966 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6967 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6969 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6971 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6973 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6974 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6975 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6978 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6980 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6981 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6982 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6983 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6986 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6987 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6989 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6990 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6991 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6992 unfunded_channels += 1;
6997 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6999 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7002 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7003 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7004 channel.write(writer)?;
7011 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7012 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7013 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7014 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7015 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7016 for forward in pending_forwards {
7017 forward.write(writer)?;
7022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7024 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7025 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7026 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7028 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7029 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7030 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7031 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7032 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7033 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7034 htlc.write(writer)?;
7036 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7039 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7040 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7041 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7042 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap());
7045 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7046 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7047 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7048 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7049 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7051 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7052 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7053 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7054 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7055 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7056 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7057 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7062 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7063 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7064 for event in events.iter() {
7065 event.write(writer)?;
7068 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7069 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7070 for event in background_events.iter() {
7072 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7074 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7075 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7080 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7081 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7082 // likely to be identical.
7083 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7084 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7086 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7087 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7088 hash.write(writer)?;
7089 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7092 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7093 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7094 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7095 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7096 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7099 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7100 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7102 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7103 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7104 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7105 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7108 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7109 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7113 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7114 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7115 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7117 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7118 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7119 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7125 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7126 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7127 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7128 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7131 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7132 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7133 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7134 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7135 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7137 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7140 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7141 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7142 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7143 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7144 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7145 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7146 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7147 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7148 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7149 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7156 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7158 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7160 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7161 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7162 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7163 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7164 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7165 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7166 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7167 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7168 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7169 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7170 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7171 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7172 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7174 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7175 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7177 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7178 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7180 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7181 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7182 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7183 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7184 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7185 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7187 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7188 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7190 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7191 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7192 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7193 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7194 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7199 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7200 pub entropy_source: ES,
7202 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7203 pub node_signer: NS,
7205 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7206 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7208 pub signer_provider: SP,
7210 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7212 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7213 pub fee_estimator: F,
7214 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7216 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7217 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7218 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7219 pub chain_monitor: M,
7221 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7222 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7223 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7224 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7225 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7226 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7228 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7230 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7231 /// deserialization.
7233 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7234 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7235 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7237 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7238 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7240 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7241 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7242 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7243 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7245 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7248 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7249 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7252 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7253 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7255 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7256 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7257 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7258 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7259 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7260 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7264 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7265 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7266 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7267 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7268 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7270 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7271 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7276 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7277 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7278 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7279 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7281 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7282 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7283 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7284 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7285 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7286 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7290 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7291 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7292 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7296 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7297 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7299 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7300 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7301 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7302 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7303 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7304 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7308 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7309 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7311 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7312 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7317 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7318 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7319 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7320 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7321 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7322 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7323 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7324 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7325 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7327 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7328 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7329 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7330 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7331 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7332 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7333 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7334 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7335 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7336 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7337 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7338 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7339 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7340 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7341 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7343 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7344 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7345 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7346 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7347 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7348 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7349 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7350 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7351 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7352 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7353 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7354 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7355 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7356 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7357 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7358 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7360 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7361 let mut found_htlc = false;
7362 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7363 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7366 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7367 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7368 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7369 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7370 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7371 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7372 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7373 log_info!(args.logger,
7374 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7375 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7376 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7380 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7381 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7382 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7384 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7385 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7387 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7388 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7389 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7390 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7392 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7393 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7394 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7395 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7399 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7400 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7401 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7402 // safely discard the channel.
7403 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7404 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7405 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7406 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7407 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7410 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7411 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7412 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7413 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7414 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7415 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7419 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7420 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7421 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7422 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7426 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7427 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7429 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7430 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7432 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7433 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7434 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7436 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7439 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7441 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7442 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7444 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7445 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7446 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7448 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7451 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7453 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7454 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let peer_state = PeerState {
7456 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7457 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7458 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7459 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7460 is_connected: false,
7462 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7465 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7467 for _ in 0..event_count {
7468 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7469 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7474 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7476 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7477 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7478 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7479 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7483 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7484 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7488 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7489 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7490 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7494 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7496 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7497 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7498 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7499 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7500 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7502 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7503 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7507 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7508 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7509 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7510 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7511 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7512 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7513 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7514 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7515 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7516 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7517 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7518 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7519 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7520 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7521 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7522 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7523 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7524 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7525 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7526 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7528 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7529 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7532 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7533 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7536 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7537 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7538 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7539 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7540 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7541 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7543 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7545 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7546 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7547 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7548 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7549 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7550 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7551 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7553 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7554 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7555 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7556 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7557 if path.is_empty() {
7558 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7559 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7561 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7562 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7563 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7564 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7566 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7567 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7568 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7571 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7572 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7573 retry_strategy: None,
7574 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7575 payment_params: None,
7576 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7577 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7579 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7580 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7581 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7582 total_msat: path_amt,
7583 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7585 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7586 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7591 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7592 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7593 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7594 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7595 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7597 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7598 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7599 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7600 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7601 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7602 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7603 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7604 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7605 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7606 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7607 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7612 !forwards.is_empty()
7614 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7615 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7616 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7617 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7618 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7619 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7620 intercepted_id != ev_id
7632 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7633 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7634 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7635 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7636 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7637 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7638 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7639 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7643 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7644 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7646 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7647 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7648 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7649 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7651 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7652 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7655 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7656 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7657 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7658 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7659 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7661 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7662 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7663 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7664 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7665 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7666 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7667 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7668 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7670 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7671 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7675 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7677 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7679 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7680 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7682 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7686 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7687 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7689 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7690 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7693 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7695 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7697 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7698 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7699 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7700 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7704 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7705 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7708 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7709 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7710 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7712 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7713 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7714 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7716 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7717 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7718 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7719 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7720 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7721 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7723 if chan.is_usable() {
7724 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7725 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7726 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7727 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7734 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7736 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7737 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7738 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7739 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7740 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7741 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7742 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7743 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7744 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7745 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7746 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7748 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7749 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7751 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7752 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7753 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7754 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7756 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7757 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7758 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7759 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7761 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7762 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7763 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7764 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7766 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7767 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7771 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7772 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7775 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7776 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7779 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7782 purpose: payment_purpose,
7783 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7789 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7790 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7791 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7793 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7794 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7798 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7800 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7801 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7802 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7803 router: args.router,
7805 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7807 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7808 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7809 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments { pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()), retry_lock: Mutex::new(()), },
7810 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7812 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7813 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7814 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7815 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7816 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7817 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7819 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7824 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7826 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7828 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7829 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7830 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7831 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7833 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7834 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7835 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7837 logger: args.logger,
7838 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7841 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7842 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7843 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7844 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7845 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7848 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7849 //connection or two.
7851 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7857 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7858 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7859 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7860 use core::time::Duration;
7861 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7862 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7863 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7864 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7865 use crate::ln::msgs;
7866 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7867 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7868 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7869 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7870 use crate::util::test_utils;
7871 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7872 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7875 fn test_notify_limits() {
7876 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7877 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7878 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7879 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7880 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7881 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7883 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7884 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7885 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7886 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7887 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7889 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7891 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7892 // to connect messages with new values
7893 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7894 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7895 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7896 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7898 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7899 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7900 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7901 // ... but the last node should not.
7902 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7903 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7904 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7905 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7907 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7908 // about the channel.
7909 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7910 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7911 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7913 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7915 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7916 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7917 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7918 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7919 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7920 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7922 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7923 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7924 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7926 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7927 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7928 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7929 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7930 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7931 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7933 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7934 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7935 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7936 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7937 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7938 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7939 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7940 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7942 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7943 // the channel info has updated.
7944 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7945 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7946 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7947 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7948 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7949 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7953 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7954 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7956 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7957 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7958 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7959 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7960 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7962 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7963 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7964 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7965 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7967 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7968 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7969 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7970 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7971 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7972 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7974 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7976 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7978 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7979 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7981 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7982 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7983 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7984 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7985 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7987 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7991 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7992 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7993 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7994 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7995 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7996 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7997 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7999 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8001 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8002 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8004 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8005 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8006 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8008 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8009 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8010 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8011 // lightning messages manually.
8012 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8013 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8016 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8017 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8018 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8020 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8021 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8023 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8024 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8026 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8027 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8028 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8030 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8031 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8032 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8034 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8036 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8038 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8039 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8042 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8043 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8044 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8047 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8048 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8049 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8050 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8055 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8056 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8057 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8058 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8063 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8064 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8065 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8066 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8073 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8074 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8075 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8076 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8077 // fails as expected.
8078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8081 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8082 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8083 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8084 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8086 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8087 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8088 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8090 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8091 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8092 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8093 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8094 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8096 let route = find_route(
8097 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8098 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8100 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8102 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8104 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8105 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8106 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8108 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8109 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8110 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8114 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8115 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8116 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8117 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8118 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8119 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8120 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8122 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8124 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8125 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8127 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8128 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8129 let route = find_route(
8130 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8131 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8133 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8135 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8136 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8137 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8138 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8139 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8141 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8142 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8143 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8145 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8146 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8147 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8148 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8149 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8151 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8153 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8155 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8156 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8157 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8158 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8159 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8160 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8161 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8163 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8165 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8166 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8170 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8171 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8172 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8176 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8178 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8179 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8181 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8182 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8183 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8184 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8185 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8187 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8188 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8189 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8190 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8191 let route = find_route(
8192 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8193 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8196 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8197 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8198 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8199 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8202 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8203 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8204 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8205 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8206 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8207 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8208 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8210 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8214 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8215 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8216 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8217 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8218 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8219 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8221 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8222 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8224 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8225 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8226 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8227 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8228 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8230 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8231 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8232 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8233 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8234 let route = find_route(
8235 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8236 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8239 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8240 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8241 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8242 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8243 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8246 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8247 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8248 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8249 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8250 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8251 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8254 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8258 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8262 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8264 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8265 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8266 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8267 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8269 // Marshall an MPP route.
8270 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8271 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8272 route.paths.push(path);
8273 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8274 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8275 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8276 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8277 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8278 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8280 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8281 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8282 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8283 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8288 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8292 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8294 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8296 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8297 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8299 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8300 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8302 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8305 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8306 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8307 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8308 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8309 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8310 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8313 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8316 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8317 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8322 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8323 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8327 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8329 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8330 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8332 total_msat: 100_000,
8335 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8336 // payment verification fails as expected.
8337 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8338 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8339 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8340 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8342 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8346 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8347 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8351 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8352 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8353 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8354 // the channel is successfully closed.
8355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8360 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8361 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8362 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8363 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8364 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8366 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8367 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8369 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8370 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8371 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8372 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8375 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8377 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8378 // as it has the funding transaction.
8379 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8380 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8381 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8383 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8386 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8388 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8390 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8391 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8392 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8394 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8395 // as it has the funding transaction.
8396 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8397 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8398 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8401 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8402 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8404 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8405 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8406 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8408 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8409 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8410 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8411 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8413 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8414 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8416 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8417 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8418 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8419 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8420 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8421 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8422 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8424 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8425 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8426 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8427 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8428 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8429 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8430 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8433 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8435 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8436 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8437 // closing transaction).
8438 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8439 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8440 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8442 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8443 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8444 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8445 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8446 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8449 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8451 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8453 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8454 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8455 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8457 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8459 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8460 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8463 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8464 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8465 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8468 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8469 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8470 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8473 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8475 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8476 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8478 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8479 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8481 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8482 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8487 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8488 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8489 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8490 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8491 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8492 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8493 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8494 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8497 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8498 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8499 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8501 // Test the API functions.
8502 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8504 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8506 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8508 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8510 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8512 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8514 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8519 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8520 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8521 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8522 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8525 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8526 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8527 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8529 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8531 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8532 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8533 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8535 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8536 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8538 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8539 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8541 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8544 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8545 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8547 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8548 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8550 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8554 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8556 use crate::chain::Listen;
8557 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8558 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8559 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8560 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8561 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8562 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8563 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8564 use crate::util::test_utils;
8565 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8566 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8568 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8569 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8570 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8572 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8576 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8577 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8578 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8579 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8580 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8581 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8582 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8583 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8588 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8589 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8592 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8593 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8594 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8596 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8597 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8599 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8600 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8601 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8602 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8603 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8605 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8606 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8608 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8609 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8610 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8611 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8613 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8615 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8617 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8618 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8619 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8620 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8621 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8623 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8625 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8627 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8628 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8629 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8630 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8631 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8634 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8635 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8636 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8638 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8639 } else { panic!(); }
8641 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8642 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8644 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8647 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8650 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8651 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8653 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8654 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8655 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8656 match msg_events[0] {
8657 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8658 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8659 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8663 match msg_events[1] {
8664 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8668 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8669 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8671 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8672 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8677 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8678 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8680 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8681 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8686 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8688 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8689 macro_rules! send_payment {
8690 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8691 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8692 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8693 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8694 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8695 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8696 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8697 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8698 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8699 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8701 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8702 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8704 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8705 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8707 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8708 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8709 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8710 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8711 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8712 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8713 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8714 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8716 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8717 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8718 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8719 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8721 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8722 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8723 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8724 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8725 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8727 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8730 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8731 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8732 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8733 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8735 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8740 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8741 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);